Keywords

14.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on Russian and Polish young adults’ views on the present-day role of religion in wider society and public life. In contrast to all other countries included in the Young Adults and Religion in a Global Perspective (YARG) project, the present-day religious landscapes of Russia and Poland need to be understood in relation to their respective Communist anti-religious pasts and historical experience of “state forced secularization” (e.g. Müller & Neundorf, 2012). Following the collapse of the Communist system in the early 1990s, past decades have witnessed the re-institution of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Russia and the Polish Catholic Church (PCC) in Poland. As a crucial part of these developments, both churches have significantly increased their presence throughout several areas of public life and established ever closer relations to their respective states and political establishments. This state of affairs, as we learn from previous studies, mass media and empirical data of the current research, has served to provoke widespread resentment among significant segments of the Russian and Polish populations, including the majority of all Russian and Polish young adults interviewed.

This issue is explored in relation to respondents’ views on Faith Q-Sort statement 71 “Believes that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation” that was part of the Faith Q-Sort (FQS) instrument developed and applied in the Young Adults and Religion in a Global Perspective research project (for more on YARG and the FQS see Chap. 1 of this volume). The analysis of the chapter is based on both FQS and interview data from Russia and Poland. “Believes that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation” was a frequently discussed statement across all national samples included in the YARG project. Overall, this statement provoked strong negative reactions among the majority of all respondents, typically rated at -3 or -4 on the FQS record sheet. The only exception was provided by the Israeli Muslim sample. The statement under study emerged as a defining one for many FQS prototypes and as a distinguishing one for 10 out of a total of all 56 FQS prototypes. “Believes that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation” does, however, appear in a range of different constellations vis-à-vis other FQS statements on related topics and questions. This chapter explores the position that this particular statement occupies in relation to other FQS statements pertaining to the role of religion in social and public life at various individual, group, and broader societal levels in the Russian and Polish samples. This is followed by the identification and analysis of three main recurring discourses through which Russian and Polish respondents most commonly express their views on the statement about the role of religion and other related issues.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides a discussion on the notion of ‘public religion’ and a general account of the present-day public visibility and presence of religion in Russia and Poland. This is followed by a discussion on how the statement “Believes that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation” is situated in relation to other FQS statements on similar topics and questions among the Russian and Polish prototypes. The third and final main section of the chapter then moves to analyze the main discourses through which Russian and Polish interviewees expressed their views on relations between church and state and the public role of religion in society. The chapter closes with a discussion of the results and some brief concluding remarks.

14.2 The Rise of Public Religion in Post-Communist Russia and Poland

Since the early 1990s, the global ‘resurgence’ of religion has developed into a major topic of inquiry and debate throughout many sub-fields in the study of religion, and indeed beyond. Although it remains a contentious issue, the (perceived) global resurgence of religion is commonly dated back to the late 1970s and early 1980s; a period in time that witnessed both the rise of the Religious Right in the United States and the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Fox, 2013, p. 24). The years following the fall of the Iron Curtain in the early 1990s saw the restoration and re-appearance of national churches on the public arena throughout many countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. In more recent times still, the increasing politicization of religion (especially as it relates to Islam) has served to further strengthen the sense that religion is re-entering the public arena on a worldwide scale.

The publication of José Casanova’s Public Religions in the Modern World in 1994, along with its elaboration on the subsequently widely employed and debated notion of ‘public religion’, provided a landmark contribution to the burgeoning scholarship on the visibility and presence of religion in the public sphere. Casanova develops his notion of ‘public religion’ as part of a broader critique of conventional and received versions of secularization theory . At the core of his argument lies his emphasis on what he identifies as a principal modern structural trend “towards the separation of the state from religions, leaving civil society as a public sphere in which religions can freely intervene” (Beckford, 2010, p. 124). Indeed, as he contends: “only public religions at the level of civil society are consistent with modern universalistic principles and with modern differentiated structures” (Casanova, 1994, p. 219). As Beckford (2010, p. 123) puts it, Casanova’s de-privatization thesis therefore posits a ‘re-politicization’ of the private sphere and a ‘re-normativization’ of the economic and political spheres. While this view clearly builds on the Habermasian liberal-political theoretical ideal of a social vitality-, pluralism- and democracy-supporting ‘civil society’ that occupies an independent ‘middle-ground’ between the private sphere and that of the state and economy (Beckford, 2010, p. 125; Beyer, 2006, p. 12), in this scheme, ‘public religions’ are therefore to be understood as ‘intermediate institutions’ and ‘free agents’ in civil society that are located somewhere ‘in-between’ the private sphere and that of the state and economy. The assumption then becomes that “only those religions that cease to be “state-oriented” and become “society-oriented” institutions are capable of entering or re-entering the public sphere of civil society ” (Beckford, 2010, p. 125).

