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Generating Cultures of Compliance: The Limits of the “Big Stick”

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New Accountability in Financial Services

Part of the book series: Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies ((PSLS))

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Abstract

Many jurisdictions are increasingly concerned with financial crimes and are responding in increasingly stringent ways to this form of wrongdoing. These responses are emerging because of the greater recognition that financial crimes can be as harmful as so-called ordinary crimes and because of the increased demand for corporate accountability. This chapter examines the approach to sanctioning crime in financial services in the UK, Australia, and Ireland since the GFC. It demonstrates that there are new, more punitive ways of thinking about regulating the financial services sectors in these jurisdictions. This has manifested in new laws and new enforcement practices. In particular, new laws have been introduced to criminalise more forms of wrongdoing and to make it easier to detect, investigate and harshly punish financial misconduct. Law has been weaponised as politicians and regulators seek to “act out” for public approval. Nevertheless, difficulties remain with enforcement in practice because law alone is a limited instrument in changing behaviour. Sanctions alone may not always generate accountability, do not prevent misconduct, and may not generate meaningful, lasting, cultural change.

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Notes

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    FSMA 2000 ss 66, 87M, 89, 89K. Whilst a censure may appear on the lower tier of the regulatory pyramid, recent research suggests that this form of reputational sanction is more severe because “their stock price impact is on average nine times larger than the financial penalties imposed by the FSA”. See: Armour, J., Mayer, C., & Polo, A. (2017). Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52(4), 1429–1448. Such findings can suggests that the implementation of the responsive model is complicated in practice where softer measures have punitive impacts.

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    UK’s SFO Closes Euribor Probe After Extradition Requests Refused, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/e7eb3b07-4efe-42b3-8fee-e56e043da1b9.

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  75. 75.

    For an overview, see: Law Commission. (2021). Corporate Criminal Liability, A discussion paper, paras. 2.48–2.60, available at: https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2021/06/Corporate-Criminal-Liability-Discussion-Paper.pdf. It is now presumed that the identification doctrine applies in such cases and that it will only be displaced by other rules of attribution when the application of the identification doctrine would defeat the intention of the legislature and the aims of the statute.

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    SFO. (2020). Former Barclays Executives Acquitted of Conspiracy to Commit Fraud, available at: https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2020/02/28/former-barclays-executives-acquitted-of-conspiracy-to-commit-fraud/; Regina v John Varley, Roger Jenkins, Thomas Kalaris, Richard Boath [2019] EWCA Crim 1074.

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  78. 78.

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  80. 80.

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  83. 83.

    Contrary to Section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010. See further: SFO v Standard Bank plc, 30 November 2015, available at: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/sfo-v-standard-bank_Final_1.pdf.

  84. 84.

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  86. 86.

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  87. 87.

    MacNeil, I. (2019). Regulating Instead of Punishing: The Senior Managers Regime in the UK. In Ligeti, K., & Tosza, S. eds. (2018), White-Collar Crime: A Comparative Perspective. Bloomsbury Publishing, 225–252, 227.

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  89. 89.

    Financial Conduct Authority. (2014). FCA Fines Five Banks £1.1 Billion for FX Failings and Announces Industry—Wide Remediation Programme, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-fines-five-banks-£11-billion-fx-failings-and-announces-industry-wide-remediation-programme; Financial Conduct Authority. (2015). FCA Fines Barclays £284,432,000 for Forex Failings, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-fines-barclays-£284432000-forex-failings.

  90. 90.

    Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, Changing Banking for Good. London: The Stationery Office Limited, para. 201. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtpcbs/27/27ii05.htm.

  91. 91.

    PCBS Report, Vol. II, para. 202.

  92. 92.

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    Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, s.1(2). See Dixon, O., & Hill, J. G. (2018). Australia. The Protection of Investors and the Compensation for their Losses. In Conac, P. H., & Gelter, M. (Eds.). (2019). Global Securities Litigation and Enforcement. Cambridge University Press.

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    Australian Securities and Investments Commission. (2014). Report 387: Penalties for Corporate Wrongdoing (ASIC), pp. 9–10.

