Introduction

Peacebuilding in the post–Cold War era is a nonlinear process due to the complexity of protracted conflict and violence involving nonstate groups as well as regional and international actors. Despite the decrease in the number of war deaths since 1946, conflict and violence are currently on the rise, with many conflicts today waged between nonstate actors such as political militias and criminal and international terrorist groups (UN 2020), resulting in a massive scale of forcibly displaced persons. The intermingling factors that have led to these trends lie in weak governance, organized crime, fragmented opposition movements, violent extremism, gender, youth, and natural resource management in conflict settings.

Given the above situation, mediation, understood as preventive diplomatic efforts for peace by the international community, has been considered an effective instrument for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts and developing sustainable peace. The term “mediation” entered the diplomatic arena in 1948 when the UN launched mediation efforts in Palestine. Since then, international mediation, regardless of whether it addresses interstate or intrastate conflicts, has mainly been undertaken by third parties or external actors, especially as the number and intensity of intrastate conflicts have increased since the end of the Cold War.

To encourage effective mediation, the UN issued The United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation in 2012 as an annex to the report of the secretary-general on Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution (A/66/811, June 25, 2012) (UNSC 2012), identifying key fundamentalsFootnote 1 based on case studies. However, third-party or external mediation has not always been successful under political transition settings in conflict-affected countries in which society is divided and there is weakened social cohesion and trust. As observed in the cases of Colombia, Myanmar, Syria, Libya, and Yemen, mediation and other forms of third-party involvement appear to be challenging (Baumann and Clayton 2017) and limited in their ability to address the complex and interdependent dynamics of conflicts at the national and local levels.

Reflecting the above, conflict resolution literature has emphasized the roles of international or outsider mediation, while little research has focused on internal or insider mediation. Wehr and Lederach (1991) first developed the concept of “insider-partial” mediators within conflicts who benefit from a certain connectedness to and a high degree of trust from the conflict parties. Svensson and Lindgren (2013) further elaborated the role of insider-partial mediators who bring important indigenous resources to a peace process and can thus complement external mediators by mitigating the bargaining problem of information failure.

Despite the recognition of the importance of insider mediation for sustainable peace, it has not been a focus in academia because it is difficult for outsiders to obtain data and information that are politically sensitive or confidential in a transitional setting in order to understand such a complex process. Most networks, which are considered as the fundamental infrastructure of insider mediation, are informal or personal, requiring outsiders to apply an adaptive approach reflecting local power dynamics and social relations among individuals and groups at the national and local levels. In addition to the lack of studies that have examined “insider mediation,” it is scientifically or methodologically difficult to prove the outcome and effectiveness of the practice, as peacebuilding itself is a complex and continuous process that has no clear end or stopping point.

To overcome these limitations, this chapter aims to conceptualize the meaning of the term “mediation” and discuss its outcome and effectiveness for sustainable peace, taking up the case of Mindanao, located in the southern Philippines, where separatist rebels have fought over five decades for independence and autonomy in a Muslim-dominated area. To this end, this chapter primarily attempts to answer two main questions within the context of the Bangsamoro peace process: (1) What are the key characteristics of standard and alternative mediation, and formal or informal mediation practices? (2) How did mediators or parties to the conflict adapt or fail to adapt to uncertainty and complexity? By answering these questions, this chapter extracts good practices or lessons learned. It contributes to the existing literature by showing that adaptive mediation approaches, shaped by multilayered mediation with the emphasis on insider mediation, is effective and increases the likelihood of sustainable peace.

Literature Review and Problem Statement

Mediation has been seen as a particularly important aspect of peacebuilding efforts that may be used in different phases of a conflict (Bercovitch and Kadayifci 2002, 21). In this context, mediation is defined as “a process of conflict management where the disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical violence or invoking the authority of the law” (Bercovitch et al. 1991, 8). Given this definition, the term is synonymous with “international mediation,” which is primarily conducted by third-party or external actors, in which it is assumed that the third party is neutral or impartial. Assefa (1987, 22) suggests that there is a general agreement that both neutrality toward the issue in dispute and “independence from all parties to the conflict” are “requisites for the successful mediator.” Similarly, Wehr (1991, 51) claims that strict neutrality is necessary, and that a mediator’s credibility is contingent upon the absence of a “commitment to any party in the conflict.”

With neutrality or impartiality as the central role of a mediator, mediation can efficiently and effectively provide information to the opposing parties that they would have been unable to obtain if the third party had not intervened (Beardsley 2008; Rauchhaus 2006; Kydd 2006; Kleiboer 1996; Bercovitch 1986; Svensson 2007, 2009). Maintaining open lines of communication between or among the parties involved and trading asymmetries in information (Princen 1992), third parties can provide alternative views on issues and identify a set of mutually acceptable agreements, bringing about potential compromises (Regan and Stam 2000). Regan and Aydin (2006, 740) articulate that “outside interventions can provide a more objective view of conditions and possible outcomes of the conflict, which helps adversaries to update their beliefs about the likely outcomes.” Absent an outside intervention, the information held by the warring parties is at best asymmetrical, and neither side has a unilateral incentive to honestly convey its intentions.

