Due Process as a Subject of Special Jurisprudence. The Checklist and Flexible Models of Procedural Due Process

Lillo Lobos, Ricardo

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-95534-2_2

Ricardo Lillo Lobos²⁶

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 97))

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Abstract

The answer to the question of which procedure is provided by the right to due process may have a critical impact on how accessible the civil justice is. With this purpose, in this chapter, first I describe procedural due process as a complex jurisprudential concept and, second, I introduce the analytical framework I will use in what follows with the purpose of studying how procedural due process it is conceived in different jurisdictions: the checklist model and the flexible model. Using an ideal type approach to explain different conceptions of the right to a fair trial from a practical perspective, it will prove to be useful to move to an analysis with normative character on how to reconcile the requirements of procedural fairness with social demands for justice, as expressed by the access to justice movement.

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Notes

1.
Miller (1977), p. 3. See also: Galligan (1996), p. 166.
2.
See: Fuller and Winston (1978).
3.
See: Tyler (1994).
4.
See: Mashaw (1981).
5.
Bone (2003), pp. 508–516.
6.
Regarding courts role against public authorities’ arbitrariness, see: Scanlon (1977), pp. 94–106.
7.
Dworkin (1985), p. 93.
8.
According to Dworkin, to determine the procedural rights to which parties are entitled is relevant the moral harm beyond the bare harm, which are related to gains and losses which emerges from utilitarian calculations. That is why its determination would be a matter of principle not policy, because it is a question of an entitlement to a right to win a lawsuit if the law is on the party’s side, even if the society overall loses thereby. See: Dworkin (1985), pp. 89, 92–96.
9.
See: Weber (1949), pp. 91–92.
10.
Sunstein (2006).
11.
Bone (2010), p. 1015.
12.
Bone (2003), p. 515.
13.
Bone (2003), p. 487.
14.
Sunstein (2006), p. 620.
15.
Following Ronald Dworkin account for the differences between legal principles and rules. See: Dworkin (1967), pp. 22–29; Dworkin (1977), pp. 22–31.
16.
Kennedy (1976), p. 1687.
17.
Kennedy (1976), p. 1688.
18.
Kennedy (1976), p. 1690.
19.
Sunstein (2006), p. 619.
20.
On interpretive choices, see: Vermeule (2000), p. 82.
21.
Between the relation among the two in its modern conceptions, see: Eskridge (2013).
22.
Sunstein (2006), p. 629.
23.
Kennedy (1976), p. 1688.
24.
Sunstein (2006), p. 629.
25.
Sunstein (2006), p. 631.
26.
Sunstein (2006), p. 632.
27.
Dworkin (1967), pp. 23–29.
28.
See: Alexy (2014), p. 68.
29.
Braithwaite (2002), p. 50.
30.
Raz (1972), p. 838. Notwithstanding, the main difference between rules and principles according to Raz is about the roles each type of norm serve in a legal system. See Raz (1972), pp. 839–843.
31.
Dworkin (1967), p. 27; Alexy (2014), pp. 70–79. Raz points out that this conflict solving criteria proposed by Dworkin as defining character of principles. See: Raz (1972), p. 833. Notwithstanding is not my purpose to solve this issue here, and I will use this character to try to define my analytical models, I believe it is important to acknowledge its limitations.
32.
Dworkin (1986), p. 52.
33.
Regarding, value oriented theories of procedural due process, see: Saphire (1978).
34.
See: Mashaw (1981).
35.
Redish and Marshals (1986), pp. 474–475. See also: Dworkin (1985), p. 90.
36.
Sunstein (2006), p. 633.
37.
Sunstein (2006), p. 634.
38.
Sunstein (2006), p. 634.
39.
Kadish (1957), p. 341.
40.
Kennedy (1976), p. 1689.
41.
Braithwaite (2002), pp. 52–60.

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School of Law, Universidad Adolfo Ibañez, Santiago, Chile
Ricardo Lillo Lobos

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Lillo Lobos, R. (2022). Due Process as a Subject of Special Jurisprudence. The Checklist and Flexible Models of Procedural Due Process. In: Understanding Due Process in Non-Criminal Matters. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 97. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95534-2_2

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95534-2_2
Published: 18 June 2022
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-95533-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-95534-2
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