3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, I provided an overview of the basic characteristics and criticism of the Copenhagen School and its securitisation theory. By committing to a rather rigid framework driven by speech act theory and exceptionalism, the Copenhagen School has overlooked the complexities, embeddedness and depth of the process associated with the construction and application of security. Building on the already existing criticism of securitisation, this chapter proposes an alternative reading of the theory, addressing the shortcomings of the traditional approach and making the framework more sensitive to (1) the tangled nature of security reflected in the variety of security logics and interpretations that intertwine and coexist in the processes of securitisation; (2) contexts such as the EU policy making environment, where a clear dichotomy between securitising actors and empowering audiences is not evident. To this end, I propose looking at securitisation from an interpretative angle, placing policy framing at the heart of the framework.

In the next part of this chapter, I will reflect upon the original building blocks of securitisation theory, i.e. speech act, exceptionality, audience-actor dichotomy, acceptance and context and discuss how the framing approach might constructively inform the original conceptualisation of securitisation. At the same time, I will discuss how the existing criticism fits into this reading of the theory, elaborating upon the idea of acceptance as well as the importance of embeddedness and contextuality in securitisation analysis. At this point, I should underline that in the following discussion I do not propose a new comprehensive theory of securitisation but rather an alternative reading of it, which could be used when analysing securitisation practices proliferated with multiple conceptions of security so typical in policymaking settings. The following chapter is structured as follows. First, it focuses on an overview of the speech act-oriented approach to securitisation and discusses how framing literature can help addressing some of its main shortcomings. Further, the chapter moves to discussing the use of “exceptionality” in the securitisation research and offers to supplement it with an idea of security logics, thus opening the analytical framework to an inquiry into different notions of security that underlie processes of securitisation. Thirdly, the chapter focuses on actor-audience interaction, showing how the traditional division between “speakers” and “listeners” of securitising moves might not fit to all instances of securitisation, policy-driven securitisation being one of them. In the next two parts of the chapter, the discussion moves to issues of acceptance of securitising moves and the role of context, elaborating on the importance of these two elements in securitisation research. The chapter concludes with a summary of the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach, outlining its most important features.

3.2 Securitisation Beyond Speech Act

The speech act approach has generated substantial criticism among scholars. It has committed securitisation framework to an idea of the linguistic securitising act of a decisionistic nature, more driven by the content of the speech and power of the speaker rather than actual effects it has on the audience. The speech act approach has narrowed securitisation down to a concentration of single acts, self-referential directives produced by powerful actors entitled to “speak security” to relevant audiences. As often pointed out by the critics of the Copenhagen School, the traditional reading of the theory has made application of the securitisation framework in empirical research problematic, especially in highly politicised and contestation-driven contexts such as policy making environment, which is inherently driven by interactional and dialogical processes of collective sense making (Balzacq, 2015b; Sperling & Webber, 2019; Stritzel, 2007). In order to address the shortcomings outlined in this criticism, I propose to look at securitisation as the work of framing – an intersubjective practice of meaning making that triggers a particular security-oriented mind-set and shapes the perception of both the nature of the problem and actions undertaken to deal with it (Huysmans, 2006, p. 24). The inclusion of framing opens securitisation to a more processual and iterative aspects of linguistic and non-linguistic construction of security, allowing one to look at this process as inherently diverse and proliferated with a various and often conflicting security-centred interpretations of the problem.

Studies on frames and framing constitute a conceptually rich though incoherent body scholarship (de Vreese, 2012; Entman, 1993). Framing research falls under the interpretative paradigm, focusing the attention on diversity, creativity and conflict within the human process of interpreting and dealing with problematic, socially relevant, and new situations (Neufeld, 1993). It is concerned with different competing views and interpretations of the problem and investigate how they interact and contribute to the process of collective “making meaning together” (Bacchi, 2015, p. 5). In this regard, Entman (1993, p. 52) proposes defining framing as a process of “selecting of some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”. He further describes framing as a practice of problematising and constructing social reality by “culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation” (Entman, 2007, p. 167). In this vein, framing is often described as a mixture of interactive, inter-subjective and contextually embedded processes through which interpretative schemata, or in other words frames, are constructed and communicated to relevant audiences in order introduce a “way of thinking and acting” about a specific problem or an issue (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 93). The framing approach has been commonly applied in research on the problematisation and contestation of socially significant events and occurrences, where relevant actors engage in negotiations and sometimes struggle over dominant interpretations, meanings and solutions (Chesters & Welsh, 2004; Daviter, 2007; Eising et al., 2015). In this way, framing research has inspired numerous academic inquiries into processes and modes of collective sense- and meaning-making, contributing predominantly, but not exclusively, to media and communication studies (Brüggemann, 2014; D’Angelo, 2002; Jorg Matthes & Kohring, 2008), social movement research (Benford & Snow, 2000; Resnick, 2009; Snow, 2007) and last but not least policy studies (Boräng & Naurin, 2015; Rhinard, 2010; Schön & Rein, 1994; van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). As this book aims to discuss securitisation occurring in policymaking contexts, I will use policy framing as the main point of reference for further theoretical discussion.

Policy framing scholarship builds on the assumption that one of the core responsibilities of a policymaker is to interpret uncertain situations and remove or mitigate parts of this uncertainty, by grounding the problem in a familiar context and proposing suitable solutions (Rhinard, 2010, p. 15). As indicated by Laws and Hajer (2006, p. 252), policy actors should seek “stability and act in a social world that is a kaleidoscope of potential realities”. By engaging policy-relevant problems, they structure this reality and define what is the essence of the problem, “what is at stake?” and “what should be done about it?” (Daviter, 2007, p. 656). Rein and Schön (1977) conceptualise this practice as the essence of framing, that is a process where policy actors produce structures of belief, perception and appreciation. Consequently, policy framing can be seen in broad terms as a “process in and through which policy-relevant actors inter-subjectively construct the meanings of the policy-relevant situations with which they are involved, whether directly or as onlookers and stakeholders” (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 97). In this process, they translate worries into solvable problems by highlighting specific features of the situation, ignoring or selecting out other features, and binding the highlighted features together into a coherent and comprehensible pattern (Aukes et al., 2018).