The roles and functions of mediators can be categorized according to their expected outcome. Beardsley et al. (2006) identify three mediation styles,Footnote 2 that is, facilitation, formulation, and manipulation on international crises together with three outcomes: formal agreement, postcrisis tension reduction, and contribution to crisis abatement. The researchers verified the relationship between these mediation styles and outcomes, finding that manipulation has the strongest effect on the likelihood of both reaching a formal agreement and contributing to crisis abatement, while facilitation has the greatest influence on increasing the prospects for lasting tension reduction and the ownership and commitment of both parties involved, ultimately leading to sustainable peace. In practice, these styles can be used in combination to maximize their overall effectiveness, depending on the timing and intensity of the conflict.

In the early 1990s, Wehr and Lederach (1991), widely known in the fields of conflict transformation and peacebuilding, first highlighted the importance of insider-partial mediators in their multidimensional work. They defined a mediator as an actor within the conflict who benefits from a certain connectedness to and a high degree of trust from the conflict parties (Wehr and Lederach 1991, 87). It is likely that these mediators have intimate knowledge of the conflict and unique entry points for mediation through an accumulated trust from all sides and that they reach their greatest potential in combination with the benefits of outsider-neutral and other mediators. In this sense, partiality can be seen as positive in that these mediators share the same social contexts as the parties and are committed to a just and durable settlement, as they must live with the consequences of their work even in the post-negotiation setting.

Svensson and Lindgren (2013) further elaborated upon this argument, emphasizing the importance of specifying the causal mechanisms behind successful mediation and linking third party mediation with insider-partial mediation for sustainable peace, not limited in its success to terminating conflicts and ending violent behavior (Regan and Aydin 2006; Regan and Stam 2000). The results of empirical data analysis suggest that the advantages of insider mediators lie in their access to credible information and indigenous resources and their capacity to understand the context with fewer incentives to exploit it for their own benefit, since they face risks to their reputations over the long term (Svensson and Lindgren 2013, 715–16). Compared to external mediators, especially those who follow manipulative and formulative approaches, insider mediators benefit from the self-organization that that arises from their work to organizing, regulating, and maintaining the peace process without an external or internal managing agent (de Coning 2021, Chap. 2 in this volume).

In light of the limited findings presented in the mediation literature, I address three arguments that attempt to explain why the combination of external and insider mediation can increase the likelihood of reducing multilayered conflict and violence and achieving sustainable peace. First, external mediators can facilitate information exchanges between the parties involved to reach agreements and settlements. Even if tensions becomes high, maintaining an open channel of communication is important to prevent any party from taking military action, as this implies a reputation risk for both sides. Through this process, the parties are expected to develop personal relationships, increase their levels of commitment to settlements, and build some degree of trust.

Second, insider mediators from diverse sectors such as government, media, rebel factions, religious institutions, and civil society organizations (CSOs) can promote dialogue among their leaders that contributes to self-organization. Outside the confines of a formal peace process, insider mediation can change actors’ mindsets and behaviors, build connections and trust, and rebuild or strengthen relationships where the social fabric is weakened or broken (UNDP 2018, 6). Social capital can serve as the foundation for peacebuilding or conflict prevention, especially in transition settings in which resource competition among stakeholders within the society becomes high. After reaching a settlement, the role of the third party will be diminished to monitoring the implementation of the agreement. Alongside the peace negotiations, formal or informal localized conflict resolution and management mechanisms should be developed. This coincides with the notion of adaptive mediation, which requires actors to be resilient and self-organized in order to recognize their interdependence and increase their sense of ownership over agreements (de Coning 2018, 2021, Chap. 2 in this volume).

Third, all multilevel mediation efforts can be made synergistically effective by strengthening the linkages among actors. In contrast to international (external) mediation, which focuses predominantly on high-level negotiations that include top-level state and rebel leaders together with high-ranking officials or diplomats from the international community, insider mediation engages multiple levels of society to address crises and ongoing tensions. Applying the model at three levels for peacebuilding—the top, middle, and grassroots levels of society (Lederach 1997)—insider mediators can be from any level, while those levels are complementary and overlap in terms of both actors and activities (UNDP 2014). In a divided or stratified society in which the root cause of a conflict originates in the divide-and-rule policy undertaken by a colonial government, insider mediation reinforced by outsider mediators can be viewed as an instrument for unifying the society and building sustainable peace in the long term.

Based on the findings of the above studies, I hypothesize that in complex conflict settings, strengthening multilayered mediation linkages increases the likelihood of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Because it is assumed that insider mediation efforts combined with external technical, financial, or political support can enhance insiders’ ownership or self-reliance and capacity through their self-organization, it is expected that even without external mediation, national or local stakeholders can work toward peacebuilding on their own.

