Abstract
The ten states of Southeast Asia, which together form the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), are in aggregate the world’s seventh largest economy and are moreover projected to become its fourth largest by 2050. At the same time, Southeast Asia has become the site of what some call the “strategic rivalry among great powers in Asia.”
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Notes
- 1.
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2015), The EU and ASEAN: A Partnership with a Strategic Purpose, JOIN(2015) 22 final, Brussels, 18 May, p. 2.
- 2.
The term Southeast Asia, here, refers to the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. ASEAN is furthermore used to designate both the organisation and its individual member states.
- 3.
See European Commission and High Representative (2015), Partnership with a Strategic Purpose, p. 2.
- 4.
Fenna Egberink and Frans-Paul van der Putten (2010), ASEAN and Strategic Rivalry Among the Great Powers in Asia, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29(3), pp. 131–141.
- 5.
States that are in a military cooperation with the United States include Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand.
- 6.
The EU at times uses the term “natural partners”, see, for example, EU Delegation (2013), EU-ASEAN: Natural Partners, Jakarta, January.
- 7.
See Maaike Okano-Heijmans (2014), Trade Diplomacy in EU-Asia Relations: Time for a Rethink, Clingendael Report, September, p. 19.
- 8.
See Laura Allison (2015), The EU, ASEAN and Interregionalism: Regional Support and Norm Diffusion between the EU and ASEAN, London: Palgrave Macmillan; Matthew Doidge (2011), The European Union and Interregionalism: Patterns of Engagement, Abingdon: Routledge, Ch. 3; Julie Gilson (2005), New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia, European Integration, 27(3), pp. 307–326; Anja Jetschke and Philomena Murray (2012), Diffusing Regional Integration: The EU and Southeast Asia, West European Politics, 35(1), pp. 174–191; Mosung Lee and Thomas Diez (2016), Introduction: The EU, East Asian Conflict and the Norm of Integration, Asia Europe Journal, 14(4), pp. 353–366; Naila Maier-Knapp (2020) Contemporary Inter-Regional Dialogue and Cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on Non-Traditional Security Challenges, Abingdon: Routledge; Philomena Murray and Nicholas Rees (2010), European and Asian Regionalism: Form and Function, International Politics, 47(3/4), pp. 269–275; Philomena Murray (2010), Comparing Regional Integration in the EU and East Asia: Moving beyond Integration Snobbery, International Politics, 47(3/4), pp. 308–323; Nicholas Rees (2010), EU and ASEAN: Issues of Regional Security, International Politics, 47(3/4), pp. 402–418.
- 9.
See Daniel Novotny and Clara Portela (2012), Prospects for EU and ASEAN Relations in the 21st Century: Growing Closer Together or Drifting Further Apart?, in: Daniel Novotny and Clara Portela (eds.), EU-ASEAN Relations in the 21st Century: Strategic Partnership in the Making, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 1.
- 10.
See Naila Maier-Knapp (2015), Southeast Asia and the European Union: Non-Traditional Security Crises and Cooperation, Routledge: Abingdon; Maier-Knapp (2020), Contemporary Inter-Regional Dialogue and Cooperation; Angela Pennisi di Floristella (2017), The EU-ASEAN Relationship: Cooperation on Non-Traditional Security Threats between Discourse and Practice, in: Ariadna Ripoll Servent and Florian Trauner (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Justice and Home Affairs Research, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 371–382; Reuben Wong and Scott Brown (2016), Stepping Up EU-ASEAN Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security, in: Olivia Gippner (ed.), Changing Waters: Towards a New EU Asia Strategy, LSE IDEAS, Special Report SR021, London, April, pp. 79–85; Michael Reiterer (2014), The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Security in Asia, European Foreign Affairs Review, 19(1), pp. 1–22.
- 11.
See Lay Hwee Yeo (2018), EU-ASEAN Security Cooperation, in: Spyros Economides and James Sperling (eds.), EU Security Strategies: Extending the EU System of Security Governance, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 67–81; Fraser Cameron (2010), The Geopolitics of Asia: What Role for the European Union?, International Politics, 47(3/4), pp. 276–292.
- 12.
See Christopher M. Dent (1999), The European Union and East Asia: An Economic Relationship, London: Routledge, Ch. 3; Alfredo C. Robles Jr. (2004), The Political Economy of Interregional Relations: ASEAN and the EU, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- 13.
See Meissner (2018), Commercial Realism, Ch. 4; Katharina L. Meissner (2016), A Case of Failed Interregionalism? Analyzing the EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement Negotiations, Asia Europe Journal, 14(3), pp. 319–336.
- 14.
See Paul J. J. Welfens, Cillian Ryan, Suthiphand Chirathivat and Franz Knipping (2009), eds., EU-ASEAN: Facing Economic Globalisation, Heidelberg: Springer.
- 15.
David Camroux (2008), The European Union and ASEAN: Two to Tango?, Notre Europe, Research & Studies 65, p. 31.
- 16.
Evi Fitriani (2014), The Impact of the EU Crisis on EU-ASEAN Relations, Geopolitics, History and International Relations, 6(1), p. 82.
- 17.