One of the strengths of the framing approach lies in a variety of mutually inclusive, yet distinctive productive and iterative practices that assign meanings and construct interpretations: sense-making, selecting, and storytelling. From the sense-making perspective, policy framing is an iterative activity which allows actors to translate an ongoing complexity into a “situation that is comprehended explicitly in words and that serves as a springboard into action” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 409). It enables actors to make sense of the situation they are confronted with and imagine possible scenarios in the light of prior notions concerning the ways of dealing with similar issues (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 98). In this aspect, sense-making has an important action component, as it organises prior knowledge and experiences and guides future response (Rein & Schön, 1977). It locks policy actors into a very specific temporal dimension, where the past and the future interlock in social construction of reality. On the one hand, policy actors reflect upon the situation considering a model of the world, prior knowledge and previously evoked frames of reference, on the other, they look into the future while imagining and planning collective actions (Bacchi, 2004; Rich & Oh, 2000). Rein and Schön (1996, p. 124) call this process a “normative leap from what “is” to what “ought to be”.

The process of selecting is commonly reflected in practices of naming and categorising. Naming essentially gives a “face” to a selected feature of the situation. It is understood as a practice that focuses audience’s initial attention on specific features using for example a metaphor (e.g. “refugee tsunami”) in order to strengthen a specific interpretation, make it more digestible, communicable, and/or captivating (Collyer & De Haas, 2012; Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Stone, 1989). In this respect, categorising is a form of naming, but more explicit focused on specific taxonomy (Rogan, 2006). Categorising often offers a differentiation (e.g. “Eastern”, as not Western “legal”, as not illegal) and often grounds possible future courses of action (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 99). For example, describing migrants as “illegal” consequently criminalises (and even dehumanises) them, suggesting that, as in the case of other criminals, they are threatening and should be prosecuted for breaking the law and consequently removed from the host society (Aradau, 2004; Schuster, 2011). There are cases when naming and categorising alone can have a powerful impact on problem definition, increasing a sense of urgency and preparing grounds for the mobilisation of specific policies (e.g. “war on drugs”); however, more often than not, framing also requires an element that gives a sense of continuity and connection between selections, names and schemes – a story or a narrative (Prior et al., 2012).

Storytelling internally binds different elements of framing together, provides a “plot” and stabilises the framing process binding together various features of the situation, making it coherent and comprehensible (Rein & Schön, 1996, p. 44). In Rein and Schön’s policy-oriented approach, frame-narratives have a framing effect, yielding particular problem definitions and guiding action. They “frame subjects as they narrate them, explicitly naming their features, selecting and perhaps categorising them as well, explaining to an audience what has been going on, what is going on, and, often, what needs to be done” (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 107). In this respect, framing should communicate a credible and coherent story, which makes sense as a whole. It should set the stage for the audience, explain the situation in which actors find themselves, explain its origins and root causes, assign blame and responsibility, and finally provide remedial actions and lead to a desirable “happy end” (Boin et al., 2009). Framing through storytelling has an ongoing and dynamic character. It is sensitive to change, adaptable to unfolding events and challenges whenever they arise (Laws & Hajer, 2006, p. 261). As argued by Weick (1995, p. 61), a good story has to be accurate and plausible, it has to hold disparate elements together long enough to energise the audience and inform action. In this respect, it is present throughout the whole policy cycle and created not only during policy design but also in the processes of policy implementation and evaluation. That is why framing actors and policy storytellers are not only those who “speak policy” from the position of decision makers, but also practitioners and street level bureaucrats who serve as boots on the ground, dealing with cases and providing feedback on the applicability of specific solutions (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 101).

Policy framing offers a fruitful contribution to securitisation studies, allowing it to move beyond the speech act-based approach and further grounding securitisation in a more dynamic and processual reading. By substituting speech acts with framing, securitisation assumes a more nuanced character, where security-driven interpretations of a given problem, event or dynamic shape collective perceptions, attitudes and inform collective actions. In this regard, securitisation is a matter of a specific security interpretation produced, communicated and contested in a given context. Framing distances the original understanding of securitisation from its decisionist and act-driven nature and focuses on repeated articulations, which create distinctive, often linguistic patterns of security meanings which are then applied to make sense of societally relevant issues (Keren, 2010). In the framing approach, it is the iteration, not a powerful directive, that makes security interpretations salient, increasing their chances to be recognised and embraced by audience as an acceptable and applicable way of “thinking and doing” (Jörg Matthes, 2012).

Securitisation as the work of framing is not limited to authoritative speech but reflected in a variety of interrelated practices such as sense making, categorising and storytelling, which together weave a web of security meanings around an issue, pulling it into the realm of security discourses and eventually practices. In this regard, repeated articulations, names and categories of security result in the development of strong associations with a specific issue, influencing collective judgment of the situation and mobilising support for security action (Chen et al., 1999, p. 48). One of the strengths of framing is the acknowledgment of the messiness of social construction. It is reflected in the dynamic nature of security-driven framings, which may change through time depending on the evolving nature of a situation that is being framed as well as interests and attitudes framing actors and audiences.

In framing-centred reading, securitisation should be treated as a continuous and intersubjective process, which is driven by contestation and dialogical relationship between relevant actors and audiences. Negotiations and struggle over meanings are inherent to framing. Van Hulst and Yanow (2016, p. 99) observe that especially in policy-oriented framing

various relevant actors bring different and conflicting experiences, expectations, desires, and fears to policy situations or develop these in them, struggles over the interpretation(s) and meaning(s) of these narrated stories can be expected, and negotiations over their meaning(s) may take place.

This competition between produced frames naturally organises actors and audiences, gathering them around shared stories and turning them into opponents or collaborators (Vandenbussche et al., 2017). In this struggle between different framings, meanings are produced, reproduced and even transformed, opening the process to more engaged and inter-subjective construction of a societally relevant issue.

3.3 Securitisation Beyond Exceptionalism

The Copenhagen School applies the notion of exceptionalism in order to clearly define the boundaries of security and avoid falling into the “everything is security” trap. Consequently, it equates successful securitisation with the state of exception, which breaks from normal politics, and builds on the idea of security driven by survival and mobilisation of extraordinary measures. As argued by Doty (1998, pp. 79–80), this “exceptionalisation” of security puts the securitisation framework in a “straight jacket”, eliminating the possibility of analysing other relevant articulations of security that exist below the threshold of exception. This limitation has been often criticised in more contemporary securitisation literature, indicating the need for a more inclusive conceptualisation of security (Corry, 2012; Hammerstad & Boas, 2014; Lupovici, 2014).

