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The Incremental Chain of Being

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From Electrons to Elephants and Elections

Part of the book series: The Frontiers Collection ((FRONTCOLL))

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Abstract

Is reality stratified? Many serious people, including scientists, philosophers, and ordinary citizens, think so. Talk of higher- and lower-level phenomena is ubiquitous, so much so that it has taken on the character of an ideology.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Washington University, CB 1073, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, 63130-4899, US

    John Heil

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  1. John Heil
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Correspondence to John Heil .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Einstein Forum, Potsdam, Germany

    Shyam Wuppuluri

  2. Mathematics Institute, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK

    Ian Stewart

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Heil, J. (2022). The Incremental Chain of Being. In: Wuppuluri, S., Stewart, I. (eds) From Electrons to Elephants and Elections. The Frontiers Collection. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92192-7_2

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