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    A variety of other regulatory and investigative agencies may also refer cases to the CDPP. These include the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), Australian Financial Security Authority (AFSA) and the Department of Human Services. The Attorney-General's Department also works with these agencies to provide legal and policy advice on white-collar crime. In addition, the Serious Financial Crime Taskforce (SFCT), established in 2015, is a multi-agency body designed to bring together knowledge and experience together to fight financial crime.

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    ASIC, Information Sheet 151, available at: https://download.asic.gov.au/media/1339118/INFO_151_ASIC_approach_to_enforcement_20130916.pdf.

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    Corporations Act 2001, s. 180(1). See: Hanrahan, P. (2018). Directors’ Counsel: Not-SD-Perfect Storm. Company Director, 34(6), 40.

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    Walsh, L. (2020). ASIC’s Massive Storm Financial Bill Revealed, available at: https://www.afr.com/companies/financial-services/asic-s-massive-storm-financial-bill-revealed-20200519-p54ubf.

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    Hargovan, A. (2018). Corporate Law: Storm Without Power: Low Civil Penalties for Directors of Storm Financial. Governance Directions, 70(4), 197–201.

  107. 107.

    Vickovich, A. (2020). Storm Financial Directors Found Negligent, a Decade On, available at: https://www.afr.com/companies/financial-services/storm-financial-directors-found-negligent-a-decade-on-20200329-p54eyw. See also: ASIC. (2020). 20-074MR Federal Court confirms Storm Financial directors breached duties. Available at: https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2020-releases/20-074mr-federal-court-confirms-storm-financial-directors-breached-duties/.

  108. 108.

    Walsh, L. (2019). Gone Bust but Not Busted. The Courier Mail, 64.

  109. 109.

    Schmulow, A., Fairweather, K., & Tarrant, J. (2019). Restoring confidence in Consumer Financial Protection Regulation in Australia: A Sisyphean Task? Federal Law Review, 47(1), 91–120, 97.

  110. 110.

    Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. (1989). Company Directors’ Duties: Report on the Social and Fiduciary Duties and Obligations of Company Directors.

  111. 111.

    Gilligan, G., Bird, H., & Ramsay, I. (1999). Civil Penalties and the Enforcement Of Directors’ Duties. University of New South Wales Law Journal, 22, 417–461.

  112. 112.

    Welsh, M. (2014). Realising the Public Potential of Corporate Law: Twenty Years of Civil Penalty Enforcement in Australia. Federal Law Review, 42(1), 1–22.

  113. 113.

    Hedges, J., Gilligan, G., & Ramsay, I. (2017). Banning Orders: An Empirical Analysis of the Dominant Mode of Corporate Law Enforcement in Australia. Sydney Law Review, 39, 501–537.

  114. 114.

    Ramsay, I., & Webster, M. (2021). An Analysis of ASIC Enforcement Against Auditors and Liquidators. Company and Securities Law Journal, 38(2), 112–137.

  115. 115.

    See further: Australian Securities & Investments Commission. (2021). Summary Prosecutions of Companies and Directors, para. 16, available at: http://asic.gov.au/online-services/search-asicsregisters/additional-searches/summary-prosecutions-of-companies-and-directors/.

  116. 116.

    Hedges, J., Gilligan, G., & Ramsay, I. (2017). Banning Orders: An Empirical Analysis of the Dominant Mode of Corporate Law Enforcement in Australia. Sydney Law Review, 39, 501–537.

  117. 117.

    Contrary to Section 475 and 530A of the Corporations Act 2001.

  118. 118.

    Keenan, P., Australian Institute of Criminology, & Australia. (2013). Convictions for Summary Insolvency Offences Committed by Company Directors. Research in Practice, pp. 1–8.

  119. 119.

    Ibid., p. 5.

  120. 120.

    Welsh, M. (2009). Civil Penalties and Responsive Regulation: The Gap Between Theory and Practice. Melbourne University Law Review, 33, 908–933.

  121. 121.

    Ramsay, I., & Webster, M. (2017). ASIC Enforcement Outcomes: Trends and Analysis. Company and Securities Law Journal, 35(5), 289–321.