Research Design (Method and Analyses)

This study adopts a case study method, taking the case of Mindanao, where MoroFootnote 3rebels (Moro Islamic Liberation Front and (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)) composed of Muslim and other indigenous peoples launched a separatist movement against the Christian majority state in the late 1960s. This conflict centered on self-determination for independence and autonomy, and is considered to be one of the most protracted in the world. Meanwhile, local clan feuds among the Moros are rampant, and ISIS-affiliated extremist groups have been active in the area since the 2010s. The case of Mindanao deserves analysis, as international and insider mediation efforts have been undertaken on the island over the last 40 years. Further, in 2019, a new autonomous region, called the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), and the MILF-led Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) were created as a product of the peace process mainly between the Moro rebels and the Government of the Philippines (GPH).

This study addresses the features of outsider mediators in this conflict using three categories of mediation styles: facilitation, formulation, and manipulation. The main argument is that while the Duterte administration has achieved the most success by enacting and ratifying the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) (Republic Act 11054) to create the BARMM and BTA, this “success” can be viewed as the results of incremental peacebuilding processes that strengthened vertical and horizontal relations among the Moros and the Christians that have been undertaken over several decades by diverse stakeholders.

Data on the mediators’ roles, approaches and strategies, intervention timing, objectives, and expected outcomes and effectiveness were collected through reviews of the relevant literature and interviews with stakeholders, including the parties involved and other stakeholders in the mediation process between the MILF and the GPH. The collected data were analyzed to (1) identify factors and actors that led to the creation of the new autonomous region through multilayered mediations by broadening the definition of mediation from traditional (international-outsider-predetermined) to innovative (local-insider-adaptive), and (2) elaborate upon adaptiveness at the local level by validating the local context and its role in shaping the peace process.

Rather than using a structured questionnaire, the interviews were designed to be open-ended enough to allow interviewees to narrate the important points that emerged for them regarding mediation in relation to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Interviews with 36 respondents were conducted in February 2020 and lasted 1–1.5 hours each. These were followed by online interviews due to the COVID-19 pandemic. All of the interviews were recorded, analyzed, and coded for context analysis. To supplement the interviews, I also obtained and utilized data from online articles with direct quotations and statements from webinars without interpretation.

Overview of the Mindanao Context: Conflict, Violence, and the Peace Process

Over the last five decades, the peace process in Mindanao has partly resulted from changes in the government’s policies and directions toward peace, influenced by the international and domestic situation. This process started under Marcos (1965–1981) and continued with Aquino (Corazon) (1986–1992), Ramos (1992–1998), Estrada (1998–2001), Arroyo (2001–2010), Aquino III (Benigno Jr.) (2010–2016), on to Duterte (2016–2022). The political reality in the Philippines, which lacks guarantees regarding the continuity of the administration’s public policy, has significantly affected the status and protraction of the peace process. In this sense, peacebuilding in Mindanao is by nature a nonlinear process.

In the peace process between the GPH and the MNLF, both parties signed a peace agreement in 1976 in Tripoli that stipulated the establishment of an autonomous government that exercises judicial powers (Sharia) and possesses special security forces and an economic system under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). As a partial product of the agreement that resulted in the provision in the 1987 Philippine constitution, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was officially created in 1990 through a referendum without the participation of the MNLF.Footnote 4 However, the armed conflict was reignited until President Ramos resumed the negotiations. Eventually, the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) was reached in 1996 that led to the election of Nur Misuari, then MNLF chairman, as the governor of the ARMM. In recognition of the incomplete implementation of the FPA claimed by the MNLF and the OIC, a tripartite review process by the GPH-MNLF-OIC started in 2007 and resulted in an agreement that included the so-called 42 consensus points, which has remained unimplemented.

Peace negotiations between the GPH and the MILF started in 1997, immediately after the singing of the FPA. Since then, the negotiation process was interrupted three times in 2000, 2003, and 2008 by outbreaks of high-intensity violence in response to changes in the government’s direction and policy toward the peace process. After over 30 rounds of talks, under the Aquino administration, both parties signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012 and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014 that was planned to replace the ARMM with a new political entity with a larger territorial scope and broader autonomy called Bangsamoro. However, the CAB could not be legislated at the Philippine Congress due to the president’s declining influence over the Congress as a consequence of the Mamasapano crashFootnote 5 in January 2015 (Franco 2017; Taniguchi 2019).

Under this situation, President Duterte, who came into power in July 2016, brought a new dimension to the Bangsamoro peace process, adopting a more “inclusive approach” that involved the MILF, all factions of the MNLF (except the Misuari-faction), non-Islamized indigenous peoples, and others who could even be viewed as “spoilers” of the peace process. During the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) deliberations in 2017, a five-month-long armed conflict—the Marawi siege—occurred in Marawi, Lanao del Sur, between the government security forces and pro-ISIS militants, who had broken away from the MILF. With the strong initiative of the president himself, BOL was enacted in 2018 and led to the creation of the BARMM and accordingly the BTA in 2019, which is expected to govern the region until 2022 when the Bangsamoro election is planned to be held.

