This chapter aims to present the migration framework and the situation of women in Albania. The first section briefly reviews the socio-economic conditions of Albania during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, which I separate into two main periods: before and after 1991. I take the year 1991 as the official end of the mono-party political system, also known as the communist era or regime, as it is also the year when the country’s first multiparty elections happened. I explain how, in this context, migration became one of the leading forces transforming Albanian society. The second section of this chapter focuses on the history of migration in Albania, limited to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Here, I also discuss the research site, the city of Tirana. The third section presents the situation of women in Albania, focusing on some central matters that support the analysis in this research.

3.1 Albania: Some Historical Markers

The scope of this chapter precludes exploring the history of Albania in detail. However, it is necessary to highlight some turning points and prevailing circumstances to understand the issue of migration in Albania.

3.1.1 Pre-1991 Period—A Country Weakened by Wars and Isolation

Albania became an independent state on November 28, 1912, under a provisional government. However, after independence, political instability and social and economic upheaval gripped Albania, the neighbouring Balkan countries and beyond. Before World War II, Albania had practically no industry, and its agriculture system was fragile. The transportation system had been built mostly by wartime occupiers: Austrian forces constructed 400 miles of strategic road during World War I, and the Italian military did the same during WWII (Keefe et al., 1971, 45). On November 29, 1944, the country was liberated from the Nazi-Fascist occupation that had started on April 7, 1939. The Communist Party, founded on November 8, 1941, led the Antifascist National Liberation War and consequently came to power after the liberation (Keefe et al., 1971). The establishment of a socialist state regime via a liberation war from the occupying forces of Fascist Italy put Albanian on a different trajectory than the other socialist countries, except for former Yugoslavia, with which Albania maintained close ties in the early post-WWII era (Ramet & Wagner, 2010).

The new regime, which called itself a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Keefe et al., 1971, 1) established a one-party system. International migration was banned (unlike in neighbouring Yugoslavia) (Bonifazi & Manolo, 2004), and the state controlled the internal migration of the population through an internal passport system, as explained later in this chapter. Any opposition to the party, first called the Communist Party and later the Albanian Party of Labour, was forbidden. The state put all media and information sources under its tight control and banned religion from 1969 until 1991 (Keefe et al., 1971; Woodcock, 2016).

Like other countries in the region and beyond, Albania entered the post-WWII era in a very adverse economic situation and with an infrastructure in dire need of reconstruction. Along with its transformation of the country’s political framework, the communist government also reformed the national economic structure essentially from scratch, using two pillars as its foundation: agrarian reform (and more notably, the collectivisation of land into cooperatives) and the nationalisation of industry. The agricultural reform of 1945 redistributed all privately-owned land exceeding certain limits to landless peasants (Vickers, 1999). With regards to industrialisation, Albania adopted a Stalinist model, establishing a strongly centralised economy with an emphasis on self-sufficiency through reliance on heavy industry (Vickers, 1999, 176), similarly to Romania, which underwent the same strict post-1944 reforms (Stan, 2010). The constitution of 1976 banned all private ownership of land and immovable property (Çaro, 2011). Two significant achievements during this period were the electrification of the country and the construction and improvement of infrastructure. Until the mid-1970s, the Albanian government succeeded in industrialising the economy and increasing per capita income at an average rate of more than 8.2 per cent a year. By 1985, the ‘relatively modern’ multi-branched industrial sector generated 43.3 per cent of the total national income (Gjonca et al., 2008, 262).

Economic improvement spurred also the development of a national social and health care system, including through the establishment and construction of services and infrastructure intended to cover the entire country. In the immediate aftermath of WWII, life expectancy at birth was no more than 50 years for both sexes. Infant mortality was the highest in the region, at 148 infant deaths per 1000 live births. However, by the end of the 1990s, life expectancy at birth had improved, shooting to 70.7 years, and the infant mortality rate had fallen to 45.4 deaths per 1000 live births (Gjonca et al., 2008, 263).

By the early 1970s, countrywide literacy campaigns and the overhauling of the national education system had eradicated illiteracy among those younger than 40 years old. By 1989, the illiteracy rate was less than 8 per cent (INSTAT, 2002). The communist regime had some undeniable achievements: it diversified the country’s economy and society through its five-year industrialisation plans, it ‘raised the standard of living, [and] reduced the impact of divisive factors on Albanian society, such as regional and clan loyalties, [and] the traditional north-south division’ (Fischer, 2010, 421). However, despite the economic progress achieved during the early decades, a very harsh financial crisis hit the last years of the communist regime. Over the years, the regime broke off all ties with the Communist Bloc, ending its relationship with the Soviet Union in 1961 and with China in 1978, which led to a worsening of the economic conditions of the country and deepened its isolation. Albania emerged from its communist years as the poorest country in Europe, with an annual gross national product per capita of approximately US$380 (Gjonca et al., 2008; World Bank, 1996).

At the political level, after its break with Yugoslavia, Albania allied with the Soviet Union beginning in 1948. Still, that alliance was also broken in 1961, when Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Party of Labour and head of state of Albania from 1944 to 1985, expelled Soviet advisers and aligned the country with China. After China ceased sending aid in 1978, Albania, like Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu, entered a period of economic recession and severe isolation not only from the Soviet Union but also other East European countries. While civil society grew and put pressure on communist governments in other countries—including Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland—no such developments occurred in neither Albania, nor Romania. Instead, any signs of opposition and dissidence were rapidly suppressed (Fischer, 2010; Ramet & Wagner, 2010; Woodcock, 2016). The communist regime in Albania, like Ceausescu’s regime in Romania, has been criticized for its extreme harshness, as it ignored human rights, controlled the population through the secret police and crushed any resistance or criticism to the party line (Stan, 2010). Fischer (2010, 421) summarises some of the most challenging aspects of the communist regime in Albania: ‘its state-of-siege isolation, its political murders, its prisons, its forced labour camps, and the hardships of long internal exile’.

3.1.2 Post-1991—The Long Transition

The Albanian communist regime fell in 1991, part of a wave of regime-topping revolutions that swept Eastern Europe. The fall of communism in Albania differed from what happened, for instance, in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where socialism was ended from above. Albania also deviated from the widespread violent riots that exploded in Romania, leading to the execution of its leader, Ceausescu (Ramet & Wagner, 2010). In Albania, the ‘collapse’ (Ramet & Wagner, 2010, 18) of the communist regime started in 1990 and was completed in 1992 with the electoral victory of the anti-communist opposition party, founded in December 1990.

In the early 1990s, Albania was the poorest country in Europe, and the troubled political crises of 1990, 1991 and 1992 were accompanied by a difficult economic situation (Gëdeshi & Jorgoni, 2012). It was in this context, and precisely during this period, that Albania began experiencing international and internal migration. These years saw the so-called ‘boat exodus’ to Italy and the ‘mass migration’ to Greece (Vullnetari, 2007, 32), with migrants travelled along the pathways through the southern mountains to reach Albania’s southern neighbour.

Law and order broke down; unemployment was rampant; anarchy, crime and violence in the streets reached frightening proportions. … Hundreds of schools, hospitals, health and day-care centres, shops, post offices, collective farms, and industrial plants were either looted or destroyed, causing further damage to an economy which was already in virtual ruins. The public transportation system broke down, and disorder prevailed. (Tarifa, 1995, 148).

Uncontrolled demographic movement and a degree of government laissez-faire that was hard to distinguish from ‘economic and judicial anarchy’ followed suit (De Waal 2005, 5). The new (anti-communist) government that came to power in 1992 ‘began to implement a fully-fledged neoliberal programme based on economic liberalisation, monetarist policies, massive and rapid privatisation, and the opening up of the local market to foreign capital, often referred to as shock therapy. During the 1992–1996 period, Albania became the “shining star; of the IMF and the World Bank, the ‘success story of the Balkans’“ (Kajsiu, 2014, 57). This programme, however, did not produce the expected outcomes. It led to some macroeconomic stabilisations (Bezemer, 2001) but also significant declines in income and employment, a constant reduction of unemployment benefits, shrinkage of the social security system and high rates of emigration (Kajsiu, 2014, 57).

