Abstract
In the contexts of Islamic Law, qiyās is a model of parallel reasoning which is employed in order to make legal decisions concerning some issues when lacking scriptural sources. This form of reasoning is composed mainly of four parts: al-aṣl, al-farʿ, al-ʿilla and al-ḥukm. In order to facilitate the reading, let us first have a very brief introduction to these terms.
This chapter overtakes the analysis developed in Rahman et al. (2019b).
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Notes
- 1.
“Occasioning factor” is used as the translation of “ʿilla” by Bernard G. Weiss (1992, 1998). The same translation is employed by Young (2017). The term is also translated as effective cause, operative cause, ratio legis and ratio decidendi. Some of these translations do not seem to bear the causal significance of the term. The term ʿilla is derived from ancient Syriac, where it means a “fault” or “blame” constituting the cause for returning articles or property. The term penetrated from Syriac into the lexicon of rational thought even before Aristotelianism penetrated Arabic culture (we owe the remark on the etymology of the term ʿilla to Joseph E. David (2010, 2014)). In a general context, a distinction is drawn between providing a ground (ʿilla) and providing a factual cause or reason (sabab): while grounding is a rational endeavour, providing a sabab might be limited to an empirical task. It seems to be related to St. Thomas’ (Summa Theologiae 2.2c:) distinction between propter quid and quia that stems from Aristotle’s distinction in Posterior Analytics 13 (for a discussion in the context of CTT see J. Granström (2011, p. 157). In fact, we should also mention the notion ḥikma that stands for the underlying higher purpose of the ʿilla. Moreover, the notion of ḥikma underlies the doctrine of rational juridical preference or istiḥsān, and the theory of public welfare or maṣlaḥa mentioned before.
- 2.
For example, as will be shown shortly later, when legal theorists provide a broad definition of qiyās, they usually use the term ʿilla to say simply the property shared by the root-case and the branch-case.
- 3.
- 4.
The word “sanction” in this work is meant in the sense of penalty, and “sanctioned” as penalized.
- 5.
- 6.
A logical analysis for these five deontic modalities is provided by Rahman et al. (2019a) and Rahman et al. (2020) by using the following formulation:
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b(x): [ (∀y: A1) left∨(y)={H}x ⊃ R(y) ] ∧ [ (∀z: ¬A) right∨(z)={H}x ⊃ S1(z) ] (x: A ∨ ¬A)
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whereby {H} is a short-form for the hypothesis A ∨ ¬A.
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that can be glossed as follows:
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All those performances of an action of type A identical to the ones chosen (by agent g) to be performed (i.e., if the left side of the disjunction has been chosen to be performed), are to be rewarded; and all those cases omitting to perform an action of type A identical to the ones chosen (by agent g) to be omitted (i.e., if the right side of the disjunction ¬A has been chosen to be performed), are to be sanctioned.
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This formulation yields the following logical analysis:
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wājib (obligatory): If we do it, we are rewarded. If we do not do it, we are sanctioned.
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b1(x): [(∀y: A1) left∨(y)={H1}x ⊃ R1(y)] ∧ [(∀z: ¬A1) right∨(z)={H1}x ⊃ S1(z)] (x: A1 ∨ ¬A1).
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mandūb(recommended): If we do it, we are rewarded. If we do not do it, we are neither sanctioned nor rewarded.
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b2(x): [(∀y: A2) left∨(y)={H2}x ⊃ R2(y)] ∧ [(∀z: ¬A2) right∨(z)={H2} x ⊃ (¬S2(z) ∧ ¬R2(z))] (x: A2 ∨ ¬A2).
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mubāḥ (indifferent): If we do it, we are neither sanctioned nor rewarded. If we do not do it, we are neither sanctioned nor rewarded.
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b3(x): [(∀y: A3) left∨(y)={H3}x ⊃ (¬S3(y) ∧ ¬R3(y))] ∧ [(∀z: ¬A3) right∨(z)={H3}x ⊃ (¬S3(z) ∧ ¬R3(z))] (x: A3 ∨ ¬A3).
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makrūh (reprehensible): If we do not do it, we are rewarded. If we do it, we are neither sanctioned nor rewarded.