  122. 122.

    See Australian and Securities and Investment Commission. (2014). Report 421: ASIC Enforcement Outcomes: July to December 2014.

  123. 123.

    Lei, V., & Ramsay, I. (2014). Insider Trading Enforcement in Australia. Law and Financial Markets Review, 8(3), 214–226.

  124. 124.

    Bromberg, L., Gilligan, G., & Ramsay, I. (2017). The Extent and Intensity of insider Trading Enforcement—An International Comparison. Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 17(1), 73–110, 89.

  125. 125.

    Mitchell, S. (2014). Australia “Paradise” for White-Collar Criminals, Says ASIC Chairman Greg Medcraft. Sydney Morning Herald, available at: https://www.smh.com.au/business/australia-paradise-for-whitecollar-criminals-says-asic-chairman-greg-medcraft-20141021-119d99.html.

  126. 126.

    Senate Economic References Committee. (2017). “Lifting the Fear and Suppressing the Greed”: Penalties for White-Collar Crime and Corporate and Financial Misconduct in Australia, available at: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/WhiteCollarCrime45th/Report.

  127. 127.

    The Treasury, Australian Government. (2015). Fit for the Future: A Capability Review of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, available at: https://treasury.gov.au/publication/fit-for-the-future-a-capability-review-of-the-australian-securities-and-investments-commission.

  128. 128.

    The Treasury, Australian Government. (2017). ASIC Enforcement Review Taskforce 2017, available at: https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/ASIC-Enforcement-Review-Report.pdf.

  129. 129.

    The Treasury, Australian Government. (2018). Australian Government Response to the ASIC Enforcement Review Taskforce Report, available at: https://treasury.gov.au/publication/p2018-282438.

  130. 130.

    Gilligan, G. (2019). The Hayne Royal Commission—Just Another Piece of Official Discourse? Law and Financial Markets Review, 13(2–3), 114–123, 115.

  131. 131.

    Ibid., p. 116.

  132. 132.

    Hayne, K. M., Cosgrove, P., Orr, R., Hodge, M., Dinelli, A., Dias, E., & Costello, M. (2019). Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry. Commonwealth of Australia.

  133. 133.

    Ibid., p. 138.

  134. 134.

    Ibid., p. 426.

  135. 135.

    Letts, S. (2019). CBA Pleads Guilty to Criminal Breaches over Hawking Life Insurance Policies, 19 November, available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-11-19/cba-pleads-guilty-to-criminal-breachs-in-hawking-life-insurance/11717630.

  136. 136.

    Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2020A00003. See also: The Treasury, Australian Government. (2020). Implementation of ASIC Enforcement Review Taskforce—Directions Power, available at: https://treasury.gov.au/consultation/c2020-48919h.

  137. 137.

    AG’s Department, Australian Government. (2016). Improving Enforcement Options for Serious Corporate Crime: Consideration of a Deferred Prosecution Agreements Scheme in Australia, available at: https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/A-proposed-model-for-a-deferred-prosecution-agreement-scheme-in-australia.pdf.

  138. 138.

    See further: Campbell, L. (2019). Trying Corporations: Why Not Prosecute? Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 31(2), 269–291.

  139. 139.

    Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017, available at: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=s1108.

  140. 140.

    Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2019. See also: Campbell, L. (2021). Revisiting and Resituating Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Australia: Lessons from England and Wales. Sydney Law Review, 43(2), 187.

  141. 141.

    See McGrath, J. (2015). Corporate and White-Collar Crime in Ireland: A New Architecture of Regulatory Enforcement. Manchester University Press.

  142. 142.

    See McGrath, J. (2020). “Walk Softly and Carry No Stick”: Culture, Opportunity, and Irresponsible Risk-Taking in the Irish Banking Sector. European Journal of Criminology, 17(1), 86–105.

  143. 143.

    See Grennan, C., & Furlong, K. (2019). Ireland’s Long and Winding Road to Adequate Whistle-Blower Protection. In McGrath, J. ed., White-Collar Crime in Ireland: Law and Policy. Clarus Press.