Albanian families relied mostly on remittances and returns from investments in Ponzi or pyramid schemes (Korovilas, 1999; Musaraj, 2011) that had developed from 1992 to 1997. These Ponzi schemes offered superior returns to early investors by paying them with money invested by subsequent investors, not from profits generated by the investments themselves (Musaraj, 2011, 85). In Albania, people deposited money in financial schemes run by local businesspersons and even anonymous individuals with the promise of interest rates of up to 100 per cent. Many families sold their houses and deposited the money in these schemes. Most likely, slightly more than half of the total investments came from remittances (Korovilas, 1999). Hundreds of thousands of Albanians lost their savings that were worth approximately US$2 billion, or 15 per cent of Albania’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Barjaba and Barjaba 2015). Pyramid schemes were not exclusive to Albania and took place in other post-socialist countries, including Romania, Russia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and former Yugoslavia (Verdery, 1996). Caritas in Romania and the MMM in Russia (Bezemer, 2001) remain among the most well-known. Despite several similarities with other post-socialist pyramid schemes, Albania’s case was unique for the reach of these Ponzi schemes had among the Albanian population. The amount of money invested and the suddenness of the collapse and its consequences, including a popular uprising in 1997 and the dissolution of state institutions for several months, were quite impressive compared to other countries.Footnote 1

After 1997, Albania entered a period of state reconstruction, followed by political and economic stability. The European Union (EU) Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania was signed in 2006 and entered in force in 2009 (European Commission, 2015). Albania became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2009 and was granted EU candidate status in June 2014. Despite the post-1997 recovery, many economic problems persist. The agricultural sector, which accounts for more than 40 per cent of employment but less than one-quarter of the GDP, is limited to small family operations and subsistence farming due to a lack of modern equipment, unclear property rights and the prevalence of small, inefficient plots of land. Corruption, property issues, inadequate infrastructure and a weak judicial system remain significant obstacles to the development of an attractive business environment for foreign investment and returning migrants (CIA, 2015, BBC 2015, Mai & Paladini, 2013). Albania remains one of the poorest countries in Europe outside the former Soviet Union. Public debt stood at 69,9 per cent of GDP in 2018 (IMF, 2019).

Remittances,Footnote 2 mostly from Albanians residing in Greece and Italy, constitute a significant source of financial support for families and thus contribute to the improvement of their living standards amid the lack of state social policies and state solidarity (Danaj, 2014). Remittances peaked at nearly 952 million euros in 2007, accounting for 15 per cent of GDP, but have been decreasing since then, reaching 5,8 per cent of GDP in 2015 (Barjaba and Barjaba, 2015; CIA 2015). Moreover, few remittances have been invested in economic activities, and the businesses that do exist are small, have limited productivity and are often informal (Gëdeshi, 2008; King & Vullnetari, 2010).

In 2018, the Survey on Income and Living Conditions showed the share of the population at risk of poverty was 23,4 per cent (INSTAT, 2019b). Previous statistics based on the Living Standards and Measurement Survey had noted a shift of poverty from rural mountain areas to central urban areasFootnote 3 (INSTAT and World Bank 2015). Migration—internal and international—took its shape in this context and remains a vital force driving social transformation in Albania. Albania can indeed be considered to be a laboratory for the study of migration, as expressed by King (2005).

3.2 Migration in Albania

Albania’s twentieth century history before 1991 can be divided into two central eras: before the establishment of and during the communist regime. Before the founding of the communist government in 1946, internal and international movement were both present. Internal migration consisted of rural mobility to main urban centres, coinciding with the first steps towards the development of industry, communications, trade and services. By 1945, despite the growth of the urban population, 80 per cent of the population lived in rural areas (Çaro, 2011). International migration mostly took the form of labour migration and was male-dominated (Vullnetari, 2007; Dahinden 2013). Migration for study, training purposes and educational opportunities were scarce. The impact of international migrants on the country’s socio-economic development can be seen in the increasing education levels in the cities with the highest migration rates (Vullnetari, 2007).

The communist government forbade international migration and placed internal migration under its tight grip. However, immediately following the immediate establishment of the new regime and until 1950, Albania saw some emigration, especially from those with political affiliations that opposed the new power. After 1950, crossing borders was forbidden with the exception of short, approved, official visits or studies. The state organised internal migration primarily to develop various urban centres according to the needs of the labour force in different industries and to improve remote mountain areas, especially in the health and education sectors (Çaro, 2011). Rural retention and minimal urbanisation started in the early 1960s onwards (Sjöberg, 1994), and the use of a domestic passport was obligatory (Vullnetari, 2014).

The system of internal passports, pashaportizimiFootnote 4, resembled the internal passport in the former Soviet Union and present-day Russia (Shevchenko, 2010; Wegren & Drury, 2001) and the hukou in China (Chan & Zhang, 1999; Lévy, 2015). The Soviet Union established a system of internal passports in 1932 to ‘manage the population flows’ (Wegren & Drury, 2001, 17). China formalised the hukou system (i.e. a family registration programme that issues domestic passports regulating population distribution and rural-to-urban migration) as a permanent system in both rural and urban areas (Chan & Zhang, 1999). Similar to the cases of Russia (and the former Soviet Union) and China, the objective of Albania’s internal passport system was to control the population’s internal movement, primarily from rural to urban areas, to balance rural and urban residents and to serve the two most important economic sectors, agriculture and industry. The restriction of internal movement was aimed primarily at rural-urban migration, especially to Tirana. Still, people found ways to bypass these restrictions by, for example, moving to the rural areas neighbouring the forbidden cities and by marrying urban dwellers. A more concrete example is diverted migration (Sjöberg, 1992) to Tirana, as presented later in this chapter.

3.2.1 Post-1991 Migration—The Entanglement of Internal and International Migration

However, with the breakdown of the communist regime, migration became a foremost issue in Albania. Indeed, we might say that migration has been one of the most significant developments in post-communist Albania. Although migration, both internal and international, started in 1990, when people understood that the regime might soon fall, only in 1993 was the internal and international movement of Albanian citizens liberalised. Article 22 of the Law on Amendments to the Constitutional Provisions, drafted in 1993, recognised the right of all Albanian citizens to choose their place of residence, move freely within the state’s territory and emigrate abroad (Vullnetari, 2007). The Constitution of 1998—which remained in effect until 2016—states that ‘everyone has the right to choose its inhabitancy and move freely in every part of the state territory and nobody should be impeded to move freely out of the state’ (Ikonomi, 2009, 109).

Ikonomi (2009) points out that the Albanian constitution uses the expression ‘nobody should be impeded to move freely out of the country’, not ‘everybody has the right to move out of the country’, as other countries limit Albanians’ right to entry. As Wihtol de Wenden (2015, 2) explains, recognition of the right to move out of the country was not followed by the right to enter another country. This contradicts the essence of several international documents, such as the Universal Declaration of the Rights of 1948 and the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families. More concretely, in order to move from Albania, Albanian citizens could enter another country only after complying with its visa regime. The EU and other developed nations put in place strict visa regimes that made it difficult for Albanian citizens to leave the country through legalised ways. Visas were mostly issued for official visits, students and tourism purposes, with particular restrictions based on the applicants’ financial situation and employment status in Albania. Albanian citizens could also migrate for work purpose on regular work visas if they fulfilled all the requirements placed by the foreign destination country, and if this latter accepted their application. That is why visa liberalisation for tourist visits to the Schengen area in 2010 represented a significant moment in the history of Albanian citizens’ freedom of movement.

