Abstract
In this paper, I shall consider a number of different ways in which philosophers in recent years have attempted to offer conceptions of natural law which in various respects suggest that the grip of law on reality might be less tight than has been traditionally supposed. One such loosening is represented by the suggestion that many laws might be best thought of as probabilistic rather than deterministic. A second kind of loosening has been the admission that certain laws relevant to human behaviour might hold only ceteris paribus. Yet a third is the suggestion that all laws - including even fundamental physical ones – might hold only ceteris paribus (Cartwright, The dappled world, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999). How, though, are these different suggestions related to one another? Which kinds of loosening might entail which other kinds? And which, if any, might be most promising as regards making room in the universe for free will? In this paper I shall try to suggest that the first and second strategies are far less useful than the third in making the kind of space which would be required to subserve the reality of free will; and that a fourth kind of loosening – compatible with but not entailing any of these other kinds – from laws as world-dictators to laws as world-constrainers might yet be more useful than any of the other three in this respect.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
For another prominent example of the same sort of claim, this time from a quantum physicist, see Hossenfelder (2019).
- 2.
If indeed Newtonian science is deterministic. For a contrary view, see Earman (1986).
- 3.
It may be important to say here, though, that I shall not here defend the libertarian line of thought in general – rather, for the purposes of the paper, I shall take it for granted. My aim here is to differentiate between some alternative ways of understanding what the falsity of universal determinism might consist in and adjudicate between them.
- 4.
This is by far the most popular way of formulating universal determinism, and so I adopt it here, in deference to the literature, although I have argued elsewhere that this is not in fact the best way to formulate the thesis of determinism since it is damagingly neutral about the question whether there is any such thing as natural necessity (Steward, 2021). This may be the place also to note that for the purposes of this paper, I shall be assuming what some have called a ‘governing’ conception of laws of nature (see Beebee, 2000), since I am in agreement with many compatibilists that on a non-governing conception, there is no evident problem about free will at all. It is only if one assumes that the laws are such as to govern that there is any problem about the compatibility of free will with determinism (though see Huttemann, this volume, for an argument that the Humean faces different problems – an assessment with which I concur).
- 5.
I do not intend to question, for the purposes of this paper, the widespread assumption that there is such a fundamental level, nor that the task of formulating its laws falls to physics.
- 6.
- 7.
Cf Nancy Cartwright “For all we know, most of what occurs in nature occurs by hap, subject to no law at all” (1999: 1).
- 8.
Recall that we are assuming, for present purposes, a governing conception of laws of nature (see note 4 above). The issue might admittedly present somewhat differently given a Lewisian ‘best system’ account, but as mentioned above, I believe libertarians have in any case nothing to fear from ‘best system’ laws.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
Kenny speaks mainly of determinism at the ‘physiological’ level as being the potential threat to free will – but presumably, he would think that the same was true of determinism at (for example) the chemical or physical levels.
- 12.
According to new dispositionalists, an agent has the ability to φ if and only if they have a disposition to φ when they are trying (or are otherwise properly motivated) to φ (I borrow this characterisation from Vetter and Jaster (2017)). New dispositionalist positions are presented by Smith (1997); Vihvelin (2004); and Fara (2005).
- 13.
So-called ‘source incompatibilists’ stress that there is a necessary condition additional to the standard ‘alternate possibilities’ condition on acting freely – which specifies that we must be the origin or source of our free actions and decisions. According to source incompatibilists, we cannot meet this necessary condition in the way required, if universal determinism is true, since according to determinism, every condition of the world (except, presumably, the first) can be traced to a prior one. See for example Kane (1996, 1999, 2008, 2011) and Pereboom (2001, 2005, 2014).
- 14.
See (Steward) 2012.
- 15.
A nomological machine is “a fixed (enough) arrangement of components, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort of stable (enough) environment will, with repeated operation, give rise to the kind of regular behaviour that we represent in our scientific laws” (Cartwright, 1999: 50).
- 16.
If necessary for the purposes of according with the wanted ‘empiricist’ conception of properties that are ‘OK’ we can treat ‘force’ here as pertaining to a phenomenologically available property, such as e.g., felt pressure, impact, effort, motion, or whatever, rather than the abstract concept of Newtonian physics.
- 17.
Anscombe was also mindful of the importance of this point – see the final sentence of her (1971) “The most neglected of the key topics in this subject are: interference and prevention” (147).
- 18.
Bertrand Russell makes something rather like this point: “In order to be sure of the expected effect, we must know that there is nothing in the environment to interfere with it. But this means that the suppose cause is not, by itself, adequate to insure (sic) the effect. And as soon as we include the environment, the probability of repetition is diminished, until at last, when the whole environment is included, the probability of repetition becomes almost nil” (1912: 179–80).
- 19.
One might also raise the question, of course, as does De Hahn (this volume), whether there are any such fundamental laws of physics at all. But if there are not, then the arguments of those who suppose that the reign of such laws is incompatible with free will will not even get off the ground.