In addition to the vertical conflict discussed above, feuds among prominent Muslim clans over political power, land, and resources, called Rido, have also been rampant in the region. These horizontal conflicts are characterized by sporadic outbursts of retaliatory violence between families and kinship groups as well as between communities in which the government or central authority is weak (Torres 2014). In a historical sense, the “divide and rule” policy introduced by the US colonial government has prevented the Moros from unifying against the state. The government provided the local leaders, mostly datu, with vested interests or official positions to pacify the region. The recent introduction of decentralization enabled local chief executives to directly access national resources through political competition. As a result, clan feuds and political violence have intensified.

Bangsamoro is intrinsically a society divided by diverse affiliations such as kinship (clan), ethnolinguistic groups, and political positions (separatist rebels or state collaborators). Thus, it should be understood that the complexity of the Bangsamoro context lies in vertical and horizontal conflict and violence.

Multilayered Mediation for Bangsamoro

Mediation Under the MNLF Peace Track as Precondition

In the course of peace talks between the MNLF and the GPH, the OIC and the member states have been involved since 1975. In particular, Libya was active in negotiating the 1976 Tripoli Agreement but officially it acted as an OIC representative, while Indonesia was actively involved in crafting the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) (Lingga 2006, 5).

In response to the MNLF’s allegation of genocide toward the Muslims by the GPH, the OIC started to get involved in settling the conflict in 1973. During the Arab-Israeli war, the OIC pressured the GPH to settle the conflict through a political and peaceful solution, threatening an oil embargo, elevating the matter to the UN, and applying economic sanctions (Rodil 2000).

Libyan foreign minister Abdelsalem Ali Treki played a crucial role as mediator, directing both parties to sign a peace agreement. As a result, the MNLF gained autonomy for the Muslims, while the GPH was guaranteed sovereignty and territorial integrity. Two decades later, as the agreement had still not been fully implemented, Indonesia reinstalled talks in 1993, acting under the auspices of the OIC and as chair of the Committee of the Six.Footnote 6 Following the noninterference principle of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia required the MNLF to put less weight on the self-determination that led to the singing of the FPA (Santos 1999). However, the FPA again faced challenges with implementation.

Based on the above, the roles of the OIC as the third-party mediator were effective to break the impasse and sign a peace agreement, using leverage as major member states of the OIC and the ASEAN (Indonesia), pressuring the MNLF to abandon its claim for independence, and negotiating for regional autonomy as an alternative. This process lacked an inclusive facilitation process between the parties and among the Moros that would have increased a sense of ownership, and enhanced self-organization. As a result, the agreement has not been sustained, creating a high level of dependency on external actors.

Peacebuilding Architecture Between the GPH and the MILF

Since the start of the peace process in 1997, the peacebuilding architecture utilized by the GPH and the MILF has evolved over time, adapting to the status of the process. However, the overall architecture is composed of the following: (1) the Peace Panel between the GPH and the MILF facilitated by Malaysia (2001) and observed by the International Contact Group (ICG) (2009); (2) the Joint Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (JCCCH) between the GPH and the MILF as a ceasefirecoordination mechanism monitored by the Malaysia-led International Monitoring Team (IMT) (2004); and (3) the Third-Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) (2013) as the monitoring mechanism of the implementation of the peace agreements (Fig. 5.1). Unlike other cases of peacebuilding that are mainly initiated by the UN, this case is characterized by its “hybridity”—with international, national, and local actors—and its “multi-layeredness,” with diverse international, national, and local (state and nonstate) actors with roles and functions that strengthen the relationships among diverse local actors that have their own constituencies in a divided society.

Fig. 5.1
The peace-building architecture between the G P H and the M I L F is displayed.

Overall peacebuilding architecture between the GPH and the MILF. (Source: Author)

Full size image

After the peace process between the GPH and the MILF started in 1997 under the Ramos administration and led to reaffirming the General Cessation of Hostilities in July 1997, peace talks with a focus on establishing and maintaining a ceasefire, known as the JCCCH, were undertaken solely by internal actors. However, these peace talks were disrupted due to a military operation conducted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) under the Estrada administration (1998–2001) from March to July 2000. In order to resume peace talks, then president Arroyo, who came into power in January 2001, requested that Malaysian prime minister Mahathir serve as a third-party facilitator to build trust with the MILF. With this facilitation, both parties signed the Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement), which contained the three aspects of security, rehabilitation, and ancestral domain in June 2001.