Lacking the right to freely enter other countries and given the criminalisation of irregular border crossings (Wihtol de Wenden 2015), smuggling and human trafficking became highly profitable businesses for organised crime and mafia in Albania. Speed-boat smuggling of migrants to Italy through the coastal city of Vlora (Mai, 2004) continued at a significant pace until the late 2000s despite numerous drownings and deaths. In south-eastern Albania, the border with Greece became a hotspot of activities, generating resources for the villagers living along the border. Villagers would offer accommodations for the ‘candidate migrants’ preparing to cross the border, provide collective transportation and guides and work with the Greek collaborators that helped migrants cross the Greek border—all these undertakings helped the social and economic life of these villages (De Rapper & Sintès, 2006, 262).

In the following sections, I explore more in detail the dynamics of Albanians’ migration processes since 1990. First, I will briefly discuss the development of international migration before delving into the details of internal population movements and return migration—remaining conscious that these processes are entangled and that migrants may engage in one or more such processes at any given time. These diverse migratory movements have important gendered aspects which warrant consideration. Most studies dealing with these gendered aspects are quantitative, so the following sections are mostly based on these quantitative results and combine them with qualitative research when possible.

3.2.1.1 International Migration

International migration ‘unfolded dramatically with the fall of the Albanian communist regime’ (Dahinden 2013, 4). INSTAT data estimates that in 2017, 1.5 million Albanian citizens lived outside of Albanian territory or about one-third of the country’s population. The majority of migrant communities are present in two neighbouring countries, Italy (448,407) and Greece (356,848). However, there is a growing trend of Albanians moving to other European Union countries, as well as in North America and Canada (GoA, 2018).

The post-communist phase of international migration in Albania started in 1990, with the so-called ‘embassy phenomenon’ (Çaro, 2011, 41). On July 2, 1990, more than 6000 Albanian citizens entered fourteen foreign embassies in Tirana, seeking asylum. The West German embassy was the most popular refuge, sought by approximately 3200 asylum-seekers (Tarifa, 1995, 143). The Italian and French embassies represented asylum seeker’s second and third choices respectively.

Rumours that the borders had been opened, and that everyone was allowed to leave, spread like wildfire during this time. In July 1990, the Constitution of 1976, which banned the organisation of any opposition parties, as well as all international migration, was still in place, but the idea of getting out had pervaded the entire country. Albanians went to Greece using secret passages in the southern mountains (Vullnetari, 2012).Footnote 5 During the last days of December 1990, approximately 16,000 emigrants left the country. On the night of December 31, 1990, more than 5000 people made the trek across the snowbound, mountainous frontier into Greece (Tarifa, 1995, 147). In March 1991, some 25,000 people seized boats in the harbour of Durres and managed to get to the Italian city of Brindisi. In August 1992, a new wave of 17,000 refugees escaped to Bari (Tarifa, 1995, 153).Footnote 6

During the early 1990s, most emigrants were young men (World Bank 2007; Dahinden 2013). Few legal opportunities existed for Albanians to leave the country, and international migration was constructed as a dangerous physical act, requiring strength usually ascribed to masculinity. Albanian women seemed invisible in the international migration movements of the early 1990s, but King and Vullnetari (2012) recommend caution when considering this invisibility. They highlight that women did participate in international migration, including by engaging in dangerous speedboat travel to Italy and taking risky mountain pathways to Greece.

Another critical moment for international migration in Albania came in the wake of the collapse of the pyramidal investment schemes in 1997 (Bezemer, 2001; Korovilas, 1999; Musaraj, 2011). The number of people migrating abroad increased, peaking in 2000 at around 50,000 new migrants per year, and steadily decreasing since then (World Bank 2007, 36). Women’s participation in international migration also rose from 20 per cent to 60 per cent of male international migration from 1991 to 2001 (Azzarri & Carletto, 2009, 7). The increasing number of women migrants is due primarily to family unification, as well as student migration (King & Vullnetari, 2012). As in other post-communist countries, Albanian women engage in international migration for various reasons, including to seek economic opportunities and escape from the gendered constraints of their home (Morokvasic, 2004).

According to Morokvasic (2004, 8), women’s mobility reflects the newly-acquired post-communist freedom of movement. Still, Morokvasic explains, it might also be the ‘result of coercion and human trafficking’, offering both new opportunities but also an explosion of precarious jobs and increasing dependence. With regards to the trafficking of women, Albania was considered to be ‘one of the centres of the recruitment and transport of women from eastern Europe to other countries, especially western Europe’ (Van Hook et al., 2006, 30). Figures on the number of women and girls involved in trafficking, unfortunately, are still not accurate,Footnote 7 and in-depth investigations are also lacking.

Since the early 1990s, Albanian women have also emigrated for educational purposes. Italy has been the primary destination country for student migrants, mostly due to the scholarship programmes offered by the Italian government and the loose requirements to enter Italian universities. In the early 1990s, one could register at an Italian university by sending a formal letter of guarantee from an Italian citizen or institution (most commonly religious institutions) or by depositing around 4000 euros in a local bank in Italy (Këlliçi, 2015). A student could apply for a scholarship after the first year of studies. In the late 1990s, the only requirement for a scholarship was the applicant’s economic situation, and given the poor economic conditions of Albanian families, almost all Albanian students met this condition.

Moreover, virtually all Albanian youth knew Italian, which explains the significant increase in the number of Albanian students in Italy after 1998. However, the requirements became stricter in 2006 and 2007, and starting in 2008, the number of scholarships went down significantly (Këlliçi, 2015). While there are no accurate data on student migration during the early 1990s, around 9000 Albanian students were studying abroad in 2003–2004 (Gërmenji & Milo, 2011, 347). During the 2007–2008 academic year, the highest number of international students in Italy was from Albania (Zenelaga & Sotirofski, 2011, 5). There were 11,415 Albanian students in Italian universities, with a gender breakdown of 4659 male students and 6756 female students (Zenelaga & Sotirofski, 2011, 5).

Greece and Italy have been the top destination countries for Albanian international migrants, with an estimated 600,000 and 500,000 Albanian migrants, respectively. Other migrants target Canada, France, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States (Barjaba and Barjaba 2015). Social networks and patterns of chain migration have taken on significant roles in the international migration process (Vullnetari, 2007). Social network support was present not only in post-1991 migration but also in earlier migration practices. For example, Albanian minoritarë,Footnote 8 primarily but not exclusively from southern villages, mobilised their ‘fossil’ networks in Greece to migrate south and obtain residency documents and employment more quickly than ethnic Albanians (Sintès, 2003, 129). Albanians living in the southern borderland villages revived familial and friendship networks with Greek citizens to gain support for their migration projects (Sintès, 2010).

Another significant characteristic of the first decade of international migration for Albanians during the 1990–2001 period, is the circular migration between Albania and Greece. Albanian migrants were mostly employed on a seasonal or temporary basis in sectors characterised by informal activity and intense unskilled labour, such as agriculture, construction, tourism, small-scale family factories and housekeeping. ‘Circular, repeat, multiple, seasonal or frequent migrations became a silent feature of migration in the region, particularly around the border regions’ (Gemi et al., 2010, 18). Although these circular movements were illegalised, many Albanian migrants engaged in them: more than 550,000 unauthorised migrants worked in Greece by the late 1990s, and most were employed in seasonal work and returned home in the offseason (Gemi et al., 2010). The participation in circular/seasonal/pendular practices, though, became problematic after 2000 due to increased border controls, ‘the stricter legalisation procedures’ introduced by the Greek government in 1998 and three successive regularisation programmes, implemented in 1998, 2001 and 2005 respectively. These three factors pushed migrants to adopt strategies for permanent settlement in Greece (Gemi et al., 2010). Unfortunately, there are no accurate data or information about the circular movements of Albanian men and women.

