Eurosceptic Contestation and Legislative Behaviour in the European Parliament

Abstract

Eurosceptic political parties have gained substantial support in democratic elections. Scholars have widely studied their programmatic positions. We know much less about the behaviour of Eurosceptics within legislatures. How does Eurosceptic contestation translate into voting behaviour? How do members of Eurosceptic parties engage in plenary debates? Do they stick to their peers when they vote and debate or do they form an untidy opposition? We expect Eurosceptic contestation to be weaker in policy fields that are less structured along the new cultural cleavage and are dominated by left-right ideologies or national interests. Our chapter develops this argument and offers an empirical study of Eurosceptic polarisation and Eurosceptic cohesion in the European Parliament (EP). We present an analysis of roll-call votes in the 7th and 8th legislative term of the EP (2009–2019). Six case studied then zoom into selected legislative processes in three policy fields to explore how contestation materialises in committee work and parliamentary debates in different policy fields. Our findings on cross-sectoral differences allow for a more differentiated understanding of Eurosceptic contestation becoming a vital feature of democratic practices rather than undermining EU policy-making, and European integration more broadly.

Introduction

With the elections in 2009, the representation of Eurosceptics in the European Parliament (EP) started to grow. The increasing number of Members of European Parliament (MEPs) strongly opposing European integration has made the contestation of EU policies and institutions within the EP more visible. Scholars have widely studied their programmatic positions. We know much less about the behaviour of Eurosceptic MEPs in the legislative process. To what extent does Eurosceptic contestation influence voting behaviour in the EP? How do Eurosceptics engage in plenary debates? Do they stick to their peers when they vote and debate or do they form an untidy opposition?

Addressing these questions is important to understand to what extent programmatic contestation translates into policy output through the legislative process in the EP. Existing studies typically focus on a specific policy field, most importantly gender equality policies (Kantola & Lombardo, 2020; Kantola & Rolandsen Agustín, 2019; Warasin et al., 2019) and economic affairs (Cavallaro et al., 2018). Comparative insights across policy fields are scarce (but see Diermeier et al., 2021). While Eurosceptics have been gaining ground in the EP, we argue that their political influence is curbed by their ideological and national diversity. The disruptive effects of Eurosceptic contestation should be therefore confined to policy fields where polarisation between Eurosceptics and Europhile is strong and Eurosceptic MEPs do not break ranks with their political groups. We expect Eurosceptics to be united on issues that polarise along the cultural Green, Alternative, Liberal (GAL) vs. Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist (TAN) axis. They should be divided when it comes to policies that are structured along the more traditional right-left axis or that touch upon national interests.

To substantiate our argument, this chapter offers an empirical analysis of polarisation and Eurosceptic cohesion in the 7th and 8th EP (2009–2019). The two legislative terms saw a subsequent rise in Eurosceptic MEPs. Our analysis combines roll-call votes with an exploration of how Eurosceptic MEPs engage in parliamentary committees and plenary debates in three policy fields. We pursue two interests: First, we seek to find out in which policy fields EP votes diverge more strongly between Eurosceptics and Europhiles and where Eurosceptics form an untidy opposition rather than voting as a cohesive bloc. To this aim, we conceptualise and apply two measures. Eurosceptic polarisation measures the proportion of votes in which the Eurosceptic plurality dissents from the Europhile plurality. Eurosceptic cohesion captures how likely Eurosceptics are to vote with their peers in Eurosceptic political groups. While polarisation is an important indicator, its actual impact on legislative decision-making in the EP may vary depending on the cohesion of the Eurosceptic bloc. Only if Eurosceptics are united in opposing Europhiles, can they obtain policy concessions. In contrast, where Eurosceptics are divided, their ‘untidy’ opposition will not be able to influence legislative substance.

Second, we want to explore how Eurosceptic contestation materialises in concrete legislative processes. We therefore zoom into six cases in three policy fields where we expect contestation to differ because conflict is predominantly structured along the new cultural cleavage (anti-discrimination and minority rights), or because left-right ideologies (economic policy), or national interests (foreign policy, structural funds) are important.

Our policy field comparison confirms our expectation that Eurosceptic contestation is polarised and shows less Eurosceptic cohesion where policies are structured along the cultural axis. Our case studies find Eurosceptic cohesion to be lower with regard to votes on policies that appeal to national interests or that are clearly structured on the right-left axis. Analysis of plenary debate suggests that in such a conflict structure the untidy Eurosceptic opposition may form alliances with MEPs from mainstream parties. Interestingly, and depending on the policy at stake, we observe such behavioural affinity not only on the right with conservative forces from southern or eastern Europe, but also on the left, e.g. regarding economic nationalism or welfare chauvinism. Scholars have emphasised the potential of Eurosceptics to undermine the working of the EU (e.g. Ripoll Servent, 2019). Our chapter offers an alternative view on democratic practices in the EU’s legislature. We focus on the potential of Eurosceptic contestation to shape rather than oppose EU policy-making contributing to a potentially more responsive and differentiated European integration. The potential, however, is limited to specific policy fields. This leads us to suggest that electoral support for Eurosceptic parties should be analysed systematically as part of a fundamental change in the EP that is no longer characterised by a pro-European oversized mainstream coalition but by flexible and inclusive majority building.

