Abstract
As already discussed, correlational inferences by indication (qiyās al-dalāla) and resemblance (qiyās al-shabah), sometimes broadly referred to as arguments by analogy (or better by the Latin denomination arguments a pari), are put into action when there is absence of knowledge of the occasioning factor grounding the application of a given ruling. These forms of qiyās relate the branch-case to the root-case by developing a parallel reasoning based on some kind of similarity. However, though both qiyās al-dalāla and qiyās al-shabah are based on establishing resemblance, the notion of resemblance deployed by qiyās al-dalāla is quite different from that one deployed by qiyās al-shabah. Thus, before developing a dialogical framework for these forms of correlational inferences, we should first examine the notion of resemblance employed by each of these forms.
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Notes
- 1.
al-Shīrāzī (1987, p. 37).
- 2.
- 3.
See al-Shīrāzī (2003, p. 112); and al-Baghdādī (1421H, p. 520).
- 4.
al-Shīrāzī (1988, p. 860)
- 5.
al-Shīrāzī (1988, pp. 809–810).
- 6.
In plain words, ruling ℌ* is dependent upon ruling ℌ which applies to cases of the type \( \mathcal{A} \). See the explanation of hypotheticals with multiple hypotheses in the appendix to the present book.
- 7.
Recall that, as mentioned in I.3.1.2, the expression “right∨(x)” stands for the operator that selects the right proof-object of a disjunction.
- 8.
This move can be seen as related to Averroes’ notion of ibdāl or substitution of the general by the particular (see Bou Akl, 2019, pp. 50–62). However, as discussed in our preface, al-Shīrāzī’s general conception of qiyās (not only of the kind al-dalāla) goes the other way around: while examining the form of the substituted instance, the general substitutional form comes to the fore.
- 9.
An alternative reconstruction would stress the fact that both the root- and the branch-case are identical in relation to the rulings, and then conclude by substitution. However, this option makes the distinction between qiyās al-dalāla and qiyās al-shabah less clear-cut.
- 10.
Recall that the injection right∨(b): \( \mathcal{C} \)(f)∨\( \mathcal{C}{}^{\circ} \)(f) yields b: \( \mathcal{C} \)(f).
- 11.
However, in other parts of Young’s book there is a discussion of this point but not in relation to that example, such as Young (2017, pp. 94–95 and p. 105).
- 12.
al-Shīrāzī (2003, p. 100).
- 13.
Cf. Young’s explanation (2017, pp. 117–118).
- 14.
- 15.
See al-Shīrāzī (1407 H/1986, p. 81).
- 16.
In fact, like the term khaṣīṣa in the first type, al-Shīrāzī does not employ the term naẓīr in the Mulakhkhaṣ, however, he does use it in the Ma‘ūna and in the al-Luma‘.
- 17.
This again involves the process of grasping the universal by examining the particular.
- 18.
See Fyzee (1964, p. 154).
- 19.
Dhimmī is a historical term referring to non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic state.
- 20.
See the explanation of hypotheticals with multiple hypotheses in the appendix to the present book.
- 21.
Notice that in the case of khaṣīṣa both steps have the same objective, namely establishing a formation rule that makes it apparent that one of the rulings is a specification of the other.
- 22.
See al-Shīrāzī (2003, p. 209). Cf. al-Shīrāzī (2016, fol. 5a).
- 23.
Cf. al-Shīrāzī (2003, p. 101).
- 24.
This is different to the main conceptions of analogy nowadays where the properties on both sides (the target case and the known case) might be similar rather than exactly the same – see e.g. Bartha (2010) – we come back to this issue at the end chapter of the present book.
- 25.
More precisely, within the framework of CTT real definitions establish what something is in relation to some canonical element of the set, and thus if two entities are definitionally equal a true proposition establishing the identity of both can be asserted. However, the inverse is not assured – see Ranta (1994, p. 52).
- 26.
- 27.
In the following sections we present only a simplified and adapted form of the Dialogical Framework, called Immanent Reasoning – see Rahman et al. (2018). The main original papers are collected in Lorenzen and Lorenz (1978) – see too Lorenz (2010a, b), Felscher (1985), Krabbe (2006). For an account of recent developments see Rahman and Keiff (2005), Keiff (2009), Rahman and Tulenheimo (2009), Rückert (2011), Clerbout (2014a, b). The most recent work links dialogical logic and Constructive Type Theory, see Clerbout and Rahman (2015) and Rahman et al. (2017).
- 28.
Cf. Rahman and Rückert (2001, pp. 113–116).
- 29.
- 30.
This last clause is known as the Last Duty First condition, and is the clause which makes dialogical games suitable for Intuitionistic Logic, hence the name of this rule.
- 31.
This, rule, as extensively discussed in Sect. 2.2.1 is one of the most salient characteristics of dialogical logic. In previous literature on dialogical logic this rule has been called the copy-cat rule or Socratic rule and it introduces a kind of asymmetry in the distribution of roles. Clearly, if the ultimate grounds of a dialogical thesis are elementary statements and if this is implemented by the use of the copy-cat rule, then the development of a dialogue is in this sense necessarily asymmetric. Indeed, if both contenders were restricted by the copy-cat rule no elementary statement can ever be uttered. Thus, we implement the copy-cat rule by designating one player, called the Proponent, whose utterances of elementary statements are restricted by this rule. It is the win of the Proponent that provides the dialogical notion of validity.
- 32.
- 33.
- 34.
See al-Shīrāzī (1987, pp. 116–117)
- 35.
Al-Bājī (2001, p. 202) provides two different opinions of legal theorist (uṣūliyyūn) concerning farq. Some legal theorist, such as Abū al-Ḥasan b. al-Quṣṣār, say that farq does not require a counterexample (i.e. a new root-case competing the root-case proposed by the Proponent)– that is to say, it is enough for the Opponent to distinguish the root-case from the branch-case in relation to a specific property which is a specification of the proposed property (let us call Ꝓ*) in order to invalidate the Proponent’s analogy. While the others, including al-Bājī, argue that farq requires a counterexample that shares with the branch-case that specific property Ꝓ*. With that said, the Opponent proposes another analogy competing the Proponent’s analogy. In fact, so far as we understood, al-Bājī speaks of farq within the frame of mu‘āraḍa, whereas al-Quṣṣār, perhaps, describes farq in general. Therefore, we distinguish two forms of farq, namely farq and mu‘āraḍa-farq.
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Iqbal, M. (2022). Dialectical System of Qiyās al-dalāla and Qiyās al-shabah. In: Arsyad al-Banjari’s Insights on Parallel Reasoning and Dialectic in Law. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91676-3_3
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