Data from the Census of 2011 show that international migration continued during the 2001–2011 decade (INSTAT, 2012). Differences between the numbers of men and women emigrating have disappeared: 288,000 men and 285,000 women emigrated between 2001 and 2011 (Bruijn et al., 2014, 17). This development again indicates a deviation from the male-dominated patterns of international migration in the early 1990s.

In 2018, the number of people emigrating from Albania was 38,703. These numbers are slightly lower than those of the previous year. However, emigration continues, and in 2018 net migration remained negative by about 15 thousand persons. Footnote 9

3.2.1.2 Internal Migration

Post-1991 internal and international migration in Albania are strongly related and cannot be analysed in isolation from one another. Over the past decades, individuals and families have been involved in various movements linking internal and internal migration (Vullnetari, 2012; De Waal, 2005; King et al., 2008). While crossing national borders remained challenging, and most emigrants left through illegalised ways, internal migration was not restricted or controlled anymore as it used to be during communism. Internal movement started at the same time as international migration, in the early 1990s. These two migration processes have a robust relationship as often, international migration by one (more) family member(s) was followed by internal movement by the rest of the family (De Waal, 2005; Vullnetari, 2012; Çaro, 2011). Another pattern that showcases the connection between internal and international migration is the process of moving to Tirana to be a step closer to going abroad. Patterns of chain migration are also found in the process of internal migration. Çaro (2011) and Vullnetari (2012) emphasise and describe the role that networks play throughout the internal migration process in Albania.

Internal migration in Albania is not a straightforward rural–to–urban movement, as it includes urban–to–urban and rural–to–rural mobilities as well. For example, approximately 40 per cent of internal migrants moved from rural to rural areas, mostly around Tirana, from 1989 to 2001 (Vullnetari, 2014). Furthermore, internal migration in Albania led to an increase in urban spaces in the main cities, such as Tirana, Durrës, Shkodër, Fier, Vlorë and Korçë, but decreases in other cities, such as Kukës and Dibër. Some cities, such as Saranda and Lezhë, experienced population declines due to international migration but received a substantial population influx from internal migration (INSTAT, 2002, 2012).

An increase in internal movements resulted in the appearance of new urban areas. Post-1991 internal migration, followed by the movement of people toward urban centres, primarily to Tirana and Durrës, led to the settlement of empty land (mostly agricultural lands) and construction of residential buildings meant for housing purposes. These new neighbourhoods were characterised by illegally constructed houses, a lack of infrastructure (e.g., streets, health and childcare centres and schools) and unauthorised access to water and electricity. Housing conditions and infrastructure, however, have improved over the past three decades. The early simple forms of housing called barake were replaced by substantial brick houses of one or multiple floors as migrants thought a real brick house would be harder to demolish if the police came to evict them from the home and land they had occupied. This supposition proved to be accurate, and currently, the country is undergoing a thorough but fraught process for the legalisation of these informal settlements. Infrastructure in most areas, especially the peripheries of Tirana, has also been improved since the early 1990s (Çaro, 2011).

The internal population movement also introduced new political and social challenges in both the destination and origin places. As mentioned above, the infrastructure in the places of destination was either inexistent or inadequate, and thus needed to be constructed from scratch or rigorously improved. Furthermore, there was considerable stigmatisation and prejudice towards internal migrants, especially in large urban centres, such as Tirana and Durres. At the same time, internal migration emptied other cities and villages, negatively affecting the development of agriculture, industry, trade and other economic, social and cultural activities. For example, internal movement crippled the country’s social assistance scheme (ndihmë ekonomike) which was allocated based on a territorial criterion. Many people who left their cities and villages were not registered as residents of their new destination and were thus not entitled to receive social assistance. This example, along with those already mentioned, show some of the policy challenges that Albania would face with regards to education, health care and its social assistance scheme in the early years of the post-1991 era.

In 2011, for the first time in the census history of Albania, the population in urban areas was higher than the people living in villages. In the Census of 2011 (INSTAT, 2012), 53.7 per cent of the population lived in urban areas and 46.3 per cent in rural areas. During the 2001–2011 period, internal migration was characterized by the movement of entire families, as opposed to a partial family movement that was more common in the preceding decade. This growth of the urban population highlights another pattern of internal migration during the 2001–2011 era: internal migrants tended to settle within cities, whereas the majority of movements during the 1990s concentrated in the neighbouring rural areas that later turned to urban peripheries. This change caused a boom in the construction sector and the expansion of new and existing neighbourhoods in the main urban centres. It is also worth nothing another significant characteristic of internal migrants during this period: their relatively young age. More than 50 per cent of migrants who moved from their city or village of origin were 15–34 years old, with most falling in the 20–24 years age group (Galanxhi et al., 2014).

Unlike international migration, internal migration in Albania is female-dominated. It’s a trend that mirrors and correlates to a difference described earlier: male family members migrated abroad, while the rest of the family, including women, moved internally. The predominance of women in internal movements has been documented since the pioneering work of Ravenstein (1885), who explicitly stated that women are more involved in internal, short-distance mobilities, whereas men tend to migrate from the country. Data from the first post-1991 Census, conducted in 2001, showed that internal migration from northern regions of Albanian involved all demographic groups, while migrants from the secondary centresFootnote 10 tended to be young, educated and female (Galanxhi et al., 2004). During 2001–2011, internal migration by women increased. According to the Census of 2011, women made up 59 per cent of the internal migrants, and the sex ratio of internal migrants was 69 men for 100 women from 2001 to 2011 (Galanxhi et al., 2014, 25). In 2014, the majority of internal female migrants belonged to the age group 20–29 years old. This trend of female-dominated internal migration continues still to date as confirmed by the latest INSTAT data (Arqimandriti et al., 2020). Census data also show gendered differences in the reasons for internal movement: men favour migration for employment, and women for university studies (Galanxhi et al., 2014). The higher numbers of young women engaged in internal migration then may be explained ‘by the shares of female students in universities, which are all located in cities’ (Vullnetari, 2012, 95). In a study on internal migration in Albania, Çaro (2011, 110) identifies several reasons for internal migration by women: a ‘better future for their children’, ‘better opportunities and a desire for city life’ and escape from the ‘patriarchal system’ in their place of origin and from the ‘control of their in-laws’. However, reasons for internal migration (which should not be restricted only to rural–to–urban migration) may vary by civil status, family situation, education and other factors, as explored in the following chapters.

3.2.1.3 Return Migration

In 2018, 23,673 migrants returned to AlbaniaFootnote 11. The last Albanian Census of 2011 revealed that 139,827 Albanians returned to the country from 2001 to 2011 (Gemi, 2015). However, the first signs of voluntary returnees—especially from Greece and Italy—can be observed in 1993–1996, after the first wave of migration of the early 1990s. These initial, sporadic movements dissipated due to the collapse of the pyramid schemes and the economic and political crisis that broke out in 1997. More visible rates of return migration emerged after the early 2000s as Albania entered a period of improving economic and political stability, and the main destination countries (Greece and Italy) began to face financial crises (Kopliku, 2016). Indeed, returnees have been mostly men who emigrated to Greece (Galanxhi et al., 2014). Women appear to have been ‘reluctant returnees’ (Morokvašić, 2015, 368). Gemi (2015, 40) observes that women preferred to stay in Greece despite the problematic conditions they might face under a regime of irregularity. The reasons they give for ‘this resistance are linked first to the fact that they continue to work even on different terms and second, the issue of their children’s adaptation to the reality of Albania’ (Gemi, 2015, 40). Amidst the economic crisis in Greece when many men lost their jobs, migrant women continued to work and adapt to the changing labour market, becoming the sole income providers for their families (Vaiou, 2002).

The main reasons that emigrants decided to return to Albania included the fact that they lost their job in the country of immigration and problems faced by the family they had left behind in Albania (Galanxhi et al., 2014). Other grounds for return included better employment opportunities, investment plans and melancholy and longing for family and country, as identified by Mai and Paladini (2013) and Kopliku (2016). Returning to Albania served as a strategy to handle not only the negative consequences of an economic crisis in the destination country and unemployment, but also de-regularisation of work and residency permits (as observed in some of the cases analysed in this book) (Gemi, 2015).