In the next section, we develop our theoretical argument that expects opposition to the EU to be influenced strongly by a cultural cleavage, which, however, is mitigated by ideological and national diversity among Eurosceptics. We then introduce our empirical approach in more detail. A quantitative analysis of roll-call votes presents results on polarisation and Eurosceptic cohesion across policy fields. Case studies zoom into six concrete parliamentary processes to explore how contestation plays out in committee work and plenary debates. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and their implications for future research.

Theorising Eurosceptic Contestation in the EP

Eurosceptic parties and movements have been more and more able to mobilise the electoral support of EU citizens that hold negative attitudes towards the EU. The rise of Euroscepticism has been fuelled by the political and social consequences of the various crises the EU has been facing since 2008, and globalisation more broadly speaking (Hooghe et al., 2002; Pirro & Taggart, 2018). The growing tide of Euroscepticism has increasingly structured conflict in the EP resulting in the polarisation of European politics (e.g. Grande & Hutter, 2016).

Research has shown that the positions of parties on European integration could not be simply inferred from their stance on left-right issues but reflect a new dimension of European politics (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2002). Euroscepticism is primarily found at the political fringes while centre-right and centre-left parties continue to be pro-integration (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). Mobilising against the pro-European consensus provides an opportunity to reap votes from mainstream parties and ‘shake up the system’ (Hooghe et al., 2002, p. 970). Eurosceptic and populist parties seek to restructure political contestation around issues (life style, cultural diversity, immigration, ecology, nationalism) that unite the pro-EU mainstream parties across the left-right cleavage and divide them internally (Braun et al., 2016; Hooghe et al., 2002). The new cultural cleavage has been referred to as Green, Alternative, Liberal (GAL) vs. Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist (TAN), as integrationist vs. demarcationist, or as cosmopolitan vs. communitarian (cf. de Wilde et al., 2014; Kriesi et al., 2008; Marks et al., 2002). It is a powerful predictor of Euroscepticism (Hooghe et al., 2002) and the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties in the EP.

At the same time, the traditional right-left dimension still shapes the political space in the EP. So do national interests. The literature has shown that the left-right dimension matters the most when issues of redistribution and regulation are at stake (Cavallaro et al., 2018; Chiru & Stoian, 2019; Hooghe et al., 2002) resulting in a weaker, albeit still visible voting cohesion on economic and market policies, such as industrial policy or labour market policies, which touch upon these issues in multiple ways. In other words, we expect right-left ideology within the Eurosceptic votes to matter more in some policy fields than in others.

In addition to right-left ideology, Eurosceptics on both sides of the political spectrum may be divided across national lines. Studies of roll-call voting and ideological congruence in the EP find that the overall cohesion of transnational party groups is relatively high, particularly with regard to left-right issues (e.g. Hix et al., 2007). This cohesion is mainly achieved through national parties rather than through leadership in the EP national groups (Hix et al., 2005). This renders dissent among Eurosceptics more likely where national interests prevail. Overall party cohesion notwithstanding, MEPs break ranks with their group when issues of high national salience are at stake (Costello & Thomson, 2016). MEPs feel not only as members of their EP political group, but position themselves as coming from a member state with its own socio-economic interests and cultural cleavages (Whitaker et al., 2017). National interests may differ across groups of countries in the EU: North versus South, large versus small, old versus new member states as well as among a Northern, Southern and Eastern region. A recent study on the policy congruence of radical right parties in the EP found them more divided than other party groups. The deepest divisions run between Eastern and Western European radical right parties on issues related to cooperation with China, opposition to Russia, reforms of the structural funds or the mutualisation of debt (Diermeier et al., 2021).

Finally, we expect Eurosceptic positions to be mediated by the legislative process. Here, two insights from the literature are relevant for our argument. First, most of the legislative work takes place in parliamentary committees. These arenas have been called the ‘machine room’ of the EP (Häge & Ringe, 2019). Socialisation into a problem-solving mode is more likely in small groups with iterative interactions and expert driven policy-making is likely to prevail (Lewis, 2010). We expect less contestation in committees than in the plenary. Behind closed doors, signals of opposition are of no use to Eurosceptics in their attempts to ‘steal votes’ from mainstream parties or to mobilise their electoral base (cf. Broniecki & Obholzer, 2020). Second, in plenary debates, opinions voiced by MEPs are used to signal opposition or support to a policy line by highlighting disadvantages that come with a proposal or calling for alternative solutions (Garssen, 2016, p. 32). MEPs breaking ranks with their political group use plenary debates ‘to explain their national party’s position to other members of their EP political group, and to create a positive record for themselves in the eyes of the national party to serve their own reelection purposes’ (Slapin & Proksch, 2010, p. 333). Thus, it is here where we expect Eurosceptic cohesion to be the lowest.