The notion of ‘public religion’ has served to inspire countless explorations of the present-day public visibility of religion and religious actors across various national, social, cultural, and religious contexts, including post-Communist societies such as Russia and Poland. While the notion of public religion can certainly be of help in framing the present-day public visibility of religion in these two countries and how this is viewed and experienced by the present young adult generation, any such exploration also needs to unfold on the basis of an adequate understanding of the nature of the state-church relations currently in play on these respective national scenes. As pointed out by Fox (2013, p. 88), in cases where the legitimacy of states or particular governments themselves become varyingly tied to their continuing support for a particular religion or religious institution, they also tend to actively support and bolster the agency of that particular religious institution and the individual religious actors that are associated with it. Current state-church relations in Russia and Poland both provide apt examples of this, although they do so in notably different respects.

The ultimate collapse of the Communist state apparatus in the early 1990s gave rise to new hopes about the emergence of a Western-styled liberal-democratic robust civil society in both Russia and Poland (e.g. Beckford, 2010, p. 125). Rather than becoming decisively ‘society-oriented’ and taking on roles as central arbiters of civil society, however, the ROC and PCC instead became increasingly ‘state-oriented’ (e.g. Titarenko, 2008, p. 251). The establishment of ever closer relations between state and church (especially in Russia) have seriously reduced the prospect of any such developments and also served to generate increasingly widespread resentment towards church interference in the field of politics and public life among the wider population in both countries. Indeed, as will be illustrated in more detail below, such sentiments also clearly surface in the accounts of Russian and Polish young adults interviewed by the YARG scholars, and especially as expressed with reference to the statement “Believes that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation”.

Part of the explanation for current state-church relations in both countries undoubtedly also has to do with their respective experiences of their Communist anti-religious past. As research on religion both during and after the fall of the Iron Curtain has been able to show, the long-term effects of Communist ‘state-forced secularization’ appears to have remained most enduring in the countries of the former Soviet Union, but less so in countries such as Poland, where the overall figures of religiosity have remained high (Müller & Neundorf, 2012, pp. 564–563). It is equally important to note that, while both the ROC and PCC were severely curtailed and marginalized during Communist times, their respective pathways to re-institution have been notably different.

Starting almost immediately after the conclusive establishment of the Soviet Communist regime in Russia in the early 1920s, the active dismantling of Orthodox institutional structures continued at an accelerating pace up until the Second World War. In the decades following the war, state persecution of religion was gradually relaxed, as the ideology of ‘scientific atheism’ had become firmly established and religion was no longer considered a serious threat to Communist ideology (e.g. Stepanova, 2013). Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the religious landscape of Russia has experienced rapid and dramatic changes. The early 1990s witnessed an explosion in conversions to Orthodox Christianity, followed by a sharp increase in the numbers of people who self-identify as Orthodox Christian that continued up until the 2010s (Levada Center, 2011). Apart from turning to the traditionally dominant ROC, increasing numbers of people now also discovered religious alternatives and either formed or joined new religious movements (Shterin, 2001) . The ROC, however, has retained its dominant position. Currently approx. 71% of Russian citizens self-identify as Russian Orthodox Christians (Pew Research Center, 2017).

When it comes to the visibility of religion in the public sphere, the first three decades of post-Soviet Russia have been characterized by four principal developments – all of which relate to the re-establishment of the ROC and its re-emergence as a central social institutional actor. As a first notable development, since the early 2000s, the ROC has significantly increased its investments and engagements in different areas of social work and social services provision (Oreshina et al., 2018). A second notable development can be seen in the growing visibility of the ROC in public spaces. Beginning already in the early 1990s, there has been widespread restoration of church buildings and the establishment of new parishes. A third development relates to the increasing presence of the ROC in the field of education, as past decades have witnessed the proliferation of parochial (Sunday) schools, Orthodox Christian gymnasiums and seminaries (Nikitskaya, 2008; Willems, 2007; Metlik, 2010), as well as the introduction of religious education in public schools in 2012. In what constitutes a fourth and particularly significant development, the ROC has established ever closer relations with the Russian state apparatus and gradually cemented its position as a central source of social morality and national identity (Bruce, 2003, p. 53). Given this state of affairs, the growing social position and influence of the ROC is most adequately understood as a result of its ever-closer relationship with the core political establishment (e.g. Zabaev et al., 2018).

