1 Introduction

Zimbabwe has been haemorrhaging via international migration, especially since the 1990s and 2000s. While there could be as many different reasons for this exodus of Zimbabweans as there are people emigrating, it is indisputable that the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991 at the behest of the Bretton Woods Institutions forms the major causes. Zimbabwe used to be a migrant-sending as well as a migrant-receiving country, but after ESAP, the trends were outwards with barely any inward movements. Zimbabwe became not only a net exporter of labour, especially human capital, but it depleted its human resources capacity, perhaps beyond levels of easy recovery in the foreseeable future. The political economic factors resulting from ESAP-induced poverty drove a significant section of the population to the indignity and insecurity of migrant labour. Drawing from that experience, it could be claimed confidently that “migration and labour questions are two sides of the same coin” (Delgado, 2015: 26) driven by neoliberal capitalism.

In this chapter, I argue that the phenomenal upsurge of cross-border labour migration from Zimbabwe to the rest of the region and overseas followed Zimbabwe’s introduction of ESAP. While some writers have attributed the economic problems to the failure of ESAP, I demonstrate that the economic decline is not the only characteristic of ESAP but a desirable outcome for capitalism. Zimbabwe has become the source of an uprooted, desperate and cheap labour supply for the care industry in the UK (Crush & Tevera, 2010: 28), domestic work, farm labour, risky security work in South Africa, and teaching and nursing in South Africa, Namibia and Botswana. Zimbabweans are worse off today than they were at independence in 1980, and available evidence suggests that the economic reform programme brought little but economic hardship, not only for the poorest groups, but also to middle-income households, in both rural and urban areas (Zinyama, 2002: 27). Of course, the trends, nature and intensity of migration and the response to it have undoubtedly been influenced by the dominance of neoliberal capitalism. Contrary to the stated advantages of ESAP, it instead resulted in deindustrialisation and consequently massive job losses. Drawing from the Zimbabwean experience as a migrant-sending country and South Africa as a migrant-receiving country, this chapter interrogates the often-ignored class dynamics of international migration in the Global South in a neoliberal capitalist era (see also Davison & Shire, 2015).

Studies have established that, since structural adjustment programmes, the number of migrants from the countries of the South to those of the Global North increased (Trifonov, 2013; UNDP, 2008; Bloch, 2005; Chetsanga & Muchenje, 2003). Since “one of the main engines of neoliberal capitalism is cheap labour” (Delgado, 2015: 28), it creates conditions that pressurise people to emigrate. Similarly, the Zimbabwean scenario is used as a reference point to argue that the very contradictions of neoliberal ideology not only induce labour migration through deregulation, but are also responsible for the criminalisation of migrants, hence reducing them to workers “having no right to rights” (Trifonov, 2013: 6) and subject to super-exploitation, casualisation and precarity. Furthermore, I explore the dichotomous view of immigrants as both necessary and undesired, in that their labour power is needed yet loathed for social security protection, which is often denied. The hegemonic neoliberal ideology has rendered “immigration labour desired for its productive capacity and disdained for its reproductive capacity” (Trifonov, 2013: 5). While aspects of dependency theory are utilised in characterising relations between labour exporting and receiving countries, this chapter takes a socio-historical view as a way of highlighting the role of ESAP in particular in accounting for massive labour migration. The outline of this chapter is as follows: an overview of the migration landscape; the historical context; a characterisation of neoliberal capitalism in the Zimbabwean context; labour and migration questions; and recommendations and conclusion.

2 Overview of the Zimbabwean Migration Landscape

In their book that aptly describes Zimbabwe’s contemporary migration as the “exodus”, Crush and Tevera (2010: 1) concede that: “After 1990, however, the accelerating social, political and economic unravelling of the country led to a rush for the exits. An economy in free-fall, soaring inflation and unemployment, the collapse of public services, political oppression and deepening poverty proved to be powerful, virtually irresistible, push factors for many Zimbabweans.” Of note, this coincides with the era of Zimbabwe’s economic structural adjustment programme. As discussed below, often the political repression of the increasingly paranoid Mugabe regime has been cited as the primary reason for socio-economic chaos in the country. Where economic reasons are given, it is usually to magnify the negative effects of the Fast Track Land Reform that stripped white farmers of land, and the government mismanagement of the economy – but definitely not mentioning that the worst mismanagement was the implementation of austerity measures under ESAP as had been prescribed by the International Monetary Fund.

