Abstract
In this chapter I will argue that reasoning is essentially a process of belief revision and change of perspective, rather than a mere process of inferring beliefs from other beliefs. I will also argue that a non-monotonic (or fallible) notion of material inference is better suited than a notion of formal or logical inference to describe the abilities involved in belief revision and changes of perspective. Finally, I will suggest that, not only deductive thinking, but also abductive thinking and counterfactual thinking—which ground the imaginative ability required to make thought experiments—are essential components of thinking. In light of this rich view of reasoning, I will contend that the dominant conception of critical thinking—typically characterised as based on algorithmic structure and deductive skills—is deeply inadequate. I will suggest that deductive, critical thinking can be useful only in contexts where the starting assumptions of the agent, or the problem to be resolved, do not change because the agent does not receive further conflicting information or does not discover that her initial assumptions were incoherent.
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Notes
- 1.
This fallacious reasoning would like to follow the form of the following correct Aristotelian syllogism:
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For any x, if x is I then x is M
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But G is I
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So G is M.
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- 2.
Harman points out that since logic, in general, aims at the validity of an argument, the same problem that afflicts deductive logic also affects inductive logic, although it is based on the calculation of probabilities.
- 3.
This section draws from arguments that I made in conferences in 2015 e 2017 in USA, Canada. Ru, and UK, and in Marabini and Moretti (2017).
- 4.
In this sense the term ‘disposition’ is intended as a kind of automatism and should not be confused with the use and relative meaning we have attributed to the term ‘disposition’ in the previous paragraphs. In that case the term was not intended, as it is for Brandom, in the sense of a sort of automatism, but on the contrary as disposition to complex reasoning.
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Marabini, A. (2022). Reasoning. In: Critical Thinking and Epistemic Injustice. Contemporary Philosophies and Theories in Education, vol 20. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95714-8_2
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