As for Poland, communist persecution of the PCC began after the Second World War through the country’s incorporation into the Eastern Bloc. Following the war, the convention with the Holy See (concordat) was terminated, and the church’s landed properties were nationalized. Catholic publications and publishing houses were closed down and many bishops and priests were arrested. The clash between Catholicism and Communism did not, however, result in a general decline in religious commitment. Instead, Catholic affiliation persisted, became increasingly associated with oppositional political activity and the Solidarity Movement, and gradually took on the characteristics of a civil religion in Poland (Mucha & Zaba, 1992, p. 57; Byrnes, 2002, p. 28). An adequate appreciation of the role of the PCC during the Communist era is therefore the key to an understanding of its role and position in contemporary Polish society and culture.

Today Poland remains a highly religiously homogeneous country. Close to 90 percent of Poles belong to the PCC , which continues to exercise considerable influence over national public and political life. The strong correlation between religiosity and nationalism in present-day Poland (McManus-Czubińska & Miller, 2008, pp. 131–132) can partly be explained by the fact that the PCC has traditionally been perceived as a cornerstone of national independence and democratic opposition. The rapid structural changes that followed in the wake of the collapse of the Communist system in 1989 did not, therefore, result in any dramatic changes in the Polish religious landscape. There are many possible explanations for the relative stability in religious attitudes in post-Communist Poland. Borowik (2010) singles out the following: the historical role of Catholicism in buttressing and maintaining national Polish identity; the civic role of religion and its political instrumentalization during the transformation period; the general decline in social security caused by rapid social and structural changes; the enduring efficacy of traditional mechanisms of religious socialization; and the possibility that more significant changes in the religiosity of Poles are still not discernible on the surface, although such changes might have occurred on the individual level. It seems plausible to argue that each of these five hypothetical explanations have played some role in the stabilization of religious attitudes among the Polish population during the past thirty years.

The PCC has steadily increased its presence throughout several areas of public life. It actively engages in the political arena, frequently cooperating with conservative political parties on legislative issues such as restrictions on abortion and the barring of sex education in schools. The presence of the PCC in public space has also become decidedly more visible in post-Communist times. The display of religious symbols in public schools and offices, the participation of priests in official state ceremonies, and the blessing of public buildings all constitute examples of this. The public visibility and presence of the PCC does, however, enjoy wide acceptance among the Polish population (e.g. CBOS, 2015).

As illustrated by the above discussion, post-Communist times have witnessed the re-emergence and re-institution of national churches as central social and political actors in both Russia and Poland. But, as the above discussion also shows, their respective pathways towards this end have been notably different. To simplify, whereas the ROC’s rise to prominence can generally be viewed in terms of a top-down process involving the active support of the Russian state, the re-institution of the PCC can instead generally be understood in terms of a bottom-up process, stemming from its wide support among the Polish population at large, previous association with oppositional politics, and through functioning as a central symbol of Polish national identity. In both countries, however, the increasing presence of the Churches in the political arena has developed into an increasingly contentious issue.

14.3 The Position of the Statement “Believes That Religion Should Play the Central Role in the Ruling of the Nation” in the Russian and Polish Samples

In this section, we move to analyze our Russian and Polish respondents’ views about the statement “Believes that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation”. Since their articulation of their personal views need to be viewed in relation to the broader discursive contexts in which they appear, our discussion will unfold on a supra-individual level, highlighting how individual respondents varyingly tap into prevalent discursive formations on the role of religion in modern societies and how they relate them to their own experiences of their respective social, cultural, and religious contexts.’

As a first dimension, we show the position of this particular statement vis-à-vis other statements on related topics and issues in the Russian and Polish prototypes that were created out of Faith Q-Sorts as generalized sets of views represented by particular cases in each country sample. As a second dimension, we explore the main ways in which this statement is discussed in the narratives of Russian and Polish interviewees.