See Yeo Lay Hwee (2009), The EU as a Security Actor in Southeast Asia, in: Wilhelm Hofmeister (ed.), Security Politics in Asia and Europe, Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 10.
- 18.
See Eero Palmujoki (1997), EU-ASEAN Relations: Reconciling Two Different Agendas, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 19(3), p. 273. See also Evi Fitriani (2017), Europe and Southeast Asia: The Nature of Contemporary Relations, in: Fredrik Erixon and Krishnan Srinivasan (eds.), Europe in Emerging Asia: Opportunities and Obstacles in Political and Economic Encounters, London: Rowman and Littlefield International, p. 75.
- 19.
See Christopher M. Dent (2001), ASEM and the ‘Cinderella Complex’ of EU-East Asia Economic Relations, Pacific Affairs, 74(1), pp. 29–30.
- 20.
See European Commission (1994), Towards a New Asia Strategy, COM(94) 314 final, Brussels, 13 July, p. 17: “The Union stands to lose out on the economic miracle taking place there because of the strong competition: from Japan and the United States and also increasingly from companies within the region's newly industrialised and capital rich countries such as Korea or Taiwan. […] If European companies are unable to take a full share of the world's main centre of growth in the next decade this will affect their profits and competitiveness, not only in Asian markets, but also world-wide. If the Union loses out on the economic miracle taking place in Asia, this will have political costs and at the very least it will exacerbate the calls for more defensive policies from those who view Asia as a threat rather than as a valuable partner, which in turn will further reduce the benefits to be gained from Asia and so on, in a spiral of decline.”
- 21.
Ibid., p. 3.
- 22.
Ibid.
- 23.
Indeed, with reference to the projected economic rise of Asia, the strategy states: “In order to seize these new opportunities the Union should seek to make a positive contribution to regional security dialogues and to follow closely developments in particular in the area of arms control and non-proliferation, regional disputes (Korea, Spratly, Kashmir) and the security of sea lanes. Matters relating to good governance, including human rights, should also play an important role in the Union’s relations with Asian countries.” (p. 2).
- 24.
European Commission (1996), Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations, COM(96) 314 final, Brussels, 3 July, p. 4.
- 25.
Ibid., p. 10.
- 26.
See European Commission (1995), Free Trade Areas: An Appraisal, SEC(95) 322 final, Brussels, 8 March, p. 7: “Failure on our part to engage in this type of wider economic co-operation may well result in important economic regions developing a regulatory framework which will potentially hurt the Union’ interests. […] If the countries of East Asia were, as a result of regulatory co-operation within APEC, to align their regulatory systems practices to those of the United States, this would place the EU at a competitive disadvantage, at least to the extent that a large and dynamic part of the world economy developed as a result a system which diverged significantly from that of the Union.”
- 27.
Ibid., p. 8.
- 28.
See Meissner (2018), Commercial Realism, pp. 136–138.
- 29.
From my own experience as a trainee in DG Trade, I can attest that EU trade negotiators are very well informed about the concessions and specific provisions that the country they are negotiating with has granted and included in its trade agreements with others countries. Preparing for trade negotiations consequently involves careful examination of the trade agreements the prospective trade partner has already concluded with others.
- 30.
As highlighted in the Chapter 4, this competitiveness-focused understanding of international trade relations has been on the rise in EU trade policy since the Global Europe trade strategy of 2006.
- 31.
European Commission (1996), Creating a New Dynamic, p. 11.
- 32.
See European Commission (1994), Towards a New Asia Strategy, p. 9.
- 33.
European Commission (1996), Creating a New Dynamic, p. 10.
- 34.
Ibid., p. 11.
- 35.
Ibid. (emphasis added).
- 36.
Ibid., p. 15.
- 37.
See Sebastian Bersick (2009), Die Rolle der EU in der Sicherheitsarchitektur Ostasiens, SWP Arbeitspapier FG7, 2009/05, July, p. 21. See also Fitriani (2014), Impact of the EU Crisis, p. 78.
- 38.
See Dent (2001), ‘Cinderella Complex’, p. 32; Maria Garcia (2010), Fears and Strategies: The European Union, China and their Free Trade Agreements in East Asia, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 6(4), p. 499.
- 39.
See Alfred C. Robles Jr. (2008), An EU-ASEAN FTA: The EU’s Failures as an International Actor, European Foreign Affairs Review, 13, pp. 544–545.
- 40.
See Meunier (2007), Managing Globalization?, p. 912; Heron and Siles-Brügge (2012), Competitive Liberalization, p. 252.
- 41.
See European Commission (2003), A New Partnership with South East Asia, COM(2003) 399 final, Brussels, 9 July, p. 18.
- 42.
See Robles (2008), An EU-ASEAN FTA, p. 544.
- 43.
See Alasdair R. Young and John Peterson (2006), The EU and the New Trade Politics, Journal of European Public Policy, 13(6), p. 807.
- 44.
See Meissner (2018), Commercial Realism, pp. 136–138; Camroux (2008), Two to Tango?, p. 28; Ludo Cuyvers (2007), An EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Reflections on Issues, Priorities, Strategies, CAS Discussion Paper, No. 53, October, pp. 4, 7.
