Abstract
As pointed out in the introduction, our study on Arsyad al-Banjari’s qiyās is based on the systems of qiyās and its interface with jadal theory as developed by al-Shīrāzī in his work. For that purpose, we employ an analysis that is based on a dialectical framework. However, we are not claiming that the framework we propose in the present study is either a literal description or a complete formalization of the jadal disputation form in which the qiyās is carried out.
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Notes
- 1.
The notion of dialectical meaning-explanation is the dialogical counterpart of Martin-Löf’s (inferential) meaning-explanation. The dialectical meaning-explanation of an expression amounts to setting rules that establish how to challenge and defend that expression. These rules also indicate how to produce a local reason for a claim and how to analyse such a reason – see Sect. 2.3. in the present chapter.
- 2.
It is also worth mentioning that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic study yet comparing the theory of juridical argumentation as developed within the Islamic tradition with the dialectical form of medieval disputations known as Obligationes. Such a study, that will fill up some flagrant gaps in the history of the development of rational argumentation, is certainly due.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
From now on we write “set” (boldface) instead of “set” in order to indicate that we deploy intensional sets as developed within CTT.
- 6.
Ranta (1994, pp. 55–7).
- 7.
More details on CTT can be found in the short introductory survey by Ansten Klev in Rahman et al. (2018, chapter II).
- 8.
For example, intuitively, if A is the set of natural numbers and B is the set of whole numbers, then the function takes one natural number and yields an element of the set of whole numbers B, e.g. b(x) = 2x.
- 9.
- 10.
Alexander of Aphrodisias called such a form of construction prosleptic proposition – see L. Gili (2015).
- 11.
Bartha (2010, p. 109).
- 12.
See e.g. Bartha (2010, pp. 36–40).
- 13.
We borrowed the example from Hallaq (1985, pp. 88–9).
- 14.
- 15.
The proof-object of a universal such as (∀x: A) B true is λx. b: (∀x: A) B. Since in our case the function b(x): B ( x: A) is actually taʾthīrꝒ(x): [ (∀y: ꝒƊ) wujūd∨(y) = {ꝒƊ∨¬ꝒƊ} x ⊃ ℌ(y) ]∧[ (∀z: ¬ꝒƊ) salb∨(z) = {ꝒƊ∨¬ꝒƊ} x ⊃ ¬ℌ(z) ] (x: ꝒƊ∨¬ꝒƊ ), the proof-object of the universal is λx. taʾthīrꝒ. Note that λx. taʾthīrꝒ(x) and taʾthīrꝒ(x) are entities of different types: while the latter is a function (i.e. a dependent object); we may conceive λx. taʾthīrꝒ(x) as an (independent) individual that codes this function (see Rahman et al., 2019, Chapter IV; Rahman et al., 2018).
- 16.
Within the language of CTT taʾthīrꝒ stands for the function taʾthīrꝒ(x): { [ (∀y: ꝒƊ) wujūd∨(y) = {ꝒƊ∨¬ꝒƊ} x ⊃ ℌ(y) ] ∧ [ (∀z: ¬ꝒƊ) salb∨(z) = {ꝒƊ∨¬ꝒƊ} x ⊃ ¬ℌ(z) ] } ( x: ꝒƊ∨¬ꝒƊ).
- 17.
While in the framework of CTT encoding of a process is a way to understand the role of a lambda operator on a function, in the dialogical framework the encoding is understood as a recapitulation or reprise of the moves constituting plays won by P (see strategic reason in Rahman et al. (2019, Chapter IV).
- 18.
Dually, if grape-juice in a state that does not induce intoxication is the element that makes the (right side of the) disjunction true, then this substance is exempted from the interdiction.
- 19.
More generally, if c: (∀x: Ꝓ)ℌ(x), b(x): ℌ(x) (x:Ꝓ) and a: Ꝓ; the application ap of c to a (i.e. ap(c,a), amounts to applying the lambda abstract of the function b(x) to a (recall that the proof-object of a universal involving the function b(x) is (or must be equal to) the lambda-abstract of that function) ; that is, ap(c,a) is equal to the value of b(a) – see Rahman et al. (2019, Chapter IV); Rahman et al. (2018).
- 20.
Sundholm (2013, p. 17).
- 21.
“The solution […], it seems to me now, comes naturally out of this dialogical analysis (not in bold in the original text). […] the premises here should not be assumed to be known in the qualified sense, that is, to be demonstrated, but we should simply assume that they have been asserted, which is to say that others have taken responsibility for them, and then the question for me is whether I can take responsibility for the conclusion. So, the assumption is merely that they have been asserted, not that they have been demonstrated. That seems to me to be the appropriate definition of epistemic assumption in Sundholm’s sense.” Transcription by Ansten Klev of Martin-Löf’s talk in May 2015.
- 22.
- 23.
P. Lorenzen and K. Lorenz (1978).
- 24.
- 25.
Young (2017, p. 15).
- 26.
K. Lorenz (2000, pp 87–106).
- 27.
J. Peregrin (2014, pp. 228–9).
- 28.
See al-Shīrāzī (1092). The first part of this material is missing from al-Ma‘ūna which is edited by al-‘Umayrīnī.
- 29.
