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The Path of Procedural Due Process into the American Constitution. Scope of Application

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Understanding Due Process in Non-Criminal Matters

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 97))

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Abstract

The historical development of the due process clause and the political context by which it was incorporated in earlier American documents and further declarations and constitutions explains the general focus on criminal matters. This focus on criminal matters might explain why even early commentators saw the clause as limited to this field of law. However, as explained in this chapter, there is a connection between the due process clause in the American Constitution and civil procedure. Two approaches are provided in order to support to this argument. First, the debates over the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, and the Seventh Amendment on civil jury trial. Second, I describe the period from the early case law of the Supreme Court until the “Due Process Revolution”. I will show how procedural due process were forged in the American Constitution while proving that at its origins it included non-criminal as well as criminal conceptions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Leubsdorf (1984), p. 600. See, also: Stuntz (1996), pp. 3–4.

  2. 2.

    Easterbrook (1982), p. 99.

  3. 3.

    See: Leubsdorf (1984); Rubenstein (2002); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 2202, 68 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1981); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S. Ct. 555, 136 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1996).

  4. 4.

    Leubsdorf (1984), p. 579.

  5. 5.

    Leubsdorf (1984), p. 588.

  6. 6.

    “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself…”

  7. 7.

    Cogan (2015), p. 531.

  8. 8.

    Cogan (2015), pp. 545–546.

  9. 9.

    “…nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

  10. 10.

    “…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

  11. 11.

    Meyer (1977), p. 149.

  12. 12.

    Blackstone (1861), pp. 100–103.

  13. 13.

    Flack (1908), pp. 8–9.

  14. 14.

    Notwithstanding, as argued by Rubinstein, there are cases were litigants have raised equal protection challenges against procedural rules and practices, these efforts have not had much impact on civil procedure. This author alleges that the nature of the equality under the Fourteenth Amendment is not the same as the one requested by the adversarial nature of the civil procedure. See: Rubenstein (2002), pp. 1869–1877. I agree with this author that the key for the constitutional requirements over civil procedure is not the equal protection clause. It is true that the right to a fair trial, which in America has been linked directly with the adversarial type of proceedings (as will describe below) requires a form of equality, which in some jurisdictions is known as equality of arms. See: Sidhu (2017). Notwithstanding this might result an alien concept in the American jurisprudence, there is at least some literature calling for its recognition as enshrined in the Constitution but as part of the adversarial legal procedure and a requirement of fairness and the due process clause but not in the equal protection clause. See: Silver (1990), pp. 1032–1038. On the contrary, in the criminal justice arena have received much more attention. Mashaw (1976), p. 47, fn. 61.

  15. 15.

    Flack (1908), pp. 76–78.

  16. 16.

    Flack (1908), pp. 20–21; 95.

  17. 17.

    Flack (1908), p. 82.

  18. 18.

    Flack (1908), p. 94; Dripps (2018), p. 52.

  19. 19.

    Meyer (1977), p. 125.

  20. 20.

    Meyer (1977), pp. 125–126.

  21. 21.

    Meyer (1977), pp. 126–127.

  22. 22.

    Meyer (1977), p. 127.

  23. 23.

    Regarding the exclusion of unconstitutional searches, see: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The Court held that “Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government.” Regarding the right to counsel of the Sixth Amendment, see: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

  24. 24.

    Gonzalez-Oyarzun v. Caribbean City Builders, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 265 (2014). But this decision was reversed on appeal. See: González-Oyarzun v. Caribbean City Builders, Inc., 798 F.3d 26 (2015).

  25. 25.

    See: McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), pp. 867–868; City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999), pp. 718–719; Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). See, also: Balboni v. Ranger Am. of the V.I., Inc., 70 V.I. 1048 (2019).

  26. 26.

    United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (1812).

  27. 27.

    Cogan (2015), pp. 849, 853.

  28. 28.

    Thomas (2016), p. 11.

  29. 29.

    See, e.g. A Farmer, No 4, March 21, 1788. Cited in: Cogan (2015), pp. 871–873.

  30. 30.

    Cogan (2015), p. 821.

  31. 31.

    Cogan (2015), p. 848.

  32. 32.

    The Federalist, No 83, May 28, 1788. Cited in: Cogan (2015), pp. 875–877.

  33. 33.

    Beebe (1933), pp. 44, 58–59.

  34. 34.

    Beebe (1933), pp. 68–72.

