5.1 Introduction

As outlined in the previous chapter, prior to the “migration crisis” the EU has become a site of a specific migration-security continuum. It consists of securitising frames and narratives, depicting non-EU immigrants in terms of security nuances and risks, associating them with unauthorised residence, irregular immigration, and bogus asylum-seeking, to name a few. The continuum brought forth three pre-existing and intertwined security logics that have been commonly used to describe the relationship between migration and security in the EU i.e. human security, “exceptionality” and most prominently, risk management. As indicated in the previous chapter, the logic of management of “risky” migrants has notably dominated the EU’s migration-security continuum. This is not surprising, as most EU securitising moves prior to the crisis were developed under the circumstances of normalised modes of politics and incremental policy cycles. This made securitisation at the EU level more mundane and driven by technologisation of security and technocratic routine.

The outbreak of the “migration crisis” has put this risk-centred mode of securitisation into a new perspective, moving the security of migrants and humanitarianism closer to the centre of political contestation, and at the same time significantly elevating the position of “threatening features” of mass migration on the EU security agenda (Eurobarometer, 2015). This has led to a more visible intertwining of human security with “exceptionality” and to a lesser extent with risk management. For instance, even though risk management-centred framing of the crisis distinctly diverts from the idea of the human being as the ultimate referent object, it still on occasion refers to pervasive threats to migrants such as transborder organised crime or recognises the need to protect the “legitimate” refugees and asylum seekers. On the other hand, in the diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis, “exceptionality” has become more closely entwined with both human security and risk, building on the language of emergency and the need for a rapid and decisive response to the deteriorating situation on the EU borders. In this regard, the “migration crisis” has visibly opened the EU migration-security debate to change and possible shifts towards new perspectives on the relationship between security and human mobility. This chapter is concerned with this dynamic, focusing on the analysis of the first two segments of the EU frame-narrative produced in response to the “migration crisis”, namely diagnosis and evaluation.

In the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach, the diagnosis and evaluation processes wield significant influence over the ways the issue is understood and acted upon. Diagnosis most commonly entails recognising and often taking ownership of the problem in terms of naming and selecting its security features. This imbues the problem with its own identity and meaning. In this sense, diagnosis revolves around conceptualisation of the threatening nature of the problem, its origins, and/or powers behind its escalation, while ascribing it within a specific policy realm. Thus, construed diagnosis is often merged with evaluation of causal effects and the moral dimension. Evaluation focuses on the question of how specific categories of threats affect security referent objects and who/what should be blamed. In this respect, evaluation is focused on the nature of the relationship and interactions between threats and referent objects. It should be noted that these specific elements of diagnosis and evaluation are not necessarily sequential or even occurring in a specific order. As in the EU policy discourse, these two segments are inherently connected, for analytical clarity, in this chapter they are discussed in unison.

This chapter is organised as follows. Every subchapter corresponds with security logics which have achieved the most significant levels of structuration in the diagnosis and evaluation segments (i.e. human security-centred, risk as well as “exceptionalist” security, which has seeped into the aforementioned logics). Each sub-chapter explains how different logics have been incorporated and used in the framing process, thus fleshing out different interpretations of the crisis embedded in the EU policy discourse as well as their key framing sponsors. Each sub-chapter discusses how the EU policy actors have been promoting various framings of the crisis, by proposing different definitions of its nature (introducing specific names and categories), root causes, threats and referent objects. The final part of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the three logics, discussing how they intertwine, correspond and fit into general diagnostic and evaluation segments of the EU frame narrative.

5.2 Human Security

In terms of diagnosis and evaluation of the “migration crisis”, human-centred logic has reached significant levels of structuration at the EU level, turning into a meaningful and essential part of the collective framing of the crisis. It has been focused predominantly on humanitarian features, emphasising the need of protecting migrants who face pervasive, recurrent, direct and indirect threats to their lives, dignity, and freedoms. Such a broad application of human security logic in diagnosing and evaluating migratory inflows to the EU is a novelty. Even though the concept of human security has been a part of EU security culture since the beginnings of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it had limited impact on the EU migration security-continuum and especially with regard to events that directly affect the EU internal security domain (Huysmans, 2006; Parkes, 2014; Pinyol-Jiménez, 2011; Roos, 2013).

There is, however, a consequnec to this type of framing. The EU has indeed recognised the human tragedy of the crisis and the need to protect migrants’ lives, reproducing this type of narrative on numerous occasions. However, at the same time it has been avoding taking full owenership of this interpretation, introducing ambiguity into naming and categorising practicies and situating key threats and causal effects of mass migration outside the territories of the European Union. As a result, from the framing point of view, the humanitarian features of the “migration crisis” have never trully crossed EU borders, becoming yet another part of a larger equation of “distant” refugee crises caused by extreme violence, poverty, undemocratic regimes and political turmoil, to name a few.

5.2.1 Naming and Categorising the Humanitarian Features of the “Migration Crisis”

Even though all the actors analysed have been active in the application of human security in the diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis, it is the European Parliament that can be considered as the key “speaker” of this logic in the EU, setting the initial tones and interpretative cues.Footnote 1 The Parliament was the first EU institution which fully and explicitly recognised the humanitarian features of the events on the EU borders, focusing the framing on the tragedy of refugees and the loss of human life in the Mediterranean. The 2013 tragic events off a small Italian island of LampedusaFootnote 2 represent one such focusing event, putting pressure on the EU to employ a more humanitarian narrative. Here, the European Parliament’s “resolution on migratory flows in the Mediterranean, with particular attention to the tragic events off Lampedusa” has unequivocally put the inflows of migrants into a humanitarian category, indicating that there is a need to do “everything possible to save the lives of people in danger” (European Parliament, 2013, rec. B). This humanitarian logic was later reproduced in the EP’s resolutions on the situation in Libya (European Parliament, 2014a, 2015e) and Syria (European Parliament, 2017b) as well as “on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration” (European Parliament, 2014b), where the EP strongly emphasised the human tragedy, exploitation of migrants and the loss life at sea. This framing was later reproduced by the European Commission in the 2015 State of the Union, which substantially increased the exposure of the human security logic.

The 2015 State of the Union was unique in terms of framing the crisis, as it was a rare instance when an EU institution, in this case the European Commission, so bluntly gave a name to the problem. While diagnosing the crisis, Jean Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, repeatedly used the name “refugee crisis”, describing the increased migratory flows as “first of all a matter of humanity and of human dignity” (European Commission, 2015g). In this vein, the President’s statement, directly defined the crisis as a humanitarian issue, emphasising its refugee nature. As stated in the speech:

There is no price you would not pay, there is no wall you would not climb, no sea you would not sail, no border you would not cross if it is war or the barbarism of the so-called Islamic State that you are fleeing (European Commission, 2015g, p. 3).

The State of the Union visibly placed migrant’s life at the centre of the problem, describing it as a value that has become threatened in the course of undesirable events outside the EU and on its borders (European Commission, 2015g). In doing so, for a moment it stepped out from its risk-centred and managerial role, openly categorising the crisis as a humanitarian issue (European Commission, 2015g, c).

As will be discussed in the next part of this chapter, this type of human security-centred naming and categorising is visible throughout the diagnostic part of the EU frame-narrative. However, there is a visible fluctuation in the intensity and mode of its application. The “uniqueness” of the 2015 State of the Union lies in the fact that it introduces the term “refugee crisis” in order to name and acknowledge the humanitarian nature of the problem. Nonetheless, this explicit naming has never gained significant resonance in the EU policy discourse. EU institutional actors, including the European Parliament, have been avoiding committing to any specific name, or even a set of names, that could symbolise the EU’s categorical ownership of the humanitarian interpretation of the crisis. Instead, the Union has applied the human security logic using descriptive accounts of various occurrences accompanying the crisis, most commonly referring to “tragic loss” (European Parliament, 2015f), “tragic events” (European Council, 2015f; European Parliament, 2015f, c), “tragic situation” (European Council, 2015d) or simply “tragedies in the Mediterranean” (European Parliament, 2015f).

This rather implicit mode of naming signifies an interesting trend. Even though the EU has recognised and emphasised the elements of human security and the need to protect those migrants who are at risk, it has also distanced itself from taking full ownership of the humanitarian interpretation of the crisis. Without committing to a specific and distinctive type of naming, the EU has kept the humanitarian features of the crisis at the discursive equivalent of “arm’s length”. This type of “framing without explicit naming” suggests that policy actors may acknowledge specific features of the problem and put them on the political agenda, but at the same time they do not fully internalise its ramifications. This strategised use of naming and categorising, has allowed the EU to manage expectations and balance imperative for specific types of humanitarian response to increased migratory flows. Here, the introduction and subsequent discursive marginalisation of the name “refugee crisis” can be treated as symptomatic. The EU policy actors have consistently avoided using this name in official discourse, substituting it with sympathetic language towards the migrants and refugees and their hardship, at the same time avoiding the term “refugee crisis” in describing the events within the EU territories and on its borders.