While generally there has always been the movement of people within the SADC, the Zimbabwean political and economic crisis created a new pattern that obviously put strain on its neighbours. A survey in 2005 by the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) established that 58% of Zimbabwean migrants were in the SADC region (Crush & Tevera, 2010; Landau, 2008). An earlier study in 2001 had revealed that “55% of the Zimbabwean migrant stock was in South Africa, followed by Mozambique (17%), Zambia (16%) and Malawi (16%) (IOM, 2016; Crush & Tevera, 2010). However, the UN Migrant Stock database suggests that the Zimbabwean-born diaspora was already becoming global in its distribution in 2001. Nearly 20% of the global migrant stock was located in Western Europe, 5% in North America, 4% in Australasia and 3% in the rest of Africa (Crush & Tevera, 2010: 18), while the International Organisation for Migration estimated that, of the 2.4 million migrants in South Africa, about 1.5 million were from Zimbabwe (IOM, 2016).

Another significant feature of Zimbabwe’s contemporary migration since the 1990s is in its composition. According to Crush and Tevera (2010: 18):

There are almost as many women migrants as men; there are migrants of all ages, from young children to the old and infirm; those fleeing hunger and poverty join those fleeing persecution and harassment; they are from all rungs of the occupational and socioeconomic ladder; they are highly-read and illiterate, professionals and paupers, doctors and ditch-diggers.

The gender composition has been confirmed by a South African Migration Programme survey in 2005 which put the gender ratios at 56% men and 44% women (Crush & Tevera, 2010: 18).

Skilled personnel emigrated even beyond the SADC, especially health sector professionals. It was recorded that, by 2003, Zimbabwe had become the fourth largest “supplier” of nurses to the UK after the Philippines, India and South Africa (Crush & Tevera, 2010: 18). At that time, nurses constituted almost 80% of immigrants from Zimbabwe to the UK. On the other hand, unskilled labour was pouring out in great numbers too, to South African farms in particular. In 1998, the proportion of migrant farmworkers who had entered South Africa without documentation was more than 90% (Crush & Tevera, 2010: 33). Stories abound of abuse in the farms, including raids and deportations just before payday, as it is alleged farmers collaborated with the police, not to mention the sexual abuse of women migrants during transportation, at border crossings, and in farms. In addition to being criminalised, migrant workers live with constant fear of xenophobic backlashes that spontaneously arise in South Africa in particular.

The Zimbabwe–South Africa situation is of particular interest for a number of reasons; some historical reasons will be elaborated below. But most significant is the perception held by many Zimbabweans, wrongly of course, that South Africa has the political and economic clout to push Zimbabwe towards better governance. With the pivotal role of President Thabo Mbeki in crafting the government of national unity in Zimbabwe, perhaps these assumptions about South Africa are not far-fetched. But also, South Africa is perceived as a beneficiary of the collapse of Zimbabwe in the thousands of jobless Zimbabweans at the disposal of South African employers. It is believed that South Africa has exaggerated the number of Zimbabweans in the country. For a long time, the media has used a figure above three million, which Zimbabwean researchers dispute. But what is undeniable is that there is a significant number of undocumented migrants in South Africa, among whom are Zimbabweans. That on its own creates yet another problem administratively. That South Africa is the destination of choice for many Zimbabweans either for long term work and settlement or for days or even hours of shopping is indisputable. For example, SAMP research has shown that almost a quarter of adult Zimbabweans have parents and grandparents who have worked in South Africa at some point in their lives (Tevera & Zinyama, 2002: 2). That could be a demonstration of the fact that South Africa has, for a long time, been the preferred destination of Zimbabwean migrants.

3 The Historical Context of Zimbabwe to South Africa Labour Migration

There are few households in Zimbabwe that could claim they never had a member in South Africa, either working or seeking employment or even in the informal sector, particularly after the 1990s. Even before then, there is a long history of migrant labour to the gold mines in South Africa. In particular, there are districts of the Matabeleland region of Zimbabwe that have been associated with exporting labour specifically to South Africa. Although initially, it was the pull of the gold rush, these migrants, mainly young men, eventually entered other sectors beyond mining such as factories, the service sector and farms. This is one category of migrant labour associated with colonial political economy and it is significant to note that none of those labour exporting districts had ever experienced migration due to over-qualification, which has depleted the country of its professionals. Also, that category was confined to men, without the massive migration of families that is the case now.