One of the main benefits of framing centred reading of securitisation theory is that it opens the framework to a more political and dynamic understanding of security, looking into its different shapes and shades that manifest through collective processes of meaning making. It diverts the focus of securitisation from the exceptional state of “no discussion” and extraordinary measures to the idea of multiple security interpretations that are negotiated and contested by relevant actors (Bourbeau, 2013; van Munster, 2009). Through collective sense making, naming and storytelling, actors mobilise and promote their specific ways of thinking and responding to a problem, imbuing it with their own understanding of what security is and what security does. As pointed out by Huysmans (2014), security is essentially contested and enacted within this political realm. A more political understanding of “security” is dynamic, “constantly written and rewritten, challenged, and therefore inherently unstable” (Pram Gad & Lund Petersen, 2011, p. 318). As Campbell (1992, p. 2) suggests in his post-Cold War analysis of the United States’ foreign policy, conceptions of danger and security are not fixed and ascribed to one single interpretation, but culturally and contextually defined. As he aptly points out, “events or factors which we identify as dangerous therefore come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various contexts and dimensions of dangerousness”. In the same spirit, Fierke (1997) notes that the meaning of security is fluid and susceptible to dynamic language used by actors to describe relationships between enemies and friends, perceived threats and referent objects.

Securitisation scholarship has been gradually incorporating the idea of opening the framework to alternative interpretations of security that operate below the threshold of exceptionalism (Bigo, 2000; Bourbeau, 2013; Gray & Franck, 2019). For instance, Corry (2012) proposes distancing the theory from the realist vocabulary and look at “riskification”, as a concept more attuned to contemporary articulations of security. He proposes a risk-centred conceptualisation of securitisation as driven by management of uncertainty and mobilisation of precautionary measures (Corry, 2012, p. 248). As he points out,

rather than engendering a politics of exception, emergency time-frames and violent and secretive means as a securitisation does, ‘riskification’ leads to long-termism, the defusing of friend-enemy relations as the construction of external existential threats is replaced by focus on internal vulnerabilities, resilience and a focus on conditions of possibility for harm, rather than direct causes of harm (Corry, 2013, p. 5).

In a similar fashion, numerous securitisation scholars have been incorporating alternative notions of security into the framework, investigating human security (Watson, 2011) or resilience (Bourbeau, 2013), as some of the logics that shape specific modes and consequences of the securitisation process.

Different notions of security in securitisation research do not have to be treated in isolation. As Rothe (2016, pp. 56–57) argues, different logics of security such as routine and exception are essentially two sides of the same governmental coin and may co-exist in the same securitisation process. Sharing this assumption, with the help of the policy framing approach, I propose to dig deeper into these different notions, modalities, vocabularies and practicies of security and explore how they become “tangled” in the process of securitisation. Here, the element of “tanglement” is reflected in how different logics of security such as exception, risk, resilience or human security, collide and intertwine at various stages and in different dimensions of the framing process. This will allow one to look at securitisation beyond a singular interpretation of security meanings that guide collective action, investigating its internal complexity and dynamics.

In order to avoid the problem of “making everything security”, I propose to employ Watson’s (2012, p. 291) view on securitisation as not fixed in the state of exceptionality or even risk, but embedded within a broader institutionalised constellation of meanings, here understood as the “security master frame”. The concept of a master frame can essentially be viewed as a broad historical and/or institutional system of meanings (Gahan & Pekarek, 2013). It is a generic frame or repertoire of interpretations wide enough to integrate other issue-specific frames, which address a given problem (Mooney & Hunt, 1996, p. 178). Benford and Snow (2000, p. 619) define a master frame as generic and very “broad in interpretive scope, inclusivity, flexibility and cultural resonance”. A master frame is an overarching idea, such as justice, which can be translated and deployed across different contexts and issues (Benford, 2013). In this respect, the term justice can be applied in different discussion on social justice or legal justice, meaning different things to different people, while staying within commonly recognised boundaries and meanings of what justice means. Even though a master frame is inherently inclusive and adaptable to new circumstances, and therefore not static, it is also stable and not easily manipulated (Carroll & Ratner, 2008). As pointed out by Huysmans (2006, p. 25) in his discussion on security meanings, even though different framings of the problem might invoke different conceptions of security, they still operate within a stable “constellation of security meanings, which draws upon historically constituted and socially institutionalised set of interpretations”. As he later observers, like grammar of a language, security meanings evolve over time but cannot be changed arbitrarily (Huysmans, 2014, p. 31). Taking this into account, I contend that looking at security as a stable and inclusive master frame allows retaining continuity in how securitisation process renders security meanings, but at the same opens up to various security logics and problem definitions resulting from different interpretive communities, experiences and perceptions.

3.3.1 Security Logics

In order to operationalise specific meanings that operate within the security master frame, I propose to use the term security logic. “Security logic” has become relatively popular among securitisation scholars, being extensively used in several works on securitisation practice and theory (Balzacq, 2015; Bourbeau, 2014; Esposito et al., 2020; Niemann & Schmidthäussler, 2014). In security literature, there have been very few but notable attempts to conceptualise what security logic entails (Balzacq, 2015; Huysmans, 1998, 2006). In general terms, security logic is viewed as discursively embedded ensemble of rules that is immanent to security practice, defining that practice in its specificity (Huysmans, 2006, p. 28). Balzacq (2015a, p. 1) proposes looking at security logic as the essence of a security notion, reduced to the rules of grammar applied to make sense of security objects, risks and vulnerabilities and define suitable course of security action. As he argues, different theories of security disagree over their understanding of security logic (Balzacq, 2015a, p. 2). For instance,

a realist rendition of the logic of security would hold that military rules inform the characteristic grammar of security practices and the concept of “existential threats” provides the background condition, which enables the different components of security practices to operate in a distinctive way” (Balzacq, 2015a, p. 2).