5.2.2 Conceptualising the Push Factors and Defining Threats

The EU policy actors seem to be more explicit in applying human security logic when diagnosing the root causes and defining forces behind the crisis, here represented by the push factors driving people to leave their communities of origin, such as economic, social, or political insecurities (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014, p. 270). The EU discourse strongly emphasises the role of the unstable and dangerous “outside”, construed as territorial and socio-political space external to the EU. Here, the policy framing of the root causes focuses on “countries and regions of origin”, described as the main locus of insecurity and pervasive threats to prospective migrants and their native communities (see Council of the European Union, 2015i; European Parliament, 2015b; European Commission, 2016c). As stated in the Agenda on Security:

contemporary security concerns originate from instability in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and changing forms of radicalisation, violence and terrorism. Threats are becoming more varied and more international, as well as increasingly cross-border and cross-sectorial in nature (European Commission, 2015d, p. 2).

The EU policy discourse closely links this type of security framing of the EU neighbourhood to human security-driven migratory movements, connecting them to the turmoil in the Middle East and parts of sub-Saharan Africa (European Commission, 2015e; European Parliament, 2015a, c; European Council, 2015d). In this vein, the EU global security strategy clearly links the deteriorating security situation in the underdeveloped regions to the root causes of the “migration crisis”, indicating that, “solving conflicts and promoting development and human rights in the south is essential to addressing the threat of terrorism, the challenges of demography and migratory pressures” (European Commission, 2016d, p. 34).

There is a coherent application of human security logic across the EU policy discourse, in the framing of the root causes of the “migration crisis”, associating them with a broad spectrum of interlinked issues that affect the wellbeing of individuals and push them into mobility, or more precisely to seek refuge from pervasive threats and structural violence. The EU discourse most commonly correlates the forces pushing individuals out of their native communities with degradation of the security environment (e.g. war, regional conflict, terrorism) on the one hand, and economic decline (e.g. poverty, underdevelopment) on the other (European Commission, 2015d, 2016f; European Parliament, 2016f; European Council, 2017c). As indicated in the European Commission’s Agenda on Migration, “civil war, persecution, poverty, and climate change all feed directly and immediately into migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of primary importance for the migration debate” (European Commission, 2015c, p. 7). On a similar note, the European Parliament argues that “the root causes of violence and underdevelopment need to be addressed in the countries of origin in order to stem the flow of refugees and economic migrants” (European Parliament, 2015f, rec. 16).

And so, the EU policy discourse attributes the blame for degradation of the security environment, the decrease of human security, and human rights infringement to three culprits, namely Syria, Libya and the so-called Islamic State (IS)/Da’esh.Footnote 3 The EU discourse has been gradually increasing the profile of Syria and Libya in the diagnosis of the root causes, linking these countries to regional instability, the rise of terrorism, and structural facilitation of the “migration crisis” (European Commission, 2015c; European Council, 2015f; European Parliament, 2015a). In the EU policy discourse, the war in Syria is framed as the original push factor, setting a refugee-driven chain reaction in the whole region,Footnote 4 leading up to the emergence of the “migration crisis” in the EU territories (European Parliament, 2017b, p. 6). The framing of the Syrian crisis is visibly permeated with human security logic, emphasising the hardship, suffering, and the consequent refuge of the Syrian people. The European Parliament’s resolutions on the situation in Syria often strengthen this framing, reiterating that “almost 50 % of all Syrians have lost their homes and 40 % of the refugees are forced to endure sub-standard living conditions” (European Parliament, 2015a, rec. M).

On a similar note, Donald Tusk, then the President of the European Council, stated that, “(…) the biggest humanitarian challenge of our time is the Syrian refugee crisis. Refugees have had little choice but to flee their country. Many of them have lost everything” (European Council, 2016b, p. 1). Continuing this line of framing, the European Parliament has become the most explicit promoter of “human security” logic, attributing blame specifically to the Syrian government as responsible for the atrocities and violence spilling over the Middle East. As stated in the European Parliament’s resolution, the:

on-going violent crisis in Syria as a result of the Assad regime and terrorist violence has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe of an unprecedented scale in history, with more than 200 000 people killed, most of them civilians, more than 7.6 million people internally displaced, and more than 12.2 million Syrians in desperate need of assistance inside Syria (European Parliament, 2015a, rec. A).

The situation in Libya has been connected to the root causes of the “migration crisis” in a slightly different manner. It is not only framed as a source of severe instability having a devastating impact on human security, but is also described as a structural security problem creating an ideal environment for criminal activities, including human smuggling and trafficking, consequently facilitating the “migration crisis” (European Council, 2015d, p. 9). This type of diagnosis and evaluation has been also emphasised by the European Parliament. As stated in the EP resolution on Libya:

Libya is a primary departure point for migrants attempting to reach Europe; hundreds of migrants and refugees fleeing the violence in Libya have reportedly died while attempting to cross the Mediterranean to Europe, leading to a major refugee crisis in Italy and Malta (European Parliament, 2015e, rec. P).

In the case of Libya, the attribution of blame is more ambiguous than in the case of Syria. It does not refer to a specific person, regime, or group, but “the unstable situation” that is obstructing the cooperation and management of the crisis. In this vein, the Libyan government, despite contributing to the crisis, is not blamed or shamed, but rather treated as a potential partner for the future actions addressing the root causes of the crisis (European Council, 2015d).

Regardless the differences in the framing of the Syrian and Libyan “contribution” to the “migration crisis”, the EU discourse explicitly correlates the deteriorating security situation in those countries with the proliferation of terrorist activities of IS/Da’esh and other jihadist groups in the region (cf. European Parliament, 2015a, e; European Commission, 2015d; Council of the European Union, 2015l). The analysed EU institutions uniformly treat terrorism as having devastating impact on the human security environment, explicitly promoting it as one of the most pervasive and prevailing causes of the “migration crisis” (see: European Parliament, 2015a; Council of the European Union, 2015k, d; European Council, 2017a). As stated in the EP resolution on migration and refugees, “the rise of IS/Da’esh in neighbouring conflict areas are having an impact on the mass influx of migrants and flows of displaced people and, therefore, on the number of individuals attempting to reach the EU” (European Parliament, 2015b, rec. E). Again, the European Parliament is responsible for the most explicit and frequent diagnosis of terrorism in terms of human security related push factors, connecting it directly to the degradation of the security environment and forced migration. In the resolution on EU strategy regarding Syria, the EP indicates that:

ISIS/Da’esh and other jihadist groups have committed cruel atrocities, including the use of brutal executions and unspoken sexual violence, abductions, torture, forced conversions and slavery of women and girls; whereas children have been recruited and used in terrorist attacks; (…) these crimes may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide (European Parliament, 2017b, rec. D).

Whereas degradation of physical security is framed as the key determinant of the increased mobility of refugees, the EU actors also refer to poverty and structural underdevelopment as one of the key forces behind the rapid increase of irregular migration into the EU. Also in this case, the diagnosis of the root causes clearly employs human security logic, showing how mixed migratory flows come into being when individuals and their communities experience persistent physical and structural violence. In this respect, there are visible links in the EU policy discourse between the degradation of security with economic decline, showing how poverty and the lack of opportunities may turn into a powerful and long-term push factor. As stated by the European Parliament:

devastating civil conflict has set countries back decades in terms of social and economic development, forcing millions of people into unemployment and poverty and entailing considerable destruction of health and education services, and large-scale displacement of Syrians and brain drain (European Parliament, 2017b, art. 15).

This emphasis on the economic root causes of the crisis is also visible in regard to framing economic migration as a type of forced migration. EU actors emphasise economic hardship in the countries of origin as one of the key issues to be addressed in curbing migratory flows into Europe (Council of the European Union, 2015j; European Commission, 2016d; European Parliament, 2017a). As indicated by the European Commission, “poverty, insecurity, inequality and unemployment are among the main root causes of irregular and forced migration. This includes regions of Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe where most of the migrants reaching Europe originate from” (European Commission, 2015c, p. 8). The Council of the European Union often uses a similar type of framing, reiterating the need to look at the crisis not only in terms of security but also developmental issues and regional dynamics that will impact the migratory flows in the near future (Council of the European Union, 2015h). The Council conclusions on migration and development observe that “by addressing political, economic and social instability, development cooperation can contribute to ensuring that migration is a choice rather than a necessity” (Council of the European Union, 2015h, p. 2).