In sum, while Eurosceptic forces have been gaining ground in the EP, we expect their political influence to be curbed by their ideological and national diversity. Accordingly, polarisation and Eurosceptic cohesion in the EP should vary across policy fields. Polarisation should be highest in policy fields that are dominated by the new cultural cleavage and lowest where traditional left-right issues prevail and national interests are at stake. Left-right ideology and national interests should also undermine the cohesion among Eurosceptic MEPs. The way in which Eurosceptic MEPs engage in committee work and parliamentary debates has important implications for EU policy-making—not least as this also affects alliance formation with Europhile MEPs. In this sense, parliamentary behaviour can be indicative of both the potential of Eurosceptic contestation to undermine the working of the EU and to form part of democratic practices.

How to Analyse Eurosceptic Contestation in the EP

We empirically analyse Eurosceptic contestations in two parts: We start with a quantitative analysis of Eurosceptic voting behaviour. Polarisation and cohesion scores are a good indicator for contestation but do not tell us what Eurosceptics agree on and disagree with. Based on our findings, we identify three policy fields where polarisation is high. Within each of the three policy fields, we select two cases to study parliamentary behaviour of Eurosceptics in more depth.

The first part of the empirical analysis draws on a dataset comprising all roll-call votes in the 7th and 8th legislative terms of the EP (2009–2019). The data was collected from VoteWatch Europe and is based on information provided by the EP. We process the data to measure two concepts: polarisation and Eurosceptic cohesion. For the first concept, we determine whether a vote was polarised on the integration dimension by dividing MEPs into two camps: Europhiles and Eurosceptics. Research on coalition formation in the EP has long emphasised the Europhile bloc of centre-right and centre-left party groups, including the European People’s Party (EPP), Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)¹ and Greens (Greens–European Free Alliance/EFA), which is broadly supportive of European integration. This ‘super-majority’ is considered to be driving legislation and is often contrasted with Eurosceptic party groups, including the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Europe of Freedom and (Direct) Democracy (EFD(D)) and Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (ENF)² on the right as well as Confederal Group of the European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) on the left, along with the mostly Eurosceptic Non-Inscrits (NI). Instead of following this logic of a Europhile and Eurosceptic block in the EP ex-ante, we assign MEPs according to the position of their respective national parties as coded by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017).³ This allows to capture changes in the composition of the groups over time.

To measure contestation, we ask whether the Europhiles and Eurosceptics voted differently on a given issue by calculating the plurality vote (relative majority) in each camp and comparing them. If the plurality of both Europhiles and Eurosceptics vote the same way, we consider a vote not polarised on the integration dimension. In contrast, if the two camps vote differently, we consider the vote polarised. The first measure of interest, then, is the proportion of votes in a policy field that are polarised. To measure Eurosceptic cohesion, we ask whether the Eurosceptic MEPs voted with the Eurosceptic plurality. For our policy field comparison, we aggregate this as the average share of Eurosceptic MEPs voting with the Eurosceptic plurality in a given policy field (values between 0 and 1). For our case studies, the level of observation is the vote in the plenary of the EP. We calculate the percentage of Eurosceptic MEPs who voted with the plurality of the Eurosceptic MEPs in this vote.

We complement our analysis of Eurosceptic contestation in the EP at the aggregate level by zooming in on Eurosceptic behaviour in specific legislative processes. We select six legislative processes from three policy fields that differ regarding our theoretical expectations (Table 5.1). In anti-discrimination and minority rights policies, positions are frequently connected to fundamental value choices, polarising along a cultural axis (Kantola & Lombardo, 2019). Conflict should clearly demarcate Eurosceptic and Europhile MEPs (Ahrens & Woodward, 2020, p. 5). In foreign policy, in contrast, we expect low polarisation as national interests should prevail where EU legislation touches upon sovereignty and core state powers (cf. Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2014). Finally, for economic policy we expect medium polarisation. Positions should be structured along the left-right axis and cluster along national groups with similar economic interests and institutionally based varieties of capitalism. Within each policy field, we have decided to explore the largely uncharted terrain of Eurosceptic behaviour in the EP by selecting two cases that score particularly high in polarisation (cf. Annex for more details on the case selection).

Table 5.1 Overview of cases

The case study analysis is based on primary sources (committee reports, voting records, verbatim of plenary debates) and secondary sources. We focus on committee work and plenary debates. Analysis for the early 2000s found that committee work is ‘very consensually, regardless of the issue at stake and the procedure applied’ (Settembri & Neuhold, 2009, p. 127). Reports are supported by an average of 93–95% of committee votes (Settembri & Neuhold, 2009, pp. 136–138). As consensus is likely to be somewhat smaller today, we consider a split vote in the responsible committee (support for a proposal below 85%) as an indicator of contestation in committee work. We cannot say if the split is driven by Eurosceptic contestation. However, the split can be contrasted with our polarisation and cohesion measures allowing for a better understanding of contestation across different arenas in the legislative process.