In this book, I use the term “security logic” to describe a pronunciation of security, connected with distinctive forms of security grammar and practice. It should be noted that te logics presented are described as ideal types and in reality, they are much more complicated and often mixed with other iterations of security. In my discussion, I follow and build on the works of van Munster (2009) and Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014) who use “security logics” to identify specific rationale employed by policy actors in constructing and applying security oriented problematisation within the EU policy realm. Van Munster (2009, p. 10) argues that the way actors represent threats and other security problems, define security measures, and identify their final security objectives is indicative of specific security logics. This is later expanded by Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014, p. 15), who point out that security logics reflect not only how actors describe threats but also referent objects and other types of vulnerabilities that require protection by security providers. Consequently, both discussions propose a conceptual framework for debating “security logics” as reflected in representation of security problems, referent objects and vulnerabilities, security measures (including their nature and duration), and the final security objective. In the subsequent part of this sub-chapter, I briefly overview and operationalise four logics – “exceptionalist” security logic, risk management, resilience, and human security, which serve as a point of reference for the analysis presented later in this book (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Security logics

3.3.1.1 “Exceptionalist” Security Logic

Critical security scholarship has been using the realist concept of security as a stepping-stone for developing new and alternative conceptions and frameworks of security. Nonetheless the realist-traditional security logic has prevailed in contemporary security thinking and even, to some extent, new schools of security (i.e. Copenhagen School of Security) (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995). Van Munster (2005, p. 2) observes that the traditional-realist logic of security is often linked to the notion of exceptionality, reflected in existential character of threats and mobilisation of extraordinary security measures. As he points out, the realist, or in other words “exceptionalist” security logic, is a “binary, zero-sum game of identity-formation that establishes an intense and particularly forceful relationship between the opposing groups” (van Munster, 2009, p. 8). Here, threats have often a personal character and are described in terms of concrete, tangible, conceivable enemies, for example “foreign countries”, “the Nazis”, “the immigrants”. They are unambiguous, often defined as elements of external origin and alien nature that endanger the survival and secure status quo of referent objects (van Munster, 2005, p. 3). Consequently, the referent objects are also clearly and unambiguously defined. They are construed as passive and vulnerable objects of security, often having state-like features described in terms of community or communitarian values or structures necessary to sustain their survival (Corry, 2012, p. 239). As indicated by Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014, p. 15), this particular logic is most commonly invoked in relation to state security, framing referent objects in terms of protection of borders, territorial coherence of the community, its sovereignty, its financial and political stability, or continuity of government.

Brzeziński (2009, p. 23) points out that framing security problems in terms of existential threats also produces a rigid and reactive way of thinking about challenges to security. In this approach, policies are rather reactive and are oriented toward dealing with a threat upon its full manifestation or materialisation (Rasmussen, 2001, p. 293). This marginalises the element of long-term security planning, focusing predominantly on well-recognised and established aspects of security reflected in its military and political dimension. Security measures employed under the “exceptionalist” logic have an extraordinary, often militaristic, character and require mobilisation of procedures well beyond so-called normal politics (C.A.S.E., 2006, p. 463). This again refers to the notion of exceptionality that implies breaking from everyday practices and rules of existence and introduction of a state of emergency and mobilisation of sufficient power and resources to counteract existential threats (van Munster, 2009). In this rationale, security policies and measures are reactive and initiated only in response to the persisting and existential threats (Niemann & Schmidthäussler, 2014, pp. 25–26). The security responses are characterised with extreme intensity in terms of scope and resources, but are also temporary and designed to reinstate the status quo from before the emergence of the existential threat. Balzacq (2015a, p. 2) points out, that this type of thinking sets security actors on the path that entails the orientation of security policies on elimination or eradication of threatening objects, securing the collective survival of a socio-political order.

3.3.1.2 Risk (Management and Resilience)

The concept of risk has deeply saturated contemporary security thinking, becoming, in its various forms, the guiding principle of security politics on the national and international level (C.A.S.E., 2006). The literature indicates two dominant perspectives on risk as based on management and resilience (Balzacq, 2015). These two notions are built on similar foundations emphasising the complexity, uncertainty and continuum of the contemporary security realm. Both risk management and resilience follow the idea of security as future oriented dynamics, entailing security actions that are supposed to manage, mitigate, avert and/or resist the upcoming shocks and disturbances to the socio-political system (Dijkstra et al., 2018). In this book, I treat these two perspectives as derivative of broadly understood risk logic, while maintaining their own identities within this specific way of security thinking. That is why I incorporate the managerial and resilience perspectives under the “umbrella term of risk”, at the same time accounting for their corresponding and differing features.

Framing of security problems is rather ambiguous in risk logic. Firstly, in contrast to “exceptionalist” logic, the term “threat” is considered unfit to describe the complex, multifaceted security problems (Renn, 2008, p. 290). Instead, it is substituted with “risk”, as the phrase more suitable to reflect future dangers, uncertainties and potentially threatening events, dynamics and occurrences. In this vein, risk logic builds on a “friend/enemy continuum” rather than strict “friend/enemy differentiation”, primarily focusing on a correlation between factors liable to produce uncertainty and levels of security (van Munster, 2005, p. 4). Here, the rationale of risk imbues “potential threats” with an impersonal character and centres on the specific interconnected features of selected phenomena, describing them as potentially dangerous with varying degrees of concreteness and gravity (Adams, 2000, pp. 199–200). In this logic, the representation of potential risks is focused on the internal and/or external dimension of security, often described as a consequence of unfortunate political decisions or omissions that can be made up for, if suitable future-oriented thinking is applied (Niemann & Schmidthäussler, 2014, p. 15).

In the managerial perspective, this translates into a specific framing of risks, as mostly internal to the system, manageable and falling under the purview of neoliberal practices of control and surveillance (Luhmann, 1996, pp. 5–6). Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014, p. 16) point out that in risk management, “problems are defined and addressed according to their anticipated future consequences, regardless of whether they will ever materialise”. In this sense, the management of risks is essentially management of the future, which may or may not bring tragic events. Resilience, even though it uses the same grammar of risk, more often refers to the future threatening events as shocks and disturbances (Zebrowski, 2013). Here, the key element is the inevitability of the upcoming events and departure from the belief that future can be managed and threatening situations can be fully averted (Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015). Consequently, the resilience rationale frames the future as uncertain, but filled with potential shocks and disturbances that will eventually materialise, though the timing, scope and magnitude of their negative consequences is uncertain (Corry, 2014, pp. 256–257).