Figures from the 2011 Census show that approximately 40 per cent of return migrants decided to establish themselves in a location other than their city or village of origin, with Tirana as the most preferred city by returnees (Galanxhi et al., 2014). These data reveal patterns linking return and internal migration. Additionally, after their return to Albania, migrants often decided to engage in circular migration between Italy and Albania to compensate for the difficulties and problems experienced in both countries (Mai & Paladini, 2013). Moreover, after the family’s return to Albania, the husband or father often engaged in circular migration to Greece or attempted to migrate to another country (Gemi, 2015). In her research about return migration to the city of Shkodra, Kopliku (2016, 112) highlights that it is often difficult to distinguish the permanent returnee from the transnational migrant as migrants may organise their lives in both the home and the host countries. Furthermore, return migrants to Albania may experience difficulties when readjusting, due to a dissimilar work climate and culture in their home country and so consider another migration project (Kopliku, 2016). These patterns reinforce the main thread of this research conceptualising migration as a process with intertwined trajectories (Morokvasic, 1984, 2003; Tarrius, 1993; Kofman 2004; Dahinden, 2009, 2014). The return might not be a permanent move but lead to other migration trajectories (Black & King, 2004).

3.2.2 Tirana: A ‘Magnet’ for Internal and Return Migration

Women in this research come from cities and villages throughout Albania but lived in Tirana at the time of interviews. Tirana is the leading site of this research, so it is necessary to describe the city to better understand the dynamics of migration happening within. Tirana was proclaimed the capital of Albania in 1920 and has since seen a rapid increase in its population (Gëdeshi, 2008) and its importance relative to other cities. Tirana remains the most attractive city in Albania for economic opportunities, education, health care access and cultural activities. During the communist period, Tirana, more than any other city, was the target of internal movement and the most desirable destination for a considerable number of Albanians, especially young people. As a major industrial, politico-administrative, educational and cultural centre, its periphery attracted what Sjöberg (1992) calls diverted migration, the internal movement that was not rural toward urban but intra-rural. Although Tirana was the preferred destination of this intra-rural movement, settling there was quite challenging due to the restrictions of pashaportizimi and controlled urbanisation. Thus, people opted for the ‘second-best alternative’: the rural cooperatives or state agricultural enterprises next to Tirana (Vullnetari, 2014). This unplanned in-migration brought about the growth of the peri-urban settlements of Tirana (Sjöberg, 1992, 14).

After the fall of communism and the end of the restrictions on internal migration, Tirana saw significant population growth. Free movement policies (lëvizja e lirë) permitted residents of villages and cities to move to Tirana freely. ‘Large-scale internal movements, land grabbing in urban and peri-urban areas followed by squatter settlements’ characterised this early period of internal migration to Tirana (Vullnetari, 2014, 51). Only in the 2010s did the Albanian government start procedures to legalise the illegal settlements built in the urban and peri-urban areas mostly by internal migrants.

During 1990–2000, most internal migrants came from the northern and mountainous regions (Galanxhi et al., 2004). During the second decade, migration from other important cities, such as Berat, Fier and Vlora, increased (Galanxhi et al., 2014, 16). Women in this research go through such pattern too. Those from the northern areas migrated to Tirana earlier than those from other southern cities. Considering only the municipality of Tirana, the area saw a population growth of more than 40 per cent from 1989 to 2001 and 20 per cent from 2001 to 2011 (Vullnetari, 2014, 55). Another indicator of the growth of Tirana since 1990 is recorded by Pojani (2010): the urbanised area of Tirana grew from 12 square km in 1990 to 32 square km in 1994 and 56 square km in 2002.

Looking beyond the figures, since 1990, Tirana has been absorbing people from remote, mountainous areas stuck in deep poverty and appalling living conditions (Galanxhi et al., 2004; Çaro, 2011; Xhindi, 2013). Most of the internal migrants from these regions have settled in the peri-urban areas. But others have done so within the municipality of Tirana. Furthermore, most have sought employment and public services within urban Tirana. At the same time, the new ‘rich’ from other cities have come to Tirana for better business opportunities, education, health services and access to social life (Xhindi, 2013, 86). These trends have made Tirana the city with the most considerable inequalities in living conditions in Albania (INSTAT and World Bank, 2015a, 2015b).

Infrastructure and public services have lagged behind population growth, leaving many gaps in infrastructure, public health and education services and environmental protection (Xhindi, 2013) and transportation (Pojani, 2010). Water and electricity remain scarce and expensive resources in Tirana (Pojani, 2010, 494). As a result of urban growth, increases in small businesses, growing individual wealth, and greater use of electric heaters and air conditioners, electricity demand has risen exponentially. Especially during the winter months, the entire city of Tirana experiences daily power interruptions. Water shortages persist during the summer months. Water and electricity supply interconnect as the post-1991 multi-floor buildings use electric appliances to pump water to the upper floors. Some interviewees highlight these issues, stressing that women, who are responsible for housework, suffer the most from these difficulties.

The continuing internal population movement and the economic crisis in sectors such as construction likely have driven the recent increase in the poverty rate in Tirana. In contrast, poverty in the mountainous area of Albania fell by half between 2008 and 2012, possible due to population shifts from the mountainous regions to other regions. Tirana witnessed a considerable increase in poverty, from 9 per cent in 2008 to 12 per cent in 2012 (INSTAT and World Bank, 2015a, b).

Tirana hosts most public and private education providers, almost all the international organisations and the majority of the NGOs in the country, as well as the majority of Albanian and foreign businesses. The capital city has the highest concentration of economic activity and generates 45 per cent of the Albanian GDP. It also issues more than 70 per cent of all credit to business in the country (Xhindi, 2013).

According to the 2011 Census data, at the time the municipality of Tirana had a population of 418,495 (203,239 men and 215,526 women). Analysing the conditions of women in Tirana remains difficult as such data are lacking. Some existing data disaggregated at the level of the municipality are old and not very relevant. Disaggregated data is also lacking at the mini-municipality level within the city of Tirana. Until June 2015, the city of Tirana was structured into 11 mini-municipalities. The neighbourhoods of Komuna e Parisit (in mini-municipality 5) and Don Bosko (in mini-municipalities 11 and 9) are the two sites of my research where the women interviewed for this book live (see Fig. 3.1Footnote 12).

Fig. 3.1
figure 1

Map of Tirana mini-municipalities and the neighbourhoods of Don Bosko and Komuna e Parisit. (Source: Original map from the Municipality of Tirana (www.tirana.al))

Full size image

Don Bosko has been a destination for internal migration, mostly from the northern parts of the country, since the early 1990s. Whereas, Komuna e Parisit was developed later, primarily by internal migrants coming from southern cities. Unfortunately, few statistics have been disaggregated at the level of the mini-municipality, let alone by gender. The only data disaggregated at this level are on poverty, drawn from the ALSMS 2002, which gives a picture of the poverty distribution within the municipality of Tirana. The poverty rate is the highest, at 20–31 per cent, in mini-municipalities 4, 6 and 11, which also have the most massive inflow of migrants (Zezza et al., 2005). In mini-municipalities 6 and 11, which include part of Don Bosko, nearly half the population consists of new residents who arrived between the 1989 and 2001 censuses (Zezza et al., 2005). However, the situation could be different in 2011 as internal migration continued during the second decade post-communism (2001–2011), drawing people from the south who concentrated in mini-municipality 5. Unfortunately, I could not find such data, and thus my description of my two research sites is limited to the information provided by the participants and to my own observations.