Turning to plenary debates, substance and argumentative patterns provide first-hand indicators on MEPs’ positions beyond party programmes. Plenary debates are highly structured, with regulated speaking orders, relatively short speaking turns and interruptions limited by rules of procedures (Garssen, 2016, pp. 27 and 37). Speakers usually clearly indicate their support or opposition to the legislative proposal and give reason by highlighting specific aspects that are particularly relevant to them or address a general aim. Sometimes, they directly link their contribution to that of another speaker. Positions are assessed relative to a speaker’s political group as well as to her country or region of origin.

In sum, the substance of a speaker’s contribution in the plenary allows to better understand on what topics MEPs position themselves and whether the reasoning indicates support or opposition along cultural, right-left or national cleavages. They provide a qualitative indicator of Eurosceptic dissent as well as insights on possible alliances where positions of Eurosceptics align with those of Europhile MEPs.

Eurosceptic Polarisation and Cohesion Across Policy Fields

The following analysis presents votes by affiliation to committees. Figure 5.1 reveals substantial variation across policy fields. Across the two legislative terms, budget issues as well as constitutional and inter-institutional affairs divide Eurosceptics from Europhiles most clearly. In the 7th EP, culture and education as well as gender equality also scored high as polarised policy field. This is in line with our expectation that culturally loaded policy areas are strongly polarised. The 8th EP saw a rise of polarisation for economic and monetary affairs, international trade and foreign and security policy in relative, albeit not in absolute terms. Gender and education and cultural policy, in turn, became somewhat less polarised in absolute terms. Interestingly, trade figured among the least polarised policy areas in the 7th EP, together with regional development and internal market and consumer protection. In the 8th EP, in contrast, fisheries, environment and public health, and agriculture rank among the least polarised policy fields (together with petitions). This suggests that national interests rather than ideological differences structure voting. Overall, there is some support for theorised differences according to the importance of cultural, ideological or national cleavages in a policy field. Yet, not all policy fields position as expected. Together with the substantial variation between the 7th and 8th EP, these findings suggest that polarisation of a policy field is far from uniform; it varies from one legislative process to another depending on the issues addressed.

Fig. 5.1

Eurosceptic polarisation in the 7th and 8th EP

Figure 5.2 shows that voting cohesion does not vary as much as polarisation. Across both legislative terms, Eurosceptic cohesion is strongest in budgetary, legislative and inter-institutional matters, as well as in fisheries. The strongest dissent among Eurosceptics can be observed in petitions, social affairs and foreign policy (7th EP) as well as in development, trade and gender affairs (8th EP). Overall Eurosceptic voting cohesion is slightly stronger in the 7th EP than in the 8th EP.

Fig. 5.2

Eurosceptic cohesion in the 7th and 8th EP

Eurosceptic Behaviour in the Legislative Process

In this section, we complement the analysis of voting patterns at the aggregate level with an exploration of Eurosceptic behaviour in six legislative processes. For each proposal, we briefly introduce the policy, discuss the polarisation and Eurosceptic cohesion in the plenary vote and compare it to contestation in the responsible committee before we turn to positions and patterns of Eurosceptic cohesion in the plenary debate.

Anti-discrimination and Minority Rights: Alignment of Euroscepticism and Conservativism

The ‘Resolution on caste-based discrimination’ calls upon numerous countries across the globe to end untouchability practices and social exclusion that frequently persist regarding access to the legal system and to employment, as well as regarding the achievement of basic human rights. The resolution is an own-initiative report adopted in the plenary on 10 October 2013. Eurosceptics and Europhiles are polarised with scores reaching 0.58 and 0.48 on the two related votes (cf. Fig. 5.1 for comparison). Yet, the score for Eurosceptic cohesion in the plenary vote shows a rather divided Eurosceptic camp with only 42%, and 41%, respectively, of Eurosceptic MEPs voting the same way. The initiative is tabled by the EP Committee on Development (DEVE). Unfortunately, no further information on the committee work is available that would allow to assess contestation in the ‘machine room’ of the EP.

The final vote meets our theoretical expectations that anti-discrimination and minority rights policies polarise strongly along the GAL–TAN dimension. The plenary debate, in contrast, does not show contestation. The rapporteur from the Greens/EFA receives broad support from the mainstream right and left. The debate is limited to the measures most effective to end caste-based discrimination, such as international measures or bilateral trade clauses agreements. No GAL–TAN divide materialises in the parliamentary debate. Eurosceptic voices remain absent from EP discourse. Two possible explanations are worth mentioning. First, anti-discrimination policies usually fall in the area of expertise of either the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) or the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM), where ECR, EFDD, ENF typically oppose proposals (Ahrens & Woodward, 2020, p. 5). Yet, this proposal is tabled by the DEVE Committee. Development Policy is less clear-cut polarised along a cultural axis. Bergmann et al. (2021) show that populist radical right parties might be sceptical about a development policy that invests into multilateral cooperation and provides funding to the global South. Yet, they push policies that promote development ‘as a tool to curb migration and refugee flows’ (Bergmann et al., 2021, p. 2). Secondly, and closely related, Eurosceptic MEPs and political groups might abstain from opposition as cast-based discrimination is an issue in third countries, on which it is more difficult to mobilise electoral support than on issues that touch upon discrimination within EU member states. Eurosceptic MEPs therefore are more likely to abstain from debates, and less likely to pro-actively table alternative policies or initiate proposals themselves.