Referent objects in risk logics are construed mostly as ambiguous, networked and interdependent. Risk logic takes into account a variety of possible scenarios that reflect how different components and aspects of security within a given system are connected and even interdependent. For instance, a possible terrorist attack may affect the physical security of human beings, as well as industry, stability of currency and continuity of government (Kessler & Daase, 2008). That is why the risk rationale rarely narrows its focus to one specific type of objects that should be taken into account, instead relaying on generalisations and different degrees of concreteness. In regard to specific approach to referent objects, the managerial approach to risk construes them in terms of passive entities (e.g. population of a state) that need to be controlled and surveilled for their own good (Krahmann, 2011). As observed by van Munster (2009, pp. 10–15), this type of logic expands its managerial competencies over referent objects, steering them into more risk aversive situations, creating order through technologies of security and risk interventions. In contrast, resilience proposes a different perspective on referent objects, describing them as more active agents, who should also contribute to security by investing in preparedness and increasing their own robustness and ability to cope with difficult situations (Diprose et al., 2008). In the resilience-centred logic, referent objects cannot be fully protected from unwanted occurrences. Resilient referent objects are those, which can remain stable and maintain their base functionality, to a degree that allows them to withstand shocks and bounce back to their original state (Bourbeau, 2013). In this regard, resilient referent objects are often framed as decentralised and even less reliant on external interventions (e.g. from the state).

Security measures employed within the logic of risk focus on normal, institutionalised forms of governance based on broad cooperation within a security realm. This entails the exchange of data and utilisation of informational technologies, which allow informed and future oriented security action (Ceyhan, 2008; Rusu, 2001). Within risk logic, expert communities, security agencies, analytical tools and knowledge practices receive special attention as instruments that allow glimpsing into the uncertain future and calculating at least some of its risks (de Goede, 2008; Renn, 2012). Consequently, the logic revolves around long term strategies and conventionalised security actions and practices focused on monitoring changes within the security realm, attempting to adjust to its dynamics and abrupt shifts (van Munster, 2005, p. 8).

In this vein, the managerial approach looks at risks as something that can be managed by employing preventive and precautionary measures, and in a long run averting future catastrophe. This perspective promotes the idea that with sufficient data and instruments of control it is possible to change the odds, intervene and eliminate risky situations. Here, the final objective is to maintain the socio-political equilibrium and continuation of normal activities within acceptable risks (Krahmann, 2011). A different approach is presented by resilience-centred logic, which does not focus predominantly on governmental forms of management and control, but on devolved security practices that decrease extreme vulnerabilities of the system and build up the robustness of a protected system and its ability to withstand shocks (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015, p. 87). In this regard, the literature indicates three basic forms of resilience: maintenance of the status quo; marginal adaptation to shocks and disturbances; and renewal based on transformation of the system in response to a catastrophe (Bourbeau, 2013, p. 10). All these elements account for the main objective of the logic, which is building up the system’s ability to withstand shocks and disturbances, so that it can continue its existence in the face of an uncertain future and inevitable dangers.

3.3.1.3 Human Security

The logic of human security has been commonly introduced with the United Nations Development Programme Report in 1994, which promoted the idea of human beings as the ultimate referent object (Hampson, 2008; Kaldor et al., 2007; Paris, 2001). Human security logic puts individuals and their communities at the centre of security. It focuses predominantly on the survival and wellbeing of humans, emphasising such issues as respect for human rights, freedoms and human dignity, to name a few (Burgess & Tadjbakhsh, 2010, p. 450). In this regard, the representation of security problems is often broad and interlinked throughout multiple sectors of human life and activity (Alkire, 2003, p. 3). In its narrower conceptualisation, human security is described predominantly as “freedom from fear”, threats and direct violence. This interpretation proposes focusing on protection of human life from critical physical and structural violence that passes the threshold of severity (Hampson, 2008, p. 239). In this respect, according to Paris (2001, p. 89) human security can be narrowed down to two fundamental elements: first, human “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression”; and second, “protection of humans from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities”. In most cases, the narrow interpretation of human security is deployed in the situation where this type of violence has already reduced the security of individuals making them flee their native communities (including states) and seek protection “outside” (den Boer & de Wilde, 2008, p. 129).

The broader understanding expands the definition and includes the so-called “freedom from want”, describing human security as a “condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised” (Thomas & Wilkin, 1999, p. 3). In this vein, Alkire (2002, p. 182) suggests that the concept “should include the social, psychological, economic aspects of human vulnerabilities, including all critical and pervasive threats to the vital core and long-term flourishing”. The broader conceptualisation builds on a more nuanced understanding of well-being, often focusing on the quality of life, structural limitations and contexts that foster systemic patterns of discrimination and vulnerability (Gasper & Sinnati, 2016, p. 15). It should be noted that human security in its broader and narrow conceptualisations connects to the notion of protection of human rights and human dignity, which provide a conceptual and normative foundation for human security by firmly rooting it in international law (Benedek, 2008). Failures to ensure fulfilment of international human rights obligations, be it in the domain of humanitarian law or economic, cultural and social rights, can directly lead to rapid deterioration of human security. According to Benedek (2008, p. 13), “the best way to achieve human security is through the full and holistic realisation of all human rights” and protection of those who are defined as vulnerable and in need.

Regardless the exact definition, the human referent object is conceptualised as passive, in a vulnerable position and requiring assistance from other actors that hold resources and power to provide protection and security (den Boer & de Wilde, 2008, p. 137).

