7.1 Introduction

The main aim of this book was to investigate the policy framing of the “migration crisis” and uncover the multiplicity of security meanings and interpretations that have been underlying the process of securitisation of migration at the EU level. In order to do so, the book introduced two conceptual elaborations that served as the basis for a more interpretative analysis, namely logics of security and securitisation as the work of framing. The conceptual framework applied in this book departs from the traditional understanding of securitisation theory, claiming that an “exceptionalist-” and speech act-driven approach to security is not fit to explore a full range of security logics and interpretations that are involved in the inter-subjective construction of security. In the analysed case of the “migration crisis”, such alternative notions as risk, resilience or human security proved to have securitising effects, pushing or pulling migration into the realm of security by mobilising, for example, surveillance technologies, border and assistance missions, and militarised means against migratory flows. In order to address the question of security logics, the book proposes to embrace policy framing theory within the securitisation paradigm and attune it to a variety of security interpretations that co-exist, struggle, and/or intertwine in the processes of securitisation. In order to reveal how the EU has been mobilising different security logics, generating a security-oriented mind-set around migration, the analysis concentrated on the EU frame-narrative produced in response to the “migration crisis”. In this way, it focused on how specific segments of it (i.e. diagnosis, evaluation and ascription of solutions) have been imbued with a variety of security logics.

The EU is certainly a complex and internally diverse securitising actor. For more than four decades, it has been enveloping migration with its technocratic modes of security, framing different categories of migrants in terms of manageable risks, requiring constant control and surveillance. Indeed, as discussed in this book, the risk-centred framings of the “migration crisis” have proved to be dominant, being most significantly structured and institutionalised within all segments of the EU frame-narrative. Nonetheless, the analysis also indicated that the EU does not subscribe exclusively to one mode or logic of construction of security. The nature of securitisation at the EU level is more complex than that. If looked at more closely and beyond the dominant modes and contents of securitisation, one can see other underlying logics which play different roles and securitise human mobility in its various dimensions. There is an inherent dynamic written into the securitisation process at the EU level, which reveals fluctuations in terms of logics applied, as well the actors who mobilise them. Even though specific logics such as risk or human security have sponsors who predominantly promote them in the EU policy discourse, these actors rarely build exclusively on just one type of interpretation. They rather create complex entanglements of security logics, using humanitarianism, risk and exceptionality while framing and consequently making different categories of human mobility part of the EU security equation. Let us revisit the EU frame-narrative and discuss the most important findings of the book in more detail.

7.2 Revisiting Security Logics in the EU Frame-Narrative on the “Migration Crisis”

This book focused on unravelling the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis”, looking into the interpretative processes and logics embedded in the EU policy discourse, which makes up a specific securitising frame-narrative on the increased migratory flows. Here, a frame-narrative creates a sense of logical and sequential process, which defines and explains a problematic and uncertain situation and translates it into an interpretative pattern that can be internalised and accepted within a specific socio-political context. By proposing a particular diagnosis, evaluation and proposition of remedial actions, a frame-narrative links an issue to a certain interpretation (e.g. security related) by silencing and/or empowering particular features of it. In this respect, the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis” has proved to be a complex and dynamic construct, permeated with a variety of security logics and interpretations that have been, to various degrees, underwriting the process of securitisation. Table 7.1 offers a synthesis of the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis” containing an overview of specific logics and their main features. As shown in Table 7.1, the analysis revealed four distinctive logics that co-exist in the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis”, namely risk management, resilience, human security and “exceptionalist” security. Let us now revisit their prominence, interactions, and dynamics within the diagnostic, evaluation and remedial segments of the frame-narrative.