Our second case, the ‘Resolution on the Roadmap against homophobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity’, calls upon the Commission to draw up a pan-European strategy to better protect fundamental rights of gay, lesbian, transsexual and bisexual people. The roadmap is one of the two core reports on gender equality in the legislature 2009–2014 (Ahrens & Woodward, 2020, p. 7). Most importantly it demands mainstreaming the fundamental rights of LBGTI people, encourages the collection of comparable data on and raises awareness for the situation of LGBTI people. It also puts forward concrete objectives to be addressed in areas of employment, education and health.

The Roadmap is an own-initiative report of the EP voted on 4 February 2013. The responsible LIBE committee is supportive but the vote (40 For, 2 Against, 6 Abstentions), indicates higher contestation than average committee votes (Settembri & Neuhold, 2009, pp. 136–138). When the report reaches the plenary, the EFD tables an alternative motion for a resolution that receives some support—yet, not enough to elude rejection. The report is adopted with 394 votes in favour and 176 against. Polarisation scores resemble those of the first case with 0.48 and 0.49 in the two votes, respectively. Eurosceptic cohesion in the plenary vote is even lower than for the first anti-discrimination case, with only 35 and 36% of Eurosceptic MEPs voting in the same way.

At the level of debates, the report is broadly supported by EPP, S&D, ALDE, Green/EFA as well as the soft Eurosceptic GUE/NGL groups. EFD is the only Eurosceptic political group taking issue with the proposal. Its MEPs from Italy, Slovakia and Greece criticise in particular two issues: (positive) discrimination and intrusion into national prerogatives—a strategy frequently used in Eurosceptic political groups (Kantola & Lombardo, 2020). They ask ‘why we should guarantee to gays, lesbians or transgender people […] specific right’ and stress that ‘nature determines the leaf and the consequent biological and genetic directions of humans’. They continue on the closely related issue of sovereignty, calling on the EU to avoid ‘a blatant forcing of national prerogatives’ and accuse the Commission of planning ‘mutual recognition of same-sex marriages’. MEPs from other Eurosceptic groups are virtually absent from debate. A number of EPP members (from Eastern Europe), however, take side with the claims of right wing Eurosceptics. This is a general pattern on gender equality and anti-discrimination issues (Warasin et al., 2019, p. 150). In addition, French conservatives voted against the report by highlighting ‘the rights of the family, to be respected’ and rejecting ‘the promotion of sex education of any kind in the youth programmes of the European Commission’ (UMP/UDI, AE, 2014b).

In sum, both cases show substantial Eurosceptic polarisation but limited Eurosceptic cohesion in the plenary vote. In the second case, this pattern materialises vividly in the committees and parliamentary debate. The plenary debate highlights contestation by only one Eurosceptic political group (EFD), which shows argumentative positions that are close to that of conservative EPP MEPs from eastern Europe and from France. These alignments point at the potential of Eurosceptic MEPs and political groups to join forces with TAN-oriented conservative MEPs to push the existing line of EU anti-discrimination policies into a more restrictive direction.

Foreign Policy: Selective Alignment

The ‘Resolution on the Annual report on human rights and democracy in the world in 2015 and the European Union policy on the matter’ is a broad non-legislative initiative. It is an annual exercise that has particular relevance in 2015—the year of the EU refugee crisis. Building on specific resolutions adopted during the year e.g. on single countries, it highlights two issues in particular: migration and discrimination. To this aim, the report calls upon EU actors and member states to fight against all forms of discrimination and the rights of women, disabled persons, children, elderly, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, indigenous people and of persons belonging to minorities as well as persons affected by cast-based discrimination. It challenges member states to respect human rights standards in their migration policies and to assure that bilateral cooperation with third countries does not benefit, directly or indirectly, security, police and justice systems involved in human rights violations.

The plenary vote on 14 December 2016 shows strong contestation. MEPs propose a single amendment text, bundling opposition to Europe. About 1/3 of the parliament does not support the report in the final vote (463 For, 115 Against, 113 Abstentions). This finding is underlined by high scores for polarisation (0.93, cf. Fig. 5.1 for comparison) and strong Eurosceptic cohesion in the vote (91%). Similarly, contestation materialises at the level of the responsible Committee for Foreign Affairs which shows comparatively low support for the instrument (75%, 42 For, 5 Against, 9 Abstention).