The chosen statement was discussed in 29 of the Russian and 24 of the Polish interviews (i.e. in a majority out of all 45 interviews conducted in each location). It constitutes a defining statement for all of the five Russian prototypes and for two out of four Polish prototypes (Prototype 1 Critical and Rational Individualist and Prototype 4 Unengaged, Secularly Inclined Sceptic). Assuming that each prototype represents a certain type of a ‘mindset’, they have been compared on the basis of how this statement is respectively positioned vis-à-vis the following FQS-statements that also pertain to views and attitudes towards the role of religion in society at various individual, group, and public levels:

  • 7 Participates in religious practices chiefly to meet others’ wishes or expectations.

  • 20 Relies on religious authorities for understanding and direction.

  • 25 Feels contempt for all religious institutions, ideas and practices.

  • 31 Is critical of the religious tradition of his or her people.

  • 46 Feels that one should remain loyal to the religion of one’s nation.

  • 58 Feels that it is important to maintain continuity of the religious traditions of family and ancestors.

These statements emerged as either distinguishing or defining for at least one of the seven prototypes included in the analysis. FQS-statement 7 “Participates in religious practices chiefly to meet others’ wishes or expectations” stands out as distinguishing for both Polish prototypes included in the analysis as well as for two of the Russian prototypes (Prototype 4 Critical and Unengaged Religious Conformist and Prototype 5 Anxious Believer). Shared agreement with this statement may reflect an experience of a tension between a personal lack of belief or enthusiasm in the face of perceived broader social approval of religion and religious activity.

The prototypes included in the analysis display notable differences when it comes to FQS-statement 25 “Feels contempt for all religious institutions, ideas and practices”. While the more ‘critically minded’ prototypes are characterized by strong agreement and identification with this statement, more ‘open-minded’ prototypes are instead characterized by the opposite view. While all prototypes are united in their rejection of the notion that religion should play a central role in the ruling of the nation, this does not necessarily involve a critical or dismissive stance towards religious institutions and religious practice as such.

FQS-statement 58 “Feels that it is important to maintain continuity of the religious traditions of family and ancestors” is distinguishing for two of the Russian and one of the Polish prototypes included in the analysis. Here, too, notable differences can be found across these three prototypes. For example, while Russian Prototype 4 Critical and Unengaged Religious Conformist agrees with the statement, Russian Prototype 1 Progressive Secular Rationalist and Polish Prototype 1 Critical and Rational Individualist do not. Furthermore, FQS-statement 31 “Is critical of the religious tradition of his or her people” is defining for both Polish Prototype 1 and Russian Prototype 5 Anxious Believer, but in opposite ways. While the former agrees, the latter does not. Hence, while all of these prototypes are unified by their rejection of the statement “Believes that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation”, they display considerable variations when it comes to their respective attitudes towards inherited and received religious traditions.

Some of the above-listed statements are defining for only one of the prototypes included in the analysis. For example, only Polish Prototype 1 Critical and Rational Individualist expresses clear distance towards FQS-statement 46 “Feels that one should remain loyal to the religion of one’s nation”, and only Russian Prototype 1 disagrees with FQS-statement 20 “Relies on religious authorities for understanding and direction”.

This general FQS-dimension analysis reveals how shared disagreement with the notion that religion should play a central role in the ruling of the nation emerges as part of several different ‘mindsets’ as well as in different types of constellations vis-à-vis other statements pertaining to the role of religion in society.

14.4 Discourses on the Public Role of Religion in the Russian and Polish Interviews

To engage in discursive practice always entails a positioning of one’s own subject in relation to particular discursive formations, i.e. sets or clusters of discourses that govern certain broader domains of thought such as, for example, politics, economics, or religion (Fairclough, 1992, p. 43). Discursive formations serve to construct particular areas of social reality, such as ‘religiosity’ or state-church relations, in particular ways, thereby also serving to position subjects in relation to such social realities in particular ways. In the following analysis of individual respondents’ views on the role of religion in the governing of the nation, particular attention is therefore paid to the different ways in which respondents position themselves in relation to broader discursive formations on the topic.

