Abstract
The items in the title are in many ways related to each other when approaching the question of explanation in physics. In Duhem’s terms, a physical theory can never “explain” the world in the sense of leading to a metaphysical reality, but the better the theory becomes in describing and predicting phenomena, the nearer it comes to a “natural classification” which is in fact a way to put the question of explanation. This opens the room among others for following the effect of the progress of theories on explanation. This, however, also depends on our ability of exploring the theories and their phenomenology “from first principles” (without further assumptions or approximations)—which in contemporary physics is a key word for computer simulations. Computer simulations also provide the possibility to test the relations between theories defined at different scales. Finally, using methods from machine learning in combination with computer simulations may allow finding relevant correlations in the data produced in a numerical analysis and thus a grasp on the internal connections in the theory providing the “right concepts” for understanding and explanation. I shall here propose a certain view of the problem of explanation in physics with emphasis on the physics of fundamental phenomena and also discuss the role of computers in modern natural science under this perspective.
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Notes
- 1.
Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft (Protestant Institute for Interdisciplinary Research), Heidelberg.
- 2.
Joos et al. [32].
- 3.
Blanchard et al. (Eds.) [9].
- 4.
- 5.
Scheibe [44].
- 6.
Cassirer [15].
- 7.
A. Einstein, “Reply to criticisms”, in Cushing [18], p. 357. This is not “against philosophy”, this just means that physics needs its free space to do its job.
- 8.
Salmon [43].
- 9.
Hempel [28].
- 10.
See, e.g. Thagard [50].
- 11.
See, e.g. Churchland [16].
- 12.
Duhem, “La theorie physique, son objet et sa structure” (1908), english translation [20].
- 13.
- 14.
There are of course also other notions of explanation as related to the context, to other understanding of causation or to particular phenomena—cf. for instance P. Weingarten, M. Massimi in proceedings of the AIPS Conference 2016, “Mechanistic Explanation” (to appear). For a general discussion see Woodward [55].
- 15.
This implies of course theory and mathematics and can be very complex—the “cosmic distance ladder”, for instance, belongs to the empirical part of cosmology but it implies both observation and theoretical models.
- 16.
H. von Helmholtz, “Die Tatsachen in der Wahrnehmung” (1878) in [27].
- 17.
H. von Helmholtz [27]. In modern terms his argument can be described as IBE (inference to the best explanation)….
- 18.
Tegmark [49] and related papers. This perspective can appear as the logical completion of a certain form of “structural realism” which appeals to mathematical physicists such as Poincaré and Weyl and which cuts short the question why, say, equations and the objects they both define and refer to should have different ontological status.
- 19.
- 20.
For a comprehensive account see ’t Hooft [51].
- 21.
In fact this interaction reaches also the meta-theoretical level when comparing different theories, cf Barth [4].
- 22.
Or indicates a structure which can be deployed when asked for.
- 23.
“… es muss also etwas in mir geben, das nicht nur zu der Sache führt, sondern sie auch ausdrückt.” see Leibniz, Quid sit idea”, in C.I. Gerhardt (Ed), vol. VII, p. 263 sq. [24].
- 24.
In Ferrari and Stamatescu (Eds.) (2002) [22].
- 25.
“Wir machen uns innere Scheinbilder oder Symbole der äußeren Gegenstände, und zwar machen wir sie von solcher Art, daß die denknotwendigen Folgen der Bilder stets Bilder seien von den naturnotwendigen Folgen der abgebildeten Gegenstände …” [30]. Notice that this parallels Leibniz’ conception, which is also worth mentioning: “Dass eine Idee von Dingen in uns ist, heißt deshalb nichts anderes, als dass Gott, Urheber gleichermaßen der Dinge wie des Geistes, diese Fähigkeit des Denkens dem Geist eingeprägt hat, damit 〈derselbe〉 aus seinen Tätigkeiten dasjenige ableiten kann, was vollkommen demjenigen entspricht, was aus den Dingen folgt.“ in C.I. Gerhardt (Ed), vol. VII, p. 263 sq. [24].
- 26.
Articles in Ferrari and Stamatescu (Eds.) [22].
- 27.
W. Heisenberg, in Scheibe and Süssman (1973), p. 140 [45].
- 28.