  144. 144.

    See McGrath, J. (2018). Twenty Years Since the McDowell Report: A Reflection on the Powers and Performance of the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement. Irish Jurist, 60(60), 33–66.

  145. 145.

    ODCE. (2010). Submission on White-Collar Crime. Dublin: Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement, 2010, available at: http://www.odce.ie/Portals/0/EasyDNNNewsDocuments/525/ODCE_Submission_en_White_Collar_Crime_30-11-2010.pdf.

  146. 146.

    Law Reform Commission. (2016). Issues Paper: Regulatory Enforcement and Corporate Offences (LRC IP 8 - 2016).

  147. 147.

    Measures to Enhance Ireland's Corporate, Economic and Regulatory Framework, available at https://merrionstreet.ie/MerrionStreet/en/ImageLibrary/20171101_Measures_to_Enhance_Regulatory_Framework.pdf.

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    Law Reform Commission. (2018). Report: Regulatory Powers and Corporate Offences (LRC 119–2018).

  149. 149.

    Regling, K. & Watson, M. (2010). A Preliminary Report on the Irish Banking Crisis; Honohan, P. (2010). The Irish Banking Crisis and Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 2003–2008; a Report to the Minister for Finance by the Governor of the Central Bank. Central Bank of Ireland; Nyberg, P. (2011). Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland. Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland.

  150. 150.

    McGrath, J. (2018). Twenty Years Since the McDowell Report: A Reflection on the Powers and Performance of the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement. Irish Jurist, 60(60), 33–66.

  151. 151.

    McGrath, J. (2015). Corporate and White-Collar Crime in Ireland: A New Architecture of Regulatory Enforcement. Manchester University Press.

  152. 152.

    Ibid.

  153. 153.

    On 13th March 1995, following an investigation by the Central Bank of Ireland, The Wise Finance Company was convicted of breaching Section 27 of the Central Bank Act, 1971 and fined £150 at Dublin District Court. By contrast, over the past decade, the DPP has prosecuted some of Ireland’s most senior bankers for wrongdoing which came to light after the financial crisis. See further: McGrath, J. (2018). Twenty Years Since the McDowell Report: A Reflection on the Powers and Performance of the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement. Irish Jurist, 60(60), 33–66.

  154. 154.

    CBI. (2018). Response to the Law Reform Commission Issues Paper “Regulatory Enforcement and Corporate Offences”. Central Bank of Ireland, para. 37.

  155. 155.

    Appleby, P. (2010). Compliance and Enforcement—The ODCE Perspective. In Kilcommins, S., & Kilkelly, U., Regulatory Crime in Ireland. First Law, 177–191. See also: McGrath, J. Twenty Years Since the McDowell Report: A Reflection on the Powers and Performance of the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement. Irish Jurist, 60(60), 33–66; McGrath, J. (2015). Corporate and White-Collar Crime in Ireland: A New Architecture of Regulatory Enforcement. Manchester University Press.

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    Honohan P. (2010). The Irish Banking Crisis: Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy. Dublin: Central Bank, 55. See further: McGrath, J. (2020). “Walk Softly and Carry No Stick”: Culture, Opportunity, and Irresponsible Risk-Taking in the Irish Banking Sector. European Journal of Criminology, 17(1), 86–105.

  157. 157.

    McGrath, J. (2018). Twenty Years Since the McDowell Report: A Reflection on the Powers and Performance of the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement. Irish Jurist, 60(60), 33–66.

  158. 158.

    Central Bank of Ireland. (2009). Annual Report 2008. CBI, p. 77.

  159. 159.

    Central Bank of Ireland. (2020). Annual Report 2019 and Annual Performance Statement. CBI, p. 124.

  160. 160.

    Statement of Derville Rowland, available at: https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/oireachtas-tv/video-archive/committees/. For the figures as of 2019, see: The Case for the Senior Executive Accountability Regime—Director General, Financial Conduct Derville Rowland, 22 October 2019, available at: https://centralbank.ie/news/article/speech-senior-executive-accountability-regime-derville-rowland-22-oct-2019.