The analysis unfolded in three stages. First, each interview from both samples was analyzed separately. This was followed by an identification and classification of the main discourses that emerged in relation to the statement under consideration in both samples. On the basis of this classification, three closely interrelated main discourses on the role of religion in society were identified as emerging particularly clearly throughout both samples: a discourse of differentiation , a discourse of plurality and diversity, and a discourse of tradition and modernity. The appearance of these discourses in the interviews does not, however, directly correlate with certain prototypes. While some respondents only briefly mentioned the statement about the role of religion in society in passing, others elaborated on their views in much greater length and detail. In some cases, respondents expressed their views through an idiom that largely echoes widespread secularist platitudes about the role of religion in society and public life, while altogether refraining from providing anything by means of further explanation about how their views on the statement relate to their own personal outlooks. This is, arguably, at least partly explained by the ways in which the separation of church and state has developed into a central liberal democratic value and ‘default position’ that figures prominently in mainstream mass media and institutional sites such as universities. Each discourse identified nonetheless centers on certain sets of values and ideals relating to the role of religion in society, and especially the area of politics.

14.4.1 Discourse of Differentiation

A first main discourse that clearly emerges from both the Russian and Polish interviews centers on the need to maintain a strong separation between religion and state in terms of their respective main functions and fields of influence. This discourse also renders religion a private matter and highlights the dangers that religious involvement in politics poses to democracy and individual freedoms. In the perspectives of the respondents, the function of religion is to cater to people’s ‘spiritual’ needs, while the role of the state is to secure people’s ‘material’ needs. As one Russian respondent said:

Number 71 [FQS71] implies that religion should play the main role in the governing of the state. Well, it’s simply foolish, it is. It is because state doesn’t serve the same purposes as religion. Religion is an institution that serves the purpose of spiritual self-actualization of people’s consciousness, of one’s personality. State, in its turn, realizes people’s needs in material values, in protection, their needs in work and, among other things, their needs to participate in some religious events. (YRUPV03)

In a similar vein, a Polish respondent stated:

In my opinion these [religion and state] should be completely separated, the Church should take care of spiritual matters and—the people who rule the country should rather take care of—aiming to improve the operation of some institutions, to enhance the umm living standards of the inhabitants. And this shouldn’t be in any way dependent on the Church issues and, spiritual resolutions. (YPLSS128)

These respondents both articulate the view that religion should focus on ‘spiritual matters’, whereas the state should focus on improving the functionality of social institutions and strive to improve the standard of living. As seen from these two quotes, the respective and ‘completely separate’ functions of religion and state are articulated in largely identical terms. However, in some cases the idea of functional differentiation is supplemented with an argument on the strongly ‘personal’, and indeed ‘intimate’, character of religious belief. In this view, religion is located outside the purview of any public, political, or other broader social agenda. As one Russian respondent recounted:

‘Believes that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation’. Under no circumstances. Well, I’m kind of in favor of a secular state, where religion is separated. […] It is rooted in my conviction that religion is a very intimate matter and some view it as their connection to God or something else; it’s very personal, and you can’t play it, you can’t use it to rule the state. That is, as a tool of authority. (YRUPV08)

Religious interference in politics is frequently expressed through an idiom of control of consciousness and the imposition of certain values. In this view, state appeals to religious arguments or authorities stand in direct conflict with its mandate to uphold individual rights and freedoms. Locating religion in the domain of ‘private life’ presupposes that certain beliefs neither can nor should be imposed on individuals. Another Russian respondent puts it somewhat more starkly:

It’s, well, probably—let’s say—absolutely clear that religion is, so to say—a state of mind, a certain unreality, whereas the state we live in is reality and, well, we understand that reality and unreality, they can’t be interconnected. Uh, and first—if religion interferes in state affairs, first, it acts in its own interests, with the purpose of strengthening its position and its influence in the country. Well, I think, I think that, um—let’s say, these are structures which, can’t even coexist, and if they do, it leads to a certain degree of absurdity. (YRUPV33)

