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China and Taiwan in Africa pp 101–119Cite as

The UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971 Recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the Legitimate Representative of the State of China

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Part of the Africa-East Asia International Relations book series (AEAIR)

Abstract

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 passed on October 25, 1971, recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations. That Resolution had a tremendous negative impact upon Taiwan (the Republic of China, “ROC”). The 1971 UN Resolution was not a historic “accident.” It was the outcome of PRC’s systematic diplomatic efforts in Africa and toward America.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Different approaches in theories of international relations and foreign policy explain “success” in different terms. A diplomatic success could be seen, for instance, as a percentage of initial goals achieved (55% or more of the initial goals achieved could be a relative success, 90% or more of the initial goals achieved could be a total success, and so forth), as a short-term or long-term success (a long-term success is a success in reality; a short-term success could mean a failure in reality, given the examples of the United Nations and the League of Nations), or as an outcome of cost-benefit analysis in diplomacy and wars (public spending, presence of soldiers, numbers of killed soldiers, public opinion disappointment, demonstrations) in a defensive or offensive war (US victory against Germany and Japan in World War II can be seen as a great success; the United States failed in Vietnam). In general, a fair success is related to morals, the right to existence, and the right of self-determination based on UN principles (the PRC’s recognition by the UN was a success for the PRC); the nonrecognition of Taiwan was a total success for PRC and a total failure for Taiwan and the United States in 1971. The African states played a significant role.

  2. 2.

    Keefer, Edward. “The Nixon Administration and the United Nations”. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/ONU_edward_keefer.pdf, 9.

  3. 3.

    Keefer, 10.

  4. 4.

    Keefer, 11–12.

  5. 5.

    The first meeting and talks were held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 at the initiative of Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia. Hennie Strydom, “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Reform of International Relations”, in A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 11, 2007, 1–46, at 1: ‘Formally, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) came into existence during the first conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries that took place in Belgrade in September 1961. Representing newly-independent developing countries, the movement and its policies can be directly linked to the decolonization process with the initial years of political engagement in world affairs characterized by anti-imperialist slogans and the denunciation of colonialism, apartheid, racism’.

  6. 6.

    For the content of official documents, see Wilson Center, Digital Archive, International History Declassified, Non-Aligned Movement, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/55/non-aligned-movement.

  7. 7.

    US Department of State, Office of the Historian. “Historical Documents”. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d167, last visited 2/2/2021.

  8. 8.

    Tao Li, “从“台湾地位未定论”到“两个中国说”——40 年代至 60 年代美国对台政策之浅析[From ‘Taiwan status unsettled’ to ‘two Chinas’: an analysis of US Taiwan Policy from 1940s to 60s],” China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House (1999), http://www.cnki.net., 71. Lawrence Xie, “Has Taiwan quit the United Nations? Discuss the question of China’s representation revolving around General Assembly Resolution 2758”, www.researchgate.net/publication/304097245.

  9. 9.

    At the diplomatic level, US ‘Department of State officials struggled in July and August to obtain ROC acceptance of a plan to allow the People’s Republic of China to enter the United Nations (and almost certainly obtain a seat on the Security Council) while the Republic of China would remain in the General Assembly. Secretary of State William Rogers met with ROC diplomats in late July, stating that the “only chance of preserving membership of ROC in UN is for US to support a resolution which would provide representation for your government and government of Peking and at least to acquiesce in majority view that government in Peking should hold seat on SC.” (Reported in telegram 139,288 to Taipei, July 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM).’ US Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d167.

  10. 10.

    “President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger wanted the Department of State to take the lead on the UN fight, telling Ambassador to the UN George H.W. Bush to “fight hard” to keep the ROC in the General Assembly. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Bush, September 30, 1971, 9:22–9:54 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 581–2) The President asked Rogers to handle the UN issue: “I think getting me involved puts in too direct a deal, particularly when we’re working out the Peking, too direct a case and I’m just, you know, they’ll try to play it as if we’re playing it against Peking, which is really not the case.” (Ibid., Recording of conversation between Nixon and Rogers, October 17, 1971, 6:13–6:26 p.m., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 11–105) On another occasion. Nixon told Rogers that he wanted to avoid personal involvement in the UN issue, and he wished to enable Rogers to gain support from conservatives for his role in attempting to keep the Republic of China in the United Nations. (Ibid., October 14, 1971, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–18).” US Department of State, Office of the Historian. “Historical Documents”. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d167, last visited 2/2/2021.

  11. 11.

    “The timing of the UN vote on Chinese representation and Kissinger’s October trip to the People’s Republic of China became a source of concern as it became apparent that the vote would be held earlier than U.S. officials had anticipated—in late October rather than in November. In numerous conversations, Nixon and Kissinger wondered whether the trip would reduce the chances for the ROC to remain in the United Nations. On September 30, Kissinger concluded that “I think basically the votes are set now. I do not think that objectively it affects the votes of anybody.” Nixon responded: “I know that, I know that. People will use things for excuses.” They also debated attempting to change the date of Kissinger’s trip to China but felt that going to the People’s Republic of China immediately after defeat in the United Nations would be even more difficult. Ultimately Kissinger felt that there was little chance of winning the UN vote: “I mean I thought as long as we were going to lose, we were better off losing on the old stand. But I think we’re farther behind than they [the Department of State officials] think. You have to consider that these diplomats, when they talk to us, they’ll try to make it sound as good as possible. Why annoy us for weeks before the vote?” (Ibid., Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, September 30, 1971, 2:25–2:50 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 582–3).” US Department of State, Office of the Historian, as above.

  12. 12.