For an actual assessment see Seiler and Stamatescu (Eds.) (2007) [22].
- 29.
The SM are in fact a collection of partial QFTs without complete unification, GRT and partial models.
- 30.
- 31.
In fact eQED is not really a fundamental object in the theory. The fundamental objects in QFT are the quantum fields, in which the fundamental relations of the theory (local interactions) are expressed. Particles are special manifestations of the fields. We also have unstable particles and resonances (e.g., Higgs boson!) and we observe a continuous transition between what we understand by particle and by just signal (enhancement) in a collision cross section. See also Falkenburg [21].
- 32.
The notion “closed” as used here is rather sloppy and does not imply that the dynamics may not lead to “unphysical” situations, such as singularities and divergences. Sometimes these can be tamed by supplementary procedures, as in QFT, but they also can be of a more fundamental nature, as in CM, ED or GRT and signal the need for an overriding theory.
- 33.
This accumulation was the ground on which Maxwell's ED could be established, but the latter is not just the sum of these partial laws. Accumulation and jumps are strongly intercorrelated, a modern example is the development of the SME.
- 34.
Theoretical (e.g., the divergent self energy of electrons) as well as empirical (e.g. the stability of matter) in ED.
- 35.
Barnes [3], Aristotle, JB 53::Analytica posteriora I 2 71b.
- 36.
Cassirer [15], p. 189.
- 37.
This concept was hypothesized following the empirical observation of conservation laws (e.g. charge conservation) and other correlations between observations. It led to a powerful theoretical constructive principle. It is not a genuine symmetry but has rather the status of a covariance since physical information is normally carried by gauge invariant quantities.
- 38.
A relativistic QM cannot be established as a consistent theory see e.g. Wachter [53]. This makes clear that one cannot simply add a new hypothesis to an old theory but one must build up a new, closed theoretical scheme “incorporating” the former. In the case at hand it means going from particles to fields as fundamental with particles as a manifestation of these.
- 39.
We can, however, on the basis of a given theoretical scheme valid at a high energy scale derive effective theories at lower scales by the “renormalization group” procedure which allows to redefine the theory for adequate applications there.
- 40.
For a brief overview see Rettler and Bailey [42].
- 41.
For a transcendental perspective see Bitbol et al. [8].
- 42.
“[wir meinen] etwas zu wissen, wenn wir glauben, sowohl die Ursache zu kennen, aufgrund derer ein Ding ist (und zu wissen, dass diese seine Ursache ist), als auch, dass es nicht anders sein kann” Barnes [3], Aristotle, JB 52: Analytica posteriora I 2 71b.
- 43.
- 44.
Referred to by I. Kant in The critique of practical reason, Ch.III, also as “physico-mechanical connections in nature” in The critique of pure reason, Appendix.
- 45.
- 46.
This is of course an important discussion which, however, is beyond the aim of this essay. In ED, for instance, we should consider also the electromagnetic fields as “natural kinds” and possibly also the potentials because of their role, say, in quantisation. This would imply, however, redefining identity, classes, etc. taking into account gauge transformations and then adapt our discussion on their relative character considering the progress of theories. For a succinct overview of the philosophy of science discussion hereto see Bird and Tobin [7]. Here however we shall only retain the observation that natural kinds just as natural classification have the same conditional status as the theories and their symbols, see Sect. 2.1, and are also bound in the process of evolving the physical knowledge and should be empirically and theoretically well defined at each level.
- 47.
“Particle” is a powerful concept in promoting hypotheses, so for instance it dominates the search for “dark matter”. See also Falkenburg [21].
- 48.
In a brief section Feynman [23], II, 20–9 discusses the deficiency of the imagination in science while finding intellectual beauty in the wave equation due to the regularities and further developments it suggests. If we take this over to understanding it says that it is not the direct imagination which counts but the multitude of relations implied by a symbol.
- 49.
W. Heisenberg, “The concept of understanding in theoretical physics”, in Blum [10] CIII, p. 335. Notice that “right concepts” and “natural kinds” need not be related.
- 50.
Bell [5].
- 51.
See I.-O. Stamatescu, Appendix 4, in Joos et al. [32].
- 52.