While historical facts do not directly account for the seeming penchant for outward movement by Zimbabweans, they nonetheless give a full picture of the migration landscape. According to Mlambo:

For most of its history, Zimbabwe was primarily a destination for migrants. Prior to the nineteenth century, the Zimbabwe Plateau was peopled by migrants from the north. In the early eighteenth century, there was a wave of migrants from the south fleeing the political and economic upheavals of Zulu expansionism. In the twentieth century, following colonial conquest and extensive land expropriation, white settlers entered the country in considerable numbers (Mlambo, 2010: 53).

As succinctly presented by Mlambo (2010), Zimbabwe’s history is partly that of migration. Its negative side has been that the politics of the country have largely reflected that too, in terms of access and distribution of resources and opportunities. Even the controversial land issue partly derives from this background of migration. Some of these early migrants, the Shona speaking groups who became numerically dominant, have used that dominance to claim rights to ownership of the country and even to marginalise the rights of the Khoisan, Tonga, Venda, Kalanga and others, some of whom could claim earlier arrival in what is today Zimbabwe. The Ndebele-speaking people, although the majority are not of Zulu origin, have found their status as indigenous Zimbabweans often questioned. The majority of Europeans came through colonial conquest, but some had migrated and settled earlier while some migrated after World War Two, some from other parts of Europe and not necessarily the UK. However, when land expropriation took place, those waves of migrations and how land was acquired by different categories was ignored. Similarly, the country has fourth if not fifth generation Asians who have integrated into Zimbabwean society, but it is doubtful whether they are perceived as belonging.

This background is crucial in explaining contemporary Zimbabwe’s socio-cultural dynamics, as sometimes it is invoked to justify forced migration. When the colonial government dispossessed Africans of arable land and legally denied them the right to even purchase land in certain areas, it was perceived by Africans as purely racism, although behind the racial cloak were capitalist interests to maximise profits from commercial farms. The resulting internal migrations due to land dispossession literally changed the settlement patterns in the country. Further, the migration of Zimbabweans to settle in Zambia was partly due to the land issue and also facilitated by the then federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

In essence, Zimbabwe labour migration, be it rural to urban or cross-border to South Africa and the region, or/and even to overseas destinations, has largely been induced and influenced by capital. In any event, “the direction and flow of migration are determined by global flows of capital” (Petras, 2007: 40) since migration is “a reflection of the class dynamic of domestic, regional and international capitalism” (Canterbury, 2010: 6). The focus here is to demonstrate how neoliberal capitalism in particular impacted on Zimbabwe-to-South Africa labour migration.

Throughout the 90 years of colonial rule, colonial government policy was always to attract European migrants, particularly those who were English-speaking. However, in the late 1970s, whites were emigrating mainly to South Africa as it was proving futile to thwart majority rule. A significant number of whites also left in the years immediately after independence in 1980. Many Zimbabweans from exile were returning home and expatriate professionals also moved in to fill the gap left by the emigrating whites. Interestingly, when the Zimbabwean government unleashed its army, the Fifth Brigade, against civilians in Matabeleland immediately after independence, some people fled to South Africa even while it was still under apartheid. It is believed that 5000 people migrated to South Africa, Botswana and Britain as a result (Madebwe & Madebwe, 2017). The uprooted white farmers also trekked to South Africa following the Fast Track Land Reform that dispossessed them of the land. When there was economic collapse triggered by ESAP and exacerbated by government policy failures, rampant corruption and repression, the exodus of skilled labour was destined for South Africa mainly, and to an extent Europe, in particular, the UK and North America.

It may be necessary to explain why both colonial-era and post-independence migration has tended to be towards South Africa. Well, colonial history tied the two countries, considering that Zimbabwe was colonised by a British and South African company as led by the then Cape prime minister, Cecil John Rhodes. There were thus political, economic and cultural ties between the two countries; and at the end of company rule, Rhodesian whites went to the polls to decide whether or not to join the Union of South Africa as a fifth province. South Africa has always been more industrialised than Zimbabwe, making the latter dependent on its economically superior sister country. South Africa has remained Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner, although the trade is skewed in favour of the bigger economy. Landlocked Zimbabwe has depended largely on South African ports. For a long time, tertiary education, especially university education, could only be obtained in South Africa. In the region, South Africa had played the centre of capital while the rest of the countries were the periphery (Hlatshwayo, 2017).