Don Bosko has been populated by internal migration since early 1990. Its newly settled population came mostly from northern regions, according to the key informants and to the 2001 Census data. Initially, few multi-floor buildings existed in the area, and one- or two-floor houses predominated the landscape. Over the years, there was a construction boom characterized by high buildings of all types, leading to an unorganised mixture of low houses and tall buildings that reveals the absence of any deliberate urban planning. The streets still lack in quality, and sidewalks are often inexistent.

In Don Bosko, poor-quality and luxury buildings stand next to each other. During my visits and meetings with the participants, I noticed several low-quality buildings. In some facilities, the construction work had remained unfinished, leaving residents to pay for the rest. Still, the price of these apartments was relatively low compared to apartments in other areas or buildings, and many migrants could not afford more.

While walking around Don Bosko, the heavy car traffic, the lack of sidewalks and the cumbersome large number of shops and coffee bars that line the streets inspire a feeling of chaos. I saw very few playgrounds or green parks (none except at the Don Bosko social centre, which gives the neighbourhood its name). Children played mostly on the sidewalks or courtyards in homes (when they existed). The area has been growing in density, in people, buildings and vehicles. My observations and discussions with people in the neighbourhoods revealed that migrants’ origins have changed over the years, shifting from the northern villages to the southern towns of Vlora, Fier, Tepelenë and Gjirokastër.

The situation is somewhat different, and yet in some aspects similar, in the neighbourhood of Komuna e Parisit. Before 1989, Komuna e Parisit was an empty meadow housing only some greenhouses and large swaths of empty fields offering the perfect spot for school-organised excursions and picnics. Today, it is one of the most populated areas in the municipality of Tirana, with buildings piling on top of each other. Komuna e Parisit was developed during the late 1990s, and in particular during 2000s, with population coming mostly from the southern areas. A significant number of women could also be observed in the streets, as was the case in Don Bosko. Women shopped in grocery shops, walked with their children and sat in the coffee bars. Another observation common to both Komuna e Parisit and also Don Bosko, was the significant number of women employed as sellers or workers that managed the majority of shops and services (e.g., dry cleaning and pharmacies).

In both neighbourhoods, I also observed narrow and often-absent streets and sidewalks. In the chaotic urban development and absence of urban planning of Komuna e Parisit, spaces between buildings are small, and green areas and playgrounds are lacking. The only advantage that Komuna e Parisit has over Don Bosko is that Komuna e Parisit is located next to the National Park and Lake of Tirana, which could compensate somewhat for the lack of green spaces and playgrounds. Another marked difference is that Komuna e Parisit is more preferred by students renting shared apartments. Komuna e Parisit is near Bllok, a central area of Tirana highly frequented by young people, and is considered to be safer than other neighbourhoods. Even though apartments in different areas of Tirana might be cheaper, many young people (students and graduates) favour Komuna e Parisit due to its relative safety.

3.3 The Situation of Women in Albania

In this section, I present some main patterns in the conditions of women in Albania during communism and after 1991. It draws mostly from statistical data and provides an overall review that sets the background of the analysis of the experiences of 32 migrant women interviewed for this research. This section starts with a brief overview covering the twentieth century until the year 1991.

3.3.1 Women’s Situation Before 1944

It is hard to find detailed, accurate data and information on the situation of women in pre-1944 Albania. I could glean information from popular narratives, such as songs, stories and the literature from that period describing and denouncing the subordinated position of women. Very few women and girls were educated, and female illiteracy was higher than 90 per cent. Illiteracy was more widespread in rural areas and the undeveloped north-east (Gjonca et al., 2008). As in many other countries, women’s right to participate in political and social activities was restricted (Musaj & Nicholson, 2011). The health system was fragile, and the infant mortality rate was 148 deaths per 1000 live births (Gjonca et al., 2008, 263). Besides, women’s participation in paid employment was low: in 1937, Albania had 345 female teachers, several female gynaecologist doctors and also a few women working in new factories in Korçë, Shkodër, Tirana and other cities (Në Dobi të Gruas Shqiptare 2012). Marriage was almost universal among women, with their average age at marriage younger than 20 years. By 15 years old, 29 per cent of all girls were married, while more than half were married by age 18, and more than four-fifths at 20 years of age (Gruber, 2002). Gruber and Pichler (2002) report that the average age at marriage was 18 years old for women and 28 for men. The wide age gap between spouses is an indicator of their unequal positions within the family, making male domination within the household very real.

During the early 1930s, local newspapers published some articles about feminist ideas and movements in other countries and criticised the position of women in Albania. Furthermore, several organisations promoting women’s rights (e.g., education, paid employment outside the home and participation in public and political life) were founded, mostly mainly in urban areas such as Shkodër, Korcë, Vlorë, Tirana and Gjirokastër. In 1928, the Civil Code approved several changes to women’s status, at least from a legal perspective. The newly approved civil code marked an official departure from the traditional, customary laws prevalent throughout the county. Instead, it recognised women’s ‘right to divorce, and equality with the husband regarding the right to inheritance’ (Musaj & Nicholson, 2011, 193). Another achievement was the establishment of the minimum age for marriage at 16 years old for girls and at 18 years old for men. This civil code did not include the right to vote as was requested by women’s organisations and supported by liberal members of parliament, and women’s right to employment remained limited (Musaj & Nicholson, 2011, 193).

3.3.2 ‘Women’s Emancipation Model’—The Communist Period

One of the most substantial policies adopted by the communist regime was the ‘emancipation of the woman’, to use the government’s terminology. This model, applied across communist countries (called the ‘women’s emancipation model’ by Moghadam 1995, 335), included policies supporting women’s participation in the productive labour force and the introduction of new laws promoting the equality of men and women. In Albania, the new Constitution of March 14, 1946, declared equal rights between women and men. According to the new law on marriage adopted in 1948, marriage was to be based on the equal rights of both spouses (Keefe et al., 1971, 34). Another major change in this new law concerned the age of marriage which was raised to 18 years for both sexes. The concept of the head of the family, recognised by pre-communist civil law, was scraped. Under the 1948 law, each spouse had the right to choose their occupation, profession and residence and to ask for a divorce (Keefe et al., 1971).Footnote 13

In a 1955 speech at the Fourth Congress of the Women’s Union of Albania, Hoxha proclaimed women as ‘the proletarian of man’ who previously had ‘only one right: to bear children and to slave day and night’ (Woodcock, 2016). In 1956, in a report on the work of the Albanian Party of Labour, Hoxha criticised the attitudes of Albanian men who continued to consider themselves as heads of the household and who took the credit for all the work done while keeping women’s work in the shadows. Regarding women’s multiple burdens, Hoxha declared that ‘efforts must still be made to extend the range of main products and lower costs. Social catering units, and especially the canteens and restaurants are not up to the task of becoming centres for feeding the family so that they can help to lighten women’s household chores so that they can participate in production to a wider extent’ (Hoxha, 1974, 536). Such social services aimed at lightening the burden of women’s reproductive work emerged throughout the former socialist countries (Gal & Kligman, 2000). These social services and structures were first introduced in 1919 in the Soviet Union, to support women’s entry in the productive sphere (Sperling, 1996). Hoxha, the leader of the Albania Party of Labour, launched the campaign for the emancipation of women in 1967 with a series of speeches recited again in 1969 (Danermark et al., 1989; Keefe et al., 1971). The new regime made literacy one of its primary objectives, with a particular focus on women and girls. ‘Female illiteracy improved from 92 per cent in 1945 to less than 8 per cent in 1989, and by 2002 it was less than 5 per cent…’ (Gjonca et al., 2008, 284).

Besides, women’s employment was another central policy target of the communist government’s ‘women’s emancipation model’ (Moghadam 1995). The full productive engagement of women and girls served several aims: first of all, it was seen as essential to women’s emancipation, but also provided a considerable bust to the labour force needed for the reconstruction spearheaded by all socialist countries (Kligman, 1994; Rosenberg, 1991). Most communist countries defined women primarily as workers, a significant change from the pre-war imaginary (Gal & Kligman, 2000). This shift was part of the broader communist commitment to homogenise and equalise the populace so as to eliminate all social distinctions, including gender, and to construct the ‘new socialist person’ (Gal & Kligman, 2000; Jinga, 2011). The full employment of women and girls was also necessary to bring them into the public sphere, weaken the influence of the old traditions and practices and make it easier to educate them with the new principles of the ‘new socialist society’.