- 45.
European Commission (2003), A New Partnership, p. 8.
- 46.
See Stephen Woolcock (2007), European Union Policy Towards Free Trade Agreements, p. 5; Garcia (2010), Fears and Strategies, p. 509.
- 47.
It is noteworthy in this regard that the moratorium on FTAs was not a formal policy but an informal policy practice inasmuch as it reflected a consensus between the Commission and Member States, see Woolcock (2007), European Union Policy Towards Free Trade Agreements p. 2. See also Elizabeth Shove, Mika Pantzar and Matt Watson (2012), The Dynamics of Social Practice: Everyday Life and How It Changes, London: Sage, p. 64 (emphasis in original): “[T]he contours of any one practice depend on changing populations of more and less faithful carriers or practitioners.”
- 48.
European Commission (2006), Global Europe, p. 11.
- 49.
See European Commission (2006), Global Europe, p. 11: “Where our partners have signed FTAs with other countries that are competitors to the EU, we should seek fully parity at least.”
- 50.
See Maria Garcia (2012), From Bottom of the Pyramid to Top Priority: Explaining Asia in the EU’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Strategy, Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies, 4(1), pp. 49–51.
- 51.
See Council of the European Union (2007), General Affairs and External Relations, 2795th/2796th Council meetings, PRESS RELEASE, 8425/07, Luxembourg, 23–24 April, p. 36: “The new WTO-compatible Free Trade Agreements with emerging countries should contribute to improving competitiveness and growth in Europe and globally and support further integration of partner countries into the international trading system. They should be ambitious and comprehensive and comprise far reaching liberalisation of trade in goods and services and investment. Special attention will be given to the elimination of non-tariff barriers. The Council supports the Commission’s approach for Free Trade Agreements based on economic considerations, especially the market potential of possible partner countries, the current level of trade barriers between them and the EU and their ongoing or concluded Free Trade Agreement negotiations with EU competitors. While respecting the priority of the multilateral trade negotiations, Free Trade Agreements with countries of ASEAN, India and the Republic of Korea should be taken forward rapidly to improve the external competitiveness and market access conditions of European industries on these important markets vis-à-vis competitors.”
- 52.
Interview #6: “No, I don’t think that, frankly, it was a significant factor during the negotiations with Korea or even ASEAN at that point in time. I think those negotiations were really fundamentally driven by economic interests, trying to get a as solid as possible trade agreement in terms of our offensive economic interests. So, the broader situation in Asia, the role of China, I don’t think that when it came to—at least at that phase—the negotiations with Korea or with ASEAN countries that it was really a particularly significant factor […] it was probably much more significant that we were not left behind in terms of free trade agreements negotiated by the United States. And when the United States policy process was paralyzed, it was also, I would say, getting a first mover advantage vis-à-vis the United States.”
- 53.
See Meissner (2018), Commercial Realism, p. 137.
- 54.
See Meissner (2016), Failed Interregionalism?, p. 333.
- 55.
The share of Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam in total EU-ASEAN trade by volume steadily grew from 55.7% (2002) to 59.6% (2010) to 61.9% (2019). While Singapore and Malaysia have consistently been the EU’s top two trading partners as a share of total EU-ASEAN trade by volume over the same timeframe, Vietnam’s share rose from 6.1% (2002) to 21.5% (2019). By comparison, Indonesia’s share in the same measurement dropped from 14.5% (2002) to 10.9% (2019), even though total EU-Indonesia trade by volume rose by a bit more than one and a half fold in absolute numbers (All data are retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/home; calculations are my own).
- 56.
See Council of the European Union (2007), 2795th/2796th Council Meetings, p. 36: “The Council welcomes and supports the Commission’s analysis and proposals to ensure, in each case, that these agreements will be part of an overall and coherent framework of EU relations with each partner. The Council underlines its interest in also achieving a further strengthening of political ties with ASEAN countries, India and the Republic of Korea through new Partnership- and Cooperation Agreements or an updating of the existing Framework Agreements including the EU political clause.”
- 57.
See Jörn Dosch and Naila Maier-Knapp (2017), EU-ASEAN Relations: Taking Stock of a Comprehensive Inter-Regional Relationship Between Natural Partners, in: Christian Echle, Megha Sarmah and Frederick Kliem (eds.), ASEAN at 50: A Look at Its External Relations, Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, p. 129.
- 58.
See ibid.
- 59.
See Camroux (2008), Two to Tango?, p. 29.
- 60.
See ibid.
- 61.
See Koh Gui Qing (2007), EU Trade Chief Impatient on Doha and Southeast Asia Deal, Reuters, 22 November.
- 62.
See Dosch and Maier-Knapp (2017), EU-ASEAN Relations, p. 135.
- 63.
Robles (2008), An EU-ASEAN FTA, p. 545. See also Garcia (2013), From Idealism to Realism?, p. 531, who makes a similar argument when pointing out that the export of EU values and standards “serves the dual purpose of enhancing EU influence and also exporting its standards thus placing its own producers on a par with, or even at an advantage over, those from other parts of the world.” More generally, see also Robert Gilpin (2001), Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economy Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 21: “[I]n a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power and to implement policies to change economic forces favourable to their own national interests and the interests of their citizenry. These national economic interests include receipt of a favourable share of the gains from international economic activities and preservation of national autonomy.”