Even though war, terrorism and poverty in the countries of origin are depicted as severe and persistent threats to human life, they are not the most persistent part of the EU humanitarian framing of the crisis. With respect to “human security” logic, the EU policy actors clearly frame human traffickers and smugglers as agents propelling the “migration crisis”, making a considerable effort to elevate their “threatening status” within the EU policy discourse (Council of the European Union, 2016b; European Commission, 2015b; European Parliament, 2016c). The trans-border criminal networks are described as the main perpetrators and facilitators of violence against migrants, exploiting human desperation and feeding on degradation of human security environment in the EU neighbourhood (European Parliament, 2016c, p. 2). As stated in the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings:

(…) human trafficking and smuggling are complex transnational phenomena rooted in vulnerability to poverty, lack of democratic cultures, gender inequality and violence against women, conflict and post-conflict situations, lack of social integration, lack of opportunities and employment, lack of access to education, child labour and discrimination (European Commission, 2012, p. 3).

In this respect, the EU policy actors attribute blame for the humanitarian crisis on the EU borders directly to trans-border crime networks, which “put at risk the lives of immigrants for their own business profits, and are responsible for thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean” (European Parliament, 2015b). Consequently, the EU framing of human smugglers puts much emphasis on the inhuman and degrading mode of their operations, often iterating that “scores of migrants drown at sea, suffocate in containers or perish in deserts,” while being squeezed onto “unseaworthy boats – including small inflatable boats or end-of-life cargo ships – or into trucks” (European Commission, 2015b, p. 1).

In this respect, the EU actors have started producing discourse entailing a stricter understanding of human smuggling, linking it to physical exploitation and trafficking, especially of vulnerable groups such as women and children (Council of the European Union, 2016f, 2017a; European Commission, 2017b, 2017d; European Parliament, 2016b, g). They have been emphasising the fact that “migrant smuggling has become an increasingly violent form of crime, which may involve serious physical or psychological violence and human rights abuse, exposing women and children to particular risk” (Council of the European Union, 2016b, p. 1). This type of framing is recurrent in the EU policy texts devoted to the criminal aspects of the crisis, where smuggling and trafficking are often treated as part of the same “industry” feeding on structural deficiencies of the European and national security and tragic situation of migrants, who often seek “services” of trans-border criminal groups out of desperation (Council of the European Union, 2016b; European Commission, 2015b).

5.2.3 Defining the Human Referent Object

When framing the humanitarian features of the crisis, the EU policy actors do not explicitly differentiate between refugees and economic migrants, or legal and illegal modes of migration, but rather diagnose threats to all individuals who engage in mobility out of fear of physical or structural violence. This inclusive definition of the human referent object is intensified in the definition of the root causes of the crisis, where the EU policy actors correlate push factors linked to the physical abuses of war and terrorism with poverty and underdevelopment (European Commission, 2015c; Council of the European Union, 2016a; European Parliament, 2017b). In this respect, the EU discourse makes attempts to embrace and acknowledge the mixed and internally diverse nature of migratory flows into Europe, emphasising the fact that hazardous journeys affect to an equal degree refugees and economic migrants (see European Council, 2017a, art. 21; European Commission, 2015c, p. 7). As stated in the European Council conclusions:

We are deeply concerned by the sharp increase in flows of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants which entails suffering, abuse and exploitation, particularly for children and women, and unacceptable loss of life in the desert or at sea (…). We agree that the first priority in this context is to save lives and do everything necessary to rescue and protect the migrants whose lives are at risk (European Council, 2015f, p. 1).

Nonetheless this type of inclusive definition of referent objects is noticeably limited to the external dimension of the “migration crisis”, emphasising the humanitarian responsibility to save migrants’ lives outside the EU territories, in the countries of origin or transit (Council of the European Union, 2016a; European Parliament, 2015f). This does not encompass the acceptance of economic migrants to the European Union on similar rights to so-called “legitimate asylum seekers”.

With the progression of the crisis, the EU policy discourse has visibly shifted its attention to vulnerable groups such as children, especially unaccompanied minors, and women, underlying the specific risks that affect their security and wellbeing (Council of the European Union, 2017a; European Parliament, 2016g). Such an adjustment in framing of referent objects is not without reason, as the numbers of women and children seeking refuge in the EU amounted up to 60% of overall arrivals in 2016 (Karas, 2016) Here, the European Parliament and European Commission have proved to be vocal promoters of vulnerable groups, devoting much attention to conceptualisation and institutionalisation of their protection within the EU policy framework (European Commission, 2017c). Nonetheless, only as late as mid-2016 did the European Parliament produce a resolution devoted specifically to “the situation of women refugees and asylum seekers in the EU”, introducing an explicit policy frame for discussion on the scale and nature of vulnerabilities of female migrants and refugees affected by the crisis (European Parliament, 2016g). As stated in the document:

(…) women refugees and asylum seekers are often subjected to multiple forms of discrimination and are more vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence in their countries of origin, transit and destination; whereas unaccompanied women and girls, women heads of household, pregnant women, people with disabilities and the elderly are particularly vulnerable; (…) women refugees not only face threats to their personal safety (long and dangerous journeys into exile, harassment, official indifference and, frequently, sexual abuse and violence, even once they have reached a place that seems safe and the resulting social stigmatisation), but are also responsible for the physical safety, welfare and survival of their families (European Parliament, 2016g, rec. K, L).

A similar type of framing has been applied to the situation of children and unaccompanied minors in migration, who have been defined as one of the most rapidly growing vulnerable groups among asylum seekers in the EU. The security of children was more decisively embraced as issue in later stages of the crisis, when the European Commission issued a communication on “protection of children in migration”. In this seminal policy document, the European Commission, building on the previous narrative of gender-related vulnerabilities acknowledged that:

(…) both girls and boys in migration are exposed to risks and have often suffered from extreme forms of violence, exploitation, trafficking in human beings, physical, psychological and sexual abuse and before and/or after their arrival on EU territory. They may risk being marginalised and drawn into criminal activity or radicalisation. Children may go missing or become separated from their families. Girls are particularly at risk of forced marriages as families struggle in straitened circumstances or wish to protect them from further sexual violence (European Commission, 2017c, p. 2).

This broad spectrum of vulnerabilities has been gradually introduced into the EU diagnosis of “migration crisis”-related threats to human security. Here, the most emphasis has been put on sexual exploitation and forced labour that have been “thriving” under the circumstances of the degraded security environment in the EU neighbourhood (Council of the European Union, 2016e; European Commission, 2016c; European Parliament, 2015d, 2016c, e).). In this respect, the narrative on women and children as vulnerable groups has been explicitly connected to migrant smugglers and traffickers, who are commonly defined as one of the main perpetrators of gender-related violence (European Commission, 2015b; European Parliament, 2015d, 2016g).

5.2.4 Comments

The human security logic has become the most significant part of the evaluation and diagnosis of the crisis at the EU level. The Parliament has proved to be most dedicated promotor of this particular framing, producing a qualitatively and quantitively rich discourse on humanitarian features of the crisis. Here, the EP’s resolutions played a significant role, case by case putting human lives and wellbeing at the centre of the framing of the crisis. The Commission as well as both Councils did follow up on this type of framing. Even though the migration security continuum places the Commission and the Councils on the risk management and exceptional security side of the framing process, respectively, these two institutions could not ignore the humanitarian features of the crisis, while proposing its diagnosis its nature and defining its root causes. This is also a testament of the significance and structuration of the human security-centred logic in the first stages of policy framing in the EU.

The EU’s application of human security logic in the diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis clearly defines migrants as the referent objects together with a plethora of interlinked physical and structural threats that affect their lives and wellbeing. In this vein, the EU actors visibly build on the notion of humanitarian crisis as an urgent situation that is caused by security factors external to the EU such as war, terrorism and poverty, but is also facilitated and escalated by trans-border criminal networks. In this type of humanitarian framing, the main source of insecurity is defined as the degraded security environment in the EU neighbourhood and the hazardous journey, often facilitated by exploitative criminal organisations that use violence as a part of their business model (Achilli, 2016, p. 99). This is the general outlook on the human security-based securitisation of the “migration crisis”. However, as indicated above, there are several interesting points that this type of framing brings into the discussion on securitisation of migration at the EU level.

