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Introduction to Human Dignity in African Philosophy

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Human Dignity in African Philosophy

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Abstract

This chapter offers a general introduction to the subject of human dignity in the literature in African philosophy. To do so, it does the following. It begins by specifying the two aims of the book. It proceeds to discuss various aspects related to the concept of human dignity in moral philosophy: (1) its contested nature; (2) the different senses associated with it and (3) its importance in moral and political philosophy. Next, it considers the onto-moral resources posited as the basis for human dignity in the literature in African philosophy – vitality, community and personhood. Finally, it highlights the three themes in applied ethics that will be considered in the book.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Of all the major anthologies I have read, I am aware of only one that has a chapter focusing on an African conception of human dignity (see Duwell et al. 2014). Of all the dissertations concerned with human dignity that I have come across, none of them consider contributions from African philosophy (see Soroko 2014).

  2. 2.

    I am aware that Ikuenobe, Molefe and Thaddeus Metz have made important contributions to this subject. Molefe (2020a, b) and Metz (2021) rely largely on the idea of human dignity to reflect on moral and political issues. This book, as an introductory text, brings insights from these scholars and others, to give the reader an overall picture of the status of human dignity in the literature in African philosophy.

  3. 3.

    If one focuses mainly on the Nguni and Sotho cultures prevalent below the Sahara, one will find that they take the concept of human dignity quite seriously. The amaXhosa people refer to it as isidima, the amaZulu people refer to it as isithunzi. When a person comports herself well and displays self-respect and generally respects others and social values, she will then be addressed as having isidima and/or isithunzi. This is one prominent usage of the terms isidima or isithunzi to pick out human agents with positive behavioral dispositions. There is a sense in which isidima or isithunzi amounts to a recognition of an inherent divine feature possessed by a human being. This divine feature is analogized with a shadow. The idea of um-thunzi refers to a shadow, it could be a shadow of a tree, horse and so on. Isi-thunzi refers to the special spiritual force that inheres and surrounds a human person. In this light, the notions of isidima and/or isithunzi are equivalent expressions of the metaphysics and ethics associated with the notion of vitality. The notion of seriti found among the baSotho people is equivalent to the notion of isithunzi, and it also is associated with the vitality ethics. Though the notion of seriti features in many discussions focusing on the moral concept of ubuntu, it is yet to receive the philosophical attention I believe it deserves (Cornell 2012).

  4. 4.

    Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye offer some of the most systematic exposition and defense of moral philosophy in the tradition of African philosophy. It is important to appreciate that these scholars are committed to the meta-ethical view that morality is entirely definable by appeal to some physical aspect of human nature – moral humanism (see Wiredu 1980; Gyekye 2010; Molefe 2021). One would expect that they would logically go on to account for human dignity by appeal to some natural aspect of human nature. In their writings they tend to account for human dignity by appeal to some spiritual property – the fact that we are children of God (see Wiredu 1992, 1996; Gyekye 1992). The story is even more interesting when it comes to Gyekye. In his defense of human rights – moderate communitarianism – Gyekye offers three distinct accounts of human dignity without specifying which is the most plausible. We have dignity because we are (1) children of God or have a divine speck of life, (2) we are created in the image of God and (3) we possess the natural property of autonomy (see Gyekye 1992, 1997). The point remains however, that there are those scholars that account for human dignity by appeal to a divine feature and those that appeal to some natural property. It remains to be seen which interpretation of human dignity, the religious or secular one, is most plausible. This question is beyond the scope of this book.

  5. 5.

    In the literature on human dignity, there is an approach to it that is described as a negative approach to it (see Kaufmann et al. 2011). I use the phrase negative approach to human dignity differently than it is used particularly in the book by Kaufmann and others. They use this idea to refer to an approach that studies the idea of human dignity in terms of how fundamental harms to human beings qua human reveal about it. That is, what do cruel acts like rape, racism, torture and so on, teach us about human dignity. I use this phrase merely to indicate an approach to it that is overly critical to a point of repudiating the term.

  6. 6.

    I select these two models to human dignity because I find them to be very useful for the purpose of this book. For other useful models to distinguish various senses of dignity, consider (Ashcroft 2005; Schroeder 2008; Schroeder and Bani-Sadr 2017). In my view, ultimately these models tend to have an overlapping consensus of how to distinguish various senses of human dignity.

  7. 7.

    I point out here that talk of a negative approach is different from the discussion of it in the section concerning the contested nature of human dignity. Here, talk of a negative approach to human dignity specifies another way to analyse the notion of human dignity, which involves focusing on instances where we suppose it to be most harmed to understand its true nature or character. In this sense, this talk of negative approach is a positive one since it considers the notion of human dignity to be useful in moral and political discourses.

  8. 8.

    It is important at this juncture that I distinguish my approach to the theme of human dignity in African philosophy to that of Thaddeus Metz. Metz tends to focus on community and vitality as the grounds for our human dignity. On my part, I add a third ethical resource as the basis for human dignity in African philosophy, the concept of personhood. Metz offers a naturalist interpretation of the vitality based account of human dignity because he does not find ethical supernaturalism usually associated with it to be suitable for modern and/or multicultural societies (Metz 2010, 2012a). On my part, I insist on a religious interpretation of vitality since I find it to be most consistent with how this idea features in the literature (see Molefe 2018). Remember, in this book, I am not after plausibility per se, my aim is to give the reader a picture of human preciousness in light of African thought. Thus, I want to be as close as possible to African cultures in my exposition of these approaches to it to construct their philosophical construct.

  9. 9.

    I must point out that Godfrey Setiloane (1976) does associate vitality with human dignity.

  10. 10.

    I do not consider the view of human dignity qua mere membership in the community since it strikes me as obviously implausible (see Metz 2012a). In this view, loners and isolated individuals will not have human dignity, a view that is implausible.

  11. 11.

    The reader might wonder why I do not consider views of human dignity associated with prominent ideas associated with the doctrines of radical and moderate communitarianism, for example. Ifeanyi Menkiti’s radical communitarianism does not necessarily or directly rely on a particular conception of human dignity. More accurately, Menkiti does not set out to offer a philosophical exposition associated with the normative idea of personhood. He does mention the concept of human dignity in one of his essays on personhood, but does not dwell on the concept at all. In light of this book, Ikuenobe and Molefe rely on the normative notion of personhood as the basis for human dignity. In this light, one could read these conceptions of personhood as associated with the so-called radical communitarianism. It is also apropos at this stage to clarify that Ikuenobe and Molefe do not agree with the view that describes Menkiti’s views on personhood and politics as radical or extreme (see Molefe 2016; Ikuenobe 2017a). When it comes to moderate communitarianism, Gyekye appears to be non-committal over whether human dignity is best construed in terms of spiritual conceptions of it or a secular one.

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  1. Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa, University of Fort Hare, Alice, Eastern Cape, South Africa

    Motsamai Molefe

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Molefe, M. (2022). Introduction to Human Dignity in African Philosophy. In: Human Dignity in African Philosophy. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93217-6_1

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