As a product of the Tripoli Agreement in 2001, the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) was created as the MILF’s development arm to determine, lead, and manage rehabilitation and development projects in conflict-affected communities. Similarly, the Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute (BLMI) was created in 2009 to develop the capacities of MILF ex-combatants to transform from rebels to government officials. These attempts were planned based on the lessons learned from the experience of the ARMM government that had been considered to be dysfunctional.

In response to the OIC’s proposal for a peacekeeping force, the Malaysia-led IMT—composed of 60 members from Malaysia (withdrawn in 2008 and returned in 2010), Brunei, Libya (withdrawn in 2011)—was officially deployed in Cotabato City in October 2004, and was later joined by Japan (2006), Norway (2010), the European Union (2010), and Indonesia (2012).Upon the request from the JCCCT and the Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs), the IMT is responsible for ceasefire monitoring, humanitarian and rehabilitation efforts, and development. In order to reduce the AFP’s threat to local citizens, the Civilian Protection Component was included in 2009 with the assignment of one expert from the EU and three from local NGOs. Except for some isolated cases, the presence of the IMT as a third party contributed to dramatically reducing ceasefire violations (from 689 cases in 2002 to 7 cases in 2007) (Lingga 2008), preventing them from escalating armed conflict, and building trust between the parties (Abubakar 2006; Gündüz and Torralba 2014; Lingga 2008).

The failed signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) in August 2008, following the Supreme Court ruling that it was unconstitutional, resulted in ceasefire violations, increased hostilities, and the displacement of around 750,000 people by the end of 2008. Backchannel diplomacy by the UK government, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) (Swiss), and the Asian Foundation (TAF) (the US) brought a one-year impasse that led to the creation of new mechanisms to include the international community in the peace processes (Rood 2016). In response to desires from both parties, the ICG, comprised of four countries—Japan, the UK, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia—and four international NGOs—Muhammadiyah (Indonesia), TAF, the CHD, and Conciliation Resources (the UK)—was established in 2009 to rebuild trust between the parties and act as a guarantee mechanism for the MILF (Tengku 2017). Importantly, this was the first-ever formal hybrid mediation support initiative (Herbolzheimer and Leslie 2013).

In 2012, the FAB, a preliminary peace agreement, was signed under the Aquino administration and ultimately reached the CAB in 2014, calling for the creation of an autonomous political entity named Bangsamoro to replace the ARMM. Based on lessons learned from the MNLF track, both panels agreed to establish a Third-Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) composed of five members from local NGOs, international NGOs,Footnote 7 and the EU to monitor, review, and assess the implementation of all signed agreements. It should be highlighted that the peace negotiation can be terminated upon the signing of an “Exit Document” by both parties with the Malaysia facilitator, the TPMT, upon the confirmation of the full implementation of all agreements.

If one traces the development of all these new mechanisms, from the JCCCH, the IMT, the ICG, to the TPMT, then one can see how they are adaptations of what has been tried before, based on the lessons that were identified from previous successes, stalemates, and failures (Zartman 2001). In comparison to the MNLF-GPH track, the mechanism involved more local actors to reflect the local context. For instance, the IMT, together with JCCCH, has direct linkages with local communities to obtain security status that is shared with the ICG members. Further, the ICG members from international NGOs linked with local NGOs to ensure concerns and needs on the ground were reflected in the peace talks. Similarly, the TPMT relied on local NGOs to collect the information needed to monitor the implementation status of the agreement. Likewise, the third-party engagement, which diversified the actors and their roles, synchronized the peace talks, and monitored the ceasefire and implementation, is more effective to ensure a timely and appropriately response for conflict resolution and prevention. The next section focuses on how mediations transitioned from third-party actors to insiders, building confidence and trust among the stakeholders.

From Third-Party to Insider Mediation

Third-Party Mediation

Peace Panel: Malaysia Facilitator

With the ASEAN principles of mutual recognition, acceptance, nonintervention, and respect, the facilitator has taken significant roles in moving forward peace talks and bringing both parties to the peace table since 2001, despite impasses along the way (Shea 2017). From the beginning, there were no terms of reference (TOR) for the facilitator. In fact, the Aquino administration attempted to write the TOR, but the MILF and the Malaysian facilitation team essentially asserted that formality was unnecessary since informality had worked well and provided for flexibility (Rood 2016, 86).

Informality can be explained in the context of Malay culture known for its “quiet diplomacy” (Taya et al. 2018). Traditionally, third-party facilitators or mediators serving as go-betweens avoid embarrassment by using indirect language, and decision-making is based on consensus to avoid any hard feelings (Tengku 2017). Underlining this notion, in the beginning, the facilitator played a significant role as a peace broker in bringing both parties to the negotiation table through shuttle diplomacy, traveling to Manila and Cotabato to meet the panels and their principles, listening, discussing, and identifying points of disagreement when the two conflicting parties were stuck in their formal negotiation. This was intended to lower tensions and encourage direct interaction in the form of negotiation that can be viewed as conciliation (Taya et al. 2018).