Firstly, the EU has visibly attempted to distance itself from explicit ownership of the humanitarian framing of the crisis, introducing a sense of ambiguity in its naming. Even though the EU has acknowledged the “migration crisis” as a human tragedy, it has spent substantial discursive resources to frame its humanitarian elements as external to the Union. As noted by the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee member:

I was a co-rapporteur, or a shadow rapporteur, on two migration crisis-related resolutions. I must admit that even in the EP we had this aversion to the term refugee crisis. Why? Because Europe does not have humanitarian crises, not anymore. We have challenges; we have concerns and deficiencies – this is it. The moment you recognise that something horrible and humanitarian-related is happening within the borders you change the political game. You admit that you have lost control and this is something that we did not want to admit. We still don’t (European Parliament-1).

Consequently, the application of human security logic is most prominently visible in the framing of the events and aspects of the crisis that are situated outside the EU. This is particularly noticeable in the framing of the root causes of the crisis, which here represent the security-related push factors for those who flee from their communities of origin fearing for their lives and livelihoods. In this vein, the EU policy actors align with the EU migration-security continuum, building on the narrative of an unstable, underdeveloped and threatening external environment, in which humanitarian crises often proliferate, varying in scale and nature, but always distant from the EU. In this respect, one of the interviewees argued that:

The refugee crises have always been in the EU neighbourhood, but have never reached the EU shores. It was never an internal problem, for European police or border guard. What has changed? The scale and efficiency of facilitated illegal migration has changed. This is what made it all different (European Commission-1).

Indeed, as indicated above, the EU policy framing has been placing migrant smuggling and trafficking at the centre of the securitisation process, explicitly building a narrative of violence and exploitation around their activities and modes of operations. Here, the trans-border criminal groups have been framed as the most severe and persistent threat to migrants’ lives and wellbeing, often getting more attention than the human security-related root causes of the “migration crisis”. Consequently, even though they are construed as facilitating factors, smugglers and traffickers have been deeply securitised within the human security logic and defined in terms of urgent security problems that affect the whole spectrum of migrants, especially those most vulnerable. This is also reflected in the material gathered from the interviews:

If I had to define one specific threat, security challenge to the EU it is the scale of trans-border organised crime and terrorism – both connected with exploiting migrants. I think that the humanitarian factor is a little bit responsible for that. The humanitarian imperative as they call it. We need to fight human smugglers to save lives. And we do it, but more in the shadows as intelligence providers and experts (Europol-1).

Legally yes, but practically there is often no difference between traffickers or smugglers. They both feed on human misery and desperation of migrants. Even though data on unaccompanied minors have been exaggerated by Timmermans and the issue of children at risk is much smaller than described, we still have a lot of groups, vulnerable groups that have been severely exploited by all kinds of people, not only smugglers but also corrupt law enforcement in Libya, Egypt, Turkey and so on. It is all a part of the same migration crisis business model (Council of the European Union-1).

As a result of this securitising move, the EU policy discourse has visibly moved towards a more humanitarian framing of vulnerable groups, specifically women and children, that have become defined as one of the main objects of violence and exploitation in migration-related situations. As discussed above, the growing numbers of arrivals of women and children into Europe have propelled the EU to refocus its attention on the vulnerable groups and adjust its policy responses according to their needs and the specificity of their situation.

Secondly, the EU application of the human security logic in the framing of the “migration crisis” is reflected in an acknowledgement of economic push factors, such as poverty and underdevelopment, that have largely contributed to increased and mixed migratory flows. In this vein, the framing of the referent objects broadens the spectrum of migrants at risk and includes economic migrants (next to refugees) among those who are threatened. This type of framing, however, does not necessarily refer to asylum procedures or secondary protection as in the case of refugees, but rather to measures related to saving lives outside the EU or from the hands of human smugglers and traffickers. As pointed out by one of the interviewees:

It is true that when we talk about saving lives of migrants we usually talk about saving them at sea, from exploitation by organised crime groups, or from terrible things that happen to them at their home countries. We tend to forget what is happening to them in Europe. They are still exploited, they still experience hardship, and often their lives are still in danger (EASO-2).

In other words, the economic migrants’ lives are construed as referent objects, if they are directly threatened in their country of origin or during the journey. This is symptomatic for the EU policy actors and their application of human security logic. The EU tends to emphasise the misery and hardship of migrants, but only up to the point of the external EU borders. However, when they cross the EU borders the diagnosis of the nature of crisis and evaluation of its causal effects visibly shift towards the logic of risk.

Nonetheless, as often indicated in the securitisation literature, the application of human security logic carries certain risks of manipulation and opens the narrative to more security-oriented interpretations driven by “exceptionality” (Davitti, 2018; Squire et al., 2021; Watson, 2011). Indeed, the humanitarian framing applied in relation to increased migratory inflows does invoke a very specific language of emergency and crisis. It creates a powerful frame that produces a moment of exception, consequently dismantling certainties and normal narratives of mobility, sovereignty, social bonds and belonging (Carastathis et al., 2018, p. 31). The humanitarian emergency language makes the situation more difficult to govern. It limits the response options to spectacular and extraordinary interventions such as military missions, border operations and high-level politics which are supposed to bring order into situation which is “out of control” (Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2016, p. 317). In this sense, the language of humanitarian emergency can be misleading. It often discursively marginalises the normalised modes of governance and routines of control and care, which even in crisis situations tend to be intertwined with one another rather than exclusive (Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2016)

Another consequence of the language of humanitarian emergency, so prominently deployed by the EU and its member states, is the recategorisation of forced migration, refugeeism and asylum-seeking in the lines of exclusionary and securitised narratives. Holzberg et al.’s (2018, p. 547) research indicates that even in Germany during the rise of “welcome culture”, humanitarian responses were “contingent upon the rejection of those considered to be undeserving and threatening”. This type of framing leads to interpretation of broadly international protection and implementation of asylum policy as a “bitter pill” that has to be swallowed so that the “normal times” can return (Carastathis et al., 2018, p. 31).

5.3 Risk Management

Even though human security-centred security logic has attracted substantial attention from the EU policy actors, the concept of risk does not stand far behind. The logic of risk has gained visible levels of structuration, introducing a distinctive way of looking at different dimensions of the crisis, especially in regard to the EU internal security domain. As already discussed, risk-oriented logic has been guiding the EU migration-security continuum since the beginnings of the securitisation of migration at the EU level. It has been reflected in the managerial approach to security, interpreting migratory flows as a disturbance that needs to be monitored, controlled and curbed. With respect to this type of logic, the EU has been focusing on protection of non-human referent objects, such as the Schengen zone, freedom of movement or effectiveness of the European asylum system. In this regard, there is a noticeable shift in the definition of risks and potential dangers. Increased proximity to the EU external borders propels managerial and border security framing of the crisis, turning “migrants at risk” into “risky migrants”, who put the internal security of the EU and its citizens in jeopardy.

5.3.1 Naming and Categorising the Risk-Oriented Features of the “Migration Crisis”

The European Commission, as a traditional leading sponsor of risk management in the EU, has been setting the pace and tone for the rest of the EU actors, mainly the Council and the European Council, for the risk-centred framing of the crisis. As already discussed in this book, the Commission has already been at the centre of the managerial approach towards migration in the EU, driven by technocratic and surveillance-oriented security policies (Kaunert et al., 2014; van Munster, 2009). Such an approach has allowed the Commission to increase its relevance within the EU internal security domain, often building on the ambiguity and flexibility of risk logic in its diagnosis and evaluation of migration and security-related issues. To this end, the Commission, with the support of other EU institutions, has been introducing a specific type of naming and categorising in regard to the crisis, framing increased migratory flows as a technical problem, solvable predominantly at the EU level and with the EU’s policies and resources.

The risk-oriented naming of the “migration crisis” is rather descriptive and frames the crisis in terms of high-intensity and large-scale occurrences, disruptions or challenges to the EU. In this respect, the crisis is commonly referred to as “unprecedented migratory flows into Europe” (European Council, 2015b) “growing flows of illegal migration” (European Council, 2015a), “alleviated migratory pressures” (European Commission, 2015c), “unprecedented irregular border traffic” (European Commission, 2016a), or a “migratory challenge for Europe” (European Commission, 2017e), to name a few. This type of naming is visibly detached from the humanitarian and human-centred aspects of the crisis, explicitly centring on irregular migration and insufficient control over EU external borders and population movements. In this fashion, the humanitarian “refugee crisis” becomes a technical “irregular immigration crisis”.

