Modern Conceptions of Procedural Due Process and the Right to a Fair Trial in Civil Matters

Lillo Lobos, Ricardo

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-95534-2_11

Ricardo Lillo Lobos²⁶

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 97))

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Abstract

This chapter describes a long and winding road on the Supreme Court case law in non-criminal matters, into what might characterize as a modern conception on procedural due process. It begins by describing the context that marked the transformation of the traditional approach followed by the Supreme Court into the current approach in non-criminal matters. In this regard, it focuses on the Due Process revolution as an attempt to broaden the protection of procedural due process and to search for a test to determine what is the procedure that is due once the clause is triggered beyond criminal law. Then, it describes how the case law led to the Mathews v. Eldridge test, the current approach used by the Court, and the debates that have arisen in the last decades regarding, class actions, statistical adjudication and arbitration. It also briefly addresses the right of access to a court and its relationship with the right to a due process. Finally, it explores some possible explanations and provides some future research question regarding the question on why the constitutional doctrine in civil matters has been much more recent and thinner than in criminal law issues.

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Notes

1.
Kadish (1957), p. 319.
2.
Mashaw (1976), p. 47, fn. 61.
3.
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), pp. 894–895.
4.
Galligan (1996), p. 190.
5.
Rubin (1984), p. 1050.
6.
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), p. 421.
7.
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), pp. 440–442.
8.
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), p. 442.
9.
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), p. 442.
10.
Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), p. 103.
11.
Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), pp. 103–104.
12.
Galligan (1996), p. 247.
13.
Regarding both categories from an historical and comparative perspective, see: Langer (2016).
14.
Kagan (2003), pp. 99–125.
15.
Galligan (1996), p. 198.
16.
Galligan (1996), p. 193.
17.
Sullivan and Massaro (2013), pp. 42–44.
18.
Pierce (1996), p. 1973.
19.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
20.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
21.
Dripps (2018), p. 30.
22.
Pierce (1996), p. 1974.
23.
Pierce (1996), p. 1974.
24.
Sullivan and Massaro (2013), p. 87.
25.
Pierce (1996), p. 1977.
26.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), p. 566.
27.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), p. 571.
28.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), p. 577.
29.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), p. 603.
30.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), p. 601.
31.
Pierce (1996), p. 1981.
32.
Pierce (1996), p. 1983.
33.
Friendly (1975), p. 1274.
34.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, (1976).
35.
Pierce (1996), p. 1981.
36.
Pierce (1996), p. 1982.
37.
Dripps (2018), p. 67.
38.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1977), pp. 348–349.
39.
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977), p. 113.
40.
Pierce (1996), p. 1983.
41.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), p. 136.
42.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), p. 157.
43.
Pierce (1996), pp. 1984–1995.
44.
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), pp. 848–849; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), p. 599.
45.
City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003), p. 716.
46.
City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 716 (2003).
47.
City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 719 (2003).
48.
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), pp. 3–4.
49.
The mother was compelled by Connecticut law to disclose the name of the putative father under oath and to institute an action to establish the paternity of said child because appellee’s child was a recipient of public assistance. In addition, the State’s Attorney General automatically became a party to the action, and any settlement agreement required his approval or that of the Commissioner of Human Resources or Commissioner of Income Maintenance. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), p. 9.
50.
In general under Connecticut law a defendant in a paternity suit is placed at a distinct disadvantage in that his testimony alone is insufficient to overcome the plaintiff’s prima facie case. Even though it is considered a civil proceeding, in Connecticut this type of proceeding have “quasicriminal” tones. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. (1981), pp. 10, 12.
51.
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, (1981), pp. 13–16.
52.
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), p. 16.
53.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), p. 758.
54.
Scherer (2006), p. 677. See also: Bradlow (1988).
55.
Brett (2016), p. 358.
56.
See: Bone (1993), pp. 594–617.
57.
Garth (1987), pp. 497–505.
58.
Grossi and Allan (2020), p. 60.
59.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.
60.
Grossi and Allan (2020), p. 98.
61.
Yeazell and Schwartz (2016), p. 545.
62.
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), pp. 40–42.
63.
Grossi and Allan (2020), p. 64.
64.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), pp. 811–812.
65.
Grossi and Allan (2020), pp. 77–81; Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), pp. 866–867.
66.
Reuben (2000), p. 954.
67.
Galanter (2007), p. 17.
68.
Yeazell and Schwartz (2016), p. 373.
69.
Galanter (2007), p. 29.
70.
Golann (1989), p. 498; Resnik (2014), pp. 1809–1811; Yeazell and Schwartz (2016), p. 374.
71.
Golann (1989), p. 532.
72.
Yeazell and Schwartz (2016), p. 374.
73.
Resnik (2014), p. 1812.
74.
Hensler and Khatam (2018), p. 389.
75.
Regarding these requirements, see: Reuben (2000), pp. 1020–1030.
76.
See: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
77.