Under the Aquino III administration, however, Tengku Dato’ Ab Ghafar Tengku Mohamed, who had served as the facilitator from 2001 to 2002, was replaced by Datuk Othman bin Abdul Razak, who had been perceived as biased to the MILF by the GPH since the Arroyoadministration (ICG 2009; Apandi et al. 2018). Together with the diplomatic tensions between Malaysia and the Philippines caused by the failure of the MOA-AD that led to the withdrawal of Malaysia from the IMT in 2008 (return in 2010), no substantial peace talks were conducted at the beginning of the Aquino administration (Rood 2016). In order to break this deadlock, the chairperson of the GPH peace panel requested that Japan host high-level talks between top leaders, President Aquino and Chairman Murad of the MILF, which resulted in great success in confidence- and trust-building between the leadership groups (Lam 2008). This historical event became a game changer for the progress of the Bangsamoro peace process.

Against this background, the next facilitator, Tengku, who served from 2011 to 2016, prioritized trust- and confidence-building, which resulted in the garnering of trust from both parties (Tengku 2017). In general, the actual roles that the facilitator played during the negotiation were: (1) presiding over the talks as a referee in case of misunderstanding; (2) helping bridge differences by shuttling between the parties; and (3) administering the discussion. Over the years, Malaysia’s role in the peace process has strengthened, as the country has gradually earned the trust of both parties. Accordingly, the facilitator’s role has transformed from facilitator to mediator and negotiator, with these three roles becoming increasingly interchangeable (Leslie 2013).

Peace Panel-International Contact Group

With the participation of diplomats and International NGOs, the ICG was established in 2009 mainly as a compromise to the MILF’s desire to internationalize the peace talks and the government’s aversion to external interference in domestic affairs. The overarching purposes of the ICG were to: (1) accompany and mobilize international support for the peace process; and (2) exert proper leverage and sustain the interest of the parties and maintain a level of comfort that restores mutual trust (Herbolzheimer and Leslie 2013).

The members were carefully selected by both parties with consideration of: (1) the strength of the support given by the state and relevant experience of the International NGO to peace in Mindanao; (2) recognized expertise in the field of conflict transformation; (3) the desire to include both Western and Muslim participants; (4) the government’s reluctance to include big powers and multilaterals; and (5) the MILF’s reluctance to consider countries that provided military aid to the AFP such as the US and Australia (Herbolzheimer and Leslie 2013). In fact, all members selected were persons or organizations that had worked toward conflict transformation or peacebuilding in Mindanao.

At the start, there were no official terms of reference (TOR), but they were eventually formulated and attached to the FAB to formalize their tasks and status. The official roles were translated into practice and stipulated that: (1) members meet before negotiations to share information and expectations; (2) members quietly observe negotiations, and if requested by the parties or the facilitator, they comment on an issue or produce draft documents for the discussion; and (3) if talks reached an impasse, members meet with the facilitator and shuttle between both parties to identify common grounds or other solutions for breaking the deadlock (Leslie 2013; Rood 2016).

The relationship between the facilitator and the ICG members evolved over time. While the facilitator has never been in a directive position to the members, all members shared the ideas to form a consensus toward the same direction. In this sense, the ICG is conceived as a collaborative and complementary mechanism among the members who have specific expertise and diplomatic status, or a hub of international and domestic stakeholders to network and build wider relationships, providing technical, financial, information, and administrative assistance for both parties, as needs arise.

The ICG took on the role of providing technical input for negotiations when the panels were working on four annexes of a final agreement: transitional arrangements and modalities; wealth sharing; power sharing; and normalization. The ICG members were allowed to participate and provide the technical working groups with direct technical inputs during the groups’ working sessions, while all outputs from each group were shared among them, discussed, and finalized (Rood 2016). Upon the request of the parties, each ICG member provided technical input and assistance in the crafting of the annexes. For instance, the UK shared lessons from Northern Ireland; Conciliation Resources provided analyses of the draft documents from the panels and discussion papers on transition, normalization, and the devolution of policing; TAF forced on strengthening governance; and CHD brought in high-profile experts to provide input on topics such as power-sharing and wealth sharing (DPI 2014).

In the process, the ICG members extended to outside official talks, maximizing their own designations and capacities based on their expertise promoting peace in Mindanao. Embassies (Japan and the UK) regularly met with lawmakers and local politicians from Mindanao to listen to their concerns and suggestions and exert diplomatic leverage in support of the peace negotiations. On the other hand, NGOs have worked with local civil society and on the promotion of cross-community dialogues, providing technical and financial support to local NGOs or CSOs, and sharing lessons learned with other stakeholders, including the business and security sectors, the media, and academia.