- 64.
See Alfredo C. Robles Jr. (2008), The EU and ASEAN: Learning from the Failed EU-Mercosur FTA Negotiations, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 25(3), p. 338.
- 65.
See Meissner (2018), Commercial Realism, pp. 152, 156.
- 66.
See Dosch and Maier-Knapp (2017), EU-ASEAN Relations, p. 135.
- 67.
See ibid.
- 68.
Fitriani (2017), Europe and Southeast Asia, p. 77. See also Garcia (2012), Bottom of the Pyramid, p. 48.
- 69.
Hanna Deringer and Hosuk Lee-Makiyama (2018), Europe and South-East Asia: An Exercise in Diplomatic Patience, ECIPE Policy Brief, No. 5/2018, p. 4.
- 70.
See Fitriani (2017), Europe and Southeast Asia, pp. 81–82.
- 71.
In his foreword to the 2010 trade strategy, then trade commissioner Karel de Gucht advises “to trade our way out of the current crisis”, see European Commission (2010), Trade, Growth and World Affairs, p. 2. See also David O’Sullivan (2013), Priorities for EU Diplomacy in East Asia, GRIPS Forum, Tokyo, 12 February: “In economic terms we know that recovery at home depends on the ability to harness growth and open new markets many of which are in Asia.”
- 72.
See Meissner (2018), Commercial Realism, pp. 159–160.
- 73.
See footnote 55 above.
- 74.
See Garcia (2012), Bottom of the Pyramid, p. 48.
- 75.
See Fitriani (2017), Europe and Southeast Asia, p. 82. The Commission had already previously had recourse to what Robles (2008), An EU-ASEAN FTA, pp. 544–545 calls a “divide-and-rule strategy” when, in 2003, instead of engaging Singapore on its request to open free trade negotiations, it proposed the creation of the Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI) to enter into a dialogue on regulatory harmonisation and approximation, added with the remark that the process could start as soon as two ASEAN member states would be posed to join.
- 76.
Karel de Gucht (2010), Europe and Singapore: Partners in Trade, Partners for Growth, SPEECH/10/58, Singapore, 3 March, p. 4.
- 77.
See, for example, European Commission and High Representative (2015), Partnership with a Strategic Purpose, p. 5.
- 78.
Interview #29.
- 79.
Ibid.
- 80.
Interview #31.
- 81.
Ibid. The reference to geographical indications, which are distinctive names related to the geographical origin of the product (e.g. ‘Feta’ cheese, ‘Parma’ ham, ‘Cognac’ brandy, etc.) and whose protection the EU seeks to improve internationally in order to fight violations, is to be read as an example of one of the many specific items DG Trade wants to have included in a trade agreement. It is indeed unlikely that, e.g. Greece would consent to a trade agreement that would not adequately protect the use of the name ‘Feta’ cheese. By contrast, the use of a trade agreement as a diplomatic tool does not necessarily require the protection of geographical indications, all the more so if the protection of geographical indications leads to a dispute between the negotiating parties.
- 82.
The differences between DG Trade and the EEAS on whether and, if so, how to resume the stalled negotiations on an EU-India free trade agreement are another case in point (see main chapter).
- 83.
See European Commission and High Representative (2015), Partnership with a Strategic Purpose, p. 5: “Specific initiatives in this area will include […] working towards an ambitious region-to-region FTA building on bilateral agreements between the EU and ASEAN Member States as stepping stones towards this objective.”
- 84.
Interview #17.
- 85.
See Daniela Sicurelli (2015), The EU as a Promoter of Human Rights in Bilateral Trade Agreements: The Case of the Negotiations with Vietnam, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 11(2), pp. 230–245.
- 86.
Interview #17: “Thailand, a very good case where the political considerations have stopped the trade negotiations. […] it was very, very difficult at the beginning with [then trade commissioner Karel] de Gucht to conclude that we have to suspend the free trade agreement. […] They [DG Trade] said: ‘This is trade! This is not politics!’ So, the debate was: ‘Trade is trade. Foreign policy is foreign policy. Let’s keep it separate!’ There was a big, big debate on that. […] At the end, he [Karel de Gucht] understood: ‘I cannot stop it. I cannot stop the Foreign Affairs Council to agree on Council conclusions that we have to stop the free trade agreement.’ […] in some member states, there was this discussion between foreign affairs ministries and economic ministries, when the competences are separated, which is the case in several member states. The economic ministries saying: ‘I don’t care! Thailand is an important economy. Let’s go for it!’ […] the same division happens in member states. When you talk to diplomats in foreign affairs [ministries] or officials in the trade or economic ministries, different, I mean, you see the discussions in the Foreign Affairs Council and in the Trade Council, I mean, this is very different, because they still see things differently.”
- 87.
See Ashutosh Pandey (2019), EU vs. Indonesia: Is It Really a Trade War?, Deutsche Welle, 16 August; Jorge Valero (2019), Malaysian minister: ‘Palm oil is a deal-breaker for EU-ASEAN trade relations’, Euractiv, 21 June.