  35. 35.

    Thomas (2016), pp. 19, 20.

  36. 36.

    Cogan (2015), p. 808.

  37. 37.

    Cogan (2015), p. 807.

  38. 38.

    Cogan (2015), pp. 806–807.

  39. 39.

    Cogan (2015), p. 820.

  40. 40.

    Cogan (2015), p. 825.

  41. 41.

    Cogan (2015), p. 826. In the same sense: The Federalist, No 83, May 28, 1788. Cited in: Cogan (2015), pp. 875–877.

  42. 42.

    See the comment of Mr. John Marshall at the State Convention of South Carolina in 1788. See also, the Address to the Citizens of Philadelphia on October 6, 1787 at the Pennsylvania Herald. Cogan (2015), pp. 840–841; 845.

  43. 43.

    Cogan (2015), p. 850.

  44. 44.

    The Federal Farmer, No 4, October 12, 1787. In: Cogan (2015), p. 848.

  45. 45.

    A quick analysis of the Constitutions of the Fifty States, at least forty-nine of them provides a right to a jury in civil matters. The Constitution of Louisiana provides civil juries only in expropriation proceeding and to determine compensation only. See: Louisiana Constitution, Article I. Section 4.B.

  46. 46.

    See, e.g.: Alabama Constitution, Section 11.

  47. 47.

    For example, the Indiana Constitution provides: “In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Indiana Constitution, Article 1. Section 20.

  48. 48.

    For example, in Alaska, the Constitution provides civil juries for cases where the amount in controversy exceeds two hundred fifty dollars. It provides also that the legislature may make provision for a verdict by not less than three-fourths of the jury and, in courts not of record, may provide for a jury of not less than six or more than twelve. See: Alaska Constitution, Article 1, Section 16. On the contrary, in California, while there is no limit amount for civil juries, there are different requirements regarding waiver and verdict between civil and criminal matters. See: California Constitution, Article 1, Section 16. In other, such as Rhode Island, while there is general right to a jury, in civil cases the legislative body might reduce the size of the jury at less than twelve but not less than six. See: Constitution of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Article 1, Section, 15.

  49. 49.

    Thomas (2012), p. 174.

  50. 50.

    Thomas (2012), p. 33.

  51. 51.

    Thomas (2012), p. 33.

  52. 52.

    Thomas (2012), pp. 33–37.

  53. 53.

    But it was mentioned earlier as a clause in State constitutions. See: Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 624 (1819).

  54. 54.

    Easterbrook (1982), p. 99.

  55. 55.

    Mashaw (1976), p. 47, fn. 61.

  56. 56.

    Den Ex Dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855), p. 274.

  57. 57.

    Den Ex Dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855), p. 275.

  58. 58.

    Den Ex Dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855), p. 276.

  59. 59.

    Den Ex Dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855), p. 276.

  60. 60.

    Den Ex Dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855), p. 276.

  61. 61.

    Den Ex Dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855), p. 276.

  62. 62.

    Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104–105 (1877).

  63. 63.

    Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877). Similarly, see: Kennard v. La., 92 U.S. 480, 483 (1876).

  64. 64.

    Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), pp. 534–535.

  65. 65.

    Den Ex Dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. 272, (1855), p. 276.

  66. 66.

    Dripps (2018), p. 48.

  67. 67.

    Kadish (1957), p. 322.

  68. 68.

    Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 L. Ed. 232, 1884 U.S., (1884), p. 541.

  69. 69.

    Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 L. Ed. 232, 1884 U.S., (1884), p. 541.

  70. 70.

    Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 L. Ed. 232, 1884 U.S., (1884), p. 542.

  71. 71.

    Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 L. Ed. 232, 1884 U.S., (1884), pp. 552–553.

  72. 72.

    Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701 (1884), pp. 707–708.

  73. 73.

    A conception, that according to Kadish comes from the case law on the Fifth Amendment such as Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). See: Kadish (1957), p. 323.

  74. 74.

    Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701 (1884), p. 710.

  75. 75.

    Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1907), p. 255.

  76. 76.

    Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), p. 374.

  77. 77.

    Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), p. 385.

  78. 78.

    Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), p. 386.

  79. 79.

    Rubin (1984), p. 1050.

  80. 80.

    Rubin (1984), pp. 385–386.

  81. 81.

    Redish and Marshall (1986), p. 456.

  82. 82.

    Galligan (1996), p. 199.