The naming is often followed by an action verb placing the migratory flows in the category of a “manageable problem”. Here, the European Commission, often followed by the European Council and the Council of the European Union, specifically focuses on the management of flows on the EU borders, calling for increased technological resources, funds and security prerogatives that would help: “stemming” (European Commission, 2016c, d, 2017h, g), “managing” (European Commission, 2016e, 2017c, e), “containing” (European Council, 2015a), “decreasing” (Council of the European Union, 2016a; European Commission, 2016a, 2017i), “mitigating” (European Commission, 2015c, f), or “controlling” (Council of the European Union, 2015e; European Commission, 2016b, 2017g) migration-related structural pressures (European Parliament, 2015c; Council of the European Union, 2015b). This type of framing assigns agency to the EU, which visibly attempts to take the initiative and quickly mitigate the negative consequences of the crisis.

The risk-driven framing reveals a different diagnosis of the crisis, not so much oriented to the external security environment, human tragedy and saving lives, but to diverting and pushing back its negative consequences from the EU internal security environment. In this regard, the EU policy discourse visibly emphasises two specific features. Firstly, the nature of the crisis is construed as a problem internal to the EU, managerial and revolving around “significant structural weaknesses and shortcomings in the design and implementation of European asylum and migration policy, which the crisis has exposed” (European Commission, 2016c, p. 2). In this sense, at the core of the crisis lies the EU’s (in-)ability to control its borders and manage migration, or rather its ability to regain this control for the benefit of the security and free movement of all migrants working and living in the EU (European Commission, 2015g, p. 4). Secondly, this nature of the crisis is specifically connected to the irregular migratory flows, terrorism and organised crime, which in this case are considered as a matter of both the internal and the external security of the EU. As indicated in the European Council conclusions, “a key element of a sustainable migration policy is to ensure effective control of our external border and stem illegal flows into the EU” (European Council, 2017d, p. 1). The European Commission has been reiterating this interpretation, additionally noting that “[t]he European Agendas on Security and on Migration have set the direction for the development and implementation of EU policy to address the parallel challenges of migration management and the fight against terrorism and organised crime” (European Commission, 2016b, p. 2).

5.3.2 Defining Non-human Referent Objects

The risk-centred EU policy discourse explicitly defines the Schengen zone and mobility in the EU as the main referent objects (Council of the European Union, 2016c; European Commission, 2016a, b). Here, freedom of movement (Council of the European Union, 2015g; European Commission, 2018a; European Parliament, 2016d, 2017a) and “Europe without borders” (European Commission, 2015a, c, d) are viewed as the pillars of European integration and some of the most important accomplishments of the EU member states. As indicated in the 2015 State of the Union and European Commission’s Communication on “Back to Schengen”:

(…) we have given up border controls between the Member States of the Schengen area, to guarantee free movement of people, a unique symbol of European integration. But the other side of the coin to free movement is that we must work together more closely to manage and protect our external borders. This is what our citizens expect (European Commission, 2015g, p. 5).

Schengen is one of the major achievements of European integration. The creation of an internal area without borders where persons and goods can circulate freely has brought important benefits to European citizens and business alike. Schengen is one of the key means through which European citizens can exercise their freedoms, and the internal market can prosper and develop (European Commission, 2016a, p. 2).

This type of framing has been reiterated on numerous occasions, with emphasis on the role and value of the Schengen zone and internal mobility within the EU as deeply linked to European integration and the wellbeing of the EU citizens. In this respect, the European Commission has been especially active in connecting border control and migration with the future of Europe, placing security and mobility at the centre of the framing process, clearly indicating that Europe is a mobile society and secure mobility is inherent to the European Union (European Commission, 2016a, p. 1, see also: 2018b).

The prominence or risk and the managerial approach has increased along with the progression of the “migration crisis”. In late 2016 and 2017, when the presence of migrants was more visible on continental Europe, the human referent object was marginalised and gradually substituted with the call for protection of the Schengen zone and EU freedoms (Council of the European Union, 2016a, 2017c; European Council, 2017c; European Commission, 2017a; European Parliament, 2017a). As stated in the European Council conclusions on the management of migration, “the objective must be to rapidly stem the flows, manage our external borders, reduce illegal migration in order to safeguard the integrity of the Schengen area” (European Council, 2016a, p. 1). By putting the Schengen zone, borders and European territories at the centre of the framing process, the EU policy actors indicate that that the real stake of the crisis is the efficiency of the European project and the basic functionality of the EU’s internal security systems (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, pp. 5–6). This type of framing opens the securitisation process to a more “exceptionalist” logic, touching upon basic, or even existential elements of the EU, such as stability and continuation of the European project. I will discuss this framing thread later on in this chapter.

5.3.3 Conceptualising Risks

While human security-centred logic places the root causes and threats predominantly outside of EU borders, connecting them to push factors such as the degraded security environment and poverty, the risk management logic situates the causes of the crisis much closer to its territories, focusing primarily on the pull factors. Pull factors are framed as structural deficiencies of the EU external borders and criminal activities that facilitate increased irregular migratory flows. As indicated by the European Commission:

Beyond regular travel flows, in 2015 alone, conflict in Syria and crises elsewhere triggered 1.8 million irregular border crossings at Europe’s external borders. This is the central problem. EU citizens expect external border controls on persons to be effective, to allow effective management of migration and to contribute to our internal security (European Commission, 2016b, p. 2).

In the EU policy discourse, the application of risk logic visibly shifts the centre of gravity for interpretation of the “migration crisis” and puts it within the EU territorial and socio-political structures. It moves security thinking away from distant turmoil and humanitarian crises and focuses it on the EU external borders and the internal security environment, which are put at risk as a consequence of increased and uncontrolled migratory pressures. In this respect, the application of risk logic begins on the EU borders, the moment when migratory flows reach the EU territories and become a different type of security problem – predisposed to generating high levels of risks and uncertainties. As in the case of human security logic, the framing of the causes of the crisis is closely interlinked with framing of threats, or rather risks, to referent objects. In this regard, the EU policy actors have been focusing on three distinctive risk-generating issues: (1) criminal groups facilitating the crisis and “pulling” migrants to the EU; (2) irregular migrants decreasing the efficiency of the asylum system (3) and terrorism-related mobility generating risks to internal security of the EU.

As risk management logic frames the “migration crisis” as a problem of irregular migration, it naturally defines trans-border criminal organisations facilitating irregular migration as one of the key causal effects. In this respect, the EU Agenda on Security describes trans-border organised crime as one the most challenging and severe threats to EU internal security, linking it with facilitation of “migration crisis”, terrorism and cybercrime:

(…) serious and organised cross-border crime is finding new avenues to operate, and new ways to escape detection. There are huge human, social and economic costs – from crimes such as trafficking in human beings, trade in firearms, drug smuggling, and financial, economic and environmental crime. Organised crime groups involved in the smuggling of migrants exploit the vulnerabilities of people seeking protection or better economic opportunities and are responsible for the loss of lives in the name of profit. Organised crime also feeds terrorism and cybercrime through channels like the supply of weapons, financing through drug smuggling, and the infiltration of financial markets (European Commission, 2015d, p. 12).

In the case of the “migration crisis”, trans-border organised crime is not only responsible for putting the refugees and economic migrants at risk, but also fuelling the crisis by exploiting the structural deficiencies of the EU borders and making irregular crossings an attractive form of migration. It simultaneously feeds on and drives the “migration crisis”. As repeatedly indicated by the European Commission:

Irregular crossing of borders threatens security and fuels the crisis. Effective management of borders and fight against organised crime responsible for migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings are essential. It is therefore of utmost importance to step up our joint efforts aimed at establishing comprehensive border management (Council of the European Union, 2015f, art. 3).

Action to fight criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers is first and foremost a way to prevent the exploitation of migrants by criminal networks and to stem uncontrolled irregular migratory flows into Europe. (…) The goal must be to transform smuggling networks from ‘low risk, high return’ operations for criminals into ‘high risk, low return’ one (European Commission, 2015c, p. 8).