  161. 161.

    CBI. (2021). Enforcement Action Notice: Ulster Bank Ireland DAC reprimanded and fined €37,774,520 by the Central Bank of Ireland for regulatory breaches affecting tracker customers, available at: https://www.centralbank.ie/news/article/press-release-enforcement-action-notice-ulster-bank-reprimanded-and-fined-37-774-520-by-central-bank-of-ireland-for-regulatory-breaches-affecting-tracker-customers-25-march-2021.

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    Central Bank of Ireland. (2016). Annual Report 2015 (CBI), p. 34.

  163. 163.

    Lewis M. (2011). Boomerang: Travels in the New Third World. W. W. Norton, 84.

  164. 164.

    DPP v McAteer; Whelan and Fitzpatrick (Dublin Circuit Criminal Court), 31 July 2014; DPP v O'Mahoney [2016] IECA 111; DPP v Maguire [2015] IECA 350; DPP v Bowe [2017] IECA 250; People (DPP) v McAteer, Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, 23 January 2017; People (DPP) v Drumm (Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, 29 June 2018); People (DPP) v Drumm (Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, 10 July 2018).

  165. 165.

    McGrath, J. (2018). Twenty Years Since the McDowell Report: A Reflection on the Powers and Performance of the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement. Irish Jurist, 60(60), 33–66.

  166. 166.

    DPP v FitzPatrick (Circuit Criminal Court (Judge Aylmer), 23 July 2017), available at: https://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/sean-fitzpatrick-full-ruling.pdf.

  167. 167.

    See however the view of King, C., & Lord. N. (2020). Deferred Prosecution Agreements in England & Wales: Castles Made of Sand? Public Law, 307–330. They question whether the UK can really escalate to criminal prosecutions in appropriate cases for a variety of ideological and practical reasons.

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    Painter-Morland, M. (2006). Redefining Accountability as Relational Responsiveness. Journal of Business Ethics, 66(1), 89–98.

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    McGrath, J. (2021). Self-Deception as a Technique of Neutralisation: An Analysis of the Subjective Account of a White-Collar Criminal. Crime, Law and Social Change, 1–18; McGrath, J. (2020). “Walk Softly and Carry No Stick”: Culture, Opportunity, and Irresponsible Risk-Taking in the Irish Banking Sector. European Journal of Criminology, 17(1), 86–105.

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    Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, 22 September 1997, available at: https://www.bis.org/basel_framework/chapter/BCP/01.htm?inforce=20191215, paras. 01.72, 01.73.

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    Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (1999). Core Principles Methodology. BCSC, p. 16, available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs61.pdf.

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    Reserve Bank of Australia. (2001). Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision: Self-Assessment for Australia, available at: https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/1997/dec/1.html. For more on the background to the fit and proper test, see: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Completed_inquiries/2002-04/fslab/report/c02.

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    APRA. Fit and Proper Person Requirements: Consultation Paper, March 2004.

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    APRA. Discussion Paper: Fit and Proper Requirements, June 2005.

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    Pearson, G. (2009). Financial Services Law and Compliance in Australia. Cambridge University Press.

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    Peters, M. K. (2010). Corporate Governance of Australian Banking: A Lesson in Law Reform or Good Fortune? UNSW Australian School of Business Research Paper, p. 11 et passim, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1567726.

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    Financial Conduct Authority (2019). Enforcement Annual Performance Report 2018/19. FCA, p. 17, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/annual-report-2018-19-enforcement-performance.pdf.

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    Financial Conduct Authority. (2018). Final Notice Darren Cummings, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/darren-colvin-cummings-2018.pdf.

  180. 180.

    Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, Changing Banking for Good. (2013). The Stationery Office Limited, para. 55.

  181. 181.

    PCBS Report, Vol. II, para. 553.

  182. 182.

    PCBS Report, Vol. II, para. 555.

  183. 183.

    PCBS Report, Vol. II, para. 557.

  184. 184.

    PCBS Report, Vol. II, para. 564.

  185. 185.

    Dáil Eireann, Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service, Interim Report on the Policy of Commercial Banks concerning Customer Charges and (2005).

