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Setting the Stage: Board Busyness as a Matter of Modern Banking Context

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Fundamentals of Board Busyness and Corporate Governance

Part of the book series: Contributions to Management Science ((MANAGEMENT SC.))

Abstract

This chapter provides readers some fundamental knowledge about the multiple directorships of boards and directors related theories which include the reputation and busyness hypotheses. Multiple directorships are not only observed as a positive indicator for the benefits of directors but also as a negative sign for the risks of directors being stretched thin. The reputation and busyness hypotheses explain such positive and negative signs of board busyness, respectively. In addition, researchers and students can understand why board busyness could be a matter of modern banking context and update some empirical evidence on the effects of multiple board appointments of directors in the banking sector.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University, Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK

    Vu Quang Trinh

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  1. Vu Quang Trinh
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Quang Trinh, V. (2022). Setting the Stage: Board Busyness as a Matter of Modern Banking Context. In: Fundamentals of Board Busyness and Corporate Governance. Contributions to Management Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89228-9_3

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