The second group of risks (i.e. irregular migrants) has been systematically framed in EU policy discourse as an obstructive security nuisance that reduces the effectiveness and integrity of the EU asylum and border protection systems (Council of the European Union, 2016b; European Commission, 2015b). Here, the irregularity of migration is commonly linked to economic migrants, who upon their arrival in the EU undergo reframing – from referent objects fleeing extreme poverty and underdevelopment, to a security problem that needs to be managed, processed, and returned to their place of origin as soon as possible (European Commission, 2016c; European Parliament, 2015f). In the course of the “migration crisis”, the EU has visibly strengthened its position on irregular migration, emphasising its “disorderly” (European Commission, 2016c) or “uncontrollable” (European Commission, 2017g) aspects and even framing it as an issue that European citizens need to be protected from. As stated by Donald Tusk after the European Council meeting in June 2017, “Last year we agreed that the EU will protect our people against security threats, illegal migration, and uncontrolled globalisation, and we must continue to deliver” (European Council, 2017b, p. 1). This stance reiterates the position of the European Commission, according to which:

Migration has been and will continue to be one of the defining issues for Europe for the coming decades. (…) We need to stem disorderly irregular migration flows, protect our external borders and safeguard the integrity of the Schengen area (European Commission, 2016c, p. 1).

Building on this type of narrative, the EU policy discourse has been employing a well-known frame of irregular migrants, posing risks to refugees and legal migrants and obstructing legal pathways of migration and efficient implementation of the EU asylum system. The European Commission has been actively strengthening this framing, underlining that:

the EU must continue to offer protection to those in need (…), but by the same token, the EU needs to draw the consequences when migrants do not meet the criteria to stay. Unsuccessful asylum claimants who try to avoid return, visa overstayers, and migrants living in a permanent state of irregularity constitute a serious problem. This corrodes confidence in the system. It offers strong arguments for those looking to criticise or stigmatise migration. It makes it harder to integrate those migrants staying in the EU as of right (European Commission, 2015c, p. 7).

In this regard, the EU policy actors have been increasingly framing ineffective policies on irregular migration as a major security deficiency and a pull factor increasing facilitated irregular migratory flows (Council of the European Union, 2014, 2015a; European Commission, 2016c). The EU policy discourse noticeably reflects a stricter and more security-driven approach to migration in the EU, aimed at deterring potential irregular migrants

(…) from trying to reach the EU by using smugglers’ services, it has to be made clear to them that they will be returned swiftly to their home countries if they have no right to stay in the EU legally. For the moment, smuggling networks exploit the fact that relatively few return decisions are enforced to attract migrants (39.2% of return decisions were carried out in 2013) (European Commission, 2015b, p. 7).

The third group of risks pertains to terrorism and its effect on increased migratory flows. Here, the EU policy discourse centres predominantly on jihadist and religion-driven terrorism,Footnote 5 making rather marginal note of domestic right-wing radicals who have been gaining support and influence on the wave of anti-refugee and anti-migrant resentments in Europe (Ragazzi, 2016, p. 14). It should be highlighted that the EU policy actors, most notably the Commission, the Council and the European Council, do not directly frame terrorism as a causal effect of the crisis and explicitly avoid making any associations between refugees and jihadist terrorism. They do, however, extensively apply a risk-oriented approach pointing towards terrorism-related concerns, risks and possibilities, while connecting them with uncontrolled migratory flows into the EU (European Commission, 2015d, p. 2, 2016b, p. 3). In regard to this risk-centred evaluation of the crisis, two major security concerns, or security causal effects, stand out and link the “migration crisis” to the problem of terrorism, namely uncontrolled irregular migration and radicalisation.

The 2015 Paris attacks have proved to be a turning point for more decisive framing of terrorism in relation to the “migration crisis” (Council of the European Union, 2015a, 2016d; European Commission, 2016b; European Council, 2015c). Here, the EU policy discourse reflects a concern that the uncontrolled migratory inflows have been used and may be used in the future by terrorist groups to penetrate EU borders for the purposes of radicalisation, recruitment and perpetration of violent acts on the EU territories (Council of the European Union, 2017b; European Commission, 2017f; European Parliament, 2017a; European Union, 2017). As indicated by a Europol’s official during hearings in the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament:

The influx of refugees and migrants to Europe from existing and new conflict zones is expected to continue. Islamic State has already exploited the flow of refugees and migrants to send individuals to Europe to commit acts of terrorism, which became evident in the 2015 Paris attacks. Islamic State and possibly other jihadist terrorist organisations may continue to do so (LIBE, 2016; see also: Europol, 2017, p. 6).

Europe faces many complex security challenges at the moment, including at the external border of the EU where high migratory pressures are exploited by criminal organisations. Although seen on a much less frequent scale suspected terrorists also use these channels to move in and out of Europe. Combating these movements is already a top priority for the EU and the Member States (LIBE, 2015).

In this respect, the possibility of terrorist entry into Europe is framed as a problem of uncontrolled mobility and insufficient border management, which makes it impossible to stop and/or track risky movements out and into the EU territories (European Commission, 2016b). One of the more prominent aspects of this type of framing is the explicit inclusion of radicalised EU citizens into the pool of “mobile jihadist terrorists”, distinctively placing the problem of terrorist mobility on the internal-external security axis. In this regard, the European Commission has been quite explicitly pointing towards the issue of foreign fighters and the need for strengthening the filtering function of the EU external borders:

EU citizens are known to have crossed the external border to travel to conflict zones for terrorist purposes and pose a risk upon their return. There is also evidence that terrorists have used routes of irregular migration to enter the EU and then moved within the Schengen area undetected. These elements brought into sharper focus the need to join up and strengthen the EU’s border management, migration and security cooperation frameworks and information tools in a comprehensive manner (European Commission, 2016b, p. 2).

Extremist propaganda has been shown to lead foreign terrorist fighters from Europe to travel abroad to train, fight and commit atrocities in combat zones, and to threaten the internal security of the EU on their return (European Commission, 2015d, p. 14).

The EU policy discourse also reflects risks related to radicalisation (Council of the European Union, 2017b; European Union, 2017). In this type of framing, irregular and mostly economic migrants are defined as prone to indoctrination and exploitation by jihadist recruiters who feed on their poor socio-economic and precarious status in the EU (Council of the European Union, 2017b; European Parliament, 2017b). As indicated by Europol and also repeated during LIBE Committee hearing on terrorism and organised crime:

Terrorist groups continue to exploit the socio-economic grievances of Muslim immigrants to the EU, in order to recruit and incite them to engage in terrorist activities. Islamic State’s ideology has a certain appeal amongst segments of the Muslim population in the EU, sometimes expressing admiration for “martyrdom”. Motivations may generally include a belief that Islam is under attack from the West (LIBE, 2017; see also: Europol, 2017, p. 7).

Similar concerns have been voiced in relation to European reception facilities and conditions, which have been often descried in the EU discourse as “unsatisfactory” (European Parliament, 2017a) “inadequate” (European Parliament, 2016e) and failing to meet the EU security and humanitarian standards (European Commission, 2016e, 2017h).

5.3.4 Comments

The analysis of EU policy discourse, as presented above, indicates that risk management logic has deeply saturated the framing of the “migration crisis”. Here, the framing of the crisis is centred on the disruptive impact of increased migratory flows on the Schengen zone, EU borders and the European system of migration control and asylum. Such an application of risk management logic visibly shifts the point of reference for the framing process, placing it within the EU and on its border. In regard to risk-oriented logic, the “migration crisis” is described as a manageable problem, a migratory flow, influx, or pressure that can be dealt with properly adjusted policy tools and technologies of control. At the same, the crisis generates risks to the EU internal security domain, revealing and feeding on its deficiencies, creating opportunities for its further degradation. As already noted, this type of framing is not new to the EU and is well-placed within the EU migration-security continuum. However, in the case of the “migration crisis” there are several important points that should be discussed in more detail.

Firstly, the application of risk-oriented logic visibly de-escalates the urgency levels of the crisis, moving it to a more mundane realm of management, surveillance and control. This is typical for this type of framing, as application of management is problematic in a situation of “panic politics”. Managing risks requires a certain sense of stability that allows to continue and adjust “normal security politics and practices” that are necessary to normalise the situation, in this case the “migration crisis”. The interviewees, specifically those representing the AFSJ agencies, agreed that:

Nothing that has been happening around the crisis is completely new. The new mandate of Frontex has been on the agenda for some time now, the EU wanted to strengthen Europol’s anti-smuggling intelligence units and EASO has to change its mandate, because right now it is not even a fully-fledged agency. This is all, to some extent, a part of a normal institutional process (Frontex-3).

This crisis is really about a multisystem failure of the migration, asylum and border control. Look how many different policies, regulations and legal orders we have here. We do not have one specific problem or a security issue, it is a networked problem with different facets and dimensions. I hate when someone asks me what this crisis is about. Is it humanitarian or security? It is neither, it is both. We have a lot of holes in this European ship of ours and we should stop deliberating over the nature of those holes and start fixing them, all of them, otherwise we sink (Europol-2).