Human security measures are focused on broadly understood humanitarian protection and, in extraordinary situations, intervention. They revolve around either direct or indirect instruments that are supposed to reduce threats, constraints or even disturbances to human life. Here, the human security approach centres predominantly on governmental tools for protection of those who are unable to protect themselves or seek shelter from physical, political and structural violence (Axworthy, 1997, p. 9). This naturally links this notion to external, often humanitarian, interventions as well as asylum and refugee policies, laws, practices and discourses that construct and enact the common understanding of protection of human beings (Huysmans, 2006, pp. 35–38). Consequently, human security measures often rely on the “coalition of good states” and security actors that are willing to take responsibility for temporary humanitarian action, restore human security and protect individuals and communities that are under severe threats (Kerr, 2013, pp. 107–108). In practice, human security-oriented security measures may substantially vary in terms of form and intensity. On one hand, they can be aligned with more mundane forms of care and protection reflected in e.g. fulfilment of international obligations in regard to refugees, provision of care to victims of violence, or transfer of development aid; on the other hand, they can link to deployment of peacekeeping operations. This latter element is commonly associated with the invocation of extraordinary security language coupled with militarised measures deployed to address the most severe instances of violence and violations of human security.

Indeed, humanitarian interventions open human security to close intertwinement with exceptional logic, but it does not have to be automatic or straightforward. Human security logic still has a distinctive identity, which focuses on many forms of protection and care, centred on preservation of human lives, rights and dignity. In this way it departs from state-like features of “exceptionalist” security, concentrated on territoriality, sovereignty and default mobilisation of extreme security measures. Finally, following Gasper’s and Sinnati’s (2016, p. 25) argumentation, while the language of emergency and exceptionality aims to “end the discussion”, human security does quite opposite. It often turns the attention on vulnerable groups and continues democratic contestation of the situation in which human security is being violated. That is why the analysis of human security logic has to be tuned into a possible merger with other types of security and sensitive to nuances of mobilisation of this specific logic.

3.4 Securitisation Beyond the Actor-Audience Dichotomy

According to the Copenhagen School, securitisation is an inter-subjective process driven by an interplay between powerful actors (who produce securitising moves) and empowering audiences (who accept or reject these moves) (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32). This relationship between actors and audiences is supposed to reflect the inherently constructivist nature of the theory (McDonald, 2008). Instead, it has ignited substantial criticism from securitisation scholars, who point out that the proposed model of actor-audience interaction is rather limiting and does not allow to fully explore the depth of intersubjective construction of security (Balzacq, 2005; Jarvis & Legrand, 2017; Roe, 2008). The criticism revolves around two key issues: firstly, the role and nature of audience is seriously under-conceptualised, leaving the theory without a clear idea of who or what may constitute an empowering agent. Secondly, the proposed mode of interaction between actors and audiences is not exhaustive, especially in reference to the interactions that go beyond mere production, acceptance and non-acceptance of securitising moves. Building on framing literature, this section offers a conceptualisation of a more active and engaged audience, which under certain conditions (e.g. within the context of policymaking) and with enough agency may break from the traditional actor-audience dichotomy. Here, the interaction is not framed around authoritative actors and audiences, but rather revolves around parties involved in the securitisation process as locked in a dialogical relationship driven by contestation.

As in securitisation, framing also envisages actors and audiences interacting in the collective construction of meanings. Here, “entrepreneurs” or “sponsors” offer generative frames and stories, which are supposed to appeal to and convince the targeted audience to acknowledge and internalise the proposed interpretation of an issue (van Gorp, 2007, pp. 123–138). Nonetheless, in the framing theory, the richness of reactions of an audience may quickly blur the dichotomy and create more of a “deliberative space of enactment of meaning”, rather than a one-way actor-audience relationship (Keren, 2010, p. 276). The function of an audience is often explained as an active processor that decodes meaning, an agent who, through complex and varying interactions with framing actors, shapes and authorises the dominant interpretation of an issue (e.g. a threat) (Aukes et al., 2018). In this perspective, an audience not only listens and reacts, but also carries interpretations and spreads them in a given context (Gamson & Madigliani, 1989; Scheufele, 1999; Vliegenthart, 2012). This can be observed in more recent studies on framing of the war in Iraq and terrorism, which analyse audience-actor interaction cycles and interpretative feedback loops in media framings (Glazier & Boydstun, 2013). Here, the researchers focus on how the media (re)produce security framings, readers and listeners share those framings among each other, react and comment (e.g. through social media), participate in opinion polls, which are then contested by the politicians and the media, etc. (Norris et al., 2003; Reese, 2007). In framing, an audience often not only legitimises but also can actively challenge particular interpretations, forcing actors to either abandon the attempt to impose their interpretation or reframe and re-engage with a new narrative (Schlichting, 2013). This leads to a very important and potentially fruitful notion in securitisation and framing literature, which is blurring the dichotomy and strict division between powerful speakers and restrained listeners.

This departure from the traditional dichotomy already has been implied in securitisation scholarship, especially in regard to contexts where clear interactional rules and differentiation between actors and audiences are not that evident (Sperling & Webber, 2019). As observed by Côté (2016, p. 550), some powerful agents associated with or assigned to the role of audience do not necessarily have to adhere to strict contextual rules that determine the audience’s traditional role. In other words, they may either already hold an influence similar to actors or strive for it, and exert greater impact over the securitisation process. This phenomenon already has been recognised in the policy framing literature, where a strict division between actors and audiences disappears as policy problematisation emerges (Chong & Druckman, 2007). As Rhinard (2010, p. 42) points out, in policy framing, actors or institutional agents involved in policymaking are supposed to communicate and interact more in a form of a dialogue than a top-down directive. In his study of European Commission’s framing practices, he describes how different Directorate Generals interact and struggle over dominant policy framings, without committing to the specific role of framing actors or enabling audiences. Here, all involved parties are locked in a feedback loop, where they speak, listen and problematise policy issues as a part of the same institutional setting (Sperling & Webber, 2019, pp. 244–245). Through these interactions, they shape the content of securitisatising moves throughout different stages of policymaking, often commiting to discoursive coalitions comprised of different policy “actors from different subject positions brought together by their common orientation towards a common problem perspective on a certain political issue” (Rothe, 2016, p. 62).

In order to better grasp the intersubjective nature of interactions between parties involved in the securitisation on the EU policymaking level, I propose distancing the framework from the traditional actor-audience dichotomy. Instead, I suggest looking at securitisation as subjected to dynamic negotiations between and within groups of relevant agents (e.g. EU institutions) involved in the process of policy framing.Footnote 1 Here, relevant agents are locked in a dialogical relationship, an iterative feedback loop, where they “talk and respond to each other” in the intersubjective construction of security. They engage in the policymaking process, contributing to its various stages, producing and promoting their own security-driven interpretations of a problem. Sometimes, their framing gains resonance and dominates a specific stage of policymaking, sometimes it loses its prominence and becomes marginalised. Regardless of their impact, they co-shape the policy discourse, contest alternative interpretations and contribute to the intersubjective construction of security.