- 88.
See Article 26 of the Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast).
- 89.
See Gayatri Suroyo and Fransiska Nangoy (2019), Indonesia to Challenge 'Discriminative' EU Directive on Palm Oil, Reuters, 31 January; Mei Mei Chu (2020), Malaysia to File WTO Legal Action Against EU Over Restrictions on Palm Biofuel, Reuters, 1 July.
- 90.
Bas Eickhout, a Dutch MEP for the European Green Party, states: “There is no precedent for a phase-out of the use of specific crops. The importance of this [palm oil and soy] provision is shown by the reaction of the European Commission, who have expressed their reservations. Apparently, there are some Directorates where trade agreements with Indonesia and Malaysia are more important than the environment”, quoted in: Dave Keating (2018), Palm oil to be phased out in EU by 2030, Euractiv, 20 June (emphasis added). While Eickhout does not specify which DG he is referring to, it is reasonable to assume that DG Trade is one of them.
- 91.
See Council of the European Union (2019), Joint Statement of the 22nd EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, PRESS RELEASE, 21/19, Brussels, 21 January.
- 92.
See Council of the European Union (2020), Co-Chairs’ Press Release of the 23rd ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, PRESS RELEASE, 843/20, Brussels, 1 December. See also Jan Willem Blankert (2020), The EU-ASEAN Dance: An EU Diplomat’s Account, Brussels, 11 December.
- 93.
Hanna Deringer, Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Danny Murty (2019), Europe and South-East Asia: Shifting from Diplomacy to Unilateralism, ECIPE Policy Brief, No. 1/2019, p. 11.
- 94.
See Fitriani (2017), Europe and Southeast Asia, p. 78.
- 95.
See Deringer and Lee-Makiyama (2018), Diplomatic Patience, p. 5.
- 96.
Katharina L. Meissner, Imke Pente, Nelly Stratieva, Boonwara Sumano (2014), Unlocking the Potential of Interregionalism: Mutual Perceptions and Interests in EU-ASEAN Relations, IFAIR Impact Group ‘EU-ASEAN Perspectives’ Policy Paper, p. 12: “ASEAN is well aware that the EU is not the only game in town and that the Southeast Asian market successively gains attraction to balance the stumbling performance of the European market.”
- 97.
See Fitriani (2014), Impact of the EU Crisis.
- 98.
On normative power, see Manners (2002), Normative Power Europe.
- 99.
Deringer and Lee-Makiyama (2018), Diplomatic Patience, p. 5.
- 100.
See European Commission (2010), Trade, Growth and World Affairs, p. 2.
- 101.
See Fitriani (2014), Impact of the EU Crisis, pp. 89–90.
- 102.
See ibid., p. 90. See also Council of the European Union (2012), Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia, 11492/12, Brussels, 15 June.
- 103.
Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership (2013–2017), p. 1.
- 104.
EEAS (2016), Global Strategy, p. 37.
- 105.
See Michael Smith (2014), EU-China Relations and the Limits of Economic Diplomacy, Asia Europe Journal, 12(1–2), p. 36. Smith writes that economic diplomacy is sometimes also defined as the use of coercive instruments, e.g. sanctions. This understanding of economic diplomacy is somewhat confusing, as the use of economic tools for foreign and security policy is more commonly called economic statecraft, see David A. Baldwin (2020), Economic Statecraft: New Edition, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See also European Commission (2017), Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalisation, COM(2017) 240, Brussels, 10 May, p. 14.
- 106.
Interview #33: “If it’s a trade agreement, then I would say it makes sense to stick to what is working and not to overload it with all sorts of … There are other types of agreements that can then be done [instead].” Interview #26: “[T]here is a number of things being done on the back of our trade policy because it’s where we have more leverage. […] From a practical point of view, it means that we are including more and more things in FTAs. What people probably don’t think necessarily is that this has a price. […] that leverage that one can have is only as valuable as you don’t yet use it. From the moment that you use it, then that’s it, you don’t have leverage anymore.”
- 107.
See also Michela Astuto (2010), EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement Negotiations, ISPI Analysis, No. 26, October, p. 7: “The complexity and sensitivity of the trade negotiations conflicted with the larger strategic goals; the Commission came to the realization that trade issues could be more easily solved through bilateral negotiations, while strategic regional interests were better served in different settings—such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM).”
- 108.
European Commission (2003), A New Partnership, p. 5.
- 109.
European Commission (2001), Europe and Asia: An Enhanced Framework for Strategic Partnerships, COM(2001) 469 final, Brussels, 4 September, p. 5.
- 110.
European Commission (2003), A New Partnership, p. 5.
- 111.
European Commission (2001), Europe and Asia, p. 15.
- 112.
See European Commission (2003), A New Partnership, pp. 11–22.
- 113.
See ibid., p. 5.
- 114.
Ibid., p. 10.
- 115.
Lee and Diez (2016), Introduction, p. 353.
- 116.
European Commission (2003), A New Partnership, p. 3.
- 117.
See Lee and Diez (2016), Introduction, p. 354.
- 118.
European Commission (2003), A New Partnership with South East Asia, p. 12.
