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PakeMail: Authentication and Key Management in Decentralized Secure Email and Messaging via PAKE

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E-Business and Telecommunications (ICETE 2020)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 1484))

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Abstract

We propose the use of password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) for achieving and enhancing entity authentication (EA) and key management (KM) in the context of decentralized end-to-end encrypted email and secure messaging, i.e., without a public key infrastructure or a trusted third party. This not only simplifies the EA process by requiring users to share only a low-entropy secret such as a memorable word, but it also allows us to establish a high-entropy secret key. This approach enables a series of cryptographic enhancements and security properties, which are hard to achieve using out-of-band (OOB) authentication. We first study a few vulnerabilities in voice-based OOB authentication, in particular a combinatorial attack against lazy users, which we analyze in the context of a secure email solution. We then propose tackling public key authentication by solving the problem of secure equality test using PAKE and discuss various protocols and their properties. This method enables the automation of important KM tasks such as key renewal and future key pair authentications, reduces the impact of human errors and lends itself to the asynchronous nature of email and modern messaging. It also provides cryptographic enhancements including multi-device synchronization, and secure secret storage/retrieval, and paves the path for forward secrecy, deniability and post-quantum security. We also discuss the use of auditable PAKEs for mitigating a class of online guess and abort attacks in authentication protocols. We present an implementation of our proposal, called PakeMail, to demonstrate the feasibility of the core idea and discuss some of its cryptographic details, implemented features and efficiency aspects. We conclude with some design and security considerations, followed by future lines of work .

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For example, in order to access the authentication menu in Signal or WhatsApp, users need to (1) select a chat (2) click on the contact’s name (3) select “View safety number/Encryption”.

  2. 2.

    https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-spake2-08.html.

  3. 3.

    https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8236.

  4. 4.

    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/-9LEdnzVrE5RORux3Oo_oDDRksU/.

  5. 5.

    https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869.html.

  6. 6.

    https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104.html.

  7. 7.

    https://matrix.org/docs/spec/.

  8. 8.

    https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks/.

  9. 9.

    https://github.com/RustCrypto/PAKEs.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. SnT, University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg

    Itzel Vazquez Sandoval, Arash Atashpendar, Gabriele Lenzini & Peter Y. A. Ryan

  2. itrust consulting s.á r.l., Niederanven, Luxembourg

    Arash Atashpendar

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  1. Itzel Vazquez Sandoval
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  2. Arash Atashpendar
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  3. Gabriele Lenzini
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  4. Peter Y. A. Ryan
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Correspondence to Itzel Vazquez Sandoval .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan

    Mohammad S. Obaidat

  2. Paris 13 University, Villetaneuse, France

    Jalel Ben-Othman

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Vazquez Sandoval, I., Atashpendar, A., Lenzini, G., Ryan, P.Y.A. (2021). PakeMail: Authentication and Key Management in Decentralized Secure Email and Messaging via PAKE. In: Obaidat, M.S., Ben-Othman, J. (eds) E-Business and Telecommunications. ICETE 2020. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1484. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90428-9_5

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