Table 7.1 EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis” (own elaboration)
Full size table

The EU’s diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis has been predominantly saturated with human security and risk management logics of security, with elements of exceptionality seeping into the framing of specific aspects of the crisis. Here, the human security-centred framing of the crisis can be defined the most prominent, dominating the framing of migratory flows, especially in the early stages of the crisis. This type of framing is centred on protection of all migrants who have become part of the increased migratory flows while seeking refuge from pervasive threats in their native communities. This type of logic has proved to have a strong externalising effect, placing the “migration crisis” and its root causes outside the EU and its socio-political and territorial domain. In this type of framing, the main security concerns do not stem from the migrants themselves, but rather hazardous migration, which takes place in an environment external to the EU and permeated with severe threats that are pushing migrants to seeking protection and betterment in Europe. In this vein, the security related causal effects are conceptualised around hardship and harm of migrants in their countries of origin, as well as their dangerous journeys to the EU. In this respect, the human security-driven framing specifically emphasises the role of trans-border organised crime, more prominently human smugglers and traffickers, who are defined as one of the effects and at the same time the driving force of the crisis, feeding on human misery and security deficiencies of the EU external borders.

The risk management-centred diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis offers a digression from human security-related interpretations, feeding on the notions of irregular migration, border security, control and management of EU internal security realm. Indeed, as soon as the “migration crisis” has “entered” the Schengen zone, the interpretation shifts into risk management-oriented logic, redefining the nature of the crisis, referent objects, security concerns and their causal effects. The centre of gravity is placed in the internal security domain as most severely affected by the increased migratory flows (i.e. marking the causal security effect). Here, the framing of the referent object visibly clashes with the migrant-centred conceptualisation, moving away from human security. Instead, the control over and functionality of the Schengen zone, freedom of movement, and the EU borders become most commonly defined as the referent objects for security policies. In this respect, the EU policy discourse has been permeated with calls for normalisation and management of the migratory flows as well as stabilisation of the situation on the EU borders. Even though human security and risk diverted from each other in their conceptualisations of referent objects, they converged in their definition of causal security effects and forces escalating the crisis. Similarly, to the human security-centred framing, risk management focuses much attention on organised crime and terrorist groups, defining them as the key perpetrators of crimes against the EU internal security and one of the key facilitators of the crisis.

The analysis suggests that the framing of organised crime and terrorism not only brings together the two logics, but also visibly infuses them with elements of “exceptionalist” security thinking. Organised crime and terrorism are both broadly defined as a threat to the existence and functionality of the defined referent objects, exploiting and feeding on the tragic situation of migrants and structural deficiencies of the EU border and migration policies. Consequently, organised crime and terrorism are defined as the major driving forces behind the “migration crisis”. Similarly, elements of “exceptionalist” security logic can also be found in the human security-centred framing of the root causes of the crisis. Here, the EU policy actors have been placing the “migration crisis” and its push factors in the EU external security domain, commonly defining it as ridden with violence, insecurity, as well as economic and socio-political instability. This is not to say that “exceptionalist” security can be described as highly structured within the diagnostic and evaluation segments, but nonetheless, its elements are visible, and their inclusion strengthens the security-oriented tone of the frame-narrative.

As shown in Table 7.1, the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the EU frame-narrative lack any significant traces of resilience. Marginalisation of resilience in the diagnosis and evaluation of the “migration crisis” may come as a surprise, as it is a commonly accepted and internalised logic within the EU security and policy frameworks. The explanation for the lack of reference to resilience in the initial phases of the framing process could lie in the fact that both risk management and human security-driven framings already covered the diagnosis of protracted deficiencies in the EU’s internal and external security environment. More precisely, the risk management-oriented framing was to some extent diagnosing structural defects in regard to e.g. external borders, while human security was used to frame the crisis-ridden EU neighbourhood. Both these diagnoses have been used as the basis for conceptualisation of resilience-building remedial actions.