- 119.
Interview #29: “[I]f you manage to have a solid ASEAN, it’s already two big partners betting on the rules-based order, multilateralism, international law, a free and fair and open trading environment and so on.”
- 120.
European Commission (2003), A New Partnership, p. 8.
- 121.
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2019), EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, JOIN(2019) 5 final, Strasbourg, 12 March, p. 1.
- 122.
Fraser Cameron (2017), “It’s Asia, Stupid”: Time for the EU to Deepen Relations with Asia, GIGA Focus Asia, No. 6, November, p. 3.
- 123.
European Commission and High Representative (2019), EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, p. 1.
- 124.
Interview #31.
- 125.
Interview #29.
- 126.
See Reiterer (2014), The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Security in Asia, p. 13.
- 127.
See Anja Jetschke and Clara Portela (2013), ASEAN-EU Relations: From Regional Integration Assistance to Security Significance?, Research Collection School of Social Sciences, Paper 1434, p. 2.
- 128.
See Lee and Diez (2016), Introduction.
- 129.
Interview #6.
- 130.
See European Commission and High Representative (2015), Partnership with a Strategic Purpose, p. 11: “Given the EU’s trade, investment and other links, it has a clear interest in stability in the region and thus in promoting a security architecture that is better able to manage the region’s political tensions and in which it plays a key role, including through future accession to the EAS.”; EEAS (2016), Global Strategy, p. 37: “There is a direct connection between European prosperity and Asian security. In light of the economic weight that Asia represents for the EU—and vice versa—peace and stability in Asia are a prerequisite for our prosperity.”
- 131.
Lee and Diez (2016), Introduction, p. 354.
- 132.
European Commission (2003), A New Partnership, p. 12.
- 133.
Interviews #15, #21, #29. See also Meissner (2016), Failed Interregionalism?, p. 329, who found similar evidence in her interviews: “The main reason for the EU to turn down interregionalism was the inflexibility and the fear to reach the lowest common denominator in the negotiations. This would have inhibited the EU’s goal of an ambitious agreement. The driving force behind the talks was to open foreign markets in trade in goods but also in other areas such as public procurement and IPR. Furthermore, the EU feared to lose the region politically and economically to actors like China. Thus, interviewees revealed that the EU wants to be present in Southeast Asia and not leave it to the Chinese.” See also Dosch and Maier-Knapp (2017), EU-ASEAN Relations, p. 135, who argue that the Commission “has a standard approach to international trade agreements which lacks flexibility and thus did not play well with ASEAN negotiators. Brussels’ insistence on a comprehensive ‘new generation’ FTA that includes far-reaching legally binding provisions on inter alia services, intellectual property rights and governance issues, clashed with ASEAN’s understanding of a more limited approach that focuses on trade liberalisation only.”
- 134.
Opting for individual bilateral PCAs allowed the EU to avoid having to negotiate with Myanmar, see Naila Maier-Knapp (2011), The Case of the European Union Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Negotiations with Thailand, Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies, 2(2)/3(1), pp. 59–60.
- 135.
See Okano-Heijmans (2014), Trade Diplomacy in EU-Asia Relations, p. 17. There appears to be some leeway, as some trade officials indicated that it might be imaginable to conclude a trade agreement without provisions on WMDs (interview #6). The relevant Council document—Council of the European Union (2009), Common Approach on the Use of Political Clauses, 10491/1/09 REV 1 EXT 2, Brussels, 2 June—is in part classified, which might be an indication that it contains guidelines for negotiators under which circumstances it could be acceptable to forgo the inclusion of certain political clauses. Although this appears to be a plausible interpretation, it cannot be verified and should therefore be treated with circumspection. In any case, any non-inclusion of political clauses will likely meet the resistance of the European Parliament, whose consent is required for the ratification of any agreement with a third country.
- 136.
See Ionel Zamfir (2019), Human Rights in EU Trade Agreements: The Human Rights Clause and Its Application, EPRS Briefing, July, pp. 8–9.
- 137.
See ibid., p. 8.
- 138.
See Sicurelli (2015), The EU as a Promoter of Human Rights, p. 235.
- 139.
See Zamfir (2019), Human Rights in EU Trade Agreements, p. 7.
- 140.
Interview #3.
- 141.
See Stephen Woolcock (2014), Differentiation within Reciprocity: the European Union Approach to Preferential Trade Agreements, Contemporary Politics, 20(1), pp. 36–48.
- 142.
Interview # 17: “It’s on a case-by-base. I mean, we don’t have to same standards. We don’t have the same standards when it comes to condemn a military coup here or there, or the violation of human rights here or there. […] There is no clear rule. And it also depends on the moment in time.”
- 143.
In case the essential elements clauses are not included in the PCA, they are to be incorporated directly into the trade agreement.
- 144.
See Sicurelli (2015), The EU as a Promoter of Human Rights, p. 236.
- 145.
Ibid., p. 232. See also Jetschke and Portela (2013), ASEAN-EU Relations, p. 3.
- 146.
See David Bailey and Fabienne Bossuyt (2013), The European Union as a Conveniently-Conflicted Counter-Hegemon Through Trade, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9(4), pp. 560–577. See also pp. 69–73 in this book.
