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Fake News in Times of Pandemic and Beyond: Enquiry into the Rationales for Regulating Information Platforms

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Law and Economics of the Coronavirus Crisis

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 13))

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic threw our societies in dire times with deep effects on all societal sectors and on our lives. The pandemic was accompanied by another phenomenon also associated with grave consequences—that of the “infodemic”. Fake news about the cause, prevention, impact and potential cures for the coronavirus spread on social platforms and other media outlets, and continue to do so. The chapter takes this infodemic as a starting point to exploring the broader phenomenon of online misinformation. The legal analysis in this context focuses on the rationales for regulating Internet platforms as critical information intermediaries in a global networked media space. As Internet platforms do not fall under the category of media companies, they are currently not regulated in most countries. Yet, the pressure to regulate them, also in light of other negative phenomena, such as hate speech proliferation, political disinformation and targeting, has grown in recent years. The regulatory approaches differ, however, across jurisdictions and encompass measures that range from mere self-regulatory codes to more binding interventions. Starting with some insights into the existing technological means for mediating speech online, the power of platforms, and more specifically their influence on the conditions of freedom of expression, the chapter discusses in particular the regulatory initiatives with regard to information platforms in the United States and in the European Union, as embedded in different traditions of free speech protection. The chapter offers an appraisal of the divergent US and EU approaches and contemplates the adequate design of regulatory intervention in the area of online speech in times of infodemic and beyond it.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the origins and the reason for distribution of conspiracy theories, see e.g. Sunstein and Vermeule (2009).

  2. 2.

    For an overview of the different misinformation threats, see e.g. European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2020); See also Brennen et al. (2020); Baines and Elliott (2020); Enders (2020).

  3. 3.

    See European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2020).

  4. 4.

    WHO stated that “infodemics are an excessive amount of information about a problem, which makes it difficult to identify a solution. They can spread misinformation, disinformation and rumours during a health emergency. Infodemics can hamper an effective public health response and create confusion and distrust among people.” See WHO (2020); see also WHO et al. (2020).

  5. 5.

    See e.g. Knuutila et al. (2020); Brennen et al. (2020); Center for Countering Digital Hate (2020); Nielsen et al. (2020).

  6. 6.

    Posetti and Matthews (2020), at 1; for understanding the different types of fake news, making a difference between disinformation, misinformation and malinformation, see Wardle (2019); For a slightly different classification, see Tandoc et al. (2018).

  7. 7.

    See e.g. Ireton and Posetti (2018) and the next section.

  8. 8.

    See e.g. Posetti and Matthews (2020); Soll (2016); Wendling (2018); Merriam-Webster (2021); Poole (2019).

  9. 9.

    Center for Information Technology and Society (2019).

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Ibid.; see also Chesney and Citron (2019).

  12. 12.

    Center for Information Technology and Society (2019).

  13. 13.

    For updated information on the initiatives around the world, see e.g. https://infogram.com/covid-19-fake-news-regulation-passed-during-covid-19-1h8n6md5q9kj6xo (last access 23 February 2022)

  14. 14.

    See e.g. Benkler (2006); Whitt (2013).

  15. 15.

    See e.g. Benkler (2006); Lessig (2009).

  16. 16.

    For a clarification of the term, see below.

  17. 17.

    See e.g. Balkin (2012); Cohen (2018); Lobel (2016).

  18. 18.

    See e.g. European Commission (2016); UK House of Commons (2019).

  19. 19.

    The focus here is placed not upon the physical intermediaries, such as network operators or Internet service suppliers (although these matter too: see e.g. Benkler (2006); DeNardis (2009); Frishmann (2012) but upon those gatekeepers existing at the applications and the content levels—the so-called “choice intermediaries” or “new editors”. See Helberger (2011); Miel and Farris (2008).

  20. 20.

    Sunstein (2007).

  21. 21.

    Napoli (2012, 2015).

  22. 22.

    See e.g. Sag (2018); Spindler (2020); Frosio (2020); Burri and Zihlmann (2021).

  23. 23.

