EU Migration-Security Continuum. Investigating Security Frames Before the “Migration Crisis”

Abstract

The chapter discusses historical development of the securitisation of migration at the EU level, outlining its different modes and venues. It discusses how the Schengen zone has become the seminal project for development of the EU border control regime reflected predominantly in the managerial approach to security practices and discourses towards migrants in the EU. It further the covers development of EU asylum policies, elaborating upon intertwining policy narratives of humanitarianism, illegality and bogus claims of asylum seekers in the EU. Lastly, the chapter discusses EU policies on detention and deportation, examining them as securitising practices of containment and control. In this way, the chapter unravels the complexity of the so-called migration-security continuum in the EU, discussing its historical and institutional development, indicating how the logics of human security, “exceptionality” and most notably risk management have become points of reference for framing of the “migration crisis”.

4.1 Introduction

Securitisation of migration is not new to the European Union. In fact, there is a substantial history of institutionalised practices and discourses that to varying degrees and intensity have been linking migration with different aspects of EU internal and external security (Bigo, 2001a; Huysmans, 2000; van Munster, 2009). Evidently, the “migration crisis” represents a critical case for studying migration-security in Europe, its development and specific framings. Nonetheless, before committing to its analysis it is necessary to discuss the so-called pre-existing securitising moves and security frames which deeply shaped the context of securitisation prior to 2015 and the beginnings of the “migration crisis”.

Neither securitisation nor framing take place in a vacuum, they have an important temporal dimension, negotiating between the past and the future, while making sense of the present security issues (Schön & Rein, 1991; Stritzel, 2007; van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). This statement is prominent throughout migration-security literature, which often underlines the importance of pre-existing security-centred institutional, discursive, practical and interpretative arrangements reflected in the so-called “security continuum” (Anderson & Bort, 2001, p. 155). The “migration-security continuum” can be characterised as a consecutive series of security discourses and practices, which contribute to the establishment of a coherent internal security environment that unambiguously connects the questions of immigration, asylum and visas to questions of security and border control (van Munster, 2009). Indeed, the EU has become a distinctive locus of this type of continuum, generating and accommodating both frameworks and discourses on migration and security (Baele & Sterck, 2015; Karamanidou, 2015; Leonard, 2010a; Sperling & Webber, 2019).

The EU has created a complex and internally diverse framework of securitisation, with a prolific variety of actors, practices, policies, discourses and interests having profound impact on the way migration has been framed as a security problem. Securitisation scholarship has identified several distinctive features that have been characteristic of the EU migration-security nexus to date. Firstly, the EU migration and asylum policy discourse has been contentious towards third country nationals, consequently placing immigration from outside Europe at the centre of securitising moves at the EU level (van Munster, 2009). Consequently, the European migration-security discourses have been commonly founded on the idea of “Fortress Europe” as based on restrictive security policies and practices designed to keep out unwanted migrants and protect material and symbolic “Europeanness” (Bermejo, 2009; Geddes & Taylor, 2016). Secondly, the EU institutional arrangement of securitisation has been evolving, starting with intergovernmental cooperation in the areas of internal security and border control, and steadily spilling over to transnational EU institutions and agencies (Leonard & Kaunert, 2019, pp. 41–73). From the analytical point of view, the EU has proven to be a rather unorthodox and problematic locus of securitisation. Securitising practices on the EU level have been traditionally centred on common security policies, dominated by technocratic practices and discourses. Also, there is no distinctive or coherently defined audience, but rather multiple actors, involved in producing securitising moves as a part of the political contestation and collective policymaking process (Floyd, 2016). Consequently, securitising moves and security frames produced by the EU are not localised in one specific institution or even policy but can be attributed to various migration-related policy discourses and security frameworks that have been dynamically changing throughout the development of the European project.

In this chapter, I discuss the EU migration-security continuum, focusing on security frames and logics that have existed in the EU since before 2015 and the “migration crisis”. The discussion follows three key and overlapping dimensions of securitisation. The first one refers to so-called “constitutional securitising moves” (embedded predominantly within the EU Treaties) that have been guiding the development of the EU internal security dimension and consequently informing and stimulating further securitising practices deployed on the EU level. The second dimension refers to the development of the “Fortress Europe” and security frames centred on border control and management migratory flows. This includes EU discourse and practices on detention and deportation of “undesirable” immigrants, discussing their influence on security framing of migration in the EU. The third dimension reflects securitising moves embedded in the existing EU security, migration and asylum policies, exploring different securitising frames that have been linking immigration with clandestine, illicit and even terrorism-related activities. The last part of the discussion focuses on the internal-external locus of securitisation of migration examining the EU’s application of internal and external security measures and migration control technologies as a form of pushing undesirable migrants away from the EU.

4.2 From Maastricht to Lisbon. Tracing “Constitutional” Securitising Moves and Security Frames

The development of the EU migration-security continuum has taken more than four decades. It has been driven by incremental and institutionalised processes, such as development of the Schengen area, which have been enveloping human mobility with the EU internal and external security policy discourses and actions (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 42). As underlined by van Munster (2009, p. 9), the EU’s mode of securitisation of migration is rarely based on the traditional framework of “panic politics” or “dramatic speech act”, mobilising discourses of fear and resentment towards migrants. It most commonly, but not exclusively, relies on mundane political, technocratic discourses and practices, guided by the logic of risk management and control, consequently linking human mobility with clandestine, illegal and threatening activities, including organised crime and terrorism (Bigo, 2002; Cohen & Sirkeci, 2016; Ibrahim & Howarth, 2017; van Munster, 2009). Many scholars also indicate that securitisation of migration at the EU level has been stimulated by the development of European integration mainly associated with institutionalisation of the EU internal security domain, and liberalisation of movement of goods, persons, services and capital (Dover, 2008; Huysmans & Squire, 2010).