In essence, it can be claimed that, as part of global capital machinations, Zimbabwe has been tethered to South Africa since colonisation in 1890 and has failed to free itself four decades after liberation. The relations between the two countries have barely changed as Zimbabwe continues in that colonial role of exporting labour both legally and illegally.

4 Why Neoliberal Capitalism in Zimbabwe?

Since its colonisation, Zimbabwe followed a capitalist path of development or underdevelopment and has continued to do so even four decades after attaining independence. Amazingly, those opposed to the Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government have often claimed, with some element of mischief, that the country once pursued socialism. The Africanisation of the civil service and expansion of social services to the majority population cannot be a measure of socialism. According to Hadebe (2019: 115):

Indeed, the ruling party officials expertly deployed Marxist-Leninist rhetoric to masquerade as leftist revolutionaries whose interests were the same as those of the poor working people. These opportunistic tendencies by the ruling nationalist elite were later deployed with devastating effects to the country’s economy … When properly put in context, it is clear that ZANU-PF has had very little regard for the workers in particular and the populace in general beyond serving its own interests.

Notwithstanding the glaring capitalist-orientation of the ZANU-PF government, those fond of bashing socialism still feel obliged to claim that Zimbabwe was once socialist. In any event, from its very first economic policy, Growth with Equity, the government avoided “disrupting the accumulation model of [the] settler bourgeoisie” (Raftopolous, 2001: 5), which was a clear indication of its pro-capital bias, notwithstanding socialist rhetoric and grandstanding (Hadebe, 2019: 115).

From a comparative perspective, the colonial settler government had much more control of the economy than any post-independence administration in Zimbabwe. Taking advice from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Zimbabwean authorities implemented an ESAP faithfully, claiming that it was a home-grown initiative. The ZANU-PF government did so in spite of a lack of evidence of the success of such programmes in sub-Saharan Africa and against the fierce protest by organised labour, as ZCTU aptly observed that:

The government strategy of staking the people’s hopes on World Bank structural adjustment policies, on foreign investment, on privatisation and on trade liberalisation ignores the evidence of the devastating effects of these policies on working people across the globe and dooms a vast section of the society to permanent joblessness, hopelessness and economic insecurity (Raftopoulos, 2001).

As correctly predicted, the trade unions saw the implementation of ESAP as a betrayal of the nation; and argued that the consequences to citizens would be dire. Already there was evidence of the triple impact of ESAP elsewhere, namely:

  1. (i)

    dismantling the national economy

  2. (ii)

    precarisation of labour markets

  3. (iii)

    displacement of a labour surplus via migration (Delgado, 2015: 34).

The Zimbabwean state, typical of a neo-colonial state, succumbed to neoliberal capitalism and used its monopoly over instruments of violence to suppress civil society, particularly the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), through frequent arrests of its leaders and violently suppressing strikes. The government preached the supposed benefits of ESAP such as increased foreign direct investments, increased employment opportunities and general upliftment of the citizens’ standard of living. According to the ESAP policy document, the objectives of the programme were to ensure higher medium- and long-term economic growth, reduce poverty, improve living conditions (especially for the poorest groups), and address the problems of burgeoning unemployment (Zinyama, 2002). As would be demonstrated later, the exact opposite happened. The Zimbabwean state became “the real guarantor of these new practices of labour domination and alienation” (Delgado, 2015: 29). Massive unemployment continues to worsen and more job losses, both in the public and private sector, have further burgeoned the informal sector. The local industries were not ready to compete with cheap imports. Inflation ballooned and as the government continued printing money, it eventually surpassed six digits, one of the worst inflation rates in living memory for a country not at war. Undoubtedly, the unbudgeted pay-outs to former guerrillas and the intervention in the DRC war were equally damaging to the Zimbabwean economy.

As should be expected, some neoliberal apologists dispute the role of ESAP as having triggered the downward free fall of the Zimbabwean economy. Normally such writers, in resonance with the Government of Zimbabwe’s narrative and that of the Bretton Woods institutions, either blame the drought or inadequate implementation of the programme, or both (Brett & Winter, 2003). According to Brett and Winter (2003: 1):

Yet ESAP is widely seen as an almost unmitigated failure…. Circumstances were unfavourable when ESAP was introduced. There were disastrous droughts in 1992 and 1995, and a global recession in 1991/92 reduced raw material prices and export demand.