The plenary debate allows to distinguish discursive differences. For the EPP, religious freedom is particularly important, ALDE focuses on freedom of civil society and media as well as on LGBTI rights. Eurosceptic contestation is most loudly and frequently voiced where the report addresses culturally loaded aspects of foreign policy as national sovereignty, the call for religious freedom and reproductive rights. On these three issues, Eurosceptics seem rather united. Across the spectrum of right Eurosceptics (ECR, EFDD and ENF), MEPs oppose a European foreign policy by highlighting the loss of national sovereignty in legal, budgetary, territorial and monetary terms (ENF) and rejecting the liberal value canon (EFDD). The arguments voiced align opposition along a cultural axis with more classical conservative concerns about the (independent) power of member states. Eurosceptic MEPs form a cohesive block when it comes to migration, too. Religious freedom and protection of religious minorities is instrumental to express opposition to ‘surviving djihadists’ (ENF, France) and ‘Muslim radicals’ brought to Europe by ‘Open Doors Germany’ (ECR, The Netherlands). They are accused of ‘physical injuries and immoral behaviour towards women’ (ECR, The Netherlands) as well as ‘massacring religious minorities’ (ENF, France). The link to Christianity is particularly important for ECR MEPs from Poland, Croatia, Slovakia and the UK, ENF MEPs from Italy and Austria as well as EFDD MEPs from UK who outplay Christians against sexual minorities, contest abortion rights and same sex marriage. Conflict on these two issues, religious freedom and reproductive rights, is clearly structured along the cultural axis. Interestingly, on these issues, Eurosceptics at times align with EPP MEPs stressing Christian values. Thus, Eurosceptics unite in the rejection of an EU foreign policy promoting and protecting human rights and democracy. Yet, they are visibly divided when it comes to the role and alliance with external powers. One group of Eurosceptics on the right vividly goes up against Russia (ECR). Another group of right and left Eurosceptics align in their critique of NATO and alliances partners—either for ignoring fundamental rights (USA, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, GUE/NGL) or by favouring the Turkish-Russian Alliance in Syria (ENF). A second issue on which Eurosceptics of the right (ECR) and left (GUE/NGL) concur is that the EU itself is causing human rights violations through its austerity measures and should therefore not claim to advocate human rights in its foreign policy. Yet, this issue has little overall visibility and seems important exclusively to southern European MEPs.

The second foreign affairs case is a Resolution on the ‘Security challenges in the MENA region and prospects for political stability’. In contrast to the above initiative, this resolution addresses a limited set of countries (Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya). It advances a wide understanding of security challenges that include economic, political, social and democratic implications. Consequently, the resolution calls for strategic and multifaceted policies to support stability.

The Resolution is adopted on 9 July 2015. But only after the adoption of the amendments from opposing MEPs⁴ and intervention by the rapporteur. The split running through the house is still visible in the final vote (400 For, 98 Against, 86 Abstentions). The vote is strongly polarised (0.92) and shows substantial Eurosceptic cohesion with 88% of Eurosceptic MEPs voting the same way. Regarding committee work, contestation is substantial. Clearly below average support for the report indicates polarisation in the responsible Foreign Affairs committee (45 For, 10 Against, 4 Abstentions).

Debate in the plenary is controversial with sizable groups of MEPs proposing further amendments. The debate highlights a number of contested issues that resemble the above case. Eurosceptics are united in their rejection of an EU foreign policy based on liberal values. They form a cohesive block when it comes to migration. Far right MEPs argue that under the cover of refugees, terrorists come to Europe (ECR and ENF) ‘flooding the European continent’ in a huge wave (ECR, Bulgaria). This position is shared by MEPs from the EPP. A similar alignment of Eurosceptics on the right, supported by MEPs from conservative mainstream parties, can be observed for minority protection in the Muslim world. While EPP members critically highlight persecution, ECR MEPs from Poland and Slovakia link minority protection to a ‘growing threat’ of the Muslim world.

Differences within the Eurosceptic right prevail in terms of geopolitical alliances. The ECR accuses Turkish authorities of cooperation with the jihadists and human trafficking and praises Israeli military presence. Diametrically opposed, an EFDD MEP from Italy demands a stronger role of Turkey, while an ENF MEP from France and an EFDD MEP from UK call for cooperation with Russia and blame US interests as the main cause for instability in the region. The later issues find support in the Eurosceptic left, where an MEP from Spain stresses that economic liberalisation created chaos in the region for which the western security approach with its ‘euphemisms, of “responsibility to protect” is to be blamed’ (GUE/NGL). Mainstream parties distance themselves from this untidy opposition and reject the simplifying claims that western intervention rather than underlying economic, social and political factors are at the source of the destabilisation of the region.

In sum, both foreign policy cases indicate strong polarisation and Eurosceptic cohesion in the plenary vote that is matched by equally strong contestation in committee work. The plenary debate is more differentiated. Depending on the concrete issue raised, Eurosceptics can align a broad front against Europe that also potentially includes conservative mainstream allies (general stances and culturally loaded foreign policy issues), or they break ranks forming an untidy opposition (geopolitical issues).