The securitisation scholarship most often defines the introduction of the Schengen area in 1985 and its operationalisation in 1990¹ as the stepping-stone for developing security measures and control over human mobility at the EU level (Boswell, 2007; Squire, 2015). Here, the abolishment of internal borders between the member states has facilitated the transformation of the European Union (then European Communities) into a territorial entity in need of protection and management of its internal order and external borders. Nonetheless, it is the gradual institutionalisation and Europeanisation of the internal security domain that has become the main vehicle for securitisation of migration in the EU (Neal, 2009; Zaiotti, 2007). In this regard, the Treaties and the Schengen acquis have become so-called “constitutional securitising moves”, embedding migration-security continuum within the EU primary law, generating the key institutional and political frameworks for development of further securitising moves (Huysmans, 2006, pp. 3–4). Below, I focus on an overview of three EU treaties, which are most commonly indicated as significant contributors to the development of the EU migration-security continuum, namely the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty.² Even though the Schengen acquis can be considered as one of the EU constitutional securitising moves, for the clarity of the analysis it will be discussed in the next sub-chapter, related to the frame of border control in the EU.

Huysmans argues that the Maastricht Treaty represents the first EU-wide and constitutional securitising move towards migration, introducing provisions for intergovernmental cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (then known as the third pillar), putting such issues as asylum, irregular immigration, organised crime, and terrorism on the EU security agenda (Huysmans, 2006, pp. 66–69). Building on the legacy of intergovernmental security forums such as the Trevi group (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale)³ and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration (AHWGI),⁴ the Treaty embraced policy and security frames centred on illegal aspects of migration into the EU territories (van Munster, 2009, pp. 27–28). As emphasised in the document, one of the priorities of the EU is “safeguarding the free movement of people and internal market” while at the same time “combatting unauthorised immigration, residence and work by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States” (European Union, 1992, p. 62). In this way, the Treaty has begun refocusing the EU institutional optics on migration onto the dangers of human mobility, introducing a significant and prevailing distinction between the “good internal mobility of the EU citizens” and “risky migration into the EU territories from the third countries” (Ibrahim & Howarth, 2017, p. 5).

The Maastricht Treaty has significantly institutionalised the securitisation process by embedding prior intergovernmental European migration-security discourses within the EU institutional framework, thus shaping the migration-security continuum in three important aspects (van Munster, 2009, pp. 36–37). Firstly, it reproduced the existing security frames and discourses, significantly strengthening the security frame of irregular immigration as a risk to the security and stability of the European Union. Secondly, it framed the European freedoms and internal market as referent objects, requiring protection from the destabilising effect of irregular immigration. Thirdly, it normalised securitisation of migration by moving it away from international security expert forums such as the Trevi group and the AHWGI to the transnational and technocratic setting of the EU. Consequently, it made room for EU institutions as new securitising actors.

Though the Maastricht Treaty moved securitisation of migration to the EU-wide institutional setting, it was the Amsterdam Treaty and the introduction of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) that have significantly expanded the scope of migration-security continuum (European Union, 1997). The introduction of a refreshed internal security policy has created room for a series of additional securitising moves, reflected in the EU multiannual action plans,⁵ but the Treaty provisions themselves could also be considered as securitising moves (van Munster, 2009, p. 9). One of them was the “communitarisation” of border control (Schengen acquis), migration and asylum and moving them even closer to the institutional domains of the EU institutions (Huysmans, 2000, p. 765). As argued by Balzacq and Carrera (2006, p. 3), by linking these three elements within the EU transnational framework, the Union strongly emphasised the existing frame of control over immigration from non-EU countries as a way of “providing citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice” (European Union, 1992, art. 29). As stated in the Amsterdam Treaty, “free movement of persons can be only assured in conjunction with appropriate security measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime” (European Union, 1997, p. 8).

The Amsterdam Treaty has specified the referent object in more detail, putting the protection of European citizens’ and their rights and ability to enjoy those freedoms at the heart of its security discourse (Monar, 2006, pp. 497–498). The introduction of the AFSJ emphasised the “security of everyday life” of European citizens, discursively linking security of the European Union to security of individuals living and traveling within the EU (Arcarazo & Murphy, 2014, p. 87). As elaborated in the 1998 Vienna Action Plan:⁶

(…) freedom loses much of its meaning if it cannot be enjoyed in a secure environment and with the full backing of a system of justice in which all Union citizens and residents can have confidence. These three inseparable concepts have one common denominator – people – and one cannot be achieved in full without the other two (European Council, 1998, para. 5).

In this respect, the AFSJ set out to become the EU area of risk management, assuring common security through control and surveillance (Fletcher et al., 2017; Kaunert et al., 2013; Trauner & Ripoll Servent, 2016). The Amsterdam Treaty has strengthened the symbolic authority of security professionals to speak and define immigration, preparing the grounds for the emergence of the EU internal security agencies (e.g. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol)) as securitising actors. In this vein, the Treaty provisions and its subsequent action plans strongly underlined the need for a closer, more institutionalised and coordinated cooperation in the area of internal security, calling for “collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information, including information held by law enforcement services (…), in particular through Europol (European Union, 1997, p. 17). The development of the AFSJ has given a boost to risk driven and managerial logic in the EU migration-security continuum, incorporating border management and risk profiling technologies and focusing on “targeting risky spaces (airports, third countries), populations (asylum-seekers, undocumented immigrants) and activities (travel, human trafficking)” (van Munster, 2009, p. 15).