The facts cited are undeniable, but they are insufficient on their own to exonerate ESAP as having been the essential problem. Whenever a government crafts and rolls out a policy, it is prudent to factor in potential risks and ways of mitigation. Droughts in Zimbabwe are a common phenomenon, and they tend to recur every 4 or 5 years. The government could not have been unaware of that. The global recession did not affect Zimbabwe alone, and it is not a convincing reason for the sudden breakdown of the country. Actually, prior to ESAP, the wage bill was 16.5% of GDP. The programme aimed at 12.9% which was never attained as it rose to 39% by 1997 (ADB, 1997) and thereafter skyrocketed to the current 80% of total expenditure.

On the other side, several scholars (UNDP, 2008; Bloch, 2005; Chetsanga & Muchenje, 2003; Gaidzanwa, 1999) do attribute the causality to ESAP of not only the economic collapse but also the trigger of massive labour migration not previously witnessed. Madebwe and Madebwe (2017: 33) write that “as a direct consequence of the austerity measures associated with the ESAP, migration was adopted as a survival strategy.” Figures for labour migration rose phenomenally after 2000, as the state response to civil unrest and political opposition was characterised by excessive violence. Indeed, poor economic conditions and political instability combined to be push factors almost a decade after the introduction of ESAP, but my argument is that ESAP remains the trigger for the social, economic and political crisis.

Of note is the changing pattern of labour migration from mainly semi-skilled young men to wholesale population movements. Munangagwa (2009: 110) puts the number as high as 37.8% migrating out of a population of around 13 million by 2008. Similarly, Madebwe and Madebwe (2017: 33) write:

Apart from unskilled and semi-skilled workers, approximately 200 000 skilled professionals emigrated, frustrated by the introduction of wage restraints, deteriorating working and living conditions, as well as instability in food prices due to the removal of subsidies.

Unemployment rose to 94% in 2008 (Van Klaveren et al., 2010; AFP, 2009). Formal employment shrank from 3.6 million in 2003 to an estimated 480,000 by 2008. High unemployment caused the informalisation of the economy where incomes are unstable (McGregor et al., 2011; Simpson, 2008). Of course, this was what has been referred to as third wave of migration that peaked in 2008. While undeniably far more massive than in the ESAP era, it is my contention that the economic liberalisation of ESAP had been the root cause.

5 The Impact of ESAP on Zimbabwe

The resultant deregulation and liberalisation led to deindustrialisation and massive job losses. The standards of living of the majority deteriorated drastically, and inflation figures were astronomic, further eroding the incomes, savings and pensions of the citizens while collapsing social services. Thus the conditions were set for a massive exodus of labour from Zimbabwe to the diaspora, with South Africa receiving perhaps the largest share. Indeed, as Delgado (2015: 31) states, “Neoliberal capitalism has accelerated mechanisms of social exclusion and dispossession through creation of an overpopulation that has no means of earning a living and whose livelihood is at stake.”

Actually, in the past two decades that have witnessed the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism, labour supply increased worldwide from 1.5 billion to 3.3 billion, and yet between 57% and 63% are absorbed, leaving an oversupply of unemployed workers (Forster et al., 2011: 3). In addition, the ILO reported that by 2009, labour insecurity had risen to 1,230 million workers, which was then more than half of the entire labour force. Undoubtedly, migrant labour has a bigger share of that insecurity, as does labour from the Global South.

6 Labour and Migration Interface

Neo-liberalism has resulted in a contradictory relationship between capital and labour in as far as liberalisation and free movement are concerned. The contradiction is that while capital freely moves about the world, labour cannot enjoy that flexibility (King, 1995). While governments in the Global South are cajoled to open up their countries for the free flow of imports and unlimited repatriation of profits, in the same breath the powerful economies tighten their border controls, impose anti-immigration laws and unleash xenophobic attitudes towards migrant workers. According to Adler (1977), developed countries can control migration flows in such a way as to maximise their own benefits at the expense of those accruing to a less developed country which is the source of migrant workers. Zimbabwean nurses, as an example, were given access to the UK to supplement its demand for care work. South Africa too opened work opportunities for science and mathematics teachers among the professionals allowed in.

As already noted, the direction and flow of migration are determined by global flows of capital (Petras, 2007), and even within the Global South there are centre-versus-periphery relations reflective of the global inequalities and social differentiation. With its relative economic development and undoubtedly the attraction of constitutional democracy as compared to its neighbours, South Africa tends to be both a transit and a destination for immigrants from the region and from Zimbabwe in particular.

