Abstract
This research is an authoritative guide to the emerging field of cryptoeconomics, the study of individual and collective choices in blockchain-based environments. These digital environments are more difficult to change than other software ecosystems, and so their creators must design them very thoughtfully. The authors provide a framework for economic design and walk readers through the phases of the design process. They analyze the challenges that stakeholders face in governing blockchain projects, and they explain why many projects fail to achieve their goals.
This chapter is based on Cathy Barrera and Stephanie Hurder’s paper, “Cryptoeconomics: Designing Effective Incentives and Governance Models for Blockchain Networks Using Insights from Economics,” with a foreword by Don Tapscott, published by the Blockchain Research Institute on January 13, 2020, and adapted here with permission.
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Acknowledgments
The authors thank Joshua Gans, Oliver Hart, Eric Maskin, Preston McAfee, and Mark Radcliffe for helpful conversations and interviews, and the editorial team at the Blockchain Research Institute for its support.
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Barrera, C., Hurder, S. (2022). Cryptoeconomics: Designing Effective Incentives and Governance Models for Blockchain Networks Using Insights from Economics. In: Lacity, M.C., Treiblmaier, H. (eds) Blockchains and the Token Economy. Technology, Work and Globalization. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95108-5_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95108-5_4
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