The 2007 Lisbon Treaty introduced several crucial changes into the EU migration-security continuum, strengthening the already mentioned risk-oriented approach and opening new avenues for securitisation. Salminen (2011, p. 276) argues that the most significant adjustment to securitisation has been brought with “depillarisaton” of the EU and the subsequent removal of rigid differentiation between intergovernmental and communitarised modes of governance of the AFSJ. This move has significantly strengthened the role of the European Commission, European Parliament or the Court of Justice of the EU in the EU internal security domain, expanding the scope of securitising moves from Treaties and multiannual security strategies to the Community instruments such as regulations, directives and decisions (Kostakopoulou, 2010, p. 154). This has pushed the EU even deeper into the technocratic realm, changing the dynamics of securitisation of migration into more every-day mundane discourses and practices of security (Karamanidou & Kasparek, 2020).

In this regard, the Lisbon Treaty has emphasised the importance of Europol and the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) for coordinating and managing the AFSJ. Eurojust, being one of the newest additions to the EU migration-security apparatus, has been tasked with operational assistance in combating and prosecuting cross-border illicit activities, including those migration-related, and the production of advice and security expertise for the EU institutions (European Union, 2007a, art 85 and 88). As pointed out by Trauner (2011, p. 180), this expansion of internal security agencies has further opened the migration-security continuum to technocratic and managerial security logic and pushing forward the agenda for control and close surveillance of migratory movements. Having this in mind, it should be noted that the Treaty has also expanded the mandate of the European Parliament, enabling democratic oversight over European internal security agencies (European Union, 2007a, art. 15, 85 and 88). Kostakopoulou argues that in reference to securitisation of migration, this increase of democratic control and transparency cannot be underestimated, as it puts EU migration policies in the spotlight, potentially diminishing the impact of exceptional security measures and frames in favour of prevention and protection of migrants and asylum seekers (Kostakopoulou, 2010, p. 155).

The Lisbon Treaty has been promoting an idea of migration management centred on increasing outflows and curbing inflows of “risky migrants” (Hampshire, 2015; Lefebvre, 2017). It has been underlining the need for the adoption of security measures against “illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation” (European Union, 2007a, art 79c). This also points towards an increased role of Frontex, especially in regard to its deportation capabilities (so called return operations). Within this managerial approach to security, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced an innovation, which has opened securitisation of migration to the domain of the internal-external security nexus. The Treaty has pointed towards the possibility of exterritorial application of migration control through EU external actions and instruments to prevent uncontrolled inflows of third country nationals into the EU territories. This includes the incorporation of a readmission agreement, as well as “partnership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection” (European Union, 2007a, art. 78.g). This framing of potentially dangerous migratory inflows is also visible in the solidarity provisions, where the Treaty envisages migration-related emergency situations, necessitating introduction of special measures (European Union, 2007a). As stated in the Treaty:

(…) in the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned (European Union, 2007a, art. 73.3).

Ibrahim and Howarth (2017) observe that this particular provision may have a substantial securitising effect, directly framing movement of people as threating and uncontrollable flows that require extraordinary measures.

4.3 Schengen and Border Control – Building “Fortress Europe”

Huysmans (2000, p. 751) argues that the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the subsequent 1990 Schengen Convention can be viewed as one of the most important impulses for “development of a restrictive EU migration policy and the social construction of migration into a security question”. Indeed, the Schengen accords are commonly considered to be the first official EU policy text “in which the abolishment of internal frontiers is discursively linked to the need for compensatory measures in the area of internal security and immigration” (van Munster, 2009, pp. 19–20). These “compensatory security measures”, often assuming a strictly securitising character, have been put into the Schengen system as a way of mitigating the so-called “security deficit” which emerged after the disappearance of internal border checks (Kaunert & Léonard, 2012, p. 81). After all, the introduction of the Schengen area has turned the EU into a new and truly complex territorial entity, which is in need of protection from internal and external threats, similar to any other state-like territories. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Bigo (2000), the Schengen system has also brought into being a specific security field, introducing new policies and modes of governance effectively incorporating human mobility into the realm of EU security and risk management.

The call for the introduction of compensatory security measures, originally elaborated in Articles 7 and 17 of the Schengen Agreement, has been used strategically in the further development of “Schengenland” as a way of increasing control over migration flows in the name of EU internal security (William Walters, 2002, p. 52). As observed by van Munster, the subsequent 1990 Schengen Convention was proof that member states’ security professionals swiftly “hijacked” the control over Schengen, shifting the focus of the project from abolishing internal borders to managing internal security and building up walls against “the uncertain and potentially threatening non-EU nationals” (van Munster, 2009, pp. 23–24). In this regard, the Schengen acquis has produced and reproduced an important frame of differentiation between good citizens of member states and bad third country nationals, or “aliens”, who pose risks to the EU freedoms and internal market (Slominski & Trauner, 2018, p. 102). As a result, the Schengen system has initiated the development of an important system of control and management, often described in terms of “Fortress Europe” or “gated community” – an elitist enclave offering security through the strong input of technologies and logistical arrangements that insulate communities from dangerous outsiders (Gruszczak, 2010).

Casas-Cortes et al. (2015, p. 79) observe that Schengen-based securitisation and development of a European gated community has been introduced through explicitly connecting undocumented and irregular immigration to the issue of crime, public order and security. As stated in Article 96 of the Schengen Convention:

(…) refuse entry to aliens may be based upon ‘a threat to public order or national security and safety which the presence of an alien in national territory may pose’, where security is considered to be at stake in the case of (i) ‘aliens’ that have been previously convicted for a criminal offence, (ii) ‘aliens’ that have committed a serious offence such a selling of drugs or who have the intention to commit such a crime, and (iii) when the ‘alien’ has been prohibited entry and who is illegally residing on the territory of one of the member states (European Union, 1990, art. 96).

