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International Symposium on Formal Methods

FM 2021: Formal Methods pp 43–60Cite as

Verifying Secure Speculation in Isabelle/HOL

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 13047))

Abstract

Secure speculation is an information flow security hyperproperty that prevents transient execution attacks such as Spectre, Meltdown and Foreshadow. Generic compiler mitigations for secure speculation are known to be insufficient for eliminating vulnerabilities. Moreover, these mitigation techniques often overprescribe speculative fences, causing the performance of the programs to suffer. Recently Cheang et al. have developed an operational semantics of program execution capable of characterising speculative executions as well as a new class of information flow hyperproperties named TPOD that ensure secure speculation. This paper presents a framework for verifying TPOD using the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant by encoding the operational semantics of Cheang et al. We provide translation tools for automatically generating the required Isabelle/HOL theory templates from a C-like program syntax, which speeds up verification. Our framework is capable of proving the existence of vulnerabilities and correctness of secure speculation. We exemplify our framework by proving the existence of secure speculation bugs in 15 victim functions for the MSVC compiler as well as correctness of some proposed fixes.

Griffin is supported by funding from Amazon. Dongol is supported by EPSRC grants EP/V038915/1, EP/R032556/1, EP/R025134/2, VeTSS and ARC Discovery Grant DP190102142.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    BIL is an assembly intermediate language [1].

  2. 2.

    For this to be exploited we must have already “poisoned” the cache [18]. In this paper, assume cache poisoning to have occurred prior to execution of each program.

  3. 3.

    BIL is an assembly intermediate language [1]. In general, we must reason about secure speculation in assembly language since compilers may optimise branch statements in high-level languages.

  4. 4.

    Technically speaking, the value being accessed is the transformed value v * 512.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, UK

    Matt Griffin & Brijesh Dongol

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  1. Matt Griffin
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  2. Brijesh Dongol
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Correspondence to Brijesh Dongol .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Marieke Huisman

  2. NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, USA

    Corina Păsăreanu

  3. Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Naijun Zhan

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Griffin, M., Dongol, B. (2021). Verifying Secure Speculation in Isabelle/HOL. In: Huisman, M., Păsăreanu, C., Zhan, N. (eds) Formal Methods. FM 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13047. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90870-6_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90870-6_3

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