  83. 83.

    Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 707–708 (1884).

  84. 84.

    Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 710 (1884); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255(1907).

  85. 85.

    Twining v. N.J., 211 U.S. 78 (1908), p. 111.

  86. 86.

    Twining v. N.J., 211 U.S. 78 (1908), pp. 106–111.

  87. 87.

    Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), pp. 719–720.

  88. 88.

    Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1879), p. 733.

  89. 89.

    Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1879), p. 719.

  90. 90.

    Iowa C. R. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389 (1896), p. 392.

  91. 91.

    Iowa C. R. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389 (1896), p. 393.

  92. 92.

    Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900), p. 402.

  93. 93.

    Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900), p. 409.

  94. 94.

    Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900), pp. 409–412.

  95. 95.

    Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230 (1900), p. 236. Similarly, Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901), p. 437.

  96. 96.

    Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

  97. 97.

    Easterbrook (1982), p. 104.

  98. 98.

    Grannis v. Ordean, 58 L. Ed. 1363 (1914), pp. 1369–1370.

  99. 99.

    Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), pp. 720–724.

  100. 100.

    Stephen (2017), pp. 1253–1255.

  101. 101.

    Stephen (2017), p. 1288.

  102. 102.

    Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), p. 110.

  103. 103.

    Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), pp. 108–110.

  104. 104.

    Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), pp. 110–111.

  105. 105.

    Redish and Marshall (1986), p. 456.

  106. 106.

    Mashaw (1976), p. 47, fn. 61.

  107. 107.

    Mashaw (1976), p. 47, fn. 61.

  108. 108.

    Mashaw (1976), p. 47, fn. 61.

  109. 109.

    Easterbrook (1982), p. 105.

  110. 110.

    Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).

  111. 111.

    Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), p. 514.

  112. 112.

    Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), p. 523.

  113. 113.

    Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), pp. 523–531.

  114. 114.

    Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932), pp. 51–52.

  115. 115.

    Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932), p. 65.

  116. 116.

    Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932), pp. 68–69.

  117. 117.

    Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932), pp. 71–72.

  118. 118.

    Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932), p. 73.

  119. 119.

    Sullivan and Massaro (2013), pp. 83–85.

  120. 120.

    Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

  121. 121.

    Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), p. 285.

  122. 122.

    Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), p. 286.

  123. 123.

    Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), p. 286.

  124. 124.

    Easterbrook (1982), p. 106.

  125. 125.

    Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), pp. 170–172.

  126. 126.

    Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), p. 172.

  127. 127.

    The Court said: “Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents by agents of government, to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), pp. 172–173. An older case in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had applied before the “shock the conscience” standard to Sixth Amendment right to counsel: “A lack of effective assistance of counsel must be of such a kind as to shock the conscience of the Court and make the proceedings a farce and mockery of justice.” United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1949), p. 379. The expression, on the contrary, is present even in even older cases but not applied to due process. See: Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180 (1886), p. 191.

  128. 128.

    Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), pp. 172–173.

  129. 129.

    Mashaw (1976), p. 47, fn. 61; Rubin (1984), p. 1049.

  130. 130.

    Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930), p. 674.

  131. 131.

    Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930), pp. 679–680.

  132. 132.

    Mashaw (1976), p. 47, fn. 61.

  133. 133.

    Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 248 (1932).

  134. 134.

    St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).

  135. 135.

    Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 301 U.S. 292 (1937).

  136. 136.

    Rubin (1984), p. 1049.

  137. 137.

    Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 301 U.S. 292 (1937), p. 304.

  138. 138.

    Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 301 U.S. 292 (1937), p. 304.

  139. 139.

    Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage & Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126 (1941), p. 133.

  140. 140.

    Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage & Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126 (1941), pp. 152–153.

  141. 141.

    Yeazell and Schwartz (2016), p. 76.

  142. 142.

    International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), p. 316.

  143. 143.

    Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), pp. 307–309.

  144. 144.

    Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), pp. 312–314.

  145. 145.

    Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), p. 315.

  146. 146.

    Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123(1951), pp. 162–163.

  147. 147.

    Famous in this regard are the cases of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. (1968).

  148. 148.

    Parkin (2012), p. 1319.

  149. 149.

    Pierce (1996), p. 1973.

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    Ricardo Lillo Lobos

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Lillo Lobos, R. (2022). The Path of Procedural Due Process into the American Constitution. Scope of Application. In: Understanding Due Process in Non-Criminal Matters. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 97. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95534-2_10

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