After the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the incorporation of the Schengen zone into the EU legal and institutional framework, the securitisation of migration has become much more interconnected within the newly established Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Salminen, 2011, p. 278). As pointed out by Leonard (Leonard, 2010a, p. 35), the EU migration control has become a matter of managers of risk such as police, counterterrorism, and border cooperation, increasingly focusing on surveillance and data collection on immigrants as a way of identifying and mitigating risky mobility. With the introduction of sophisticated systems for data collection such as the Schengen Information System (SIS),⁷ Visa Information System (VIS),⁸ European Asylum Dactyloscopy (Eurodac),⁹ or Eurosur,¹⁰ the Schengen area has turned into a “dense network of surveillance and control taking advantage of new forms of personal identity management, early warning and threat prevention regarding cross-border human and material flows” (Gruszczak, 2010, p. 6). As a result of this “technologisation” of migration control, the movement of population has become a significant factor in the EU security paradigm.

4.3.1 Frontex and Protection of the EU Borders

The EU external borders have become one of the key sites of securitisation of migration (Bigo, 2014; Ibrahim & Howarth, 2017; Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2014). In 2004, for the purpose of increasing efficiency of the external border control, the EU created a decentralised agency, specifically designed to facilitate operational strengthening of security at the external borders and assist in management of migratory flows into the EU – the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex)¹¹ (Neal, 2009, p. 333).

Frontex occupies a prominent place in the securitisation literature, as it is commonly described as one of the key actors securitising migration at the EU level (Horii, 2016; Kasparek, 2010; Leonard, 2010a). The significance of Frontex lies in its “double-logic securitisation”, reflected in both “exceptionalist” security- and risk-driven practices and discourses (Neal, 2009, p. 337). Its peculiar securitising position can be attributed to a wide scope of activities pertaining to its managerial, intelligence and surveillance prerogatives as well as operational involvement on the external borders of the EU (Kalkman, 2020; Leonard, 2010a, p. 232).

Frontex has been put in the centre of what is called Integrated Border Management (IBM). The IBM is a system underpinning EU cooperation on border controls, joining up all activities of the EU and member states’ public authorities tasked with border security including surveillance and control (Jorry, 2007). In this regard, according to its original founding regulation, Frontex has six main tasks:

(1) coordinating operational cooperation between Member States regarding the management of external borders; (2) assisting Member States in the training of national border guards, including establishing common training standards; (3) conducting risk analyses; (4) following up on developments in research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders; (5) assisting Member States when increased technical and operational assistance at external borders is required; and (6) assisting Member States in organising joint return operations (European Union, 2011b, art. 1.5).

Leonard (2010a) observes that all these activities hold securitising potential, encompassing operational, discursive and bureaucratic practices, which generate a specific “technocratic security framework” around migration. In this respect, two types of Frontex’s activities are commonly attributed with substantial securitising effect and aptly reflect the double logics of securitising nature of Frontex, namely coordination of border operations and risk analysis.

Border operations align with a more “exceptionalist” security logic as they represent mobilisation of extraordinary resources in the crisis situations. The operations constitute a significant portion of Frontex’s activities (Carrera et al., 2017). The agency, being tasked with coordination of joint operations along the air, land and sea external borders, assists the EU member states and Schengen associated countries in conducting joint reinforced border control in the event of unprecedented migratory inflows (Leonard, 2010a, p. 239). The agency also coordinates Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) comprising of “specially trained experts from EU member states’ that can be deployed on the territory of another member state requiring assistance for a limited period of time (…) in exceptional and urgent situations” (European Union, 2007b rec. 6, 7). Frontex’s operations have been designed to intervene in border crises including substantial increase of transnational border crime and uncontrolled influx of migrants into the Schengen area (Léonard & Kaunert, 2020). As pointed out by Lutterbeck (2006, p. 65), given the participation of semi-military units (e.g. Guardia Civil in Spain or the Guardia di Finanza in Italy) in these emergency operations, Frontex’s involvement is often framed as militarisation of migration management based on deployment of excessive security measures against irregular immigrants and asylum seekers.¹²

Frontex’s operations and rapid interventions can be deployed under specific circumstances specifically relating to a sudden increase of migratory pressures generated by large numbers of third-country nationals trying to enter the territory of a member state illegally (Frontex Website, 2018b). In this regard, Frontex, relying on sophisticated intelligence analysis structures,¹³ is responsible for production of consistent security discourses, such as reports and analyses¹⁴ assessing and predicting irregular migratory flows and risks they pose to the security of the EU external borders (Paul, 2017). In this vein, the agency depicts itself as an intelligence-driven discursive and epistemic actor involved in “assessing changes, risks and threats with possible impact on the security of the EU’s external borders” (Frontex Website, 2008, p. 9). Leonard (2010a, p. 240) notes that this particular self-framing seems to have an interesting securitising effect. As she argues, “given that ‘intelligence’ has traditionally referred to information concerning threats to (national security), the use of this concept, rather than more neutral concepts such as ‘data’ or ‘information’, already contributes to securitising asylum and migration in the EU” (Leonard, 2010a, p. 242). Bigo and Guild (2005, p. 86) notes that this type of risk analysis places migrants in a specific security dimension, securitising migration “proactively, anticipating the risks and the threats, locating the potential adversaries even before they have any consciousness of being a threat to others”.

It should be stressed that even though the logic of management of “risky” migrants and irregular border crossings seems to be quite prominent, traces of “exceptionality” are becoming increasingly important in the way EU frames protection of borders and the Schengen zone. As discussed above, there are visible trends leading to militarisation of EU border regime, which most notably include employment of decisive and often extraordinary security measures towards irregular migrants. This, coupled with a language of emergency that is often used in the situation of increased migratory pressures opens the continuum to more robust utilisation of logic of “exceptionality” in the future.