    See e.g. Ezrachi and Stucke (2016); for a brief overview of the issues, see Burri (2019a).

  24. 24.

    See e.g. Burri (2015).

  25. 25.

    Balkin (2012); also Balkin (2018).

  26. 26.

    Balkin (2012).

  27. 27.

    Balkin (2012, 2018); Klonick (2018).

  28. 28.

    See Helberger (2011); Miel and Farris (2008).

  29. 29.

    For a taxonomy of the different algorithmic filters, see Bozdag (2013).

  30. 30.

    Napoli (2014), pp. 33–38; Also Saurwein et al. (2015); Helberger et al. (2015); Burri (2019b).

  31. 31.

    Klonick (2018).

  32. 32.

    See e.g. Bamberger and Lobel (2018); Burri (2019a).

  33. 33.

    Burri (2019a); European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) (2014); Pollicino (2021).

  34. 34.

    Cohen (2018); Kreiss and Mcgregor (2017); Benkler et al. (2018).

  35. 35.

    Latzer et al. (2014), at pp. 29–30.

  36. 36.

    Hoffman et al. (2015), at p. 1365.

  37. 37.

    Hoffman et al. (2015); Sunstein (2007).

  38. 38.

    Hoffman et al. (2015), at p. 1365.

  39. 39.

    Dahlgren (2005).

  40. 40.

    Pariser (2011).

  41. 41.

    Sunstein (2001, 2007, 2009).

  42. 42.

    Filter bubbles, together with “information cascades” and the human attraction to negative and novel information have been said to fuel the distribution and virality of fake news. For a careful analysis of these phenomena of online communication, see Chesney and Citron (2019), in particular pp. 1765–1768.

  43. 43.

    Goodman Ellen (2004); Helberger (2012); Napoli (2012); Napoli et al. (2018).

  44. 44.

    Napoli et al. (2018); Burri (2019b); McKelvey and Hunt (2019).

  45. 45.

    Balkin (2012); Klonick (2018).

  46. 46.

    Cohen (2018).

  47. 47.

    Balkin (2018); see also Kaye (2019).

  48. 48.

    See e.g. De Schutter (2014).

  49. 49.

    See e.g. Farber (2019); Feldman and Sullivan (2019); Keller (2011); Oster (2017); Pollicino (2021).

  50. 50.

    The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda, FOM.GAL/3/17, 3 March 2017, at 1. General Principles, para. (a).

  51. 51.

    Ibid., at 2. Standards on Disinformation and Propaganda, para. (a).

  52. 52.

    See e.g. Eichensehr (2015); Daskal (2016); Eichensehr (2017).

  53. 53.

    See e.g. the Yahoo! case as one of the first on free speech violation and online jurisdiction. There the US court when faced with the recognition and implementation of the French court order under the “comity of nations” doctrine stated that: “Absent a body of law that establishes international standards with respect to speech on the Internet and an appropriate treaty or legislation addressing enforcement of such standards to speech originating within the United States, the principle of comity is outweighed by the Court’s obligation to uphold the First Amendment.” (see Yahoo! II, 169 F. Supp. 2d, at 1193). For more on the case, see Goldsmith and Wu (2001), at pp. 49–64; Greenberg (2003).

  54. 54.

    See Klonick (2018); see also Chander (2014).

  55. 55.

    See Bontcheva and Posetti (2020), in particular pp. 36–40.

  56. 56.

    Boncheva and Posetti (2020), ibid., at p. 108; see also Bayer et al. (2019); Roudik et al. (2019).

  57. 57.

    See e.g. Nunziato (2019); Klonick (2020).

  58. 58.

    See e.g. Haupt (2005) (also providing an overview of the comparative literature); Tourkochoriti (2016).

  59. 59.

    Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (dissenting opinion Holmes).

  60. 60.

    521 U.S. 844 (1996).

  61. 61.

    Ibid., at para. 885. In the more recent case of Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), the Supreme Court compared social media platforms to a town square and recognized their function as a forum to exchange ideas and viewpoints.

  62. 62.

    Tompros et al. (2020), at pp. 88–89.

  63. 63.

    Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).

  64. 64.

    United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990).

  65. 65.

    Tompros et al. (2020), at p. 90, referring to Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992).

  66. 66.

    See e.g. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012). A regulation of unprotected speech may still violate the First Amendment with regard to content discrimination if it includes distinctions among subcategories of speech that cannot be justified. See e.g. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).

  67. 67.

    United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 322 (dissenting opinion Souter).

  68. 68.

    New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), at 279–280. The decision in Gertz extended the NY Times standard of “reckless disregard” from public officials to public figures and defined these as the persons who, due to their notoriety, achievements, or the rigour of their success, seek the attention of the public. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).

  69. 69.

    567 U.S. 709 (2012). For a fully analysis of the case, see Tompros et al. (2020), at pp. 93–97.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., at 718.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., at 710, 726.

  72. 72.

    N.Y. Penal Law §240.50 reads: “A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the third degree when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, he or she […] [i]nitiates or circulates a false report or warning of an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a crime, catastrophe or emergency under circumstances in which it is not unlikely that public alarm or inconvenience will result.” Falsely reporting an incident in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and punishable by up to 1 year’s imprisonment and a fine of USD 1’000. The statute permits in addition entities providing emergency services to seek restitution for “the amount of funds reasonably expended for the purpose of responding” to false reports.

  73. 73.

    For a fully-fledged analysis of the law, as well as its possible unconstitutionality post-Alvarez, see Tompros et al. (2020).

  74. 74.

    See e.g. Tourkochoriti (2016); Burri (2021).

  75. 75.

    Securing the Protection off Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act), 124 Stat. 2380 (2010). See Goldman (2020).

  76. 76.

    Communications Decency Act of 1996, (CDA), Pub. L. No. 104-104 (Tit. V), 110 Stat. 133 (8 February1996), codified at 47 U.S.C. §§223, 230. For a detailed analysis, see Brannon and Holmes (2021).

  77. 77.

    Goldman (2020); see also Goldman (2019); Bone (2021).

  78. 78.

    Kloseff (2019).

  79. 79.

    Klonick (2018).

  80. 80.

    47 U.S.C. §230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

  81. 81.

    Goldman (2020).

  82. 82.

    See e.g. Burri (2022).

  83. 83.

    See e.g. Goldman (2019); On the constitutionality of possible Section 230 amendments, see e.g. Brannon and Holmes (2021); see also Citron and Wittes (2017) (arguing that platforms should enjoy immunity from liability if they could show that their response to unlawful uses of their services was reasonable).

  84. 84.

    Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, H.R.1865 (115th Cong. 2017–18).

  85. 85.

    Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019).

  86. 86.

    Biased Algorithm Deterrence Act of 2019, H.R. 492, 116th Cong. (2019).

  87. 87.

    Algorithmic Accountability Act, S. 1108, 116th Cong. (2019).

  88. 88.

    For details on and analysis of the legislative proposals, see Bone (2021).

  89. 89.

    The IF model maintains that platforms should be required to abide by fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and confidentiality with regard to their end users. For a discussion, see Balkin (2016, 2018); Balkin and Zittrain (2016); Khan and Pozen (2019); Whitt (2019); Haupt (2020).

  90. 90.

    See e.g. De Gregorio (2020); Bloch-Wehba (2019).

  91. 91.

    Dink v Turkey [2010] ECtHR 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 and 7124/09.

  92. 92.

    Informationsverein Lentia and Others v Austria [1993] ECtHR 13914/88; 15041/89; 15717/89; 15779/89; 17207/90.

  93. 93.

    European Convention on Human Rights, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; see also Article 11 (Freedom of Expression and Information) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), OJ C [2012] 326/393, 26 October 2012.

  94. 94.

    See e.g. Autronic AG v Switzerland [1990] ECtHR 12726/87; Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft SRG v Switzerland [2012] ECtHR 34124/06.

  95. 95.

    Handyside v. United Kingdom [1976] ECtHR 5493/72, at para. 49.

  96. 96.

    For details, see Oster (2017), at Chapter 3; Pollicino (2021).