Hybrid mediation is considered to be innovative in that the facilitator and the ICG members took facilitation roles: in (1) easing tensions and building confidence and trust between the parties by creating an environment that was conducive to exchanging ideas, dispelling misunderstanding, and clarifying consensus points; (2) building formal and informal or vertical and horizontal networks and social capital in a historically divided society and strengthening the ties between the state and civil society; (3) synchronizing all the efforts to bring about synergetic effects on peace talks, ceasefire, and distribution of peace dividends in an inclusive manner; and (4) mobilizing any forms of support from the international community from peacemaking, peacekeeping, and humanitarian and socioeconomic development.

Looking through the lens of adaptive mediation (de Coning 2021, Chap. 2 in this volume), the facilitation process led by the facilitator and the ICG members enhanced the capacity of both parties and stimulated self-organization among the parties through negotiating over agendas, finding consensus, and stipulating them into the agreement. In the beginning, the TOR of the ICG were purposely not specified to adapt their strategies and approaches to the changing political environment or the security status on the ground. At the same time, as the process reached a deadlock, backchannel diplomacy was conducted at a meeting as usual in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and also in Manila and Cotabato, in the Philippines to transmit necessary information and resolve misunderstandings between the parties in order to get back to the negotiation table.

It is expected that all of the above can contribute to: (1) increasing both parties’ sense of ownership and commitment for the implementation of the agreement through a transparent process in the international community; (2) nurturing norms and values for conflict resolution through democratic means on the basis of consensus; and (3) increasing resilience to cope with uncertainty, setbacks, and shocks, when attempting to facilitate such complex social change processes.

Insider Mediation: Insider Mediation Group (IMG)

The signing of ceasefire and peaceagreements by both parties does not ensure peace. In contrast to third-party mediation, insider mediation by the parties involved in the peace process as well as diverse groups within Moro society is a new attempt to increase the likelihood of sustainable peace in a divided society shaped by complex, protracted conflict and violence.

Around the signing of the CAB in 2014, new attempts were undertaken for advocacy, and informal dialogues and consultations were established around the enactment of the BBL in Congress (Kumar 2017). As a track-two form of advocacy, “Friends of Peace” was formed with the initiative of Cardinal Orland Quevedo, the Archbishop of Cotabato and a highly respected public figure in the Philippines where the Catholic Church is influential in politics (Cartagenas 2010; Pinches 1997). The Cardinal, who has also been engaged in promoting peace in Mindanao over the last few decades (Asiones 2019; Abreu 2008), identified public figures, including a leading historian, a prominent female journalist, a drafter of the 1987 Philippine constitution, influential members of the private sector, and academics. In the aftermath of the Mamasapano encounter, these figures were engaged in conducting public advocacy and providing legislators with legal advice to move forward (Kumar 2017). Despite all of these efforts, the incident eventually led to the failure of the BBL to be passed.

Under the Duterte administration, this group has evolved to adopt roles and functions related not only to promoting social harmony and interfaith dialogue but also to unifying Moro society including its fragmented leadership (MILF-MNLF and the factions), ethnolinguistic groups, non-Muslim indigenous groups, faith-based leaderships, and advocates. Most of its members are professionals or senior advisers to leadership such as lawyers, engineers, civil servants, and government officials related to the Moro leaderships, influential clans, and CSOs. With the support from the EU and the UNDP, the members were trained to enhance their capacity around mediation and negotiation skills at the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands and the Philippines (mostly in Davao City in Mindanao) from 2016 to 2017.

In the course of the training, the participants organized themselves into informal task forces, named the Insider Mediation Group (IMG). Working closely with the MILF-led Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC)Footnote 8 tasked with drafting the BBL, some of them were formally appointed as commissioners, and the task force for engaging in the Congress took on a significant role in building a wider consensus among stakeholders or interest groups among the Bangsamoro on the passing of the BBL during the last administration, calling for unity among the Moros and leaders. One of the biggest achievements was the group’s lobbying and provision of legal advice to Christian legislators during the deliberation of the bill so that the proposed BBL by the BTC that complies with the CAB would not be watered down.

At present, the IMG has been expanded within the Moro and between the Moro and Manila, and members have evolved their roles and applied to run the interim government, mediating and building consensus within and outside government. In the BTA, 10 out of 80 members of parliament (MP) are IMG members, while some are Cabinet members and a few are high-ranking officials. On the basis of the trust and confidence built among them during the legislative process, the members are now mediating interests and building consensus among diverse stakeholders inside and outside organizations (Arguillas 2019). Some concrete examples regarding the engagement are presented in the following paragraphs.

The IMG has played a pivotal role in strengthening vertical and horizontal ties. One mediator is a lawyer by profession and a former high-ranking government officer of the ARMM regional government. As a legal advisor on the MILF side, he has been engaged in peace talks between the MILF and GPH and was also assigned to serve as a member of the Joint Normalization Committee. During the legislative process of the BBL, he had been a legal advisor for Senator Juan Miguel F. Zubiri from Bukidnon (Mindanao), who was the chairman of the subcommittee on BBL, to ensure the spirit and intent of the CAB. After the creation of the BTA, he has been addressing issues of local governance as the minister of the local government and now delivers emergency services as a member of Bangsamoro Inter-Agency Task Force on COVID-19, coordinating with other ministers and local government executives.