References
Almeida, M., & Bernstein, M. (2003). Lucky libertarianism. Philosophical Studies, 113, 93–119.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Intention. Blackwell.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1971). Causality and determination. In Metaphysics and the philosophy of mind: Collected philosophical papers (Vol. II, pp. 133–147). Blackwell.
Beebee, H. (2000). The non-governing conception of laws of nature. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXI 3, 571–594.
Cartwright, N. (1999). The dappled world. Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N., & Merlussi, P. (2018). Are laws of nature consistent with contingency’? In W. Ott & L. Patton (Eds.), Laws of nature. Oxford University Press.
Coyne, J. (2014). What scientific idea is ready for retirement?: Free will. The Edge. https://www.edge.org/response-detail/25381. Accessed 23 Dec 2020.
Davidson, D. (1970). Mental events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory. Duckworth. Reprinted in his Essays on actions and events (pp. 207–227). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. (1973). The material mind. In P. Suppes, L. Henkin, G. C. Moisil, & A. Joja (Eds.), Proceedings of the fourth international congress for logic, methodology and philosophy of science. Reprinted in his Essays on actions and events (pp. 245–259). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. (1974). Psychology as philosophy. In S. C. Brown (Ed.), Philosophy of psychology. Macmillan. Reprinted with comments and replies in his Essays on actions and events (pp. 229–244). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
De Haan, D. (2022). How to re-think about the problem of free will without laws of nature. In Powers, Time and Free Will. Springer, this volume.
Earman, J. (1986). A primer on determinism. Reidel.
Fara, M. (2005). Dispositions and habituals. Nous, 39, 43–82.
Fodor, J. (1987). Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. MIT Press.
Glynn, L. (2010). Deterministic chance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61, 51–80.
Haji, I. (1999). Indeterminism and Frankfurt-type examples. Philosophical Explorations, 2, 42–58.
Honderich, T. (1988). Mind and brain: A theory of determinism (Vol. 1). Clarendon Press.
Hossenfelder, S. (2019). How to live without free will. Retrieved from https://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/05/how-to-live-without-free-will.html
Huttemann, A. (2022). The problem of radical freedom. In Powers, time and free will. Springer, this volume.
Kane, R. (1996). The significance of free will. Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (1999). Responsibility, luck, and chance: Reflections on free will and indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy, 96(5), 217–240.
Kane, R. (2008). Incompatibilism. In T. Sider, J. Hawthorne, & W. Zimmerman (Eds.), Contemporary debates in metaphysics (pp. 285–302). Blackwell Publishing.
Kane, R. (2011). Rethinking free will: New perspectives on an ancient problem. In R. Kane (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will (pp. 381–401). Oxford University Press.
Kenny, A. (1963). Action, emotion and will. Routledge.
Kenny, A. (1975). Will, freedom and power. Blackwell.
List, C. (2019). Why free will is real. Harvard University Press.
McKitrick, J. (2010). Manifestations as effects. In A. Marmodoro (Ed.), The metaphysics of powers: Their grounding and their manifestations. Routledge.
Mele, A. (1995). Autonomous agents. Oxford University Press.
Mele, A. (2006). Free will and luck. Oxford University Press.
Molnar, G. (2003). Powers: A study in metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Oxford University Press.
Mumford, S. (2009). Passing powers around. The Monist, 92, 94–111.
Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. Cambridge University Press.
Pereboom, D. (2005). Defending hard incompatibilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29, 228–247.
Pereboom, D. (2014). Free will, agency, and meaning in life. Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. (1912). On the notion of cause. In Mysticism and logic (pp. 173–199). Unwin.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Penguin.
Smith, M. (1997). A theory of freedom and responsibility. In Ethics and the a priori (repr.) (pp. 84–113). Cambridge University Press.
Steward, H. (2012). A metaphysics for freedom. Oxford University Press.
Steward, H. (2021). What is determinism? Why we should ditch the entailment definition. In M. Hausmann & H. Noller (Eds.), Free will: Historical and analytical perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.
Stoutland, F. (1986). Reasons, causes and intentional explanations. Analyse and Kritik, 8, 28–55.
Strawson, G. (1994). The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies, 75, 5–24.
Tanney, J. (1995). Why reasons may not be causes. Mind and Language, 10, 105–128.
Vetter, B., & Jaster, R. (2017). Dispositionalist accounts of abilities. Philosophy Compass, 12(8), 1–11.
Vihvelin, K. (2004). Free will demystified: A dispositional account. Philosophical Topics, 32, 427–450.
Whittle, A. (2010). Dispositional abilities. Philosophers’ Imprint, 10, 1–23.
Wilson, A. (2009). Disposition-manifestations and reference-frames. Dialectica, 63, 591–601.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Steward, H. (2022). Laws Loosened. In: Austin, C.J., Marmodoro, A., Roselli, A. (eds) Powers, Time and Free Will. Synthese Library, vol 451. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-92485-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-92486-7
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)