4.4 Detention and Deportation – Reception and Return

The element of detention and deportation of irregular migrants has become a prominent frame of securitisation in the EU, constructing migrants as objects that need to be separated from the host society and expelled from its territories (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 52). As observed by Mountz et al., “detention is best understood as a sequential process that should be viewed in connection to detection, deportation, and exclusion” of migrants who are construed as a risk to public safety (Mountz et al., 2013, p. 534). In this vein, detention is a specific instrument for securitisation, controlling and moving “migrant undesirables” into a semi-prison setting and automatically designating them as threatening (Walters, 2010, pp. 80–81). Securitisation scholarship often depicts detention as a form of criminalisation of refugees, asylum seekers, and irregular immigrants, with deportation used as a deterrent and punishment for illegal, fraudulent or simply undesirable behaviour (Khosravi, 2009, p. 41).

Traditionally, the issue of detention and deportation has not been high on the EU agenda, falling under the purview of the national immigration and security policies of the member states (Mountz et al., 2013, p. 525). This trend changed with the 2000s and the introduction of Reception (European Union, 2003) and Return (European Union, 2008) Directives which have established common standards and procedures for the detention and removal of “third country nationals residing illegally on territory of a member state” (European Union, 2008, p. 1). The EU defines detention as “confinement of an applicant by a Member State within a particular place, where the applicant is deprived of his or her freedom of movement” (European Union, 2013b, art. 2.h). The Reception Directive allows for application of this type of detention in reference to undocumented migrants as well as refugees and asylum seekers “when protection of national security or public order so requires” (European Union, 2013b, art. 8.3.e). The argument of public and national security has been invoked quite commonly in the EU detention provisions as a way of limiting access to information or restricting the activities of threating immigrants, including removing the possibility of voluntary returns, imposing entry bans, and denying information on the reasons for deportation decision or entry bans (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 54).

As pointed out by Mainwaring (2012, p. 697), the EU framing of detention as a matter of public order and safety opens the possibility of “incarceration of people who have committed no crime from six to eighteen months in highly criminalising and traumatising conditions, which eventually lead to deep securitisation of immigrant and refugee populations”. Detention scholarship points out that detention has been increasingly used by the EU member states as a deterrent for curbing the influx of irregular immigrants and asylum seekers as well as means for more robust execution of returns (Amit & Lindberg, 2020; Ceccorulli & Labanca, 2016; Prem Kumar & Grundy-Warr, 2004; Niedźwiedzki & Schmidt, 2021).

Deportations or rather “returns”,¹⁵ as euphemistically referred to in the EU policy discourse, are closely connected to the detention regime. As explained by Leonard (2010a, p. 245), the EU return policy “aims to send back to their country of origin (or a country through which they have transited) those whose asylum application has been rejected or who have otherwise been found in an illegal situation on the territory of one of the EU Member States”. Return operations have become a prominent part of the UE migration control mechanism, specifically designed to address the removal of risky and unwanted immigrants in regard to “special concerns of safeguarding public order and security” (European Commission, 2005, p. 5). The EU promotes an effective returns policy as key in ensuring public support for legal migration and asylum, as it projects an ability to control and remove problematic “overstayers”, irregular third country nationals and failed asylum seekers from the EU host societies (Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2014).

In this vein, the EU return policy is framed as a tool for combating irregular immigration, but also an important element of the internal security system, centred on detecting, removing and banning individuals identified as posing risks to the public policy, public security or national security of the member states (European Union, 2008). As observed by Baldaccini (2009, p. 114), the EU Return Directive, also called the “shameful Directive”, introduces a restrictive scheme designed not so much to protect the EU citizens from threats, but to remove and keep out irregular migrants with security measures such as “prolonged pre-removal detention and a ban on re-entering the EU”. The Directive visibly downplays the humanitarian overtones and protection safeguards, allowing for a wide application “criminalising practices” and “forceful returns” as an attempt of managing irregular immigration and decreasing the general intake of asylum seekers (Cherubini, 2015, p. 228). As stated by the European Commission,

Member States must be supported in designing and implementing voluntary return programmes and plans for enforced return, (…). Supporting Member States in obtaining the necessary documentation for an immediate return and readmission of illegal migrants remains a priority (European Commission, 2006, p. 9).

The return decisions are taken and executed by the EU member states, but they are often financially and logistically supported by Frontex (Slominski & Trauner, 2021). The agency is tasked with facilitation and coordination of return operations, where the EU member states may jointly remove whole groups of irregular immigrants and rejected asylum seekers to their countries of origin or countries of transfer (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010, p. 144). Frontex most commonly provides or co-provides means and expertise in forced and voluntary expulsion of immigrants, including specialised training, escort officers, transportation or medical support necessary to conduct effective return operations (Frontex Website, 2018a). Frontex return operations constitute an important example of EU-level and practice-based securitisation, deploying joint extraordinary security measures to effectively remove large numbers of immigrants from the EU territory (Léonard & Kaunert, 2020). As observed by Leonard (2010a, p. 246), “nowhere else in the world, and never before, has there been such a high level of sophistication in the coordination of operations aiming to expel certain groups of migrants amongst such a large group of states”.

At this point, it should be noted that even though the EU’s reception-return policy scheme has strong securitising features, it is also a space where the notions of protection, care and security become closely entwined. In many aspects, the EU practice and discourse on detention and return policy seems to be internally conflicted. It presents securitised policies as “caring for” or “saving” refugees and asylum seekers by giving them shelter and addressing their needs during their detention and expulsion, at the same time categorising them as common security threats and risks to public safety (Mountz et al., 2013, p. 529). This type of approach is also visible in relation to voluntary or assisted returns which are framed as the “humanitarian solution” (Bendixsen, 2020, p. 113). Here, migrants are often framed as saved from precarious and undocumented existence in an EU member state and helped to return “home” (Bendixsen, 2020, p. 114). This type of narrative is often refered to as “hostile hospitality” or the safety/security and risk nexus, which reflects the ways “migrant safety and border security discourse are seemingly reconciled in both official state discourse and policy. Within the discursive space of the safety/security nexus, migrant safety and border security are framed as mutually attainable goals; greater border security is posited as the means to increase migrant safety” (Williams, 2016, p. 27).