  97. 97.

    See e.g. Perinçek v. Switzerland [2015] ECtHR 27510/08.

  98. 98.

    See e.g. Lehideux and Isorni v. France [1998] ECtHR 55/1997/839/1045; Garaudy v. France [2003] ECtHR 65831/01; Witzsch v. Germany [2005] ECtHR 7485/03.

  99. 99.

    See e.g. Pavel Ivanov v. Russia [2004] ECtHR 35222/04; Aksu v. Turkey [2012] ECtHR 4149/04 and 41029/04.

  100. 100.

    See e.g. Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013); van der Sloot et al. (2016); Burri (2021).

  101. 101.

    Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 May 2014, ECR [2014] 317 [hereinafter Google Spain].

  102. 102.

    See e.g. Wechsler (2015); Hoffman et al. (2016).

  103. 103.

    Google Spain, at para. 74, referring to Joined Cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF) and Federación de Comercio Electrónico y Marketing Directo (FECEMD) v. Administración del Estado, Judgment of 24 November 2011, ECR I-12181, at paras 38, 40.

  104. 104.

    Directive 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 27, 2016, on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L [2016] 119/89. [hereinafter GDPR].

  105. 105.

    Google Spain, at para. 88. There is a qualification in para. 99: “As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general public on account of its inclusion in such a list of results, those rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general public in having access to that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name. However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.”

  106. 106.

    Oster (2017), at p. 18 and Chapter 3.

  107. 107.

    Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v Norway [1999] ECtHR 21980/93, at para. 65.

  108. 108.

    Stoll v Switzerland [2007] ECtHR 69698/01.

  109. 109.

    Ahmet Yildirim v Turkey [2012] ECtHR 3111/10, at para. 54.

  110. 110.

    See Helberger et al. (2020).

  111. 111.

    See ibid.

  112. 112.

    Delfi v Estonia [2015] ECtHR 64569/09.

  113. 113.

    MTE v Hungary [2016] ECtHR 22947/13, at para. 82.

  114. 114.

    C-507/17, Google v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), Judgment of 24 September 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:772. For a great summary of the case and references to the primary sources, see Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/google-llc-v-national-commission-on-informatics-and-liberty-cnil/ (last access 23 February 2022).

  115. 115.

    Ibid., at para. 74: “… the operator is not required to carry out that de-referencing on all versions of its search engine, but on the versions of that search engine corresponding to all the Member States, using, where necessary, measures which, while meeting the legal requirements, effectively prevent or, at the very least, seriously discourage an internet user conducting a search from one of the Member States on the basis of a data subject’s name from gaining access via the list of results displayed following that search, to the links which are the subject of that request.”

  116. 116.

    See ibid., at para. 27; see also Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar delivered on 10 January 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:15.

  117. 117.

    Goldman (2019), referring to Search King, Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc., 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. 2003); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007); Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Google, Inc. v. Hood, 96 F. Supp. 3d 584 (S.D. Miss. 2015); e-ventures Worldwide v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2210029 (M.D. Fla. 2017); Martin v. Hearst Corporation, 777 F.3d 546 (2d Cir. 2015).

  118. 118.

    Goldman (2019), referring to Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc., 143 Cal. App. 4th 1242 (Cal. App. Ct. 2006); Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Shah v. MyLife.Com, Inc., 2012 WL 4863696 (D. Or. 2012); Merritt v. Lexis Nexis, 2012 WL 6725882 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Nieman v. Versuslaw, Inc., 2012 WL 3201931 (C.D. Ill. 2012); Getachew v. Google, Inc., 491 Fed. Appx. 923 (10th Cir. 2012); Mmubango v. Google, Inc., 2013 WL 664231 (E.D. Pa. 2013); O’Kroley v. Fastcase Inc., 831 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2016); Fakhrian v. Google Inc., 2016 WL 1650705 (Cal. App. Ct. 2016); Despot v. Baltimore Life Insurance Co., 2016 WL 4148085 (W.D. Pa. 2016); Manchanda v. Google, Inc., 2016 WL 6806250 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).

  119. 119.