Unlike other countries, such as former Yugoslavia, Albania does not have a tradition of feminist movements or feminist organisation, not even during communism. All the activities regarding women resulted from the initiative of the party and the Albanian Women’s Union (Fico, 2014). The Albanian Women’s Union, founded in 1943, took charge of increasing women’s involvement outside the home, especially in public and political life (Jacobs, 1945; Keefe et al., 1971). The parliament of 1974–78 had the highest percentage of women members of parliament in Albania’s history, at 35.2 per cent (Keefe et al., 1971).

Albanian women occupied high positions in the communist bureaucracy and served as highly qualified workers in the economy. However, an equal division of roles and responsibilities within the household did not follow. In the case of Romania, for example, studies on women’s situation in the early 1970s showed that the unequal division of household labour posed the primary obstacle to women’s equal participation in the public sphere (Jinga 2011, 120). Traditional gender roles, that placed women in charge of reproductive work and men productive work, prevailed in the domestic sphere. Sometimes, women’s participation in public life (e.g., political and community meetings) demanded many sacrifices, especially in their relationships with their husbands (Çuli, 2012; Keefe et al., 1971). Men did not experience the same pitfalls; they were inherently exempted from unpaid and care work and, in many cases, retained their dominant role within the family. Women had to be as active as men in the public sphere, but responsibility for housework still fell on them. Women’s engagement in the productive sphere did not result in the equal participation of men in the reproductive sphere. Policies and propaganda during the communist regime did not include insights about individual liberation or individual rights. They considered women in relation to the man or the state: a mother, a wife, a distinguished worker, etc. Women had to transform their way of life from within, upturn family relations, and re-model patriarchal traits to mirror an ideal socialist family.

Women were praised not only as workers but also as mothers. The cinema, one of the most potent propaganda channels, glorified the image of the woman who worked outside the home and was also a dedicated mother and wife (Puto, 2013). For example, from the 1960s, the Romanian and Bulgarian governments put increasing emphasis on the ‘foremost and natural’ role of women to give birth to children, due to concerns over declining birth-rates (Brunnbauer, 2000). In the case of Romania, pro-natalist policies became very repressive and abortion was penalised in 1966 (Kligman, 1998; Jinga, 2011). Women thus were burdened with the duty of enlarging the socialist nation and played essential roles in the construction and reproduction of nationalist ideologies (Anthias, Yuval-Davis & Cain, 1993). By dressing and behaving correctly and giving birth to children within legitimate marriages, women both signified and reproduced the symbolic and legal boundaries of the collectivity (Këlliçi & Danaj, 2016).

In Albania, contraception and abortion remained illegal throughout the communist period. Condoms were difficult to procure, no contraceptive pills were imported, education or literature on the reproductive cycle was not provided, and traditional methods of contraception, such as withdrawal (the “pull out method”), were practised (Woodcock, 2016). Kligman (1998) and Jinga (2011) document a similar situation in Romania, where pressures over physical intimacy arose after Ceausescu came to power. The status of abortion and reproductive rights was not uniform across the former socialist countries. For example, in Poland, abortion was legalised during communism and delegalised afterwards, while Russia legalised abortion in 1920, penalised it from 1936 to 1955 and then legalised it again after Stalin’s death (Wites, 2004).

Ironically, one of the most notable features of the pre-communist era, the traditional role of womenFootnote 14 which required that women give birth to children for the sake of the nation, was transferred to the state. In its first decades, the communist regime promoted high fertility and proclaimed mothers of six or more children to be heroic mothers (nëna heroina). Interestingly, the fertility rate decline in Albania did not start with the post-1991 transformations that swept the country after the fall of communism, but in 1960, steadily falling from the very high post-war levels. The total fertility rate, which was still close to 7 births per woman in the early 1960s, decreased to 3.0 in 1990 (Danaj et al., 2005; Lerch 2013). This decline happened in the absence of any family planning, unlike in the case of China that has imposed strict family planning policies since the 1970s. The distinctive feature of fertility reduction in Albania, compared to other European countries, was that it decreased for women across all ages and in both rural and urban areas, with only slight differences. Gjonça, Aasve and Mencarini (2008) attribute this pattern to the increased education of women and girls in rural areas, which was another priority of the communist government, along with higher participation in productive work. Women’s double burden provided another reason for unwillingness to have many children, independent of the pro-natalist policies and political discourses of the 1950s and 1960s. The decline of the number of children shows resistance to state policies regarding reproductive rights and as a tactic for coping with the increasing economic difficulties, especially starting in the late 60s. These economic conditions may also explain why the state allowed this decline in the fertility rate to continue without additional interference.

Any analysis of the conditions of Albanian women during communism is complex, and clear-cut, yes/no responses to questions about the liberation (or not) of women under socialism are inadequate.

3.3.3 Post-1991 Period—A Brief Presentation of Women’s Situation

The transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe to date have been subsumed under the frame of a supposed consensus around the neo-liberal market model (Einhorn, 2005). Post-socialist neoliberal programs adopted across the region since 1989 have often resulted in gendered job loss with higher rates of female unemployment and the dismantling of public services of particular help to women (Gal & Kligman, 2000). The transition also bolstered a remobilisation of traditional gender roles (Lelea and Voiculescu, 2017), redefined women’s roles in society, and the home was again supposed to be a woman’s proper place (Kligman, 1994; 256). The gendered division of labour also sharpened, assigning men to the productive sphere and women to the reproductive one. Brunnbauer (2000) talks about the ‘domestication’ of women, referring not only to the visible withdrawal of women from the public sphere but also to the early 1990s policies and discourses that discouraged women’s participation in productive work and public life. In Albania, too, women withdrew from the labour market and disappeared from politics and the political action and debate (Fico, 2014). ‘Male democracies’ (a term applied by Sonja Licht, cited in Einhorn, 1993, 148) were created throughout the region, including Albania, and men became the primary beneficiaries of the momentous promises of 1989. Many women, drained by the double burden and influenced by the new ideologies of nationalism and capitalism, at least in the initial period, welcomed the discourse of a return to the domestic sphere and the opportunity to care for their families (Einhorn & Sever, 2003).Footnote 15

In this context, in the early 1990s, the ‘political action and debate about Albania’s past, present and future was completely void of gender analysis’ (Fico, 2014, 167). The public debate and the media depicted women either as victims (of political oppression in the past and poverty and sexual exploitation in the present) or as sex objects. Women in Albania and other countries expressed mixed feelings about their place in the productive and reproductive sphere as dictated by the double burden, the restrictions put on the freedom they had experienced during communism and the new economic programmes (for more, see Penn & Massino, 2009).

During 1991–1993, the first women’s non-governmental organisations (NGO) in post-socialist Albania were founded. These organisations that dealt with women’s issues expanded in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In post-socialist countries, a ‘gendering’ of the NGO sector seemed to occur, with women more involved in organisations with socio-economic and educational agendas, and men in groups involved in ‘high politics’ (Kligman, 1996, 72). Nevertheless, this ‘gendering’ should not undermine the role of NGOs in making visible and raising issues primarily related to the conditions of women and children (e.g., domestic violence, rape, trafficking, informal work and child abuse).