Economic Regulation: Undermining Eurosceptic Cohesion

The ‘International Procurement Initiative’ was proposed by the Commission in 2012 under the ordinary legislative procedure. The initiative seeks to restrict access to the EU public procurement market for third countries not offering reciprocal access to their markets. Third country procurement markets remain frequently closed de facto or de jure, while the EU procurement market is open to foreign bidders. Restricting access to and competition on the EU procurement market, the proposal can be regarded as the EU’s ‘own version of a “Buy national” proposal’ (Dawara, 2016, p. 845).

Not surprisingly, the Council met the legislative proposal with reserve. While part of the member states supported the proposal (most vociferously Greece), others are at best lukewarm (prominently Germany) or openly oppose (Spain) (AE, 2014c). They highlight the protectionist nature of the proposal and fear retaliation measures by powerful trading partners, most importantly by China. In the EP, the proposal is adopted in the plenary in January 2014. Similar to the Council, diverging views and splits result in a strongly polarised vote (scoring 0.79 and 0.8, cf. Fig. 5.1 for comparison) and medium Eurosceptic cohesion with 76% of Eurosceptic MEPs voting in line with the plurality in their camp. Committee work in the responsible Committee on International Trade underlines the contested nature of the proposal with an unusually strong split in the vote (63%, 19 For, 10 Against, 1 Abstention).

The plenary debate shows protectionism versus free trade as the most important dividing line. Mainstream parties (EPP and S&D) are largely in favour. But they face a wide range of opposing political groups that criticise the proposal. For Eurosceptics, the proposal is ‘dangerous legislation’ (ECR from UK) because it protects markets and attempts to transfer further powers to Brussels. It is similarly dangerous for Italian EFD members, however for different reasons, as ‘it is always and only large companies in Northern Europe that benefit from greater openness’. A NI MEP supports this line and highlights the benefits of protectionisms ‘to protect their jobs and their businesses’. Along this line, a Fidesz MEP stresses the need for ‘socially sustainable public procurement’ rather than a further liberalisation in European markets.

The own-initiative report on a ‘Public Procurement Strategy Package’ pursues a streamlining and digitalisation of the public procurement process. It is of seemingly technical nature, but the initiative is directly linked to broader changes in procurement politics: a strengthening of the principle of the most economically advantageous tender that favours social and green criteria in public procurement in contrast to the dominant practice of awarding public contracts based on the lowest price. This way the initiative aims at encouraging e.g. the employment of disabled or the use of non-toxic material. Also, a joint EU liability system requiring successful bidders to declare subcontracting was much debated (AE, 2014a).

The plenary adopts the text on 4 October 2018. During the vote in the plenary, no amendments are tabled and the whole text is adopted in a single vote. Unsurprisingly, polarisation in the vote is rather low (0.37), but Eurosceptic still vote relatively coherent with 59% of Eurosceptics MEPs voting the same way. Work in the responsible lead committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection seems to have run smoothly and the report is adopted with a strong majority in favour (28 For, 2 Against, 0 Abstention).

The plenary debate reflects strong support from the mainstream political groups (EPP and S&D) as well as the ECR. The Greens/EFA are generally supportive, but advocate exclusions of food from public procurement. Eurosceptic MEPs on the extreme right reject the proposal vehemently. The EFDD and ENF link economically left positions to cultural arguments about ‘them’ versus ‘us’. In the context of public procurement, ‘us’ are national or local tenderers while European and international competitors are ‘them’. Economic closure and economic left positions align when a British EFDD MEP calls for ‘a new way to look at procurement to make sure taxpayers’ money stays within the local area, creating jobs and ensuring local investment’. Along the same line, but replacing local with national interests, a French ENF MEP qualifies opening public procurement markets as a real problem for ‘sovereignty and independence’ while Eurosceptics ‘intend to protect their country’. Yet, not all Eurosceptics are in favour of strengthening the state at the national level a Polish NI MEP explains when advocating to ‘withdraw the state from anything that is not absolutely necessary’.

The two economic policy cases on public procurement differ in the level of contestation. For the International Procurement Initiative Eurosceptic contestation is loud and visible in the plenary. This seems to resonate with committee work as well. Anti-EU opposition strategically links the alleged Brussels power grasp in areas of national economic policy with socio-economically left positions. Yet, not all Eurosceptic political groups join the criticism of a market-liberal EU. This limits the cohesion of Eurosceptics and situates some of them close to the Europhile left with regard to green and social procurement criteria. Contestation of the Public Procurement Strategy Package is less visible but follows similar lines. MEPs criticise and oppose market-liberal Europe in the plenary debate on grounds of nationalist and local interests—again aligning the cultural cleavage with economically left positions.

The six cases from three diverse policy fields vary with regard to Eurosceptic contestation. The cultural cleavage that drives polarisation in the EP is mitigated by ideological and national diversity among Eurosceptics. This expectation was most clearly met in the field of economic policy. In contrast, foreign policy showed stronger Eurosceptic cohesion and anti-discrimination policy lower Eurosceptic cohesion in votes than we would have expected for initiatives situated on the cultural axis. For anti-discrimination the lower than expected cohesion might be influenced by selecting policy processes that address minority rights in third countries rather than gender ideology within the EU. In foreign policy, in turn, substantial Eurosceptic cohesion in the vote comes along with rather split positions among members of Eurosceptics political groups in legislative debates. This indicates that studying votes might hide important differences within the Eurosceptic camp and overestimate Eurosceptic cohesion within the EP.

