Keywords

Introduction

Resilience theory has frequently been applied to the study of how systems (both human and environmental) are structured and how those structures respond to their surrounding conditions.Footnote 1 Within these constructs, some scholars have argued that there is a cycle of rise and fall, collapse, restructuring, rebirth, etc., that every system goes through. Known as the “Adaptive Cycle,” this is usually depicted as an infinity loop, with “reorganization, growth, conservation, and release” as its four quadrants (see Fig. 1 and, e.g., Holling 2001; Holling and Gunderson 2002; Redman and Kinzig 2003). The extent to which the system maintains the ability or flexibility to avoid a dramatic release phase is considered a measurement of its resilience and adaptability.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, DC

Visualization of the “Adaptive Cycle” (following Holling and Gunderson 2002, Fig. 1)

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Of particular relevance to this paper is the ‘Release’, or Ω phase, which occurs when a system, as a part of its ‘Conservation’ (K) phase, has produced efficiencies and structures to such an extent that it becomes inflexible in its response to external pressures and changes. The result is a process of devolution or disintegration, resolving into a period of restructuring (α phase). As part of this, it has been further suggested that resources might be reorganized into a new system, in order to take advantage of opportunities created by the disaster (see, e.g., Redman and Kinzig 2003; Redman 2005, 72–74; among others).

Within the eastern Mediterranean at the end of the twelfth century BCE, a series of disruptions are observable in the archaeological and historical record. These disruptions appear at different times, are of different levels of intensity, and impact the socio-political and economic systems to varying degrees. Proposed causes of these disruptions also vary, with no one single culprit identified. The variability in time, scale, and impact have left a disparate array of theories as to what, exactly, happened. In this paper we suggest that the Adaptive Cycle and construct of Panarchy can assist in framing the impacts upon the eastern Mediterranean at this time. In particular, the construct of Panarchy is a useful heuristic to contextualize the differing effects found in the eastern Mediterranean writ large, as well as to discuss impacts at regional and local scales.

Brief Overview of the Bronze Age Collapse

Just after the beginning of the twelfth century BCE, at the end of what archaeologists call the Late Bronze Age in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean and across an area which stretched from what is now modern Italy to Afghanistan and from modern Turkey to Egypt, a thriving and interconnected group of societies or civilizations suddenly experienced a catastrophic collapse. By 1100 BCE, at the absolute latest, the interconnected world which they had known for several centuries by that point had broken down. For some, the existing socio-economic and political system was removed and supplanted; others proved more resilient and were able to adjust and otherwise survive, but almost always in a new permutation. The groups in question included the Mycenaeans on mainland Greece and the Minoans on Crete; the Cypriots and the Egyptians; the Hittites in Anatolia (modern Turkey); the Canaanites in the Levant (modern Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan); and the Mitanni, Assyrians, and Babylonians in Mesopotamia (modern Iraq).

However, the question of what actually caused the Collapse (as it is known) has not ever been answered to everyone's satisfaction, despite numerous attempts at an explanation. Hypotheses that have been suggested over the years include drought, famine, earthquakes, and invaders. Especially favored was the notion of sweeping destructions by the so-called Sea Peoples, whom the Egyptian records claim overran everyone and everything that was in their way in both 1207 BCE and 1177 BCE, during the reigns of the Pharaohs Merneptah and Ramses III. “No land could stand before their arms,” said Ramses III on his mortuary temple at Medinet Habu, near the Valley of the Kings in Egypt, “from Khatte, Qode, Carchemish, Arzawa, and Alashiya on. … They were coming forward toward Egypt, while the flame was prepared before them. Their confederation was the Peleset, Tjekker, Shekelesh, Danuna, and Weshesh, lands united” (translation following Wilson 1969, 262–63). Of all the countries, areas, and groups mentioned in these inscriptions, only the Egyptians themselves were able to hold off the invaders, at least according to their own account.