Cf. the note on relativistic QM (footnote 38).
- 53.
- 54.
Joos et al. [32]. There exist of course macroscopic quantum effects unaffected by decoherence such as superconductivity, laser, transistors with many practical applications.
- 55.
The hypothesis that quantum effects are at work in our brains, may be problematic since under the typical working conditions there (temperature, external influences) decoherence may be expected to destroy local quantum coherence. In an evolutionary perspective there seems to be no necessity for a quantum organ, see Hepp and Koch [29].
- 56.
There are macroscopic quantum effects which in a sense can belong to daily experience, such as superconductivity, or which by enhancement produce macroscopic effects, such as nuclear energy. And of course X-rays, LED, MRT, etc. They prove that the world is fundamentally quantum at all levels but the genuine quantum character is not direct enough to help us build quantum intuitions, and their interpretation remains abstract—the more so that QM itself does not offer us a clear and consistent interpretation for its most fundamental rules, e.g. measurement (albeit when using classical concepts …).
- 57.
- 58.
This is not the interpretational structure mentioned in Sect. 2.1 but the attempt to provide a metaphysics for QM.
- 59.
- 60.
See e.g. Joos et al. [32].
- 61.
Wigner [54].
- 62.
To what extent does QM comply with this understanding of lawfulness is an outstanding question—between the incompleteness criticism (Einstein), the claim of universality of statistical laws (Schrödinger), the denial of the need for space–time description (Anschauung; Heisenberg, Cassirer), ….
- 63.
See, e.g., the exciting discussion in Penrose [40].
- 64.
The mathematical-symbolic schemes of classical physics, for instance, provide keys for developing symbols for the newer theories.
- 65.
See, e.g., Bourbaki [13].
- 66.
This is of course a relevant issue in the philosophy of physics. For a nice example of using modern mathematical tools at the meta-theoretical level see, e.g., Barth [4].
- 67.
Or “regulative principles”—not to be understood as constitutive (cf. I. Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Appendix).
- 68.
The name “gauge symmetry” is slightly misleading (cf footnote 37), nevertheless this concept proved to be very rich and extremely useful both in developing and in analysing theories.
- 69.
- 70.
Thagard [50].
- 71.
McCulloch and Pitts [38].
- 72.
Dreitlein [19].
- 73.
The capacity of a system to take all allowed configurations.
- 74.
Mlodinov and Stamatescu [39].
- 75.
- 76.
- 77.
Schmidt and Stamatescu [47].
- 78.
An interesting discussion of the stability properties of the solar system can be found in Petterson [41].
- 79.
See Stamatescu and Kühn et al. (Eds.) [36].
- 80.
Non-standard logics can also be represented in binary logic.
- 81.
McCulloch and Pitts [38].
- 82.
There are a number of approaches in this field which mix analogue (cold atoms, optical lattices, etc.) and digital features in various combinations.
- 83.
- 84.
Of course one uses simulations also for processes, hypotheses, etc. as far as these can be formalized.
- 85.
Wunderlich et al. [56] and further publication of the Neuromorphic Computer Group at the University of Heidelberg. Neuromorphic computers are “hybride” (analog-digital) machines with some millions of Hodkgin-Huxley neurons in variable architectures.
- 86.
For an introduction and review see Carleo et al. [14].
- 87.
Abbreviations
- CM:
-
Classical mechanics
- CSM:
-
Classical statistical mechanics
- CS:
-
Complex systems theory
- ED:
-
Classical electrodynamics
- GRT:
-
General relativity theory
- QED:
-
Quantum electrodynamics
- QFT:
-
Quantum field theory
- LFT:
-
Lattice field theory
- QG:
-
Quantum gravity (in spe)
- QM:
-
Quantum mechanics (in the text used sometimes as paradigm for quantum theories in general)
- SM:
-
Standard model: SME (of elementary particles), SMC (of cosmology)
- SRT:
-
Special relativity theory
- SST:
-
Solid state theory
- Th:
-
Thermodynamics
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Stamatescu, IO. (2022). Explanation, the Progress of Physical Theories and Computer Simulations. In: Kiefer, C. (eds) From Quantum to Classical. Fundamental Theories of Physics, vol 204. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88781-0_12
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