As the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the frame narrative identified and explained the main features of the “migration crisis”, its root causes, referent objects and causal security effects, the remedial action phase dealt with conceptualisation and translations of those interpretations into policy responses. Ideally, the remedial action phase should build on the diagnosis and evaluation, representing a natural and logical continuation of previously established frames and logics. However, the case of the EU’s policy framing of the “migration crisis” reveals a slightly different dynamic, reflected in dispersed and non-linear interpretative patterns. The logic of risk management prevailed in the remedial actions phase, confirming its dominance throughout the frame-narrative with the introduction and further institutionalisation of EU policy measures oriented to control, management, and surveillance of migration flows, migrants, and borders. At the same time, the EU frame-narrative has ultimately diverted from a singular human security- and migrant-centred conceptualisation. Instead, it focused on introducing sites (i.e. “hotspots”) and measures (e.g. Eurodac, SIS system) that have successfully reframed the incoming migrants from objects of protection to objects of risk that need to be controlled for security purposes.

The remedial action segment of the frame-narrative lacks any distinctive traces of human security that make it into a properly institutionalised and standalone logic. Instead, elements of human security have been dispersed or redistributed among the “exceptionalist” security- and resilience-oriented conceptualisation of policy actions, most often serving as a factor legitimising mobilisation of more robust security-militarised (e.g. EUNAVFOR “Sophia”) or financial (e.g. EU Trust Funds) measures. Here, the resilience-centred policy measures constitute a peculiar case of framing, linking elements of risk and human security with elements of “exceptionality” reflected in the mobilisation of militarised resources. In this case, the EU has been promoting two types of resilience, centred on the internal and external security dimensions. The idea of external resilience focuses on elimination of push factors for migration by strengthening the economic, security and political sectors of countries of origin and transit. In this respect, resilience-building measures such capacity building missions or trust funds distinctively feed on human security logic, being framed as instruments bringing relief, development, rehabilitation and security to the countries and communities ridden with underdevelopment and human suffering. The internal dimension of resilience, on the other hand, focuses on the development and effectiveness of the EU’s common asylum system (i.e. CEAS, relocation, resettlement), which is commonly framed in the EU policy discourse as an essential element of the European system of international protection. Here, the effectiveness of the system is reflected not only in its robustness and ability to withstand a sudden increase in asylum applications, but also in the ability to quickly identify and remove “bogus asylum seekers” in favour of “true asylum seekers”.

Traces of human security are also visible in the conceptualisation of “exceptionalist” security measures within the EU frame-narrative. Here, militarised policy responses such as EUNAVFOR “Sophia” or Frontex-led border operations have often been framed as humanitarian missions with prominent search and rescue-oriented components. This type of framing, however, has proven to be limited in scope and time-length. The notion of the humanitarian imperative successfully launched and legitimised the mobilisation of extraordinary security measures in the Mediterranean, but in the course of the “migration crisis”, it has been marginalised in favour of more security-centred concerns. In this respect, in the later stages of the crisis (i.e. 2017 onwards) the operational plans and mandates of the EU missions have been gradually revised and reframed to assume tasks centred on “seek and destroy” rather than search and rescue. As a result, the protection and wellbeing of migrants has been deemphasised in the EU’s conceptualisation of remedial actions, focusing on identification of foreign fighters and terrorists within the migratory flows, and the fight against trans-border organised crime.

7.3 Reflecting on Securitisation as the Work of Framing

As emphasised in this book, the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach was developed and applied in order to open the discussion on the construction of security to a broader and more inclusive conceptualisation, consequently allowing analysis of securitising moves that occur below the threshold of “political drama” and extraordinary security circumstances. In this regard, the proposed approach was supposed to be better suited for analysis of securitisation at the EU policy level, tuning the analytical framework to a multiplicity of meanings, interests and logics that normally co-exist and struggle in policymaking processes. Let me now recap and reflect on how this approach has worked in the presented analysis of the EU’s policy framing of the “migration crisis”.