Indeed, the EU policy discourse does not define one ultimate referent object, as in the case of human security-centred logic, but instead points to a set of dispersed yet interconnected objects, such as the Schengen zone, the EU borders or asylum and migration policies. The common denominator for all these referent objects is control, which here can be defined as an overarching referent object that the EU strives to protect, maintain and exercise. As observed by one of the interviewees:

This crisis is not about refugees, Syrians, Iraqis, or what have you – we can deal with them. It is about irregular migrants who day in day out test our ability, as a Union, to withhold constant migratory pressures in the situation of extreme structural deficiencies. Look at the Greek sea borders, it is impossible control them in such a situation. There is no border right now, we are playing hide and seek on the high seas, with fingers crossed that we do not die and they [irregular migrants] do not die in this very risky and tragic game (Frontex-2).

Indeed, in the risk-oriented framing, the element of “losing control” over parts of the EU external borders and consequently human mobility is construed as one of the most significant causal effects of the crisis. As a result, every element that contributes to this effect is defined as a risk, or a security concern potentially affecting the EU internal security order. Here, the issue of facilitated irregular migration, along with the clients and the perpetrators of this crime, seems to play a central role in the EU framing of the crisis. As already noted, the risk-oriented framing of irregular migrants is not specifically out of character for the EU and is in line with the EU migration-security continuum. Consequently, the massive influx of migrants into the EU is described as a serious structural problem that decreases the efficiency of the EU asylum system and obstructs the processing of those who are in “real” need of protection, namely refugees.

Even though irregular migrants play an important role in risk-oriented framing of the “migration crisis”, it is trans-border organised crime, primarily human smugglers and traffickers, that is defined as a key pull factor. In this respect, the EU policy discourse prominently reflects the destructive and obstructive role of organised crime, attributing to it the majority of the blame for creating conditions for the progression and further escalation of the “migration crisis”. As noted by one of the interviewees:

It might not be popular what I am going to say right now, but refugee crises have always been present in the EU neighbourhood. It is nothing new really. I would not say that Assad or ISIS caused this refugee crisis in Europe. It is the smugglers that have created this bridge to Europe and brought the crisis to our doorsteps (Europol-3).

Thus, in the EU policy discourse, this “bridge” between the uncertain and threat-ridden external security environment and EU internal security has become one of the most important security concerns. It is linked with increased risks of terrorist mobility and activity in the EU and consequent radicalisation of the refugee and migrant groups arriving to and living in the EU territories.

5.4 “Exceptionalist” Security

In the EU, the “exceptionalist” logic of security has not reached significant levels of structuration in the diagnosis and evaluation segments of the framing process. Thus, it cannot be treated as separate strand within the frame-narrative, setting a distinctive and coherent tone for diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis. In contrast to certain member states’ political and media discourse, the EU policy actors have been refraining from the traditional path of securitisation of migration and explicit diagnosis of the crisis in terms existential dangers to the European Union. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis” is completely free from the “exceptionalist” security logic.

The elements of militaristic language, the sense of extreme urgency and state-related definition of the referent object is still present in the EU’s framing of the crisis. It manifests not as a separate logic, but rather intertwines with human security- and risk-centred interpretations in different aspects of diagnosis and evaluation. As in the case of the previous logics, “exceptionalist” security has its key sponsors within the EU policy discourse, namely the Council of the European Union and the European Council. This is not surprising, as the Council is often described as a “guardian of national security”, exercising often strong militaristic and Realpolitik-driven approach to framing and conceptualisation of threats within and outside the EU borders (Maricut, 2017, p. 166). After all, both Councils are comprised of government officials who traditionally promote an intergovernmental and state-centred approach to security (Hampshire, 2016). In this regard, the Councils traditionally have sponsored a strong security-centred approach to migration and border policies, correlating it with public safety, the need of control over borders and EU territory, as well as stability of the Union as a whole (van Munster, 2009, pp. 59–63). In this sub-chapter, I will discuss how “exceptionalist” security logic has seeped into the human security-centred and risk-oriented framing of the nature and causal effects of the “migration crisis”.

5.4.1 Human Security – “Exceptionalist” Security

As already noted, the human security-oriented framing of the crisis puts the migrant’s life at the centre of the problem, defining it as the value that requires protection from a long list of pervasive threats such as war, terrorism, criminal exploitation, extreme poverty or underdevelopment, to name a few. In the EU’s diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis, this specific type framing intertwines with a more “exceptionalist” outlook on security, building on common elements of exceptionality and externality of existential and brutal threats to referent objects.

Firstly, as in the case of “exceptionalist” security logic, the human security framing imbues the “migration crisis” with a sense of urgency, centring it on the “humanitarian imperative” and “human tragedy” or “humanitarian disaster” that is happening in the EU neighbourhood and on the EU borders. It proposes an unambiguous definition of the human referent objects (i.e. “friends”) and existential threats (i.e. “enemies”) that have to be addressed decisively in order to protect the migrant’s life. In this vein, the brutality and severity of threats, defined as war, terrorism, and crime networks, create an imperative for application of extraordinary security measures that in such a situation are capable of protecting migrants. It could be argued that even though human security logic does not directly securitise migrants, it creates a very specific security framework around them, implicitly placing them within the realm of “exceptionalist” security permeated with urgency, unambiguity, existential threats and an imperative for the application of extraordinary, often militarised, measures.

Secondly, the humanitarian framing of the “migration crisis” has coincided with “exceptionalist” security logic in the diagnosis of the root causes, specifically in regard to identification and location of existential threats to migrants. Here, the EU constructs its humanitarian perspective by focusing explicitly on threats that originate outside its socio-political and territorial domains. In this respect, the blame is commonly attributed to external actors and phenomena, which according to the EU policy discourse hold the sole responsibility for the outburst of the “migration crisis”. In this vein, the EU neighbourhood is most often defined as the source of the migratory problems, and described as in extreme turmoil, overridden with conflict, terrorism, and crime, all of which pose existential threats to migrants during their hazardous journey to Europe.

5.4.2 Risk Management – “Exceptionalist” Security

As discussed above, risk-driven diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis proposes a distinctive framing of increased migratory flows, describing them as having significant potential for decreasing the structural efficiency of the EU internal security system, consequently jeopardising the stability and controllability of the Schengen zone, freedom of movement, and external borders of the EU. In this respect, the application of risk logic locates the security problem within the internal security domain and defines it in terms of risks and security concerns, rather than direct threats. On the face of it, such a framing seems very distant from “exceptionalist” security thinking; nonetheless, there are traces of traditional securitisation logic in the risk-oriented framing of the crisis. This mesh of logics is most pronounced in the definition of the referent objects (e.g. the EU external borders and the Schengen zone) and the framing of the organised crime, which in the course of the crisis has arisen as an exceptional security problem for the EU.

The risk-driven definition of referent objects tends to include indications to state-like features of the EU such as territory and external borders, which require “safeguarding” (European Commission, 2016a, p. 12; European Council, 2015b, p. 4; European Parliament, 2016f, p. 2), “protecting” (Council of the European Union, 2016c, p. 22; European Commission, 2016a, p. 2; European Parliament, 2016f, p. 9) or “defending” from disturbing effects of the “migration crisis” (Council of the European Union, 2015l, p. 1–2; European Commission, 2016e, p. 17). In this respect, the European Council, has proved to be the most vocal promoter of “exceptionalist” logic in the EU policy discourse. In official remarks, customarily delivered after the European Council meetings, the President of the European Council has been applying the militaristic and urgent language connecting the need of regaining control over external borders with the survival of the Schengen zone and even the EU as a whole:

I will repeat this again: without control on our external borders, Schengen will become history (Council of the European Union, 2015c, p. 1).

Let there be no doubt: the future of Schengen is at stake and time is running out (European Council, 2015e, p. 1).

Yesterday’s discussion on migration confirmed the hierarchy of our aims, where protecting our territory, protecting our external borders as well as stemming illegal migration come first (Council of the European Union, 2017d, p. 1).