    United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth Session, 1976th Plenary Meeting, Official Records, New York, Monday, October 25, 1971.

  13. 13.

    “On October 12 NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis sent a memorandum to Department of State Executive Secretary Theodore Eliot for distribution to all diplomatic posts: “You may be asked by host governments about ChiRep implications of Kissinger trip to Peking at end of this month. If so, you should stress that sole purpose of trip is to make arrangements for Presidential visit and that there is no connection between Kissinger trip and ChiRep issue. The U.S. is firmly supporting the continued membership of the ROC in the UN.” (Ibid., NSC Files. Kissinger Office Files, Box 87, Country Files, China Trip, October 1971).” US Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d167, last visited 2/2/2021.

  14. 14.

    “Nixon was not optimistic concerning the future of the Republic of China in the United Nations, stating on one occasion that “my view is that the time for Taiwan to go out is next year, it shouldn’t go this year, it’s not good for the Chinese.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, October 14, 1971, 3:05–5:40 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 289–18) On October 25 the General Assembly approved the motion for priority (61 in favor, 53 opposed, 17 abstentions), then defeated the Important Question Resolution (55, 59, 15). Bush’s motion for a separate vote on expulsion of the Republic of China lost (51, 61, 16), and the Albanian Resolution was adopted (76, 35, 17). Information on the debate and final vote is in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971, volume 25 (New York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1974), pages 126–137.” US Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d167.

  15. 15.

    For the detailed discussions and the official records, see United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth Session, 1976th Plenary Meeting, Official Records, New York, Monday, October 25, 1971.

  16. 16.

    We thank Professor Antonios Karaiskos (Kyoto University Law School) for these observations. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Recent Japan-Taiwan Relations”. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/taiwan/pdfs/japan-taiwan_relations.pdf, 2013.

  17. 17.

    Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique02.htm, last visited 2/2/2021.

  18. 18.

    Patrick Worsnip, “Taiwan rejected in high-profile bid to join UN, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-un-idUSN1926872820070919, 2007.

  19. 19.

    Copied by: Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sgsm11164.doc.htm, 2007, last visited 2/2/2021.

  20. 20.

    Chen, Dean. “The Strategic Implications of Ma Ying-jeou’s “One ROC, two areas” Policy on Cross-Strait Relations”. American Journal of Chinese Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2013, pp. 23–41.

  21. 21.

    https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf. Article 2(b) provides that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.”

  22. 22.

    Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Norway, “White Paper, The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue”, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceno/eng/ztxw/twwt/t110655.htm, 2004/05/17.

  23. 23.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “China and Algeria”, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2798_663596/, last visited 2/2/2021.

  24. 24.

    China, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, UAE, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Twenty-seven UN member states voted against that PRC’s law: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See also https://www.axios.com/countries-supporting-china-hong-kong-law-0ec9bc6c-3aeb-4af0-8031-aa0f01a46a7c.html, last visited 2/2/2021.

  25. 25.

    Id. See also https://thediplomat.com/tag/china-kenya-relations, last visited 2/2/2021.

  26. 26.

    Id.

  27. 27.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China and Gambia, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/fzs_663828/gjlb_663832/2994_664004, last visited 2/2/2021.

  28. 28.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping Chairs the Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity Against Covid-19 and Gives a Keynote Speech, June 18, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1790013.shtml, last visited February 1, 2021.

  29. 29.

    The Summit was attended by President Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa of the Republic of South Africa, President Macky Sall of the Republic of Senegal, President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi of the Arab Republic of Egypt, President Felix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo of the Democratic Republic of Congo, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, President Ali Bongo Ondimba of the Republic of Gabon, President Uhuru Kenyatta of the Republic of Kenya, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita of the Republic of Mali, President Issoufou Mahamadou of the Republic of Niger, President Muhammadu Buhari of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, President Paul Kagame of the Republic of Rwanda, President Emmerson Mnangagwa of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission.

  30. 30.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping Chairs the Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity Against Covid-19 and Gives a Keynote Speech, June 18, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1790013.shtml, last visited 2/2/2021.

    President Xi underscored that in the face of COVID-19, China and Africa have offered mutual support and fought shoulder to shoulder with each other, and have enhanced solidarity and strengthened friendship and mutual trust reaffirming China’s commitment to its long-standing friendship with Africa.

  31. 31.

    “We must stay committed to fighting COVID-19 together. China will continue to do whatever it can to support Africa’s response to COVID-19. China will continue to help African countries by providing supplies, sending expert teams, and facilitating Africa’s procurement of medical supplies in China. China will start ahead of schedule the construction of the Africa CDC headquarters this year. China will work with Africa to fully deliver the healthcare initiative adopted at the FOCAC Beijing Summit, and speed up the construction of China-Africa Friendship Hospitals and the cooperation between paired-up Chinese and African hospitals. Together, we will build a China-Africa community of health for all. We pledge that once the development and deployment of COVID-19 vaccine is completed in China, African countries will be among the first to benefit.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC , as above.

  32. 32.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping Chairs the Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity Against Covid-19 and Gives a Keynote Speech, June 18, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1790013.shtml, last visited 2/2/2021.

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  1. European University Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus

    Charalampos Stamelos & Konstantinos Tsimaras

  2. Athens, Greece

    Charalampos Stamelos

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  1. Department of History and Political Science, Alabama State University, Montgomery, AL, USA

    Sabella O. Abidde

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Stamelos, C., Tsimaras, K. (2022). The UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971 Recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the Legitimate Representative of the State of China. In: Abidde, S.O. (eds) China and Taiwan in Africa. Africa-East Asia International Relations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95342-3_7

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