Our analysis of parliamentary behaviour only partly corroborates scholarly work based on election manifestos, official party programmes and other policy documents (Falkner & Plattner, 2019, pp. 729–730). Studying plenary debates, we find evidence for weak Eurosceptic cohesion in EU foreign policy regarding geopolitics. Yet, we also see Eurosceptics closing ranks in opposing foreign policies that touch upon issues of national sovereignty, migration or religion leading to cohesive Eurosceptic voting. In anti-discrimination policy, as suggested by the programmatic analysis (Falkner & Plattner, 2019, pp. 731–732), Eurosceptics frequently dissent when voting and debating in the plenary. Yet and unlike the literature suggests, the level of polarisation is rather low. Market regulation has so far received little attention in debates about Eurosceptic contestation. Unrightfully so, since our cases on public procurement reveal polarisation and medium Eurosceptic cohesion carrying the potential for alliance formation on the right as well as on the left of the classical political axis.

Conclusion

This chapter investigated how Eurosceptic contestation translates into voting behaviour in the EP and how the members of Eurosceptic parties engage in plenary debates. It argues that Eurosceptic contestation varies across policy fields. Our quantitative roll-call vote analysis (2009–2019) corroborates our expectation that the cultural cleavage driving polarisation in the EP is mitigated by the ideological and national diversity among Eurosceptics leading to different levels of polarisation and, to a lesser extent, undermining Eurosceptic cohesion. We complement this analysis with six case studies from three diverse policy fields that add to our understanding what contestation means for policy output and EU integration. Contestation is the loudest and Eurosceptic cohesion the strongest regarding foreign policy issues, particularly where they touch on migration or religion and are thus clearly situated on the GAL/TAN axis. Yet, in other areas and on other issues, Eurosceptics are far from united when opposing the Europhile majority. Dissent among Eurosceptics occurs frequently, particularly where the cultural cleavage is less dominant or where it is diluted by ideological and national diversity (as is the case for public procurement policies, but also for our anti-discrimination cases).

The findings of this chapter contribute to a better understanding of Eurosceptic contestation in the EP in at least two ways. First, our cases show substantial contestation in the EP committees, but also variation across committees in different policy fields. Less than average support points at strong polarisation in at least four of the six cases (in one case we lack sufficient information). Only for economic policy did we find that expert negotiation behind closed doors showed less indication for contestation than behaviour in the plenary. This goes against the image of committees as arenas shielding parliamentary work from polemic controversies and signalling to voters. Even though we selected strongly contested cases, our findings cast some doubts on the domestication of Eurosceptics through procedures and deliberative practices in democratic institutions.

Second, not everything is lost amid the rise of Euroscepticism. Scholarship expecting Eurosceptics to undermine the working of the EP might be well-advised to expand their analysis from party programmes to legislative behaviour and to consider policy field differences more systematically. Democratic practices highlight substantial Eurosceptic dissent, but also flexible alliance formation. Interestingly, and depending on the policy at stake, we observe such behavioural affinity not only on the right with conservative forces from southern or eastern Europe, but also on the left, e.g. regarding economic nationalism or welfare chauvinism. We therefore suggest that electoral support for Eurosceptic parties should be analysed as part of a fundamental change in the EP that is no longer characterised by a pro-European oversized mainstream coalition but by flexible and inclusive majority building. Rather than simply undermining European integration, such democratic practices might allow Eurosceptic contestation to support responsiveness and contribute to a more differentiated European integration.

Notes

• 1. Renamed as ‘Renew Europe’ (RE) in 2019.

• 2. Renamed as ‘Identity and Democracy’ in 2019.

• 3. We draw on the variable ‘EU position’, classifying national parties with scores under 4 as Eurosceptics, and those over 4 as Europhiles.

• 4. Amendments were tabled by individual MEPs not by political groups indicating that political groups were split internally.

Annex

Case selection takes into account scores for Eurosceptic polarisation. For our three policy fields we proceeded in the following way:

• For anti-discrimination and minority rights, we searched all roll-call votes with ‘discrim’ in the title (total of seven in the 7th and 8th EP8), excluded cases that did not concern anti-discrimination and minority rights and selected the two topics with the highest level of Eurosceptic polarisation.

• For foreign policy, we selected all roll-call votes in foreign affairs that score at the highest level of Eurosceptic polarisation (27 cases with polarisation >90% in the 7th and 8th EP) and selected two processes on the basis of substance (one with a broad approach and one a specific topic).

• For economic policy, we searched all roll-call votes with ‘utilities’ or ‘public services’ or ‘public procurement’ in the title (total of 10 in the 7th and 8th EP), excluded cases related to public health and selected the two processes with the highest level of polarisation.

Note that one case might consist of multiple votes, most importantly where opposing MEPs tabled alternative proposals.