Most recently, however, one of us has suggested that the Sea Peoples were simply one manifestation of the larger problem(s) during that period, and that it is more likely to have been a combination of all of the above—a perfect storm of calamities, as it were—that led to the collapse and breakdown of the globalized society that had flourished for centuries by that point (Cline 2014, 2021). Moreover, it took several decades, and perhaps as much as a century, for the globalized network as a whole to completely collapse, for the various civilizations went down at slightly different times and in slightly different ways, depending upon how resilient they were.

The subsequent period of transition, which saw various processes of rebirth, reorganization, or replacement in different parts of the affected region as a whole, proceeded at varying speeds and by diverse means in each area. While some, like the Assyrians, held out longer than others and recovered faster than most, it was to be nearly four hundred years, not until ca. 800 BCE, before we can truly speak of the globalized network to have been reestablished. There was much transformation involved during these centuries, including new players in several areas, such as the kingdoms of Israel and Judah in what had been southern Canaan. Among those who adapted to the “new normal” were pockets of surviving populations, such as the Phoenicians in what is now primarily coastal Lebanon, who may have taken advantage of the discord and chaos in the years following 1177 BCE and the destruction of cities such as Ugarit in northern Syria (see also Kemp and Cline, this volume).

Resilience/Adaptive Cycle/Panarchy

The Bronze Age Collapse is an event that requires teasing out the processes which regulate continuity, change, and collapse within a system.

Complex systems operate at a series of scales, whether this be a leaf on a tree within a forest, or a household in a village of a larger state system. Each of these units holds the capacity for operating within an Adaptive Cycle, yet the processes within each will be affected by actions taken by other systemic cycles with which they are associated—either at larger or smaller scales (hierarchical, Fig. 2) or at similar scales (heterarchical). This interdependent, networked system of adaptation is termed ‘Panarchy’ (Holling 2001; Holling, Gunderson, and Peterson 2002) and serves as a means by which one can conceptualize complex adaptive systems and their impact upon other associated systems of organization—both vertically in terms of hierarchical systems of organization, and horizontally in relation to other similarly-scaled systems that are operating at the same time in close proximity or association.

Fig. 2
figure 2

(following Holling and Gunderson 2002. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, DC.)

In this example, a smaller system, as part of its Ω phase, foments revolution, which impacts a larger system undergoing a hyper-extended phase (K), thereby contributing to an ensuing Ω phase in the larger system. Alternatively, a larger system in a K phase contributes previously forgotten constructs of organization to a smaller system, facilitating restructuring (α phase) , Fig. 2)

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Furthermore, as Holling, Gunderson, Redman, and others have pointed out, it is possible—and potentially very relevant in this case—to discuss “collapse” within the construct of “Panarchy.” As Redman and Kinzig (2003) have stated: “many historical studies see the collapse of a civilization as the end of the discussion, because the period, dynasty, or even society appears to be at an end. Happily, resilience theory recognizes that collapse, release, and reorganization are just as integral as the exploitation/growth phase. … Sometimes the shell of the old system, e.g., the government or social organization, survives the collapse and is reused. At other times after a collapse, the system devolves to a lower level with potential subsequent reintegration. During periods of reorganization of human systems, the focus is usually on social, political, or economic organization.”

It is at this critical Ω phase where the hierarchical interdependence (or lack thereof) of systems comes into critical play. During and after the process of release, lower and higher systems of organization serve as structures that can either buffer against complete systemic failure or as guides towards reorganization. Figure 2 presents a hypothetical example, where an intermediate system undergoing collapse brought on by disturbances at a lower level of organization is assisted by ‘memory’ (expected patterns/practices) from a higher-level system.

Drawing from the historical/archaeological record, an Ω phase observed widely in Anatolia in the eighth century CE (Roberts et al. 2018) was mitigated in a specific region in central Anatolia, given the imposition of the Byzantine state for strategic purposes (Newhard et al., 2021). Despite the environmental and archaeological records showing decreases in agriculture and human activity throughout Anatolia, the region around the city of Avkat (north-central Anatolia) maintained if not increased in the amount of human activity as a result of its importance in the defensive network of the Byzantine Empire.