In what represents a continuation of the views articulated by the previously quoted respondents, the views expressed here connect to a discourse on the respective different functions of religion and state by making a further phenomenological distinction between the ‘unreality’ (or ‘transcendence-focus’) of religion as opposed to the ‘reality’ (or ‘immanence-focus’) of the state. The conjunction of these two domains is perceived as constituting an ‘absurdity’. From this standpoint, as soon as religion is granted political power, it is deemed to use it to strengthen its societal position and influence. This respondent thus clearly articulates strong suspicion towards the prime motivations of religious institutions in the public domain. Based on their personal experiences of the growing public role and influence of religion in Russia, such suspicion was also articulated by several other Russian respondents. Many Russian respondents are not only united by their disagreement with the chosen statement and joint emphasis on a clear separation between church and state, but also by their largely shared personal experiences of recent developments in church-state relations in Russia. Indeed, the manifestations of these relations are described in quite striking terms, as in religion now being ‘everywhere’. Similar to the Russian respondents quoted above, several Polish respondents also tap into a discourse of the proper behavior of a constitutionally secular state. One Polish respondent expressed unequivocal views on the subject:

‘Believes that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation’. I extremely disagree with that. I think that—the nation and religion should be completely separate institutions. Religion should have no influence, I mean—um no real influence on power, developing the structure of social order. It should not have [influence] in the same way as the state. Religion should be voluntary; if one wants, he can join it, cultivate it, of course, but there should be no religious element in ruling the nation because it is—in my opinion, it has negative effects and creates divisions and problems—um I would like to—um avoid such a situation and I think it is worth avoiding. (YPLSS327)

The ‘extreme’ disagreement with the statement expressed by the respondent stems from a conviction that religious interference in state politics would cause problems and conflicts both within and between societies. Overall, the discourse of differentiation taps in to broader prevalent discursive formations on the necessity for modern democratic states to remain secular and religiously neutral. It emphasizes the potential dangers that the extension of religious values and beliefs to the political sphere would pose for cherished individual freedoms. This discourse simultaneously highlights that religion should remain a private and voluntary matter. Hence, religious incursions into politics and the establishment of closer ties between state and religion are viewed with great concern.

14.4.2 Discourse of Plurality and Diversity

A second main discourse that emerges from the Russian and Polish interviews centers on the fact of diversity and plurality as a natural condition of modern society and emphasizes the peaceful co-existence of different religions, religious/spiritual and non-religious outlooks or persuasions alike. Although it retains close connections to the previously discussed discourse of differentiation and the idea of religion as a private matter, it also adds particular emphasis on the ways in which state preference or support for a certain religion almost by necessity leads to discrimination, exclusion, and hostility towards minority persuasions. As expressed by one Russian respondent:

I think that if a religion rules the nation, it will mean, first of all, that adherents of other religions will be oppressed and non-believers will be oppressed above others. Consequently, I’m against this […] I don’t think there’s any point in a religious intervention in state affairs; to each his own. (YRUPV15)

In this account, the affordance of political power to a particular religion or religious institution is directly linked to the oppression of alternative persuasions, be they religious or otherwise. Such views were also echoed by several other respondents. Another Russian respondent said:

We have a great deal of religions, even within our country, so if we suggest that religion rules the state, it would mean doing so at someone’s expense. It’s not a good strategy. (YRUPV18)

Religious political power is directly associated with the repression of individual freedoms and the curtailing of religious diversity. Indeed, as argued by this respondent, if one religion is allowed a central role in the governing of the nation, this will necessarily happen at the ‘expense’ of the liberties of those who hold other views. A Polish respondent recounted:

In my opinion religion and generally the church as an institution because it is also criticized by me now. They should not influence each other because, for instance, there is no obligation to be a Catholic in Poland. There are also other national and ethnic minorities here. And if this religion played a key role, well, then those nations would be aggrieved or just the atheists or even people who quest […] Religion should be and the most important holidays should be commonly celebrated, but without exaggeration. So certainly it should not play a key role. (YPLSS23)

In a way that closely resembles the accounts of the Russian respondents quoted above, this one also links the political elevation of one religion or religious institution to the marginalization of ‘national and ethnic minorities’. In some accounts, the concept of ‘democracy’ also comes into play:

I think the division between the state and religion is the fundamental element of a democratic society […] And without this division we have a religious state, which is not the best option: no religion. Even if I was, let’s generally assume, a Christian living in a Christian state, I don’t think I would be happy knowing that other people may not necessarily be Christians. What about them? (YPLSS149)

For this respondent, the question of whether even citizens belonging to the dominant religion of society would necessarily want the persuasions of others to be limited or curtailed is explicitly linked to democratic ideals.

