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QCB: Efficient Quantum-Secure Authenticated Encryption

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Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2021 (ASIACRYPT 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 13090))

Abstract

It was long thought that symmetric cryptography was only mildly affected by quantum attacks, and that doubling the key length was sufficient to restore security. However, recent works have shown that Simon’s quantum period finding algorithm breaks a large number of MAC and authenticated encryption algorithms when the adversary can query the MAC/encryption oracle with a quantum superposition of messages. In particular, the OCB authenticated encryption mode is broken in this setting, and no quantum-secure mode is known with the same efficiency (rate-one and parallelizable).

In this paper we generalize the previous attacks, show that a large class of OCB-like schemes is unsafe against superposition queries, and discuss the quantum security notions for authenticated encryption modes. We propose a new rate-one parallelizable mode named QCB inspired by TAE and OCB and prove its security against quantum superposition queries.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For example, indistinguishability under quantum encryption queries can be achieved by the Counter Mode from a classical PRP assumption [3].

  2. 2.

    Three versions of OCB have been proposed. We focus here on the last one, OCB3, while all three suffer from similar superposition attacks.

  3. 3.

    One attack on OCB presented in [21] was partial, as it assumed without any mention the use of Lemma 2.

  4. 4.

    Theorem 6.3 in [5] is about related-key attacks, but this implies a corresponding result for the key-tweak insertion TBC, see Theorem 7.1 of the same paper.

  5. 5.

    There is only one case in which the use of a counter may enable an adversary to choose his IVs adaptively: he may wait for the counter to increase in order to reach a wanted IV. But the IV increases only when a message is encrypted so waiting for an IV increase should be essentially considered as costly as performing a query, which implies that the IVs that will be used will be in \(\{IV_1,\dots ,IV_1 + (q-1)\}\) .

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Acknowledgements

We thank the reviewers from EUROCRYPT 2021, CRYPTO 2021 and ASIACRYPT 2021 for their helpful feedback and insights, which helped us improve the paper and correct technical errors. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 714294 - acronym QUASYModo). A. S. is supported by ERC-ADG-ALGSTRONGCRYPTO (project 740972).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Inria, Paris, France

    Ritam Bhaumik, André Chailloux, Gaëtan Leurent & María Naya-Plasencia

  2. Institute for Quantum Computing, Department of Combinatorics and Optimization, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada

    Xavier Bonnetain

  3. Université de Lorraine, CNRS, Inria, Nancy, France

    Xavier Bonnetain

  4. Cryptology Group, CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    André Schrottenloher

  5. ANSSI, Paris, France

    Yannick Seurin

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  1. Ritam Bhaumik
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Correspondence to Ritam Bhaumik , Xavier Bonnetain , André Chailloux , Gaëtan Leurent , María Naya-Plasencia , André Schrottenloher or Yannick Seurin .

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  1. NTT Corporation, Tokyo, Japan

    Mehdi Tibouchi

  2. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

    Huaxiong Wang

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Bhaumik, R. et al. (2021). QCB: Efficient Quantum-Secure Authenticated Encryption. In: Tibouchi, M., Wang, H. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2021. ASIACRYPT 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13090. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92062-3_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92062-3_23

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