In this instance, engagement with the higher-order Byzantine system buffered the Avkat region against stresses which would have otherwise been felt. Contrarily, it as has been pointed out by various scholars that frequently it is small, and often very rapid, changes in just one part of the structure that will end up bringing down the entire system (see, e.g., Redman 2005, 73–74). This occurs in systems where the hierarchical relationships are inherently weak, have otherwise become weakened via systemic stress, or conversely, are overdependent upon that component of the structure (see Kemp and Cline, this volume).

We would suggest that the twelfth to tenth centuries BCE in the Eastern Mediterranean can be seen within the construct of the Adaptive Cycle and of Panarchic collapse and reconfiguration (i.e., the K–Ω–α phases at various levels). Viewing the eastern Mediterranean as a series of heterarchical systems interconnected by a series of hyper-networked elite relationships, the multiple disruptions occurring would impact each of these systems differently, based upon their own idiosyncratic configurations. If so, then we might begin by restating the facts as follows: after centuries of sustained interaction and international trade and diplomatic contacts between the Great Powers of the Late Bronze Age (e.g., Hittites, Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Cypriots), as well as the smaller kingdoms of the Canaanites, during what can be described as the K phase of the Adaptive Cycle, the system came crashing down within a few decades—two to three generations at most—in what seems to be rather clearly the “release” or Ω phase of the cycle.

What we see next is the recovery, or reorganization, part of the cycle (α phase). During this period, which varied in length depending upon the area and society involved, the various civilizations either successfully transformed/adapted or, having been unsuccessful, continue to collapse and reconfigure into new systems. Thus, for example, the Neo-Assyrians—who had successfully sustained themselves for longer than most of the rest of the Great Powers—finally suffered through two centuries of instability, drought, famine, and attacks from groups such as the Arameans, before remerging as the dominant power in the Near East beginning in the ninth century BCE.

An alternative scenario was followed by the Hittites in Anatolia, whose system collapsed entirely, as part of the “release” or Ω phase of the cycle. While the main part of the empire did not recover or reorganize, one small part carried on—namely the rump states located in northern Syria, such as the small kingdom of Carchemish, which was ruled by a descendant of the Hittite king.

Similarly, most of the small Canaanite kingdoms and city-states simply vanished and were eventually assimilated or replaced by new entities such as the kingdoms of Israel, Judah, Edom, and Moab. The small city-states on the coast of what is now Lebanon—including Byblos, Sidon, Tyre, and Arwad—not only survived but flourished amid the chaos that followed the Collapse. They now became “anti-fragile,” to invoke a term coined by Taleb (2014), and took over the role that had previously been filled by entities such as Ugarit, expanding out into the Mediterranean and eventually sending their ships as far as the Aegean and beyond, to north Africa and even Spain.

While Taleb’s term is useful, we note that some scholars have suggested modifying the α phase within the adaptive cycle, so that it describes a period during which “resources are reorganized into a new system to take advantage of opportunities” (Redman and Kinzig 2003). Such a description would aptly fit the reorganization on the part of the newly reborn Phoenicians. (We note that a similar discussion may also be relevant for Cyprus, and its transition from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age.)

The Aegean Region as an Example of Panarchic Collapse

The aftermath of the Collapse was problematic for more political entities than just the Hittites. For instance, Mycenaean society on Mainland Greece, as they had known it for centuries by that point, essentially came to an end in the decades after 1200 BCE. The Collapse dealt a blow to the Mycenaean civilization which, until then, had been flourishing since the seventeenth century BCE. While the full nature of the political and socio-economic system is still under scrutiny and likely varied from region to region (Parkinson 2007), if evidence from Pylos can stand as a rough proxy, it appears that elite elements of society, established at regional centers in a heterarchical system, engaged in a process of ‘prestige finance’ by which resources (local and exotic) were mobilized and redistributed as symbolic capital between themselves and others within their individual, regional (likely) hierarchical systems (Nakassis 2011). During the Collapse, the ability to mobilize both would have been severely curtailed, leading to the loss of political power. Most of the main centers suffered destruction, and the elite systems that had most likely administered the bulk of long-distance exchange—along with the central administrative centers, the need for specialized labor, and administrative tools such as writing—disappeared.