- 147.
See, for example, European Commission (2003), A New Partnership, p. 3: “New bilateral agreements with countries of the region should all contain the ‘essential element’ clause regarding human rights, while the EU and particular countries in the region may decide to launch Human Rights-specific bilateral dialogues.”
- 148.
See Sicurelli (2015), The EU as a Promoter of Human Rights, p. 234.
- 149.
Philippe Meyer, quoted in Robles (2008), An EU-ASEAN FTA, p. 558.
- 150.
See Sicurelli (2015), The EU as a Promoter of Human Rights, p. 238.
- 151.
Zamfir (2019), Human Rights in EU Trade Agreements, p. 5.
- 152.
Ibid.
- 153.
Bailey and Bossuyt (2013), Conveniently-Conflicted Counter-Hegemon, p. 571.
- 154.
European Commission (2003), A New Partnership with South East Asia, p. 10.
- 155.
Quang Minh Pham (2010), The South China Sea Security Problem: Towards Regional Cooperation, Asia Europe Journal, 8(3), p. 428.
- 156.
See European Commission (1994), Towards a New Asia Strategy, p. 2; European Commission (2001), Europe and Asia, p. 6; European Commission (2003), A New Partnership, p. 12. See also Council of the European Union (2012), Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia, pp. 5, 19.
- 157.
European Commission and High Representative (2015), Partnership with a Strategic Purpose, p. 12. Also interview #29: “80 per cent of our trade passes through the South China Sea, the Malacca Strait et cetera. So, if anything happens there, we have a big problem in Europe.”
- 158.
Council of the European Union (2014), European Union Maritime Security Strategy, 11205/14, Brussels, 24 June, p. 3.
- 159.
See ibid., p. 4.
- 160.
See ibid., p. 7.
- 161.
See Volker Stanzel (2016), Danger on the High Seas: The East Asian Security Challenge, ECFR Policy Brief, No. 156, January.
- 162.
See BBC (2019), Iran seizes British Tanker in Strait of Hormuz, 20 July.
- 163.
See, for example, Antonio Missiroli (2015), Towards an EU Global Strategy: Background, Process, References, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, p. 142: “The EU has a huge stake in the continued success of Asian economies, including China’s reform efforts. But the EU is also vulnerable to the ramifications of underlying political and security tensions. Disputes and conflicts in the region would affect trade routes, financial flows and a regional order in a part of the world which is of paramount importance to the EU.”
- 164.
European Commission (2014), European Union Maritime Security Strategy: Responding Together to Global Challenges. A Guide for Stakeholders, Brussels, p. 3.
- 165.
See, for example, European External Action Service (2019), Statement by the Spokesperson on Recent Developments in the South China Sea, Brussels, 28 August; European External Action Service (2016), Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on Recent Developments in the South China Sea, PRESS RELEASE, 126/16, Brussels, 11 March.
- 166.
See Yeikyoung Kim (2016), The EU, Regional Integration and Conflict Transformation in the South China Sea Territorial Disputes, Asia Europe Journal, 14(4), pp. 388–395.
- 167.
See pp. 74–81 in this book.
- 168.
Indeed, it does not seem that events surrounding the entry into force of the Hong Kong security law on 30 June 2020 have in any way affected the EU’s intent to conclude an investment protection agreement with China. On 30 December 2020, the EU and China announced an agreement in principle on an investment protection agreement.
- 169.
The arms embargo in place since the Tiananmen Square massacre has little more than symbolic value.
- 170.
Interview #48.
- 171.
Interview #29.
- 172.
Interview #29.
- 173.
Jean-Yves Le Drian (2016), Shangri-La Dialogue Speech, Singapore, 5 June.
- 174.
Cf. Article 42(4) TEU.
- 175.
Council of the European Union (2014), Maritime Security Strategy, p. 10.
- 176.
Interview #49: “We can intervene on security issues from a certain perspective. This is very different from the Americans having a fifth fleet in a region. We’re not in that league and we certainly don’t pretend to be.”
- 177.
Cf. Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, Official Journal of the European Union, 12 November 2008.
- 178.
Cf. Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), Official Journal of the European Union, 19 May 2015; Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/472 of 31 March 2020 on a European Military Operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI), Official Journal of the European Union, 1 April 2020.
- 179.
Interview #48: “In the case of a freedom of navigation, the only benefit is to send a message that you’re still attached to freedom of navigation. There is no need to send a ship every week. There is no need for twelve ships. One ship is enough! And one ship a year is enough! Also because it’s just a political message: ‘we haven’t given up, we still believe that there should be freedom of navigation.’ And basically we’re sending the message that what China has been doing is illegal. That’s it. And we don’t have to do it with twenty ships. […] This is not about protecting trade militarily. It’s just about sending a message to China. So, you send a message, you send it as cheaply as you can.”
- 180.