Since 1991, Albania’s legal framework has undergone significant improvements through the ratification of a series of international documents, essential amendments and the alignment of national legislation to global conventions, among others. Albania ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1993 and its optional protocol in 2003. However, the harmonisation of laws and the implementation of CEDAW in practice took a very long time. Indeed, many necessary changes and improvements still remain to be implemented—especially for the de-facto application of women’s rights. While the development of the legal framework has been underway since 1995, the most significant events concerning gender equality, domestic violence, and anti-discrimination date back to 2006 (Kocaqi et al., 2015, 16).Footnote 16

The political participation of women in Albania remained flat until the introduction of gender quotas in the Gender Equality Law and Electoral Code of 2008. These new legal provisions prompted a numerical increase of women serving in parliament, on municipal councils and as mayors. The percentage of women among members of parliament rose to 21 per cent in 2013 and the rate of women among mayors to 14 per cent after the 2015 local elections.Footnote 17

Despite an increase in women’s participation in the labour market immediately after the fall of communism, its rate remains low compared to men’s. In 2019, 40 per cent of women aged between 15–64 years old are out of the labour market, neither employed (54 per cent) nor unemployed (11,9 per cent) (Arqimandriti et al., 2020). In contrast, 23,1 per cent of men were out of the labour market, 68,5 per cent employed, and 12,7 per cent unemployed. Another significant feature of the labour market in Albania is its gender segregation dimension. Women and men belonging to the 15–64 years old age group work mostly in the agriculture sector. However, the gender gap is significant. In 2018, 42.3% of employed women worked in the agriculture sector compared to 33,5% of employed men.

On the other hand, only 0,5% of employed women work in construction compared to 12.1% of employed men. Being mostly employed in the agriculture sector does not help the economic empowerment of women. They are most engaged as family workers focusing on the family’s subsistence (Arqimandriti et al., 2020).

The occupational gender segregation in Albania, both horizontal and vertical is not that different from that of other countries. In gender-based occupational segregation, ‘men and women do different kinds of work so that one can speak of two separate labour forces, one male and one female, which are not in competition with each other for the same jobs’ (Hakim, 1979, 1). In Albania, the horizontal occupational segregation touches the categories of “public administration, community and social services” that are dominated by women, and “trade and business” dominated by men. It appears that the constructed gender role ascribing women to care and men to breadwinning extend to the labour market structure where women dominate in “care” and social employments (Arqimandriti et al., 2020). Regarding career advancement, women are hurt in vertical occupational segregation as ‘men dominate higher-grade higher-paid occupations and women concentrate in lower-grade, lower-paid occupations in the same area of activity’ (Hakim, 2006, 284).

In the domestic sphere, women almost exclusively perform unpaid care work. The same source shows that women with young children have less free time and dedicate the most time to unpaid work compared to men and women with older children or no children. Women with no partners and no children spend less time in unpaid work and have the most free time. Employed women have the longest working day (i.e. total work), the least free time and the least time for personal activities. According to the Time Use Survey (INSTAT, 2011), women spend two more hours a day on work of any kind (i.e. paid and unpaid work) than men, seven hours versus five hours, respectively. Men also are more advantaged in free time and personal care compared to women (INSTAT, 2011).

The data presented above reveal some of the main patterns of women’s engagement in paid and unpaid work at the national level. The situation is more complicated than shown here. Still, a post-communist withdrawal of women from the labour market to reproductive care work, resulting in the reconfiguration of the gender roles, can be observed, even among young women. Furthermore, even women with paid employment almost still have sole responsibility for reproductive work and care. The national-level data serve as a frame to better situate and understand the experiences of the women participants in this research.

About education, no significant differences in the numbers of boys and girls appear at the basic education level.Footnote 18 However, the enrolment rates are lower in rural areas and among the poor. Problems regarding minority groups’ access to education remain. Children with disabilities have a drop-out rate approximately ten times higher than the general drop-out rate, and the school participation rate of Roma girls is significantly lower than that of Roma boys (Wittberger et al., 2012). Visible gender differences, though, emerge at the secondary level, where boys are more numerous especially in rural areas, and the university level, where women outnumber men at an increasing rate (Wittberger et al., 2012).

One explanation for the widening gap among university students is that young men engage more in paid work and international migration (Ekonomi et al., 2006). Another reason is young women’s goal to move from their towns or villages of origin (as the cases in this research show). Expanding job opportunities in a labour market where opportunities continue to be scarce is another reason. The high number of female students may be one of the explanations for the fact that internal migration in Albania is female-dominated.

The persistent importance of education for both boys and girls may be one of the lasting legacies of the communist period. The 2011 Census data shows still high rates of education among boys and girls, even across regions and wealth brackets. Moreover, parents’ educational attainment seems to have no impact on children’s level of education, according to the 2001 Census data (Danaj et al., 2005). Gilyuk (2016) reports a different situation in the case of Russia, finding a correlation between parents’ education level and children’s linguistic education.

The family is a principal institution in the construction of gender relations and the study of migration, as seen even in cases where women migrate on their own. To complete this national-level contextual panorama, I briefly present some patterns of family formation and family structure in Albania. The marriage rate in Albania remains very stable, at 8.9 in 1990 and 8.1 in 2018, and marriage remains almost universal (Danaj et al., 2005; INSTAT, 2019a, b; Lerch, 2009) Among youth aged 15–29 years old, approximately 0.2 per cent cohabitate (Danaj & Festy, 2006).Footnote 19 Nevertheless, slight changes in the age at marriage may be noted, which has risen from 27.3 for men in 1990 to 31.5 in 2018 and from 23.0 for women in 1990 to 26.5 in 2018 (INSTAT, 2019a, b). There are rural-urban differences in the proportion of young married people. According to the 2001 Census data, the percentage of married women in the 16–29 age bracket is higher in rural areas. Also, those with university degrees have lower marriage rates than those with lower education levels. The influence of one’s educational level on the marriage rate is more significant at the age of 25–29 years after finishing tertiary studies. In this age group, people with university degrees have the lowest marriage rate (approximately 50 per cent).

The fertility rate in Albania decreased from 3.2 in 1989 to 2.1 in 2001 and 1.37 in 2018 (INSTAT, 2011, 2019a, b). There is also a noticeable decline in fertility rate among young people, as shown in Table 3.1, with an increasing number of childless women in urban and rural areas.

Table 3.1 Proportion of young childless women (percentage)
Full size table

Based on the 2001 Census data,Footnote 20 the proportion of childless women at age 25–29 years old is much higher among those with university degrees (more than 50 per cent). Here, again, as with marriage, the influence of education level is evident (Danaj et al., 2005). The decline in the fertility rate, significantly postponing the birth of the first child, marks a change in national family-formation patterns. Besides, less than 1 per cent of births occur outside marriage, indicating that cohabitation rates remain low, similar to the 0.2 per cent rate in 2003 (Danaj et al., 2005). Unfortunately, more recent data are not available.

The decline in the fertility rate is one of the main factors driving the decrease in the average household size from 4.7 members in 1989 to 3.9 in 2011 (INSTAT, 2002, 2012). The other factor may be the decline of the extended family due to migration, both internal and international. According to INSTAT (Bruijn et al., 2014, 19), the number of households ‘with more than one family nucleus’ decreased from 20 per cent to 10 per cent between 1989 and 2001. Internal movement and international migration triggered a process of nucleation of the family structure in Albania. Nevertheless, this process did not start with post-communist migration, but earlier. The first Albanian Census conducted by the Austro-Hungarian occupation forces in WWI (Kaser, 2014) provides a different picture of Albanian household size than the ethnographic studies of the early twentieth century: only 8 per cent of all family households had more than ten members, and the average was five or six members, while nuclear families constituted 39.7 per cent of rural households and 56.2 per cent of urban households (Kaser, 2014, 101–102). After the establishment of the communist government, the ‘nuclearisation’ of the family structure became part of the regime’s ‘modernisation measures’ (Kaser, 2014, 103). In 1989, the average family size was 4.7, and it has continued to decrease ever since.

It is important to reiterate that the dynamics and nuances within the national-level data presented here are various and complex. Some of these dynamics are explored and analysed in the following chapters that draw from women’s voices and experiences.