4.5 Migration and Asylum Policies – Between “Bogus Asylum Seekers” and Irregular Migrants

The so-called “bogus asylum seeking” as a form of illegal activity has been one of the most prevalent security frames in the migration discourse in the EU and its member states (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 41). The general confusion around asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants in the EU arose from discursive presentation of asylum seeking as a form of alternative, potentially illegal economic immigration to the European Union (Huysmans, 2006, p. 66; Klaus et al., 2018). Leonard & Kaunert, (2019) point out that the EU has been gradually and successfully imposing restrictive control over refugees and asylum seekers. For instance, the Dublin Convention of 1990,¹⁶ by addressing the problem of states’ refusal to review asylum claims, introduced important restrictions in reference to the mobility of refugees and their ability to lodge sequential asylum applications in different EU member states (i.e. asylum venue-shopping) (Kaunert & Léonard, 2012, pp. 1400–1401). As van Munster notes (2009, p. 32), “on closer inspection the Dublin Convention, and its later incarnations, seems to be designed to keep refugees away rather than to regulate their protection, facilitating readmission agreements and sequential expulsion of refugees from the EU”. Consequently, next to narratives driven by human security and the need for protection of those fleeing persecution and extreme violence, asylum seekers and refugees have been labelled as potential frauds, seeking economic gains and exploiting the international system of protection (Guild & Minderhoud, 2012). The 1992 Edinburgh European Council conclusions directly refer to this rationale, calling on the member states for “common endeavours to combat illegal immigration and preventing the misuse of the right to asylum in order to safeguard the principle itself” (European Council, 1992, p. 47).

This frame has been carried on with the institutionalisation of the EU internal security dimension by the Maastricht Treaty (introduction of the third pillar – Justice and Home Affairs) and the Amsterdam Treaty (introduction of Area of Freedom, Justice and Security). De Lobkowicz (1994, p. 100) observes that the institutionalisation of the EU Justice and Home Affairs has eased the prior semi-clandestine and “exceptionalist” approach to migration and asylum, moving it away from security forums into the more technocratic EU institutional structure. It has not, however, stopped the EU from expanding its security frame over refugees and asylum seekers. Instead, it has emphasised its more mundane and risk-oriented nature through technologies of control such Eurodac (fingerprints database) and compulsory collection of biometric data from irregular immigrants, as well as all asylum applicants in the EU (Skleparis, 2016). As noted in the 2004 Hague Programme:

the on-going development of European asylum and migration policy should be based on a common analysis of migratory phenomena in all their aspects. Reinforcing the collection, provision, exchange and efficient use of up-to-date information and data on all relevant migratory developments is of key importance (European Council, 2004, p. 1).

In this regard, utilisation of technologies of control, surveillance and risk management has become an important logic behind securitisation of asylum and migration in the EU.

This is not to say that the human security, human rights and protection frame has been ultimately neglected in the EU asylum policy discourse. The EU regularly acknowledges its international obligations towards refugees and asylum seekers, often underlining the need and responsibility for providing shelter, care and protection. In this regard, the European Parliament has become an important venue for humanitarian framing of asylum and migation, pushing the EU policy discourse towards a more liberal approach to asylum and migration (Leonard & Kaunert, 2019, p. 87). In the context of the deep securitisation of migration, the EU has been attempting to create a discursive space for humanitarian framing of asylum, proclaiming itself as an “area of protection” and emphasising its commitment to the “European values and humanitarian tradition” (Comte, 2010, p. 173). Securitised migration and asylum policies have been running in parallel with gradual development of the human rights framework and instruments supporting more efficient protection of asylum seekers and refugees (e.g. European Refugee Fund) (Scipioni, 2017, p. 17). For instance, the right to asylum is included in the Charter for Fundamental Rights (European Union, 2000) and further developed within the CEAS, including harmonisation directives on asylum procedures and minimum standards (European Union, 2005; European Union, 2013a), refugee status qualification (European Union, 2004; European Union, 2011a), reception directives (European Union, 2003; European Union, 2013b), and the Eurodac directive (Council of the European Union, 2000). The existence of the humanitarian frame is also reflected in the establishment of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO)¹⁷ and Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA),¹⁸ which produce expertise and provide support to human rights and the protection-oriented dimension of asylum in the EU (Carrera et al., 2013).

4.5.1 Irregular Migration, Organised Crime and Terrorism

The “security first” principle has been dominating migration and asylum policies at the EU level, emphasising the illicit and clandestine dimension of human mobility and stimulating the deployment of security- and policing-oriented practices (Jorg Monar, 2016, pp. 37–38). In the EU, the notion of illegal conduct of migrants quite visibly remains the prevailing category, deeply connecting to discourse on legal migration and exercise of freedom of movement (Huysmans, 2006, p. 97). As stated, un the 1999 Tampere Programme,

…it would be in contradiction with Europe’s traditions to deny freedom to those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to our territory. This in turn requires the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes (European Council, 1999, art. 3).

In point of fact, over the years the EU migration-security continuum has become an institutionalised mode of policymaking, allowing the creation of close associations between drug trafficking, money laundering and even terrorism and migration (Huysmans, 2000, p. 760). As observed by Bigo (1994, p. 164), after the introduction of the Schengen

the issue of security and human mobility was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs, crime, and on the other, rights of asylum and clandestine immigration, but it came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free movement of persons within Europe.