  186. 186.

    Honohan, P., Donovan, D., Gorecki, P., & Mottiar, R. (2010). The Irish Banking Crisis: Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy. Central Bank of Ireland, para. 4.27.

  187. 187.

    Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority. (2005). Financial Services Regulation: Comprehensive Framework of Standards for testing the probity and competence of Directors and Managers of Financial Services Firms, Consultation Paper 11. IFSRA; Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority. (2006). Second Consultation on Fit and Proper Test, Consultation Paper 15, IFSRA.

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    Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority. (2007). Consumer Protection with Innovation, Competitiveness and Competition. Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority. Annual Report of the Financial Regulator 2006, IFSRA.

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    Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority. (2008). Fit and Proper Requirements, Instructions Paper. IFSRA.

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    Central Bank Reform Act, 2010. Fitness and probity requirements for credit unions came into effect in 2013 and operated initially on a phased basis.

  191. 191.

    Central Bank Reform Act 2010, Section 21.

  192. 192.

    Central Bank Reform Act 2010, Section 20. The CBI’s list of CF roles is available at: https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/regulation/how-we-regulate/authorisation/fitness-probity/regulated-financial-service-providers/regulatory-requirements/gns-4-1-1-3-1-1-list-of-controlled-functions.pdf?sfvrsn=14.

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    Central Bank of Ireland. (2014). Fitness and Probity Standards (Code Issued Under Section 50 of the Central Bank Reform Act 2010), available at: https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/regulation/how-we-regulate/fitness-probity/regulated-financial-service-providers/fitness-and-probity-standards.pdf?sfvrsn=6. In addition to these Fitness and Probity Standards, at EU level certain fitness & probity requirements are imposed under EU law on credit institutions and certain investment firms, in particular under the EU Capital Requirements Directive, Directive 2013/36/EU (“CRDIV”) and Directive 2014/65/EU (“MiFID2”).

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    Minimum Competency Code. (2017). CBI, available at: https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/regulation/how-we-regulate/authorisation/minimum-competency/minimum-competency-code-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=4. See also, Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 (Section 48(1)) Minimum Competency Regulations 2017.

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    Central Bank Reform Act 2010, Section 22, 23. The CBI’s list of PCF roles is available at: https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/regulation/how-we-regulate/authorisation/fitness-probity/regulated-financial-service-providers/regulatory-requirements/gns-4-1-1-3-1-1-list-of-pre-approval-controlled-functions.pdf?sfvrsn=6.

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    Speech by Derville Rowland, Director General, Financial Conduct, CBI, 10 June 2021, available at: https://www.centralbank.ie/news/article/speech-importance-of-fitness-probity-and-ensuring-responsibility-derville-rowland-10-june-2021.

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    Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. See also, Guide to Fit and Proper Assessments, 2018, ECB; available at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.fap_guide_201705_rev_201805.en.pdf?3f4bf12e0963836b584ef40686cbe4c1. Also, ECB Consultation on Revised Guide to Fit and Proper Assessments, June 2021; available at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2021/html/ssm.pr210615~443208ce35.en.html.

  198. 198.

    Central Bank Reform Act 2010, Section 25.

  199. 199.

    Central Bank Reform Act 2010, Section 43.

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    See, CBI website: https://www.centralbank.ie/news-media/legal-notices/prohibition-notices.

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    Behaviour and Culture of the Irish Retail Banks, 2018, p. 32, available at: https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/publications/corporate-reports/behaviour-and-culture-of-the-irish-retail-banks.pdf?sfvrsn=2.

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    See further: O’Malley, T. (2019). Sentencing White-Collar and Corporate Crime. In McGrath, J. ed., White-Collar Crime in Ireland: Law and Policy. Clarus Press, 157–194.

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  1. Sutherland School of Law, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

    Joe McGrath

  2. Eversheds Sutherland, Dublin, Ireland

    Ciaran Walker

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McGrath, J., Walker, C. (2022). Generating Cultures of Compliance: The Limits of the “Big Stick”. In: New Accountability in Financial Services. Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88715-5_4

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