The first aim of the “framing approach” was to stop fixing securitisation analysis to one meaning of security, traditionally linked with the state of exception, but to embrace a variety of security interpretations that commonly result from different interpretive communities and actors that take part in the policymaking process. In the presented analysis of securitisation of the “migration crisis” at the EU level, this conceptual assumption proved to be necessary and enabled incorporation of different types of diagnosis, evaluation and conceptualisations of remedial actions that have been introduced by the EU policy actors at different stages of the framing process. In this way, the analysis has revealed biases towards specific logics among the EU policy actors, who have been promoting or sponsoring their own interpretations of the “migration crisis”. For instance, the European Parliament has been the most vocal sponsor of the humanitarian and human-centred conceptualisation of the “migration crisis”, distinctively framing the crisis as a human tragedy and incoming migrants as referent objects that require the protection of the EU. At the same time, the European Commission has been promoting rather risk-centred logics, building on the notions of control of European external borders and management of migratory inflows into Europe. The Council of the European Union and the European Council emphasised yet another interpretation, sponsoring the realist security-oriented framing of the crisis, often promoting physical protection of the borders and EU territories and mobilisation of military means to fight human smugglers and traffickers. This does not mean that these policy actors were the sole “users” of specific logics. The analysis has shown that each EU institution was weaving its own set of securitising moves using a variety of security logics. In this respect, the case of the “migration crisis” has shown that there is a certain degree of messiness and a distinctive internal dynamism inscribed into the process of securitisation at the EU level.

This proliferation of actors and their interpretations has confirmed that in complex policymaking environments such as the EU, securitisation cannot be limited to one authoritative actor who controls the whole process. It is rather subjected to dynamic negotiations between and within groups of relevant actors, who wield different positional powers that enable them to influence particular elements of the collective understanding of a security problem. In this way, though the European Parliament has proved to be an influential promoter of human security-centred diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis, due to its limited control over EU security policies it has lost its influence in the conceptualisation of remedial actions. Similarly, the European Commission and the Council have proved to be the most powerful in conceptualising remedial actions and promoting instruments that would allow long-term management of the crisis and direct military interventions, respectively. It should be noted that in the analysed case of the “migration crisis”, the policy framing was rather conciliatory with limited instances of policy controversies. There have been issues that introduced conflict between the EU policy actors, namely the relocation scheme and consequently the reform of the CEAS and the Dublin system. Here, the Council and the European Commission clashed over the framing of nature and scope of the relocation mechanism, proposing different interpretations and conceptualisations of the scheme. The bone of contention was reflected in the actual definition and logics of specific measures. The relocation mechanism represents a good example, when the Council along with Central and Eastern European Member States argued whether this measure should be included in the normalised modes of migration management (in line with risk and resilience) or rather should be defined as an extraordinary measure, mobilised only in the times of extreme crisis (in line with “exceptionalism”).

In the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach, specific biases towards security logics and differences in influence over various parts of the framing process are often influenced by contextual factors that are deeply embedded in socio-linguistic and socio-political settings as well as local power structures. In this book, the contextual factors are best seen in the pre-existing security frames, or the migration-security continuum, produced at the EU level. The presented analysis of the continuum has revealed several important tendencies in the securitisation of migration. Firstly, the EU policy actors have been intensifying securitising moves towards migrants as a way of managing security deficits within the EU borders (e.g. introduction of the Schengen zone or Europeanisation of the asylum system). Secondly, the EU has been incrementally developing and institutionalising a plethora of risk management instruments and policies such as migration and border management systems, Frontex operations, detention and returns, to name a few. The strong emphasis on risk management has prepared the ground for further proliferation of resilience-oriented thinking and policies directed at both, external and internal policy realms. As a result, the logic of risk, already dominant in the migration-security continuum, has only been strengthened during the “migration crisis”, placing more control over securitisation in the hands of the European Commission, along with the AFSJ specialised agencies.