Cumming and Peterson (2017) lay out four criteria for defining collapse: (1) elements of the system must be lost, (2) the loss is quickly executed (within a generation), (3) the loss includes significant amounts of social capital (broadly defined), and 4) the consequences must be long-lasting. The Mycenaean world of the twelfth century BCE meets all four of these criteria. Key actors (wanax), system components (writing/administration), and interactions (long-distance ties with key trade partners) were lost. This loss happened relatively quickly—likely within a generation—and included elements required for maintaining the prestige economy (social capital) of the Mycenaean elites. The removal of the Mycenaean palatial system limited long-distance engagement and flattened social hierarchies.

Although partial habitation continued at some of the cities, such as at Mycenae, and some lucky or skilled few may have even successfully continued some sort of life as they had known it previously for a few decades, e.g., in the Lower City at Tiryns, the Mycenaean palatial system, for all intents and purposes, failed to adapt and transform to the new normal. What remained were those systems that operated independently (or could operate independently) of the elite system (Arena 2015). It would be centuries before the same level of socio-political complexity was regained. In sum, the vast majority of the elite centers, such as Mycenae, Pylos, and Thebes, seem to have succumbed rather quickly, along with all of their societal norms, ranging from palatial administration and feasting to their writing system. While the collapse of this system may have been welcomed by some, as has been suggested by Weiberg and Finné (2018), who see the large-scale Mycenaean building projects in particular as straining the economy to its breaking point, overall, it can only be viewed as a catastrophe for the majority of the Mycenaean elites and certainly for their society as a whole, which ended rather abruptly.

However, we would also note that the extent of the “Collapse” is surely one of perspective, at least in terms of socio-political organization. As has been noted, the construct of collapse is often a construct of identity (Lantzas 2016; Strunz, Marselle, and Schröter 2019; Cumming and Peterson 2017). For instance, if we were able to ask the wanax (king) of Pu-ro (Bronze Age Pylos) whether the world as he knew it had fallen apart, he would definitely reply in the affirmative. The system in which he primarily operated was gone. However, if we were to ask the same of a farmer living at the same time in the periphery, they would probably say that nothing had really changed, unless of course they had been personally affected by the drought.

Further, it has long been apparent to most scholars that the Collapse was neither total nor complete in terms of broader, international connections. It is now apparent that long-distance trade did not completely disappear during the transition from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age on the Greek mainland, particularly at sites like Lefkandi in Euboea; it may also be the case that it was these links to the Eastern Mediterranean that helped contribute to the eventual economic, political, and societal reconfigurations that resulted in the Greek societies of the Archaic and Classical periods.

In short, while catastrophic to the upper echelons and elite of the Mycenaeans, if we view the events in the Aegean at the end of the Bronze Age in terms of the longue durée, the disappearance of Mycenaean society and the end of the Bronze Age civilizations in the Aegean did not spell the end of inhabitation on the Greek mainland, nor on Crete and the Cycladic islands for that matter. Instead, it may be useful, once again, to suggest that the events in this region should be viewed in terms of the extent to which the idiosyncratic structures of regional systems adapted and changed—in other words, regional adaptive cycles and their engagement within and upon broader interconnected systems (Panarchy).