The terrorist attacks in New York (2001), Madrid (2004) and London (2005) significantly stimulated the perception of migration as a security matter, defining a common terrorist threat as alien, radicalised and connected to “undesired mobility of threatening humans” (Jorg Monar, 2016, p. 34). Baker-Beall (2009, pp. 198–199) observes that as a result of increased terrorist threat, the EU counter-terrorism discourse has decisively centred on the idea of threatening “others”, potentially engaging illegal activities, facilitating terrorism and exploiting the vulnerabilities of “Europe of open borders and open societies”.

In this regard, both the Hague (2004) and Stockholm (2010) programmes, concerned with the development of the European internal security dimension, have underlined the connection between terrorism and cross border mobility-related security problems such as irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling of human beings, and organised crime (European Council, 2004, pp. 2–3, 2010). In both cases, the EU policy discourse underlines the internal-external dimension of the issue, calling for decisive joint actions and advanced cooperation with the third countries, addressing the root causes of the problem (Kaunert & Leonard, 2010, pp. 146–147). As often indicated by security scholars, the 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks shocked the EU internal security dimension, repositioning migration policies as a vital part of the counter-terrorist realm (Maguire, 2015; Nail, 2016; W Walters, 2008). With the help of the Schengen-based systems of migration control and surveillance,¹⁹ human mobility, especially from third countries, has become a category of risk that needs to be deeply regulated (Leonard, 2010b, p. 35). As stated in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy:

we need to enhance protection of our external borders to make it harder for known or suspected terrorists to enter or operate within the EU. Improvements in technology for both the capture and exchange of passenger data, and the inclusion of biometric information in identity and travel documents, will increase the effectiveness of our border controls and provide greater assurance to our citizens (Council of the European Union, 2005, p. 10).

By entwining immigration with criminal and terrorist activities, the EU has been gradually applying the same modes of governance in relations to both migration as well as combating transnational organised crime, terrorism and drug trafficking (van Munster, 2009). In this regard, it has framed migration not as much as a direct threat to European security, but a risk potentially facilitating proliferation of existential security problems (Argomaniz et al., 2015, p. 201). As emphasised in the Hague programme,

the management of migration flows, including the fight against illegal immigration should be strengthened by establishing a continuum of security measures that effectively links visa application procedures and entry and exit procedures at external border crossings. Such measures are also of importance for the prevention and control of crime, in particular terrorism (European Council, 2004, p. 16).

This position was later reiterated in the EU Internal Security Strategy, which explicitly linked migration and organised crime, arguing that “in relation to the movement of persons, the EU can treat migration management and the fight against crime as twin objectives of the integrated border management strategy” (European Commission, 2010, p. 11).

4.6 Externalisation of Migration Control. Securitisation Within the Internal-External Security Nexus

The externalisation of migration control has notably influenced the EU securitisation practices and policy frames, moving migration into the realm of the internal-external security nexus or the so-called externalised dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Balzacq, 2009; Trauner & Carrapiço, 2012; Wolff et al., 2009). Trauner (2011, p. 7) observes that the internal-external security nexus has steadily become one of the key concepts guiding the EU migration-security discourse, intertwining and connecting the realms of internal/domestic security (i.e. crime, public order, political stability, population control) and external/foreign security (i.e. diplomacy, military engagement and development). In this regard, Bigo (2001b, p. 112) notes that

internal -external security is often embedded in the figure of the ‘enemy within’, of the outsider inside, which is increasingly labelled with the catchword ‘immigrant,’ who is, depending on the context and the political interests, a foreigner or a national citizen representing a threatening minority. The outsiders are insiders. The lines of who needs to be controlled are blurred.

Over recent decades, the EU has been constructing migration as a security problem that should be addressed at its roots, namely outside the EU territories and its formal jurisdiction (Menz, 2015). Since the 1990s the internal security agenda has been “leaking” into EU foreign security policies, making more room for irregular immigration and terrorism and providing for expansion of migration control to external EU action (Menz, 2015, p. 310). Consequently, EU foreign, development and neighbourhood policies have been taking on internal security features by including immigration, border control and dangers of uncontrolled influx of problematic populations into its own policy frames and actions (Fletcher et al., 2017).

For instance, the 1992 Edinburgh Declaration calls for addressing the causes of migration and refugee flows through the European Communities’ external policy while referring to the Balkan wars and observing that “the danger that uncontrolled immigration could be destabilising” to the member states (European Council, 1992, annex 5). This frame was later reiterated in the Tampere conclusions (European Council, 1999), the Hague (European Council, 2004) and Stockholm (European Council, 2010) programmes, as well as the EU Internal Security Strategy (European Commission, 2010) where the EU once again called for the use of external policy tools to increase the Union’s dialogue and cooperation with countries of origin and of transit in order to improve their capacity to carry out border control, to fight against irregular immigration and better manage migration flows (Boswell, 2003; Chou, 2009). Karamanidou (2015, p. 49) argues that this prevailing expansion of externalised forms of migration management has been motivated by “the perception that domestic and EU-level policies were insufficient in dealing with migration pressures and co-operation with other states would enhance the protection-providing and controlling capacities of the EU”.

One of the most significant features of the externalised securitisation of migration at the EU level is reflected in the attempts to project its internal security measures onto surrounding states and regions (Paoletti, 2010, p. 29). As indicated by Eriksson and Rhinard (2009, p. 253), the internal-external security realm marries the instruments of manageable internal security with unmanageable external security environment, introducing a sense of control over elusive transversal threats such as terrorism or organised crime. In this vein, the EU commonly engages in political activities and so-called “policing at distance”, incrementally incorporating migration into the security realm through a variety of security measures and legal frameworks, ranging from carrier sanctions and visa regimes to Frontex-run policing measures patrolling international waters so as to prevent migrants reaching EU territories, to policies on readmission (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 49).