Further, the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach embraces the fact that the inter-subjective construction of security is not based on a single powerful discursive act, but is a continuous, inter-subjective and iterative process. Indeed, the analysis of the framing of the “migration crisis” reveals that securitising moves have been embedded in a frame-narrative that has been incrementally pushing the increased migratory flows into the EU security realm. In this respect, every policy actor has been producing distinctive sets of utterances (reflected in specific types of policy documents), which to various degrees have influenced and stimulated different aspects of the framing of the analysed crisis. For instance, the diagnosis and evaluation segments were deeply influenced by the European Parliament’s series of resolutions on the “situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration” and external aspects of the crisis (e.g. on the situation in Libya, on the situation in Syria, on human rights, etc.). Similarly, the Commission was using the annual “State of the Union” speeches to initially promote the humanitarian framing of the crisis, visibly attempting to build up an imperative for action for the EU as a whole. In regard to the conceptualisation of remedial actions, the biggest impact was exerted by the Commission’s “Agenda of Migration”, along with corresponding action plans (e.g. against human smuggling) and strategies (e.g. EU Internal Security Strategy), which have been commonly referenced in other policy texts on the “migration crisis”. The Council of the European Union and European Council were communicating though conclusions (the Council and European Council) and outcomes (the Council), mostly promoting “exceptionalist” and more robust use of security measures against the increased migratory flows.

Finally, with the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach, the analysis focused on how different EU policy actors have been “talking to each other” through policy texts and speeches, communicating specific interpretations, supporting or contradicting each other in the framing process. In this approach, policy actors play the role of interlocutors (being audiences and actors) that incrementally and inter-subjectively imbue the “migration crisis” with security meanings. Here, acceptance of securitising moves does not stem from straightforward agreement or acknowledgements, but structuration of specific interpretations and institutionalisation of remedial actions within the EU interpretative framework. In this sense, the human security-centred and risk-oriented framing have become commonly accepted within the EU by assuming the role of an obligatory and commonsensical interpretation of the crisis (i.e. reaching structuration). Similarly, in the conceptualisation of remedial actions, the risk-centred instruments and policies, already institutionalised within the EU migration-security continuum, have naturally gained prominence over other logics and corresponding policy responses. In this respect, risk proves to be the dominant and commonly accepted logic in the securitising frame-narrative, being both structured and institutionalised within the EU policy discourse.

7.4 Final Reflections on Risk and Securitisation of Migration in the EU

The analysis of the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis”, outlined in this book, reveals its distinctive securitising features, predominantly embedded in the logics of risk. The prominence of risk signifies broader tendencies of the European Commission and the EU agencies in their claiming increasing control over human mobility within and into the EU. In this respect, the risk-driven securitisation of the “migration crisis” could have direct consequences on the future of the integration process and the way the common migration policies are constructed and implemented within the EU internal (AFSJ) and external (CSFSP/CSDP) realms.

It is important to mention the potential dangers of deeper and broader securitisation of migration to the general direction of the European integration. Regardless of other types of crises that have been affecting the EU, migration will most likely remain one of the most challenging issues in contemporary European politics. In this respect, within a broader European political discourse, migration is explicitly described as a problem, an issue, a nuance, a risk, or finally, a threat. The key word here is “migration”, not increased migratory flows or uncontrolled movement of population associated with the “migration crisis”, but the general idea of human mobility, which according to the logic of securitisation generates undesirable consequences that need to be controlled in the name of the stability and security of the EU political, social and economic system. This increased application of broadly understood security and risk rhetoric may translate into deep securitisation of mobility and freedom of movement within Europe, incorporating one of the cornerstones of European integration into the security realm. This carries a certain risk for the future of migration policy in the EU. Securitisation is a double-edged sword that on the one hand allows gaining control over an issue or domain (here, human mobility) in order to protect it, but on the other it also limits the discussion to policy areas that do not go beyond security. Along with the crisis, the debate on migration in the EU has been dominated by security concerns, rendering such important dimensions of migration policy as integration, culture, social policy, employment, economy, or education undermined or even marginalised. As the new EU “Pact on Migration and Asylum” has shown, migration and security are now even more intertwined in the EU policy discourse, and this may become a significant challenge for the development of more comprehensive and less restrictive EU policies towards migrants (European Commission, 2020).