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b4(x): [(∀y: A4) left∨(y)={H4}x ⊃ (¬S4(y) ∧ ¬R4(y))] ∧ [(∀z: ¬A4) right∨(z)= {H4}x ⊃ R4(z)] (x: A4 ∨ ¬A4).
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ḥarām (forbidden): If we do it, we are sanctioned. If we do not do it, we are rewarded.
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b5(x): [(∀y: A5) left∨(y) ={H5}x ⊃ S5(y)] ∧ [(∀z: ¬A5) right∨(z)={H5}x ⊃ R5(z)] (x: A5 ∨ ¬A5).
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- 7.
For more details about legal rulings in Islamic law, including particularly the five deontic modalities, see al-Ghazālī (1324H/1906, pp. 55–99).
- 8.
Young has treated in depth al-Shīrāzī’s classification of qiyās in his Dialectical Forge (2017), but we are herewith offering both an exposition that has been enriched with al-Shīrāzī’s Ma‘ūna (edited by al-‘Umayrīnī ) and a logical analysis. This complements the work of Young.
- 9.
In the Mulakhkhaṣ edited by Niyāzī (al-Shīrāzī, 1407 H/1986) quoted by Young (2017), we find the shorter formulation “بعلة (with an ʿilla)” rather than “بعلة جامعة بينهما (with an ʿilla unifying the two of them)” as it is the case in the Ma‘ūna, (edited by al-‘Umayrīnī) – see al-Shīrāzī (2016, fol. 2a) and al-Shīrāzī (1987, p. 36).
- 10.
The term ʿilla here, as alluded to previously, refers simply to some property the root-case and the branch-case share. More precisely, the property which is not (yet) ascertained to be the occasioning factor. In this context, as will be see in the discussion of qiyās al-ʿilla, for occasioning factor, al-Shīrāzī indicates it by the words “العلة التي علق الحكم عليها في الشرع (the ʿilla upon which the ruling is juristically made dependent).” Similarly, in al-Waraqāt, al-Juwaynī (1955), when defining qiyās in general, uses the term ʿilla which refers not to the occasioning factor, but to the property shared by the aṣl and the farʿ. Furthermore, he distinguishes the ʿilla (i.e. which refers simply to the property shared by the aṣl and the farʿ) in qiyās al-ʿilla from that in qiyās al-dalāla. He asserts that in the first form of qiyās it is the cause for the ruling (موجبة للحكم), whereas in the second form, it is the indicator for the ruling (دالة للحكم). In the other work, al-Luma‘, al-Shīrāzī makes use of the term ma‘nā (معني), that literally means meaning or sense, rather than ʿilla. Like the term ʿilla, the term maʿnā employed here refers to some property joining the aṣl and the farʿ.
- 11.
In the Luma‘, al-Shīrāzī provides a similar definition though with a different redaction. More precisely, in this work he defines qiyās as “the correlating of a branch case to a root-case, in some of its legal rulings, with a maʿnā that joins the two of them, and the application of the root-case’s ruling to the branch-case.” See al-Shīrāzī (1995, p. 208; 2003, p. 100).
- 12.
- 13.
Beside the term ʿilla, al-Shīrāzī employs different terms in his other works. He uses the term maʿnā in the Maʿūna (al-Shīrāzī, 1987, p. 36); nukta (point) in the Luma‘ edited by Muḥyī al-Dīn Dīb Mustū and Yūsuf ʻAlī Badīwī (al-Shīrāzī, 1995, p. 204); and bayyina (evidence) in the other edition of the Luma‘ (al-Shīrāzī, 2003, p. 99). However, these terms are unified by the words following them, namely “that upon which the ruling is juristically made dependent” that makes all of these terms signifying the occasioning factor.
- 14.
If we examine al-Shīrāzī’s example it seems that al-sabab here signifies sabab al-nuzūl and sabab al-wurūd, that is, the historical cause of revelations for the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth respectively.
- 15.
- 16.
The same classification can be found in al-Juwaynī’s (1955) Waraqāt.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
See also the examples for this type of qiyās in al-Luma‘ (al-Shīrāzī, 2003, p. 101).
- 20.
It looks as if this type of qiyās is very close to Aristotle’s argument from likeness (homoiotes).
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Iqbal, M. (2022). A General View of Qiyās: A Dialectical Reading. In: Arsyad al-Banjari’s Insights on Parallel Reasoning and Dialectic in Law. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91676-3_1
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