Another mediator is associated with the religious aspect of the mediation process. Despite his upbringing in an influential clan in local politics, he has been engaged in religious dialogues, community engagement, and conflict resolution on the ground. He only stepped into the political mainstream in 2016 when he was appointed as a member of BTC and now serves as an MP in the BTA parliament. His exposure to a multicultural environment during his stay at Ateneo de Davao University (Jesuit) helped him realize the importance of interreligious dialogue (Lidasan 2020). In 2011, he was appointed as the head of the newly created Al Qalam Institute, which is an institute for Islamic Identities and Dialogue at the University, by Fr. Joel E. Tabora, S.J, the president of the University. Interacting with the mediator, Fr. Tabora has come to deeply understand the historical and cultural background of the conflict and has worked for peace and justice in Mindanao, as proven by the push for the passage of the BTC-drafted BBL.Footnote 9 In this sense, Davao became a hub of insider mediation between the Moro and Christian communities outside the Bangsamoro.

One mediator on the MNLF side, who is a lawyer by profession, a former member of the BTC, and the present MP in the BTA, pointed out that the role of mediators has become more important and relevant, given the intertwining, conflicting interests of diverse groups within the Bangsamoro, in order to enact necessary laws such as electoral and local government code (Sema 2020). As such, in a transitional setting in which formal institutions or organizations are being developed, this type of informal network within the Bangsamoro and within the Philippines can fill in the gaps until a formal institution can be effectively established. It also functions as a mechanism to prevent conflicts over resource allocation caused by changes in power relations in the formation of a new political order.

Over time, the number of mediators has increased from 30 in 2016 to more than 100 in 2020, involving more diverse groups or sectors in the newly created political entity. With the confidence and trust that has been constructed since the last administration, even mediators outside the BTA have been actively engaged in supporting the functioning of the BTA, in academia and CSOs, national and local governance. Importantly, keeping collaborative efforts with the national government is considered as key to success, as many contentious issues, which are not clarified, should be shared and solved between the BTA and the national government.

As shown above, the IMG is conceived as a platform for the Bangsamoro that works toward a political settlement, adjustment, and reconciliation among diverse interest groups. Through continuous processes, the actors in a conflict can understand and respect their differences, exchange ideas, build a consensus, modify their norms and values, and build confidence and trust through informal dialogues. In other words, the whole process can be viewed as the formation of a new political order, expansion of the public sphere, and creation of a new “political community” shaped by new norms and values under a new identity as the Bangsamoro. In this sense, insider mediation is also viewed as a binding and healing process engaged in by a historically divided or fragmented society. Thus, all the efforts conducted through the IMG to strengthen vertical and horizontal relations with trust can contribute to more sustainable peace by increasing the society’s resilience to violent conflict.

From the adaptive mediation perspective, insider mediation contributed to increasing the level of interdependency between the parties and within the Moro society, and lessoning the roles of outsider mediators that would increase the likelihood of self-organization and resilience to cope with uncertainty, setbacks, and shocks in the longer term. During the implementation stages of the peace agreement, the Bangsamoro government has to be engaged in negotiating with the national government and adjusting the interests among diverse sectors of people within the Moros or the Bangsamoro. Achieving that aim requires the rebels to acquire those political skills and maneuvers in order to transform from rebels to government officials. In that sense, learning from the process of adaptive mediation, including insider mediation prior to the signing of peace agreement, would greatly help for the parties to sustain the agreement.

Conclusion

Based on the findings presented above, four advantages of an adaptive mediation approach can be identified from the Bangsamoro peace process. First, the model of third-party mediation based on impartiality has been shaped by consensus (not confrontation) by both parties, which resulted in nurturing trust, norms, and values for conflict resolution through democratic means. Second, adaptive mediation approaches utilizing innovative, flexible, inclusive, and transparent approaches allowed the local context to be considered in the decision-making process during negotiation through a collaborative and complementary mechanism at the national and local levels. This type of adaptive mediation increases both parties’ level of acceptance, commitment, and ownership regarding the implementation of the signed peace agreement. Third, while the inclusion of diverse stakeholders in the peace process is key to the successful unification of people in a historically divided society, norms and values should be shared in order to develop respect for differences and build a consensus through dialogue. Fourth, shifting from the negotiation to implementation stages, the roles and functions of third parties change from providing input to ensure an agreement toward monitoring the status of implementation. As peace talks progress, insider mediators can gradually increase their levels of involvement for trust and consensus-building and the adjustment of conflicting interests among diverse stakeholders. The Bangsamoro experience has shown that incremental and adaptive efforts will contribute to developing resilience to conflict and violence and ultimately to sustainable peace.