Drawing from Adler’s (1977) theory of dependency, it could be claimed that Zimbabwe’s relation with South Africa, in particular, is one of dependency. According to dependency theory, migration is viewed either as benefiting the receiving country more than the labour-exporting country, or as positively retarding the development of the peripheral country (Adler, 1977).

Unfortunately, the dependency relations not only affect the present but contribute to future dependence too. The depletion of skilled human-power, especially science and mathematics teachers, would result in future inadequacy in those areas, as is already the case with high failure rates in the sciences in the Matabeleland region of Zimbabwe, which is closest to South Africa.

7 The Role of the Zimbabwean State Under Neoliberalism

Perhaps some could be wondering what role the state plays in all of this conundrum. In the Marxist sense, the bourgeoise state serves the interests of capital, and unfortunately, the Zimbabwean state is no different. In a way, the role of capital remained hidden as the Zimbabwean state took responsibility for the anti-people policies that impoverished a nation, turning it into hapless beggars. In its propaganda effort, the government claimed that its ESAP was homegrown and unlikely to have negative consequences.

It is the unfavourable economic conditions primarily, and political insecurity, that set Zimbabwe up as a net exporter of labour – I daresay resulting in the loss of the country’s greatest asset that it may never replenish, its workforce! Again, drawing from dependency theory, if the ruling elite of the labour-exporting country supports the emigration of labour, then that elite would not be acting in the best interest of their country (Adler, 1977). Although the Zimbabwean authorities have not openly declared their role in exporting labour, the various mechanisms put in place to siphon remittances, including through police roadblocks specifically targeting foreign-registered vehicles, could be a pointer to the state’s interest. It is a well-known fact that Zimbabwe would have long been a failed state had it not been for the support from migrant remittances and development aid from international donors.

At the service of neoliberal capital, the Zimbabwean state exposed its citizens to becoming almost stateless labour nomads and that despised subclass of workers caricatured for the hollowness of their once-respected education and skills that have neither saved their country nor themselves from sliding into an economic abyss – indeed, confirming the secondary importance of the superstructure over the base, which remains the economy.

Of course, in the dependency relationship between Zimbabwe as a migrant-sending country and South Africa as a receiving country, the South African state is not neutral. As an agent of South African capital, the South African state is responsible for policies that undermine African economies; it is responsible for policies that extract wealth from Africa into South Africa, and it is responsible for policies that are concentrating the capital of the continent. Be that as it may, Zimbabwe has a responsibility and must be held primarily accountable to its super-exploited citizens.

8 Migration in the Age of Neoliberal Capitalism

Trifonov (2013: 5) states correctly that “immigration labour is desired for its productive capacity and disdained for its reproductive capacity…” thus expressing the dichotomous view of immigrants as both necessary for their labour and undesired for social protection. Most often, the media and policy makers underplay the benefits from super-exploitation of cheap labour and instead amplify the supposed drain on social services such as health, education, housing and water due to the “influx of aliens.” Indeed, the ever-widening asymmetries among and within countries and regions mean that in those countries where production has been dismantled by structural adjustment programmes, social services were similarly destroyed. The search for health and educational services means that more and more Zimbabweans cross to South Africa to seek those services. If the cost to households could be quantified, it could perhaps shed more light on how the little income earned in the migrant-sending countries is similarly exported for social services.

The love-hate relationship is most often also experienced in the migrant-sending country, Zimbabwe in this instance. The government instituted mechanisms to siphon as much as possible from remittances. While the financial benefits are appreciated by the government, those who have emigrated are looked down upon and often ridiculed for the menial jobs they have to do for a living.

International migration is increasingly subject to criminalisation policies and practices, racialisation, and race- and gender-based discrimination (Davison & Shire, 2015; Delgado, 2015). In the SADC in particular, criminalisation goes against officially proclaimed regional integration efforts. Migrant workers are dehumanised as stateless people without claim to human and labour rights. It is this labour precarity and vulnerability that exposes migrant labour to super-exploitation by capital. Chilling stories of how labour migrants have suffered horrendous abuse when trafficked across international borders have not deterred future migrants. Apart from very low wages on farms, and in domestic work and other menial jobs that migrant workers opt for, women and girls are often subjected to sexual abuse too. But this precarity and vulnerability is not confined to migrant labour, especially undocumented labourers, but affects local workers too due to the growth of unemployment and competition with a pool of cheaper migrant labour. The resultant friction stratifies and divides the working class, which turns against itself leaving capital entrenching itself deeper with minimum resistance from fractured labour.