    Case C-18/18 Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited, Judgment of 3 October 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821. For a great summary of the case and references to the primary sources, see Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/glawischnig-piesczek-v-facebook-ireland-limited/; For a critique of the case, see Keller (2019).

  120. 120.

    Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), OJ L [2000] 178/1.

  121. 121.

    See in particular Article 14 E-Commerce Directive.

  122. 122.

    Austrian Supreme Court, ORF/Facebook, Judgment 4Ob36/20b of 30 March 2020.

  123. 123.

    There was not such a request involved in the case at issue.

  124. 124.

    Articles 12–14 E-Commerce Directive.

  125. 125.

    Article 15 E-Commerce Directive. In Scarlet v SABAM (Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), ECLI:EU:C:2011:771), the Belgian collecting society SABAM applied for a permanent order requiring a network access provider to monitor and block peer-to-peer transmission of music files from SABAM’s catalogue. The CJEU decided that a broad order of the type requested would go both against the prohibition of general monitoring obligations of the E-Commerce Directive and the fundamental rights of Internet users to the protection of their personal data and freedom of expression guaranteed under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. See also Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85. Specific monitoring obligations have been however found not in violation of Article 15 E-Commerce Directive (see De Streel et al. (2021)).

  126. 126.

    Article 16 E-Commerce Directive.

  127. 127.

    Article 15(2) E-Commerce Directive.

  128. 128.

    European Commission (2018); see also European Commission (2017).

  129. 129.

    European Commission (2018), ibid., at points 5–17.

  130. 130.

    European Commission (2018), ibid., at points 16–21.

  131. 131.

    European Commission (2018), at points 22–28. For an evaluation of the rules, see de Streel et al. (2021), at pp. 22–23.

  132. 132.

    Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, OJ L [1989] 298/23.

  133. 133.

    Directive 2010/13 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audio-visual media services (Audio-Visual Media Services Directive), OJ L [2010] 95/1, as amended by Directive 2018/1808, OJ L [2018] 303/69 [hereinafter AVMSD].

  134. 134.

    Article 1(1aa) AVMSD defines the “video-sharing platform service” as “a service as defined by Articles 56 and 57 TFEU, where the principal purpose of the service or of a dissociable section thereof or an essential functionality of the service is devoted to providing programmes, user-generated videos, or both, to the general public, for which the video-sharing platform provider does not have editorial responsibility, in order to inform, entertain or educate, by means of electronic communications networks [...] and the organisation of which is determined by the video-sharing platform provider, including by automatic means or algorithms in particular by displaying, tagging and sequencing.”; see also European Commission (2020).

  135. 135.

    Article 28b (1b) and (1c) AVMSD.

  136. 136.

    Article 28b (1a) AVMSD.

  137. 137.

    Article 28b (3) AVMSD. The AVMSD lists certain appropriate measures, such as transparent and user-friendly mechanisms to report and flag the content and easy- to-use and effective procedures for the handling and resolution of users’ complaints.

  138. 138.

    Directive 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, OJ L [2017] 88/6.

  139. 139.

    Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, OJ L [2011] 335/1. For an analysis of both documents, see e.g. de Streel et al. (2021), at pp. 25–29.

  140. 140.

    The Code was signed in 2016 by Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube. Google+, Instagram, Dailymotion and Snapchat and Jeuxvideo.com joined subsequently. The Code’s text is available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en (last access 23 February 2022)

  141. 141.

    The Code was signed by Facebook, Google and Twitter, Mozilla, as well as by advertisers and parts of the advertising industry in October 2018; Microsoft joined in May 2019, while TikTok became a signatory in June 2020. Code’s text is available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation (last access 23 February 2022)

  142. 142.

    The Code includes also an annex identifying best practices that signatories will apply to implement the Codeʼs commitments. For all documents, see https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation (last access 23 February 2022)

  143. 143.

    European Commission (2021).

  144. 144.