While securitisation through control of risky objects can be considered as one of the key features of securitisation of migration, the development of broadly understood walls can be defined as the key instrument for gaining and securing this control. The prominence of risk-driven securitisation indicated that the future of the EU’s common approach to migration lies in the “fortification of Europe” (Geddes & Taylor, 2016; Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017). The concept of “Fortress Europe” had been well known before 2015 (Bermejo, 2009; Caviedes, 2004), but the framing of the “migration crisis” has increased its relevance among the EU policy actors, embedding this idea in the policy discourse and even significantly moving it beyond the EU borders. Here, the dominance of resilience and risk management in the framing of the “migration crisis” show that building “fortifications”, be it physical walls (e.g. Bulgarian-Turkish or Hungarian-Serbian border fences) or biopolitical constraints and systems of control (e.g. Passenger Name Record, Entry/Exit System), arise as a preferred policy option in responding to migration-related challenges.

While responding to the “migration crisis”, the EU has taken prominent steps in strengthening its border regime, attempting to regain control over irregular migratory flows and increase the resilience of the most affected portion of its external border as well its external security environment. Nonetheless, as argued by Pallister-Wilkins (2016), building stronger, and more elaborate forms of “walls” guarantees little more than more elaborate forms of human smuggling and higher costs for migrants who engage these services. For instance, deeper securitisation of border controls between the United States and MexicoFootnote 1 or Palestine and Israel so far correspond with the rule that “where is a border wall, there is a tunnel”, and prove that unreflective strengthening of border control has a limited impact on curbing irregular migratory flows (Baele & Sterck, 2015; Castles, 2004). In this respect, deeper securitisation and strengthening of the border and migration regime in the EU should be carefully evaluated and further researched, specifically in reference to the declared and promoted aim of such securitisation, which is better management of migratory flows. As often pointed out by Castles, the notion that migration can be managed at all is rather controversial and should be approached critically (Castles, 2004, 2017). Migration is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that is stimulated by multiple factors such as globalisation, economic incentives, migrant agency, climate change, immigration policies, and many other stimulants arising from the context of countries of origin, transit and destination (Niedźwiedzki, 2010, pp. 53–58). Narrowing management of migratory flows down to smartening of borders (e.g. EU’s Smart Borders Initiative), restraining of migrants in detention centres, coordinating return operations, and deterrence, may lead to a more or less effective containment of migrants rather than their management.

Many studies point out that the idea of effective migration management is often driven by addressing the root causes of irregular migratory flows as soon as possible (Brettell & Hollifield, 2015; Castles, 2017; Triandafyllidou & Spencer, 2020). As shown in this book, the EU policy actors have committed the policy responses to the “migration crisis” to the logic of resilience, focusing on building the effectiveness of the security sector in managing the migration in the countries of origin and transit of irregular migrants (e.g. EUCAP Mali and EUCAP Niger). This type of resilience-building reflected in externalisation of border controls only contributes to securitisation of migration outside the EU borders and might be ineffective in addressing the root causes of increased migratory flows. As a consequence of this type of policy, the EU has fortified itself even more deeply in the securitised politics of migration control, often underappreciating complex structural factors stimulating irregular migration such as inequality, human rights violations, or societal insecurity, to name a few (Scipioni, 2017). In this regard Castles (2004, p. 222) argues that migration policies might benefit from desecuritisation and commitment to long term political and economic agendas concerned with fair trade, global equality and conflict prevention, to name a few. Similarly, Bilgic (2013, p. 48) notes that in regard to the security-migration nexus, emancipatory approach to security could serve as an interesting policy option in a long run, potentially mitigating push factors by reducing North-South inequality and fostering fairer and less exploitative economic relations between countries of origin and the EU and its member states. This is not to say that a deeper desecuritisation of migration is a viable option in the EU, especially after the experiences with the “migration crisis”. Securitisation of migration is well established within the EU policy discourse and practice and it is there to stay. Nontheless, looking for alternative logics that proliferate the debate on migration and security allows for nuance in the political and academic discussion but also the search for alternative migration policies.