In this regard, the EU has been applying a wide plethora of political and external action measures attempting to expand its control and influence over the external migration-security domain. Within the framework of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), the European Commission has established a political dialogue and security cooperation with third countries, which have been considered strategic for curbing and managing migratory flows, with so-called Mobility Partnerships (Strik, 2017). As observed by Collyer (2012, p. 507), the GAMM carries a significant securitising effect, broadly incorporating security measures into international frameworks concerning human mobility. For instance, the GAMM links the negotiation of visa-facilitation provisions with the establishment of readmission agreements as a means for forceful return of irregular immigrants and unsuccessful asylum applicants to partnership countries, given they are the country of origin or transfer (European Commission, 2011, p. 16). At the same time, the GAMM emphasises the resilience of the security structure of partner countries as a way of safeguarding legal migration, reducing the risks of irregular migration, and managing rapid inflows of refugees (Hampshire, 2016, p. 578). As stated in the Framework, the internal security of the EU neighbourhood must be built up along with the “external dimension of asylum in order to contribute more effectively to solving protracted refugee situations” (European Commission, 2011, p. 17).

This resilience-oriented approach to securitisation of migration is also visible in linking the deficiencies of third countries with migration-security issues, emphasising that

migration and mobility are embedded in the broader political, economic, social and security context. A broad understanding of security means that irregular migration also needs to be considered in connection with organised crime and lack of rule of law and justice, feeding on corruption and inadequate regulation” (European Commission, 2011, p. 15).

In this vein, the GAMM envisages a possibility of launching security capacity-building initiatives in third countries, transferring skills and resources in order to prevent and reduce migration-related illicit activities, including trafficking, smuggling and irregular migration (European Commission, 2011, p. 15). The framework allows for mobilisation of the EU Internal Security Fund and EU Asylum and Migration Fund, along with development of cooperation, and border assistance under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy (e.g. EUBAM Libya) (European Commission, 2014, p. 6).

In regard to external dimension of migration management, the EU has been stressing the importance of pre-frontier controls such as pre-arrival visa and background checks, which are supposed to detect threatening individuals attempting to enter the EU territories (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 49). In this vein, the EU Internal Security Strategy calls for a closer cooperation with third countries in sharing intelligence and coordinating common efforts, by “deploying security expertise to EU Delegations, particularly in priority countries, including Europol liaison officers and liaison magistrates” (European Commission, 2010, p. 3). A similar provision is included the GAMM framework, which calls for a closer exchange of information between Immigration Liaison Officers and partner countries, as well as EU agencies specialising in migration and organised crime intelligence (European Commission, 2011, p. 16). McNamara (2013, p. 322) observes that this devotion to management through intelligence and risk profiling may be a double-edged sword, on the one hand generating a sense of control and security, while on the other preventing whole groups of forced migrants from accessing the EU territories and seeking protection in a safe manner, on the grounds of suspicion. In this regard, EU practices of “policing at distance” has made its mark on the EU migration-security continuum, carrying a strong securitising effect.

4.7 Conclusion

As discussed above, the EU is responsible for the creation of a very specific migration-security continuum, interwoven with a variety of policies, discourses, and security practices. The EU migration-security continuum was set up with the introduction of the Schengen zone, partly as a response to the internal security deficit but also as an opportunity for increasing control over inflows of migrants from outside the EU. In this sense, the securitisation of migration at the EU level can be considered as an incremental and institutionalised process locked within three closely related dimensions: “constitutional securitisation”, “Fortress Europe”, and the “migration-crime nexus”.

Even though these dimensions have been discussed separately in this chapter, they are closely entwined in the continuum, often reinforcing one another. The “constitutional” securitising moves have been gradually moving the continuum from intergovernmental into more supranational and decentralised modes of governance. Due to changes introduced by the EU treaties, the continuum has gained a framework, which enabled a much closer interplay between different aspects of migration management at the EU level. For instance, the notion of “Fortress Europe” and the development of a more restrictive border regime has discursively and practically merged with the EU’s asylum scheme and the migration-crime nexus. Irregular migrants and asylum seekers who are captured in the EU and categorised as unidentifiable, risky, or threatening are often detained and isolated for purposes of deportation. This is part of broader capture-identification-containment-return cycle that has been present in all three dimensions of the continuum, steadily gaining prominence in the EU’s approach to migration management.

As indicated in this chapter, the EU’s migration-security continuum is a complex construct, suggestive of three logics that have been intertwining and to different degrees influencing the way the EU has been framing the relationship between migration and security. This concerns most notably risk management, but also elements of “exceptionality” and human security. Traces of the logic of “exceptionality” can be found in the conceptualisation of “Fortress Europe”, especially in regard to the militarisation of border management and discourse on border operations and emergency interventions in the situation of unprecedented migratory inflows. Similarly, elements of human security are embedded within the EU’s discourse on asylum policy and “worthy” asylum claims as well as its reception and return policies. Nonetheless, it is hard to ignore that the risk seems to be most fundamental, overarching and expansive out of the logics existing in the continuum. It has a tendency to expand together with the need for precise control of migratory movements and rapid technologisation of migration management policy in the EU. References to risk can be found in a plethora of the EU migration policies, ranging from protection of refugees and management of the asylum system to border security, robust Frontex operations, detention and returns, as well as the externalisation of migration control. As a security logic, risk has been consistently introduced into the continuum, setting the tone for further securitisation of migration in the EU. In the next chapter, I analyse how risk and other pre-existing frames and security logics construed as a part of the EU migration-security continuum translate into security framing of migration-related emergency situations such as the “migration crisis”.