3.5 Defining the Process of Acceptance

As McDonald (2008, p. 572) points out, even though there is much commotion about actor-audience interaction, inter-subjectivity and performativity of securitisation process, it is still unclear when it all happens. Thus, the debate on securitisation propells an important question: when does an issue turn into a socially constructed security problem? The Copenhagen School has been widely criticised for mistreating the discussion on the so-called moments, processes or politics of acceptance (Balzacq, 2005, p. 179). Indeed, the criteria put forward by Buzan et al. are rather ambiguous, suggesting that securitisation takes place when a securitising move “gains enough resonance to a point when it is possible to legitimize emergency measures” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). However, it is not clear how this resonance, or any other sign of acceptance for that matter, can be isolated and academically verified within an audience-actor interaction.

There have been several notable attempts to operationalise and define “acceptance” in securitisation research. In relation to the policymaking domain, Williams (2007, p. 67) proposes to treat it as a moment of translation of securitising moves into suitable policies and security actions. Similarly, for Floyd (2016, p. 679), acceptance can be traced in a change of the policy action, which is then “justified by the securitising actor with reference to the threat [that is] identified and declared in the securitising move”. In this section, I propose to look at acceptance not only as single moments marking changes in policy actions, but as a process, which is reflected in the way specific security interpretations and logics, to various degrees, saturate relevant socio-political and socio-linguistic contexts (e.g. the EU) and inform problem definitions, evaluations and recommendations for treatment (Entman, 2003; Hajer, 2002b, 2006). Building on Hajer’s (1995) discourse theory and Rothe’s (2016) discussion on “politics of acceptance”, I apply the concepts of “structuration” and “institutionalisation” as indicators of prominence and “acceptance” of specific security logics operating into policy discourse and practice.

The concept of structuration helps to comprehend to what extent a security interpretation or security logic is inscribed into the socio-linguistic and governmental landscapes (Rothe, 2016, p. 38). Hajer (1995, p. 60) explores this approach referring the way different policy actors use or draw upon existing and proposed interpretations of a problem (or storylines) in order to make a relevant contribution to the policymaking process. For example, if a specific type of framing (e.g. migration as a terrorist risk) becomes increasingly and recursively present in the core policy texts, analyses, reports, speeches, and such, it means that it has saturated the policy discourse to a degree that it turned into a “natural” and acceptable way of describing the phenomenon of migration. Additionally, an interpretation, in order to become powerful and dominant, has to be acknowledged and used as a “common sense”, without which the document or speech would be considered irrelevant or less applicable in describing the challenges related to, in this case, migration. In this interpretation, such a situation is an indicator of high structuration and general acceptance of a given interpretation of a problem among involved agents (Hajer, 2002a).

The second element of “acceptance” is centred on institutionalisation of proposed security interpretations into “societal and political practices, routines and organisations and their materialisation in the form of concrete tools and policy responses employed by governmental and other relevant institutions” (Hajer, 1995, p. 61). This approach corresponds with Bigo’s and Balzacq’s arguments that policy instruments and tools constitute an important element in shaping the final product of securitisation (Balzacq, 2007; Bigo, 2002). As Balzacq (2011, p. 15) notes, “given the thickness of security programs, in which discourses and ideologies are increasingly hard to disentangle, and differences between securitising actors and audiences are blurred, there is growing evidence that some manifestations of securitisation might best be understood by focusing on the nature and functions of policy tools used by agents/agencies to cope with public problems, defined as threats”. In this regard, if a specific policy tool (e.g. military operation) is designed, announced and incorporated as a part of a policy response to a given problem, it is an indicator that the corresponding security interpretation is becoming institutionalised. Using the previously mentioned example of “migration as a terrorist risk” frame, the indicator of its institutionalisation would come down to a situation when a securitising agent recommends and executes policy tools related to on-going surveillance, detailed security screening or preventive detention of migrants.

3.6 Including Context in the Securitisation Process

The Copenhagen School views context as a set of “facilitating conditions” that increase or decrease the probability for success of the process of securitisation (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 31–32). Buzan and his colleagues (1998, p. 32) point towards internal linguistic rules of speech acts and external social aspects of context, where the power of speech and authority of the speaker intertwine in the construction of security. The more resources and linguistic skills the speaker has, the higher the chances for the success of securitising act (Wæver, 1995, p. 68). I propose departing from looking at securitisation as facilitated by contextual conditions, but rather treating it as situated within broader socio-political, socio-linguistic and therefore, interpretative settings. Building on the framing literature, I argue that the interpretative context to various degrees envelopes and informs socio-political and socio-linguistic settings, reflecting the already existing ways of thinking about, and consequently responding to, proposed definitions of security problems. In this sense, securitisation should not be treated as a singled-out event but as part of an interpretative continuum, where pre-existing security frames structure and inform collective construction of security.

The framing literature allows one to view the context of securitisation as informed by pre-existing security frames, which deeply impact the field of possibility of what can be thought, said and done about a securitised issue in a given context (Rothe, 2016, p. 42). Pre-existing security frames correspond with already existing types of securitising framings reflected in e.g. historically and culturally embedded definitions of enemies and threats, resentments towards specific groups, negative stereotypes, security narratives, to name a few (Stritzel, 2007). In this respect, the interpretative context could be treated as a type of continuum, where the content and type of prior securitisations inform, but do not automatically dominate, subsequent securitising processes, and so on. For example, prior securitisations of environmental protection in the EU have deeply impacted the interpretative scheme for collective problematisation of climate change, its perceived consequences and, most importantly, policy responses (Methmann et al., 2013). In this case, securitising actors have been naturally referring to the “old” frames of interpretation, bringing out and often expanding on prior securitising moves and security responses that appeared acceptable and reasonable (Schlichting, 2013, p. 501). Actors may decide to keep the interpretation of an already securitised problem, or an issue proximate to this problem, or take it to a different level by initiating even more extreme measures. Such an escalation of securitisation is not unprecedented and can be observed in securitisation practices employed in reference to mass protests (Carvalho Pinto, 2014), nuclear energy (Peoples, 2014), or irregular migration (Provera, 2015), to name a few.