While viewing the impacts within the eastern Mediterranean within these constructs is useful to conceptualize the pattern and identify ramifications of hierarchical and heterarchical relationships, the Adaptive Cycle and Panarchy do not render information as to how those patterns and relationships work. Further work into the individual systems from a construct of heterarchy, which assesses both hierarchical (vertical) and networked (horizontal) relationships, will enable us to better review and understand the impacts of events such as those experienced in the eastern Mediterranean at the end of the Bronze Age (Cumming 2016). Combined with a stated framework for describing collapse (c.f., Cumming and Peterson 2017), the processes afoot in the eastern Mediterranean would have the capacity for deeper cross-cultural comparison with other collapse events—ancient and modern.

Discussion/Conclusions

By way of brief conclusions, we may summarize the situation as follows. First and foremost, it is clear that the Late Bronze Age in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean ended in either disruptions to or the elimination of the hyperconnective adaptive system that had been in place for centuries by that point, leading to cascading disruptions to, and/or the elimination of, lower levels of organization. These impacts, and the subsequent α phases, vary by area and specific society, depending upon a variety of factors. Among others, these include their own internal systemic organization (e.g., Aegean vs. Egypt), their own panarchic organizational structure (i.e., the connections between state/regional/local systems, including political, economic, religious, and social), and their dependence upon the hyperconnective adaptive system that had just collapsed. In the case of the Aegean, once the wider eastern Mediterranean networked system was removed, those regions that were highly mobilized towards this engagement were deeply impacted.

In addition, there are some broad takeaways and observations that we might be able to generalize from what we see in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean during and immediately after the Collapse. For example, the panarchic collapse that we suggest has taken place came about precisely because of the high levels of interconnectivity and multiple ‘stresses.’ Furthermore, given the differences in lower-level systemic structures, the impacts to those systems will vary. That is to say, a climatic ‘dry phase’ may more severely impact one system than another, while the disruption in long distance trade may hit one system hard but may have less effect on another. It does seem clear that the numerous and varied pressures present at the end of the Late Bronze Age brought everyone into a process of reorganization and that it may have been the ‘failure’ of one or more of the interconnected societies that began the unraveling which ultimately resulted in the Collapse.

Overall, from the particular vantage point of the collapse of the Small World network that was in place within the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean areas at the end of the Late Bronze Age, we would suggest that ‘collapse’ per se is not uniform in scale. Furthermore, (a) it is not simultaneous in occurrence; (b) it is not instantaneous (although it is also not a long drawn-out affair); (c) it is not necessarily bad for absolutely everyone concerned (some may in fact celebrate the downfall of the central institutions and economy); and d) it was not necessarily recognizable from within the maelstrom at the time that it was taking place.

It seems clear that although some may have been aware at a local level that things were going very wrong (e.g., textual references to drought, famine, and invaders), the vast majority, if not all, of the affected societies were unaware that their larger interconnected network as a whole was about to fail. There was also no indication at the time that it would take centuries for the system to once again achieve the level of complexity that had been in place ca. 1200 BCE. It was only in retrospect that the Collapse was identifiable; and it is only now, millennia later, that we recognize that it was also most likely inevitable, as part of the larger, and ongoing, panarchic cycle in these regions.

In conclusion, it is clear that further study of the Collapse and its aftermath in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean lends itself well to the key points addressed in this volume. We should be able to assess the level of resilience, or lack thereof, in the various societies that were affected in this region. We can also, from studying the texts that have been left to us, as well as from the occasional proxy indicator, determine the extent to which the people in those societies were able to perceive or understand the major challenges and the risks that they faced, including whether their reactions were systematic and organized or random and inchoate.

Finally, it seems apparent, to us at least, that there are lessons to be learned from what happened to these societies more than three thousand years ago and that a better historical understanding of their responses, both positive and negative, to the threats that they faced could potentially help us grapple with the comparable risks and challenges that we currently face today, most particularly but not limited to climate change and the other stresses that arise from such a global threat to the environment. Now it is not just a specific region in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean that will be affected, but potentially our entire globalized society that is at risk if we do not listen to and learn from what happened to our predecessors at the end of the Late Bronze Age.