9 Ways of Mitigating the Neoliberal Onslaught Against Labour

Considering that, under neoliberalism, government policies tend to entrench rather than roll back neoliberal forces, what option does labour have to address this scourge manifesting itself as a migrant labour problem? Some lessons could be drawn specifically from the Zimbabwe-to-South Africa labour migration experiences. Firstly, there is a need for organised labour to organise beyond its traditional base of formal employment. That applies to both sending countries such as Zimbabwe and migrant-receiving countries such as South Africa. Organising the precarious in the informal sector and migrant workers could give a voice to the exploited and marginalised groups in the labour market.

Zimbabwe’s ESAP-induced massive unemployment and state repression of organised labour has resulted in many workers being pushed into the informal sector. It is mainly these precarious workers who are forced to emigrate from an un-unionised background to a criminalised, precarious, vulnerable and often difficult-to-organise immigrant labour force in South Africa. Strengthening efforts towards organising the unorganised workers that include migrant labour would go a long way towards lessening the capitalist onslaught against working people. Webster (2016) sees organising informal workers in the Global South as part of the anti-neoliberal approach that reverses the logic of the decent work deficit.

Secondly, it is important for progressive forces, especially civil society including organised labour, to advocate for a transformative agenda that could reverse some policies and laws that have so far promoted an anti-people agenda, including the casualisation of labour. It is important to address the socio-economic conditions that compel labour migration and the system that sustains it. The complicit role of the state in creating conditions for emigration should be interrogated regarding whether the same state power could be used to reverse its negative policies for the good of citizens and retention of its workforce. Similarly, the migrant-receiving countries, South Africa in this case, should proffer progressive legislation and policies that properly respond also to the root causes, and not just the “influx of immigrants” and impact on social services. For example, documenting all migrants provides the government with information on who is in the country and from where and since when. Civil society, and organised labour in particular, should play a proactive role in the integration and socialisation of the newcomers, who would have been legally permitted to stay.

Lastly, it is important to strengthen research and documentation on labour migration in the Global South, especially from pro-worker perspectives. Such research findings could help influence migration policies in the Global South which, to an extent, replicate trends in the Global North whose conditions differ markedly from those of the south. An understanding of labour migration in the Global South could illuminate our appreciation of Global South to Global North migration and dispel the myths of migration and development. It is important to see the negative side of neoliberal capitalism behind the uprooting of communities, compelling them to emigrate.

10 Conclusion

In this chapter, I used the example of ESAP in Zimbabwe and its liberalisation agenda, which triggered deindustrialisation and massive job losses and consequently increased exportation of labour, to argue that neoliberal capitalism has been the root cause of increased labour migration. Of course, the ZANU PF government of Zimbabwe had continued with the capitalist model inherited from colonial rule, together with its protectionist safeguards. The move towards liberalisation and deregulation, which characterise neoliberalism, was the Zimbabwean government’s initiative on the advice of IMF and the World Bank. It hurriedly implemented the structural adjustment programme against evidence of its previous failures in Africa and against strong protestations from the labour federation, ZCTU.

While it is a fact that the manner in which the Mugabe administration handled the economic meltdown and other imprudent decisions such as the unbudgeted payment of former guerrillas, the intervention in the DRC war, and its violent suppression of the labour-backed opposition, was inept and grossly irresponsible, it can still be argued that ESAP was the tipping point for the economic collapse. Indeed, the massive exodus of labour migration was experienced more than a decade after the ESAP’s introduction in 1991; nevertheless, the push factors are still traceable to ESAP. It is unfortunate that the hegemony of neoliberalism continues in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, notwithstanding its devastating impact on populations. This chapter further shows that the inherent contradictions of the neoliberal ideology of deregulation and control of labour across international boundaries account for the criminalisation of migrants and their super-exploitation, casualisation and precarity. However, the precarity of labour is not limited to immigrant labour but extended to workers in the migrant-receiving country such as South Africa, resulting in further disintegration of working-class solidarity in the form of xenophobic outbursts. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe continues, after the Mugabe era, to embrace neoliberalism with the hope of rebuilding its shattered economy.