Another issue where the logic of exceptionality intertwines with risk management is organised crime. The problem of organised crime has been placed very high on the EU security agenda, playing an important role in both the human security and risk-oriented framings of the crisis. In this respect, organised crime has been construed as one of the main “enemies” of European integration, a direct threat to EU citizens and their freedoms as well as to migrants. Building on this narrative, the EU has been applying militaristic language, expressing the need for “combating” (Council of the European Union, 2016b), “eradicating” (European Union, 2017), or “fighting against” organised crime, most notably human smugglers and traffickers (European Commission, 2015b, f). As indicated in the Valetta Political Declaration:

We undertake to scale up our joint efforts in preventing and fighting migrant smuggling, eradicating trafficking in human beings and combatting those who exploit vulnerable people, both in Europe and in Africa. Trafficking in human beings, including for the purpose of sexual exploitation and forced labour is a serious crime and an unacceptable infringement of fundamental human rights. We will strengthen the fight against organised criminal networks, including their links to terrorism, through effective border management, enhanced cooperation and the implementation of the relevant legal and institutional frameworks (European Council, 2015f, p. 3).

The European Council reiterated this position, clearly stating that “we [the EU] must prove that we can defend Europe against organised crime and those who want to abuse our openness” (European Council, 2017b, p. 1). This type of language and militaristic narrative towards organised crime has been present in the EU migration-security continuum but has reached significantly higher levels of structuration with the framing of the “migration crisis”.

5.4.3 Comments

“Exceptionalist” security logic, though residual, exists in the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis”, manifesting itself in different parts of diagnosis and evaluation. It does not necessarily disrupt the dominant logics of human security and risk management, but rather increases a sense of urgency and emphasises the imperative for action – often of an extraordinary nature. As noted by one of the interviewees:

We have become even more territorial with this crisis. Every time we talk about protecting our borders, putting more armed men on the checkpoints, erecting walls, I think that this migration crisis is getting more and more militarised. I have been on Parliamentary delegation on Evros and in Bulgaria very recently and there is a lot of military or military-like activity going on there. I am not sure if it is the right direction, but this is how we face this purportedly humanitarian problem – with men in uniforms and guns (EP-1).

The elements of “exceptionalist” security logic can be observed in the example of the framing of organised crime and evaluation of its role in the “migration crisis”. Trans-border organised crime has been widely framed in the EU policy discourse as one of the most severe and urgent security issues that affect a plethora of referent objects ranging from migrants, European citizens to security of EU external borders. At same time it feeds on and fuels EU security deficiencies, becoming the key facilitator of the crisis. As noticed by one Europol official and the EP-2:

Organised crime can be linked to everything from illegal immigration to terrorist attacks. It is a security nightmare, really, and you cannot just get rid of it. Today, the problem is not as much about existence of organised crime, because they are here to stay, but their business model that feeds on our security deficiencies and fuels our security problems. For example, organised crime makes money on the migration crisis and uses this money to finance terrorism. Our first and foremost security concern should be about breaking this model (Europol-3).

There has never been so much attention paid to trans-border organised crime as there is today. I sit on the special committee on terrorism and even there we talk about a lot about organised crime, human smuggling, trafficking and radicalisation in the refugee camps. It all revolves around organised crime. It connects many dots and is a big problem in Europe and outside Europe. A good example is corruption among law enforcement officers. It is organised crime that corrupts them and pays them. We need to eradicate it, but for that we need to work together, as a Union and as global security actor (European Parliament-2).

5.5 Conclusion

Framing of a policy-relevant problem is a complex and messy process, imbued with many different logics and approaches reflected in a plethora of potential interpretations that struggle, correspond, and intertwine in the inter-subjective contestation of the problem’s specific nature, causal effects and remedial actions (Schön & Rein, 1991, p. 23). The aim of the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach is to flesh out these different logics and types of security thinking applied in the collective framing of issues and phenomena that potentially yield security implications for the socially valued objects. In this sub-chapter, I presented an overview of the first two components of the securitising frame-narrative produced in response to the “migration crisis”, namely diagnosis and evaluation. These two elements, though conceptually separate, constitute a very closely interlinked interpretative space, which prepares the background for remedial action by providing the definition of the nature of the problem, root causes and security implications, threats, and attribution of blame.

The analysis of the EU’s diagnostic and evaluation scheme indicates that securitisation of the “migration crisis” is interwoven with different strands of security logics that “emplot” or wrap the EU frame-narrative, unravelling the existence of a complex and dynamic interpretation. In this respect, the analysis unveils dominant security logics that have been applied in the diagnosis and evaluation of the “migration crisis”, namely human security and risk management – both containing traces of “exceptionalist” security thinking. Even though these logics drive two distinctive types of framings and build on different features and causal effects, they still co-exist in the EU frame-narrative, overlapping and intertwining in the policy framing process.

Human security and risk management logics, being part of the same frame-narrative, place the “migration crisis” on the internal-external security axis, revealing the dynamic nature of both the crisis as well as the framing process. The human security logic is centred on the security of all migrants who embark on the journey to the EU, fleeing from pervasive threats and structural violence This type of logic has a very strong externalising effect, placing the “migration crisis” and its main security features outside the EU and its socio-political and territorial domain. Here, the core security issues do not stem from the migrants, but hazardous migration, affected by external security environment proliferated with dangers, such as organised crime of terrorism. The human security framing, though reaching highest levels of structuration, has proved to be limited in two significant aspects. The first limitation refers to the factor of time and normalisation of the humanitarian interpretation in the EU policy discourse regime. With the progression of the crisis, the EU policy actors, except for the Parliament, have been gradually deemphasising the humanitarian features of the crisis, acknowledging their importance, but rather as a matter of courteous reference than strong support. The second limitation refers to the spatial dimension of the human security-oriented interpretation of the crisis. The humanitarian framing ends at the EU external borders and gives a way to a risk-oriented and managerial approach to security.

The EU external borders represent an important symbolic and physical space, where the two logics most extensively interact and intertwine in their framing of the central security concerns and referent objects. Upon contact with the EU borders, migrants are effectively stripped of their protective status and reframed as risks to security. Consequently, the salience of the humanitarian narrative is downplayed when confronted with the EU borders and replaced with the referent object defined as control over migration and the Schengen zone. This shift in framing of the referent object introduces tension into the EU frame-narrative, particularly in relation to the definition of the root causes and framing of migrants. While human security logic promotes an inclusive approach to migrants requiring protection, the risk-oriented interpretation clearly recognises the mixed character of inflows, differentiating irregular migrants into “desirable asylum seekers” who deserve protection and “undesirable economic migrants” who are a security nuisance. This tension has visible effect on conceptualisation of remedial actions segment of the EU frame narrative. The EU borders also reflect some important points of convergence for both logics. In the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the EU frame-narrative, trans-border organised crime constitutes a significant element for both logics. In both types of framing, organised crime is recognised as a severe security problem in relation to both referent objects, be it migrants (human security) or control over border and migration (risk management). Organised crime also represents the point, where “exceptionalist” security thinking seeps into the EU frame-narrative, being imbued with a sense of severity and urgency and linked with other major security concerns such as terrorism.

What has been omitted in the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the EU frame-narrative is the logic of resilience. The lack of this logic in the initial stages of the framing process comes as a surprise, as it has been commonly defined in the EU studies literature as one of the newest leitmotifs in EU security policymaking (Wagner & Anholt, 2016). Being the cornerstone of the new EU global strategy, it explicitly tackles the problem of recurring migration-related risks and threats such as an unstable neighbourhood, refugee crises, terrorism and poverty, all of which have been flagged by the EU in the framing of the crisis (European Commission, 2016d, pp. 27–30). In this vein, resilience would seem like a natural fit for the diagnosis and evaluation of the “migration crisis”. Its omission could be influenced by three factors. Firstly, the prominence and framing power of risk management logic in the EU migration-security continuum has deeply impacted the interpretation of the crisis, leaving little space for other risk-oriented logics. Secondly, the framing of the crisis has been more reactive, focusing on regaining control over migration and the EU external borders and managing the situation, rather than preparing for the inevitable cycles of migratory pressures. Thirdly, when the EU Global Strategy was introduced in 2016, resilience became much more influential in the EU in the later stages of the crisis, having more impact on the conceptualisation of remedial actions.

The diagnostic and evaluation segments of the frame-narrative address the questions of “what are we dealing with?” and constitute the interpretative grounds for conceptualisation of policy responses that are most suitable for a specific category of problems at hand. In reference to the “migration crisis”, the policy actors have introduced two dominant diagnostic and evaluation framings, namely human security and risk management oriented. They represent two distinctive strands of security framing that have reached discourse structuration and have significant chances for institutionalisation within the last segment of the frame-narrative, namely conceptualisation of remedial action. In the next chapter, I discuss how these logics, along with their specific interpretations of referent objects, categorisation of threats and evaluation of causal effects translated into specific EU policies mobilised in response to the “migration crisis”.