Generally, the discourse on plurality and diversity underlines the need for states to support and uphold equal religious liberties for all citizens. While the discourse of differentiation is more focused on religion (as a private matter), the discourse of diversity and plurality is instead based on the idea that a secular state should not intervene in religious matters and views religion as part of the individual lifeworld. Failure to do so, according to this discourse , leads to the oppression and marginalization of minority persuasions, which would, again, stand at odds with the liberal values espoused by the majority of respondents in both countries.

14.4.3 Discourse of Tradition and Modernity

A final third main discourse that emerges from the interviews centers on the notion that traditional religious dogmas and mores have lost their relevance for modern societies. In this view, religious traditions and beliefs are ill-suited to function as a source of moral order in increasingly pluralistic modern societies. This discourse primarily emerged in the accounts of the Russian respondents. For example:

‘Believes that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation’, is it called theocracy? […] Because there were countries like that, and there might be a few now. Well, again, I think it corresponds with the fact that religion can intimidate […] So I think that if we look at religion from the philosophical perspective, there should be some religious ideas, well, in the national ideology . Because it could be beneficial, because religion has some very good statements, essentially—well, but I don’t think that religion as an institution can do any good. Especially in the modern world and even in modern Russia. (YRUPV42)

While this respondent clearly rejects the notion that religion should play a part in the governing of the nation, she nevertheless maintains that religion can provide valuable ‘philosophical’ and ideational elements that can serve to underpin ‘national ideology ’. As an institution, however, religion is viewed as being incapable of contributing to modern Russian society, and indeed modern society in general. Another Russian respondent related the issue to broader secular values:

I don’t think that religion, some kinds of traditions are, first of all, meant to be permanent, and second, meant to determine gender relations and the ruling of the state, let alone some other social institutions. Because, first of all, these are very different things, these are completely different spheres of influence for me. And I don’t really know, but I think the state must still be secular and a citizen must align his or her behavior in it not according to some kinds of religious dogmas, but according to some kinds of moral values, which he or she has in his mind, probably. (YRUPV10)

In the opinion of this respondent, it would be a mistake to regard religious beliefs and traditions as possessing some kind of ‘eternal’ quality. Hence, as they become outdated, ‘religious dogmas’ should not retain the power to influence behaviors and morals indefinitely, but rather be substituted with ‘moral values’. Another Russian respondent clearly articulates the view that nations should be governed on the basis of rationality and reason:

No, it’s the brains that should play the central role in the ruling of a nation. […] because religion—is kind of indiscriminating. But you can’t do this when you rule a nation. (YRUPV24)

She also seems to suggest the practical impossibility of religion or religious institutions playing any type of part in any such activities. Some very similar thoughts are also expressed by this Polish respondent:

I do not think that ‘that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation’, because people should not be guided by it. They should be sometimes guided by reason; faith is not enough. Ruling the question as to whether religion should play—it should not. Not all people think the same as I do, and then you know what—trouble. (YPLSS106)

In this account, if ‘reason’ is allowed to be eclipsed by religiously motivated arguments in the sphere of politics and governing, this risk is seen as leading to disagreements or ‘trouble’. Another perspective on the irrelevance of religion in the modern world was also suggested:

I don’t believe that ‘religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation’. I fundamentally disagree with it. That’s exactly what I was talking about earlier, we’re so um strongly individualized now that religion is completely losing its importance as an element that holds people together, and because it is a system that has rather fundamentalist views, it would strongly restrain the possibility of human development and self-creation. So you can’t give it the privilege of ruling. (YPLSS47)

In this account, religion is described as ‘completely losing’ its capacity to function as a unifying force for people in increasingly diverse modern societies. This respondent also taps into discourses of diversity and pluralism by directly associating religion with ‘fundamentalist’ views that serve to curtail ‘human development’ and individual freedom and self-determination. An appreciation of the secular state and increasing social plurality and diversity is also expressed in relation to general socioeconomic development:

Well, I am an economist by profession, and I think the world has now reached, well, many countries, in any case, have reached the level of development when people of different ideas and beliefs are assembled together in the country, and if there is the one religion in such a country, it won’t bring any good or be effective. Some people will be oppressed, and therefore it seems to me that states, especially multi-religious, should be secular. (YRUPV36)