See Felix Heiduk (2019), European Powers and the South China Sea, in: Leszek Buszynski and Do Thanh Hai (eds.), The South China Sea: From a Regional Maritime Dispute to Geo-Strategic Competition, Abingdon: Routledge, p. 162. The EU attended, as an observer, the Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo 2016 hosted by Indonesia. In addition, the EU and Vietnam signed a Framework Participation Agreement on 17 October 2019, which allows for the participation of Vietnam in CSDP operations. While no such operation with Vietnamese participation has taken place yet, the EU and Vietnam held their first security and defence dialogue in Brussels on 22 November 2019, see European External Action Service (2019), The European Union and Vietnam held the First Security and Defence Dialogue, Press Release, Brussels, 26 November.
- 181.
See, for example, EEAS (2016), Global Strategy, pp. 38, 41: “In East and Southeast Asia, we will uphold freedom of navigation […]. We will help build maritime capacities and support an ASEAN-led regional security architecture. […] The EU will contribute to global maritime security, building on its experience in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and exploring possibilities in the Gulf of Guinea, the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca.”
- 182.
The EU expressed its intention of becoming an observer state to the EAS as early as 2006, see Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2006), New Visions for EU-Japan Relations, Opening of Joint EU-Japan Symposium, SPEECH/06/227, Brussels, 6 April. The ADMM-Plus format, launched in 2010, is a dialogue platform for security and defence issues that brings together ASEAN and its eight dialogue partners Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States.
- 183.
See Mathieu Duchâtel (2016), Europe and Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Beyond Principled Statements?, Asia Policy, 21, January, pp. 54–58.
- 184.
The typical formats are, in declining order, a ‘Declaration of the HR/VP on behalf of the EU’, a ‘Declaration from the HR/VP’, a ‘Statement by the Spokesperson of the HR/VP’ and ‘Local EU Statements’.
- 185.
Duchâtel (2016), Europe and Maritime Security, p. 55.
- 186.
See European External Action Service (2016), Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the Award rendered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, PRESS RELEASE, 442/16, Brussels, 15 July.
- 187.
See Eva Pejsova (2019), Increased Relevance for EU Policy and Actions in the South China Sea, ISEAS Perspective, No. 52, Singapore, 26 June, p. 3; Heiduk (2019), European Powers and the South China Sea, pp. 152, 160.
- 188.
See Heiduk (2019), European Powers and the South China Sea, p. 156.
- 189.
See Maier-Knapp (2020), Contemporary Inter-Regional Dialogue and Cooperation, pp. 54–66.
- 190.
See Heiduk (2019), European Powers and the South China Sea, p. 161.
- 191.
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand (2016), Press Release: The 3rd ASEAN-EU High Level Dialogue on Maritime Security Cooperation, Bangkok, 20 September; European External Action Service (2017), ASEAN-EU Co-Chairs Joint Press Release on the 4th ASEAN-EU High-Level Dialogue on Maritime Security Cooperation, Manila, 6 October.
- 192.
See Heiduk (2019), European Powers and the South China Sea, pp. 162–163. Although Indonesia and Malaysia remain outside ReCAAP and several non-ASEAN countries are contracting parties to the agreement, ASEAN assumes a central role in ReCAAP, see Miha Hribernik (2013), Countering Maritime Piracy and Robbery in Southeast Asia: The Role of the ReCAAP Agreement, European Institute for Asian Studies, Briefing Paper 2013/2, March.
- 193.
In similar vein, Duchâtel (2016), Europe and Maritime Security, writes that “the essence of the European approach is to remain at the general level of principles and avoid taking clear sides” (pp. 55–56) and “[a]s long as tensions in the South China Sea remain below the threshold of armed confrontation, the policy debate in Europe will remain focused on how to best formulate statements” (p. 54).
- 194.
See Heiduk (2019), European Powers and the South China Sea, p. 157. See also Aggarwal and Govella (2013), Trade Linkages to Traditional and Non-Traditional Security, p. 240: “[S]ecurity concerns play a larger role in bilateral trade agreements with more geographically proximate states, particularly potential EU members, while FTAs with more distant partners are driven more by economic gains.”
- 195.
Federica Mogherini (2015), Speech at the 14th Asia Security Summit: The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Fifth Plenary Session, Global Security Challenges and the Asia–Pacific: Building Cooperation Between Regions, 31 May.
- 196.
Sophie Boisseau du Rocher (2014), The EU’s Strategic Offensive with ASEAN: Some Room Left But No Time…, GRIP Analysis Note, Brussels, 8 January, p. 15.
- 197.
Ibid., p. 13.
- 198.
EEAS (2016), Global Strategy, p. 38.
- 199.
Ibid., p. 3 (emphasis added).
- 200.
Council of the European Union (2018), Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia, Council conclusions, 9265/1/18 REV 1, Brussels, 28 May, p. 2 (emphasis added). The third implementation report on the EU Global Strategy employs the terminology “global security provider” again, see European External Action Service (2019), The European Union’s Global Strategy: Three Years On, Looking Forward, Brussels, June, p. 10.
- 201.
Heiduk (2019), European Powers and the South China Sea, p. 165.
- 202.
Camroux (2008), Two to Tango?, p. 35.
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Stueber, J. (2022). The EU Trade-Security Nexus in EU-ASEAN Relations. In: The Trade-Security Nexus in EU External Action. Contributions to International Relations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90796-9_4
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