Actually, Al-Shīrāzī (1092) provides another kind of muʿāraḍa where the Opponent brings up a new analogy for the branch-case that competes with the parallelism proposed by the Proponent. Al-Baṣrī (1964, Vol. 2, p. 770) calls this kind muʿāraḍat al-qiyās bi al-qiyās. Let us assume the Proponent asserts that the branch-case f is similar to the root-case a in relation to the property Ꝓ; given the fact that the ruling ℌ applies to a, he claims that it should also apply to f. The Opponent then brings forward a new root-case a* which is similar to the branch-case f with regard to some other property Ꝓ*, but the opposite ruling ( ¬ℌ) applies to this new source-case. So, according to the Opponent, it is ¬ℌ that applies to f. In short, the branch-case enjoys two different properties that entail two opposing rulings (ta‘āruḍ). According to Al-Baṣrī, in that case, the preponderance (tarjīḥ) of one analogy over the other in terms of similarity should be established. Al-Baṣrī (1964, Vol. 2, p. 770) sometimes calls this specific case qiyās ghalabat al-ashbāh (analogy based on the dominant resemblance). Clearly, this is the other term used by al-Shīrāzī to indicate qiyās al-shabah. Hence, this kind of mu‘āraḍa is only applicable to correlational inference by resemblance, not to qiyās al-‘illa..
- 30.
Young (2017, p. 151).
- 31.
Our formulation is based on a specific form of qalb, that is, al-Juwayni's reversal and oppositeness (al-qalb wa-al-ʿaks). When using this specific form of qalb, as already mentioned, the Opponent does not bring forward a new ʿilla, but merely destroys the Proponent’s ʿilla. So, we include it in class of destructive criticisms. We do not employ the complete qalb of al-Basri and al-Shirazi et al., discussed by Young, (2017, pp. 166–167), which undermines Proponent's aṣl as well. The complete qalb is included as subclass of the constructive criticism (muʿāraḍa) since by using this form of qalb the Opponent proposes a new ʿilla for the same root-case (i.e. the same as the Proponent’s root-case). The point is that if we restrict the use of qalb to only one root-case, then it all comes down to accepting or not that the ruling of the thesis applies to that root-case. This assumes that the Proponent either misinterprets the sources or misses some relevant evidence that can be found in those sources. Moreover, as already pointed out, we assume that the application of the ruling under consideration to a root-case is justified by an established text, that is, a source which is unambiguous and not subject to a disagreement. So, in order to integrate the complete form of al-qalb in our framework, some adaptation of the rules is required, but it is quite straightforward, since it is simpler. As we shall see below, we share with Young (2017, pp. 158–159) that qalb is different from fasād al-waḍʿ, however we draw the distinction in a way slightly different to the one of Young.
- 32.
See al-Shīrāzī (1987, p. 104).
- 33.
- 34.
- 35.
majhūl al-ṣifa (unknown of attribute) “presumes existence [of the object of contract] but involves lack of reasonable knowledge of the thing’s characteristics” (Hallaq, Sharīʿa, p. 244). Rahman & Young (2021) develop a thorough analysis of this example.
- 36.
al-Shīrāzī (1987, pp. 111–112). Young (2017, pp. 158–159) has a slightly different interpretation, since according to his view, the Opponent’s objection mentions neither the Proponent’s source-case nor his ʿilla. Here I follow the interpretation of Rahman et al. (2019, p. 58), where the counterexample of cat’s saliva is seen as an instance of Proponent’s branch-case saliva of beasts of prey. Thus, I take that the difference of fasād al-waḍʿ and qalb resides in the fact that whereas the latter does not require that the new root-case is an instance of the property that defines the branch-case, the former does.
- 37.
al-Shīrāzī (1987, pp. 100–101).
- 38.
Young (2017, p. 162).
- 39.
Hallaq (1985, pp. 88–89).
- 40.
In the following sections we present only a simplified and adapted form of the Dialogical Framework, called Immanent Reasoning – see Rahman et al. (2018). The main original papers are collected in Lorenzen & Lorenz (1978) – see too Lorenz (2010a, b), Felscher (1985), Krabbe (2006). For an account of recent developments see Rahman and Keiff (2005), Keiff (2009), Rahman and Tulenheimo (2009), Rückert (2011), Clerbout (2014a, b). The most recent work links dialogical logic and Constructive Type Theory, see Clerbout and Rahman (2015) and Rahman et al. (2017).
- 41.
Cf. Rahman & Rückert (2001, pp. 113–116).
- 42.
- 43.
This last clause is known as the Last Duty First condition, and is the clause which makes dialogical games suitable for Intuitionistic Logic, hence the name of this rule.
- 44.
This, rule, as extensively discussed in Sect. 2.2.1. is one of the most salient characteristics of dialogical logic. In previous literature on dialogical logic this rule has been called the copy-cat rule or Socratic rule and it introduces a kind of asymmetry in the distribution of roles. Clearly, if the ultimate grounds of a dialogical thesis are elementary statements and if this is implemented by the use of the copy-cat rule, then the development of a dialogue is in this sense necessarily asymmetric. Indeed, if both contenders were restricted by the copy-cat rule no elementary statement can ever be uttered. Thus, we implement the copy-cat rule by designating one player, called the Proponent, whose utterances of elementary statements are restricted by this rule. It is the win of the Proponent that provides the dialogical notion of validity.
- 45.
- 46.
In the context of jadal this move is called “ta‘līl” by the means of which the Proponent asserts that a given property determines the factor occasioning the relevant ruling. See Young (2017, pp. 24–25).
- 47.
See our comments on the doubts on the validity of this rule in Sect. 2.3.1.3.
- 48.
Cf. Aristotle, Pr. An. 69a1; Bartha (2010, pp. 36–40).
- 49.
Shīrāzī (1987, p. 112).
- 50.
Young (2017, p. 159).
- 51.
- 52.
- 53.
See Young (2017, pp. 166–7).
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Iqbal, M. (2022). Dialectical System of Qiyās al-ʿilla. In: Arsyad al-Banjari’s Insights on Parallel Reasoning and Dialectic in Law. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91676-3_2
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