In this account, holding up to a particular religion is seen as causing obstacles for state efficiency and societal progress. A Polish respondent expressed some similar views:

There are people who do not believe and those who believe should understand them. And if we close ourselves in a sort of a bubble in which religion is most important, well, then those people will not be able to understand the other ones and will take a negative attitude towards them. So, I do not say that there can be no religion. There can be religion, it does not disturb me. However, it should not be most important because we live in times where it exists, but, unlike in the past, we know there are other things, so, somehow, we should be open—to what happens. (YPLSS63)

Thus, state preference for any one religion is associated with conservatism and ignorance. The discourse on tradition and modernity expressed by these respondents appears to generally reflect what Casanova (2013, p. 31) has referred to in terms of an understanding of secularity as ‘stadial consciousness’. This is to say that people who live in what they regard as modern societies tend to understand and experience secularity as a modern ‘default position’ and as ‘the meaningful result of a quasi-natural process of development’ (Casanova, 2013, p. 32). In this view, religion largely represents a residue of the past that modern societies and individuals would need to, or should already have, ‘overcome’. The prevalence of this discourse among the Russian respondents most likely follows from their negative personal experiences of the present-day public visibility of the ROC. In contrast to the gradual modernization of the Catholic Church following the Second Vatican Council, the ROC has maintained its pre-revolution standards and thus remained decidedly more conservative in both its general outlook and communication with the wider Russian population. This has served to strengthen a view of the ROC as an archaic and backward-striving institution, especially among younger generations.

14.5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks

As illustrated by the analysis of this chapter, the notion that religion should play a central part in the ruling of the nation sparked lively discussion and was commented on in the majority of all Russian (29) and Polish (24) interviews. In the vast majority of cases, the Russian and Polish young adults interviewed expressed strong disagreement with the statement. The analysis of the position of the FQS-statement 71 vis-à-vis other statements on similar topics and questions in the Russian and Polish prototypes did, however, reveal that disagreement with it was not necessarily indicative of a negative stance towards religion or religious traditions as such. Among both Russian and Polish respondents, the statement “Believes that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation” provoked strongly negative reactions for largely the same reasons. The analysis revealed that respondents mostly expressed their views on the public role of religion in society through three interrelated main discourses: a discourse on differentiation, a discourse on diversity and plurality, and a discourse on tradition and modernity. Each discourse also strongly connects to wider prevalent discursive formations on individual rights and freedoms as the natural and taken-for-granted states of affairs in modern democratic societies. When discussed in direct relation to the state, the notion of a national or civil religion is rejected by respondents in favor of a complete disentanglement of nation, citizenship, and religion and the firm location of religion to the private sphere. It is also worth noting that Russian and Polish respondents do not recognize religious institutions as contributors to civil society, but rather as tools for strengthening state authority . Indeed, the notion of a civil society is almost altogether absent from their accounts. The majority of respondents held the view that the interference of religion in politics will almost by necessity lead to the imposition of certain beliefs and values, the curtailment of minority persuasions, and a general infringement of individual democratic liberties and freedoms. The Russian and Polish churches’ interferences into politics and ever closer links to their respective states were therefore viewed with suspicion and often great concern.

All respondents included in the analysis referred to religion in the singular. The interviews are also characterized by the near total absence of any mentions of other religious actors except for the ‘church’, which in all cases refers either to the ROC or PCC . ‘Religion’, therefore, is equated with either one of these dominant churches. This would appear to suggest that Russian and Polish respondents have limited experiences of the visibility of any other types of religions or religious actors in the public spheres of their respective countries. The absence of mentions of other levels or aspects of church organization such as ‘parish’, ‘diocese’, etc., would also appear to suggest that respondents tend to perceive the churches in terms of monoliths that they lack any deeper personal relationship to.

It is, however, well worth asking why particularly Russian but also Polish respondents stand out with regard to their rejection of the statement in question. They all belong to the post-Communist generation and thus lack any personal experiences of an anti-religious Communist past. Russian respondents’ strong rejection of the idea that religion should play the central role in the ruling of the nation is at least partly explained by the strong secular character of higher education in Russia and the fact that the ROC has aligned itself with a political establishment that finds weak support among younger generations. The Polish respondents’ rejection of the considered statement is perhaps best explained by the PCC ’s continued association with and support for conservative values, and a ruling political party whose policies remain unpopular among the young.