    The Commission’s Assessment of the Code of Practice in 2020 revealed in particular include inconsistent and incomplete application of the Code across platforms and Member States, limitations intrinsic to the self- regulatory nature of the Code, as well as gaps in the coverage of the Code’s commitments. The assessment also highlighted the lack of an appropriate monitoring mechanism, including key performance indicators, lack of commitments on access to platforms’ data for research on disinformation and limited participation from stakeholders, in particular from the advertising sector. See European Commission (2020a, 2021).

  145. 145.

    European Commission (2020b).

  146. 146.

    European Commission (2020c).

  147. 147.

    The DSA defines very large platforms in Article 25 as online platforms which provide their services to a number of average monthly active recipients of the service in the EU corresponding to 10% of the EU’s population.

  148. 148.

    For an overview of the new obligations depending on the type of platform, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act-ensuring-safe-and-accountable-online-environment_en (last access 23 February 2022)

  149. 149.

    For an overview of the different initiatives, see e.g. de Streel et al. (2021); Roudik et al. (2019).

  150. 150.

    See e.g. Kaye (2017); Haupt (2021); see also Zurth (2021); Tworek and Leerssen (2019); Citron (2018).

  151. 151.

    Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], 01 September 2017 [BGBL I] at 3352. The law entered into force on 1 January 2018.

  152. 152.

    § 1(3) NetzDG, referring to §§ 86, 86a, 89a, 91, 100a, 111, 126, 129 bis 129b, 130, 131, 140, 166, 184b, 185 bis 187, 201a, 241 and 269 of the German Criminal Code.

  153. 153.

    § 1(1) NetzDG. Platforms that post original journalistic content, email or messaging services are not covered.

  154. 154.

    The deadline may be extended if additional facts are necessary to determine the truthfulness of the information or if the social network hires an outside agency to perform the vetting process.

  155. 155.

    § 3 paras 1 and 2 NetzDG.

  156. 156.

    § 2 paras 1 and 2 NetzDG. The report has to be published in German in the Federal Gazette and on the website of the social media network one month after the end of each half-year period. The report must be easily identifiable, immediately accessible, and permanently available. It must include information on the general efforts to prevent illegal actions on the platform, a description of the complaint procedure, the number of complaints received, the number and qualifications of employees who are handling the complaints, the network’s association memberships, the number of times an external party has been used to decide the illegality of the content, the number of complaints that led to the content being deleted, the time it took to delete the content, and measures that were taken to inform the complainant and the member who posted the deleted content.

  157. 157.

    § 4 NetzDG, in conjunction with Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten [OWiG] [Act on Regulatory Offenses], 19 February 1987 [BGBL. I] at 602, as amended, § 30(2). The fine is rendered by the Department of Justice upon a Court decision. The decision of the Court is final and binding on the Department of Justice.

  158. 158.

    See e.g. Haupt (2021); also Guggenberger (2017); Nolte (2017).

  159. 159.

    See e.g. Zurth (2021); see also the refences listed in note 150 above.

  160. 160.

    Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der Hasskriminalität, 30 March 2021 [BGBl. I], at 441.

  161. 161.

    Gesetz zur Änderung des Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetzes, 3 June 2021 [BGBL I] at 1436.

  162. 162.

    § 3d amended NetzDG.

  163. 163.

    For overview of the changes, see https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/DE/NetzDGAendG.html (last access 23 February 2022) (in German).

  164. 164.

    Goldsmith and Woods (2020).

  165. 165.

    Ibid.

  166. 166.

    See e.g. Bhagwat (2021).

  167. 167.

    Helberger et al. (2017), at p. 2; see also Finck (2018) (arguing for a co-regulatory model of platform regulation); Saurwein and Spencer-Smith (2020) (mapping the different governance approaches).

  168. 168.

    See e.g. with regard to Russia, Moyakinea and Tabachnik (2021); for a discussion of other cases, see Roudik et al. (2019).

  169. 169.

    Daskal (2019), at p. 1605.

  170. 170.

    Ibid.

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Burri, M. (2022). Fake News in Times of Pandemic and Beyond: Enquiry into the Rationales for Regulating Information Platforms. In: Mathis, K., Tor, A. (eds) Law and Economics of the Coronavirus Crisis. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95876-3_2

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