Resnik (2014), p. 1813.
78.
Resnik (2014), pp. 1018–1019.
79.
Reuben (2000), p. 1036.
80.
Hensler and Khatam (2018), p. 393.
81.
Stone (2017), pp. 190–192.
82.
Reuben (2000), p. 1040.
83.
Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993), p. 605.
84.
Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993), pp. 617–618.
85.
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), p. 424.
86.
See: Hittner and Weisz (1990), pp. 352–354.
87.
Sullivan and Massaro (2013), pp. 87–88. See: Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2502, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979).
88.
Cited only in two criminal cases but not applying its balancing test to the due process analysis: United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
89.
Dripps (2018), p. 69.
90.
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992). More recently, by applying the Mathews v. Elridge test to a post-and-forfeit procedure, the Court of Appeal of the District of Columbia Circuit, gave the same rationale to not apply this test to criminal procedure. Kincaid v. Gov’t of D.C., 854 F.3d 721 (D.C. Cir. 2017), p. 726.
91.
Mashaw (1976), p. 46.
92.
Redish and Marshall (1986), pp. 472–474.
93.
Redish and Marshall (1986), p. 473.
94.
Holt (2015), pp. 325–327.
95.
Available at: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/magna-carta/magna-carta-1225-westminster/.
96.
Thompson (1948), p. 97.
97.
Coke (1797), pp. 55–56.
98.
Pankratz (1992), p. 1099.
99.
Hittner and Weisz (1990), p. 350. See also: Hart (1953), pp. 1362–1402.
100.
Pankratz (1992), pp. 1099–1102.
101.
Rhode (2001), p. 1786.
102.
14 Stat. 27, 39 Cong. Ch. 31, Sec. 1.
103.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), p. 77.
104.
Leubsdorf (1984), p. 590.
105.
Rice (1999), p. 559.
106.
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), p. 513.
107.
Rice (1999), p. 562.
108.
Bradlow (1988), p. 677.
109.
Scherer (2006), p. 677.
110.
Michelman (1974), pp. 556–557.
111.
Hittner and Weisz (1990), p. 350.
112.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), pp. 382–383.
113.
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), p. 429.
114.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, (1971), p. 379.
115.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, (1971), p. 381.
116.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, (1971), pp. 380–381.
117.
Hittner and Weisz (1990), p. 351.
118.
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), pp. 444–445.
119.
I did not find the language of clause in its 1354 version only in the current constitutions of three States: Maryland (1867), New Jersey (1947), Vermont (1793). Only the Constitution of New Jersey does not provide for a clause with the language of “due process” or neither with the “law of the land”.
120.
This is the case, for example, with the constitutions of Arkansas (1874) and New York (1938).
121.
Arkansas (1874), Idaho (1890), Minnesota (1857), New Hampshire (1784), North Dakota (1889). The Constitution of Michigan (1963) provides in its article 1 section 17 a due process clause inside a provision that reads: Art. 1. Section 17. Sec. 17. “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”
122.
Information available at: https://sos.idaho.gov/ELECT/stcon/article_I.html.
123.
Similar clauses might be found in: Arizona (1910), Arkansas (1874), Colorado (1876), Florida (1968), Georgia (1982), Idaho (1890), Illinois (1970), Maryland (1867), Massachusetts (1780), Minnesota (1857), Missouri (1945), Montana (1972), Nebraska (1875), New Hampshire (1784), Rhode Island (1986), South Carolina (1895), Vermont (1793), Washington (1889), Wisconsin (1848), Wyoming (1889).
124.
In the same situation might be: Alabama (1901), Connecticut (1965), Delaware (1897), Indiana (1851), Kansas (1861), Kentucky (1891), Louisiana (1974), Mississippi (1890), North Carolina (1971), North Dakota (1889), Oklahoma (1907), Oregon (1857), Pennsylvania (1968), South Dakota (1889), Tennessee (1870), Texas (1876), Utah (1895), West Virginia (1872).
125.
Kadish, distinguishes between “fixity” and “flexibility” as the two dominant motifs in the Supreme Court approaches to provide meaning to the due process clause. According to it, this to cases are expressions of this intent. Kadish (1957), p. 322.
126.
Debele (1987), pp. 515–519.
127.
Debele (1987), pp. 524–525.
128.
Debele (1987), pp. 527–536.
129.
Debele (1987), pp. 536–542.
130.
Kadish (1957), p. 325.
131.
Kadish (1957), p. 325.
132.
Kadish (1957), p. 325.
133.
Twining v. N.J., 211 U.S. 78 (1908), p. 111.
134.
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), p. 286.
135.
Redish and Marshall (1986), p. 470.
136.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), p. 70. Cited in: Redish and Marshall (1986), pp. 455–503, fn.71.
137.
Kadish (1957), p. 319. Cite in: Mashaw (1976), p. 47, fn. 61.
138.
Gardbaum (2003), p. 411.
139.
Horan (1976), pp. 848–849.
140.
See, e.g.: McAffe (2007).
141.
Chemerinsky (1986), p. 513.
142.
Gardbaum (2003), p. 394.
143.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), pp. 52–58.
144.
Hittner and Weisz (1990), p. 349.
145.
On the contrary, inaction or omission from public agencies (e.g., providing protection against private wrongdoings) is a much more debatable trigger of the clause. Regarding this debate, see: See: Strauss (1989), pp. 53–86.
146.
For a critic on this rationale, see: Leubsdorf (1984), pp. 602–603.
147.
Bone (2010), p. 1011.
148.
Grossi and Allan (2020), pp. 59–60.
149.
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 1.
150.
Leubsdorf (1984), p. 588.
151.
Michelman (1974), p. 548.
152.
Gardbaum (2003), p. 398.
153.
Gardbaum (2003), p. 415.
154.
Gardbaum (2003), pp. 418, 421.

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School of Law, Universidad Adolfo Ibañez, Santiago, Chile
Ricardo Lillo Lobos

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Lillo Lobos, R. (2022). Modern Conceptions of Procedural Due Process and the Right to a Fair Trial in Civil Matters. In: Understanding Due Process in Non-Criminal Matters. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 97. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95534-2_11

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