The interpretative context and pre-existing security frames inform the socio-linguistic dimension of securitisation, reflected in the “local rules of language” and “the network of constitutive norms and narratives that surround a single linguistic securitising act” (Stritzel, 2011b). This perspective expands the Copenhagen School approach, by focusing not only on the rules of speech act, but also linguistic features embedded in the context such as “the distinct linguistic reservoir that is available at a particular locality and point in time” (Stritzel, 2007, p. 370). Within the scope of the socio-linguistic context, it is possible to observe how securitising actors attempt to exploit and adapt to local linguistic rules and norms using analogies, similes and contrasts in order to increase their chances for successful securitisation (Stritzel, 2007, pp. 368–372).

As the pre-existing security frames reflect patterned ways of responding to security threats, they also influence the socio-political dimension of securitisation process, including the institutional setup governing security policies.Footnote 2 Stritzel (2007, p. 370) defines the socio-political context as “sedimented social and political structures that may put actors in positions of power to influence the process of constructing meaning”. That is why the features of socio-political context often indicate “who can speak” and “to whom” (Salter, 2008, p. 329). They reflect the power structure, positioning and modes of interaction between the involved parties (Côté, 2016; Roe, 2008). Salter (2008, p. 329) recognises this marriage of the interpretative and socio-political dimensions in securitisation research, arguing that every setting can be characterised by a “different set of grand narratives by which truth is authorised, the characters who are empowered to speak, and the relationships between characters and audience”. Thus, it can be expected that different loci of securitisation will be composed of different types of actors, audiences, and linguistic rules, all of which impact the securitising narrative and success of the process differently.

The framing and securitisation literature supplement the discussion on the role of context with incorporation of so called “distal events” that originate outside the socio-linguistic and socio-political settings of securitisationFootnote 3 (Eder et al., 1995; Glazier & Boydstun, 2013). As pointed out by Watson, problematisation of socially relevant issues cannot be treated independently from external developments (Watson, 2012, p. 287). Framing and securitisation are not a self-contained process, which can be exclusively associated with powers of speech and text or an interpretative repertoire embedded in local culture and politics (Balzacq, 2005, p. 193). Collective problematisation is most commonly influenced by complex events and developments of internal (e.g. domestic) and external (e.g. foreign) origin, which carry reinforcing or aversive consequences on the specific interpretations of socially relevant issues. For example, terrorist activity in Syria and North Africa can be a powerful external factor, facilitating and influencing he securitisation of refugees and migrants in the EU Member States, or bushfires in Australia might contribute to securitisation of climate change in the US (Diez et al., 2016; Léonard & Kaunert, 2020; Rothe, 2016). In this vein, Lupia and McCubbins (1998, p. 55) suggest there is an interaction between internal and external socio-political contexts – the more the external environment is indicative of threats, the less influence could be ascribed to local powerful actors, internal conditions and local frames of reference. As this claim provides an interesting insight into dynamics and inter-relation of different contexts, it certainly requires further discussion and empirical verification.

3.7 Conclusion: Key Points of “Securitisation as the Work of Framing” Approach

The aim of this chapter was to discuss the building blocks of securitisation theory as presented by the Copenhagen School and propose a more interpretative and framing-oriented reading of the theory. Let me now summarise the main components of “securitisation as the work of framing” approach and discuss the main changes it proposes to the original framework and the direction in which it moves the securitisation analysis. For this purpose, I have reduced this chapter to five essential assumptions, which will serve as a basis for further discussion.

  1. 1.

    Framing, instead of speech acts the traditional conceptualisation of securitisation relies on speech acts and a decisionist, static and illocutionary construction of security through authoritative utterances produced by powerful actors (Wæver, 2015). In this book I conceptualise securitisation as the work of policy framing, which views construction of security as a messy and internally complex iterative process comprised of a variety of actors, security logics, interpretations and interests that are inherently entangled in the way security issues are constructed. Here securitisation is reflected in mobilisation of security-related perceptions in the minds of targeted empowering agents and audiences, enabling incorporation of these perceptions into the common schemata of interpretation.

  2. 2.

    Tangled security logics, instead of exceptionalism – instead of fixating on a single understanding of security based on existential threats and exceptional security measures, I argue that multiple logics and interpretations of security should be considered as an intrinsic part of securitisation. Security logics are understood as pronouncements that produce a specific social order, the essence of a security notion, reduced to the rules of grammar applied to make sense of security objects. In this vein, securitisation is a complex and, more importantly, messy process, in which logics and interpretations of security collide and intertwine. This results in an emergence of different blends of security which reconfigure the relationship between referent object, referent subject and threat.

  3. 3.

    Dialogical audience-actor interaction, instead of authoritative instances of securitisation in this policy-oriented framework, securitisation does not revolve around a single authoritative actor, but is subjected to dynamic negotiations between and within groups of relevant agents involved in the process. Therefore, the traditional differentiation into actors and audience is substituted with a relationship in which actors play both roles. They are locked in an iterative feedback loop, where they “talk and respond to each other” in the intersubjective construction of security.

  4. 4.

    Politics of acceptance, instead of one-dimensional interaction the widely-criticised ambiguous definition of acceptance of securitising moves as “resonating” with the audience is hereby supplemented with discourse structuration and institutionalisation. Structuration corresponds to the idea that certain interpretations become dominant when they turn into obligatory and “commonsensical” points of reference in the problematisation of an issue at hand. Institutionalisation takes place when interpretations solidify, becoming incorporated into societal and political practices, routines and organisations.

  5. 5.

    Embedded security, instead of facilitating conditions securitisation should be understood as a highly context-sensitive process, deeply embedded in socio-linguistic and socio-political settings and local power structures (Stritzel, 2011a). In this respect, I propose a departure from treating the context of securitisation as a mere facilitating condition. Securitisation is contextualised within an interpretative continuum, rendering context an important factor that structures and even interpretatively pre-sets the process of constructing security.