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\(\mathsf {FLOD}\): Oblivious Defender for Private Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning with Dishonest-Majority

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 12972)

Abstract

Privacy and Byzantine-robustness are two major concerns of federated learning (FL), but mitigating both threats simultaneously is highly challenging: privacy-preserving strategies prohibit access to individual model updates to avoid leakage, while Byzantine-robust methods require access for comprehensive mathematical analysis. Besides, most Byzantine-robust methods only work in the honest-majority setting.

We present \(\mathsf {FLOD}\), a novel oblivious defender for private Byzantine-robust FL in dishonest-majority setting. Basically, we propose a novel Hamming distance-based aggregation method to resist \(>1/2\) Byzantine attacks using a small root-dataset and server-model for bootstrapping trust. Furthermore, we employ two non-colluding servers and use additive homomorphic encryption (\(\mathsf {AHE}\)) and secure two-party computation (2PC) primitives to construct efficient privacy-preserving building blocks for secure aggregation, in which we propose two novel in-depth variants of Beaver Multiplication triples (MT) to reduce the overhead of Bit to Arithmetic (\(\mathsf {Bit2A}\)) conversion and vector weighted sum aggregation (\(\mathsf {VSWA}\)) significantly. Experiments on real-world and synthetic datasets demonstrate our effectiveness and efficiency: (i) \(\mathsf {FLOD}\) defeats known Byzantine attacks with a negligible effect on accuracy and convergence, (ii) achieves a reduction of \(\approx \)2\(\times \) for offline (resp. online) overhead of \(\mathsf {Bit2A}\) and \(\mathsf {VSWA}\) compared to \(\mathsf {ABY}\)-\(\mathsf {AHE}\) (resp. \(\mathsf {ABY}\)-\(\mathsf {MT}\)) based methods (NDSS’15), (iii) and reduces total online communication and run-time by 167–1416\(\times \) and 3.1–7.4\(\times \) compared to \(\mathsf {FLGUARD}\) (Crypto Eprint 2021/025).

Keywords

  • Privacy-preserving
  • Byzantine-robust
  • Federated Learning
  • Dishonest-majority

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comprehensive comments. This work was supported by the Strategic Priority Research Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Grant No. XDC02040400.

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Correspondence to Xiaojun Chen .

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Appendices

A Byzantine-Robustness Analysis

Cosine similarity is one of the best metrics to measure the similarity of two vectors. Recall the cosine similarity of two \(\mathsf {sgn}\) \(\widetilde{\mathbf {w}_i}\) and \(\widetilde{\mathbf {w}_s}\) is \( c_i = \frac{\langle \widetilde{\mathbf {w}_i}, \widetilde{\mathbf {w}_s}\rangle }{\Vert \widetilde{\mathbf {w}_i}\Vert \cdot \Vert \widetilde{\mathbf {w}_s}\Vert } \), and \(\mathsf {FLTrust}\) clips \(c_i\) using \(\mathrm ReLU\) function to remove the poisoned model updates with negative \(c_i\) [11]. Based on \(\widetilde{\mathbf {w}_i}\), \(\widetilde{\mathbf {w}_s}\) in \(\{-1,1\}^d\) and Eq. (2, 3), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} c_i&=\frac{\sum _{j=1}^d \widetilde{w_{ij}}\cdot \widetilde{w_{sj}}}{\sqrt{d}\cdot \sqrt{d}}=\frac{1}{d}\cdot (\sum _{j=1}^d (1-2\mathcal {E}(\widetilde{w_{ij}}))\cdot (1-2\mathcal {E}(\widetilde{w_{sj}})))\\&= 1 -\frac{2}{d}\cdot (\sum _{j=1}^d(\mathcal {E}(\widetilde{w_{ij}})+\mathcal {E}(\widetilde{w_{sj}})-2\mathcal {E}(\widetilde{w_{ij}})\mathcal {E}(\widetilde{w_{sj}})))\\&= 1 - \frac{2}{d}\cdot (\sum _{j=1}^d\mathcal {E}(\widetilde{w_{ij}})\oplus \mathcal {E}(\widetilde{w_{sj}})) = 1-2\frac{hd_i}{d}. \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, we have \(c_i>0 \Leftrightarrow 1-2\cdot \frac{hd_i}{d}>0\Leftrightarrow hd_i<\frac{d}{2}\). Therefore, with \(\tau = \frac{d}{2}\) we have \(\nu _i>0 \Leftrightarrow c_i>0\), which means \(\tau \)-clipping Hamming distance-based method is capable to exclude the poisoned \(\mathsf {sgn}\) model updates equivalent to that the cosine similarity-based method achieved. What is more, our \(\tau \)-clipping Hamming distance-based method is more flexible than the cosine similarity-based one since we can alter \(\tau \) for different tasks to achieve the best Byzantine-robustness.

B Proof of Theorem 1

Proof (of Theorem 1)

The universal composability framework [10] guarantees the security of arbitrary composition of different protocols. Therefore, we only need to prove the security of individual protocols. We give the proof of the security under the semi-honest model in the real-ideal paradigm [10].

Privacy of \(\mathsf {CXOR}\). There is nothing to simulate as the protocol is non-interactive.

Privacy of \(\mathsf {PCBit2A}\). In offline phase, \(P_0\)’s view in real-world is composed of \(\{ \mathbf {x}_i, \mathbf {r}_i,\mathbf {x}_i', \mathbf {r}_i', \mathsf {AHE.Enc}_{\mathrm{pk}_0}(\mathbf {y}_{i})\}\). To simulate it in ideal-world, the \(\mathsf {Sim}\) can simply return \(\{\mathbf {\Delta }_i^x,\mathbf {\Delta }_i^r, \mathbf {\Delta }_i^{x'},\mathbf {\Delta }_i^{r'}, \mathsf {AHE.Enc}_{\mathrm{pk}^{'}_0}([0,0,...,0])\}\) where \(\mathbf {\Delta }_i^x,\mathbf {\Delta }_i^r, \mathbf {\Delta }_i^{x'},\mathbf {\Delta }_i^{r'}\) are chosen from \(\mathcal {R}^d\) at random and \(\mathrm{pk}'_0\) is generated by \(\mathsf {Sim}\). Due to the semantic security of \(\mathsf {AHE}\), these two views are computationally indistinguishable from each other. And \(P_1\)’s view in real execution can also be simulated by \(\mathsf {Sim}\) which outputs two random vectors in \(\mathcal {R}^d\) since the real-world view \(\{\boldsymbol{\xi }_{i}, \boldsymbol{\xi }'_{i}\}\) are masked by random vectors \(\mathbf {r}_{i}\) and \(\mathbf {r}'_{i}\). In online, the output of \(\mathsf {Sim}\) for corrupted \(P_t\) is one share which is uniformly chosen from \(\mathcal {R}^d\), and thus \(P_t\)’s view in the real-world is also indistinguishable from that in ideal-world.

Privacy of Private \(\tau \)-\(\mathsf {Clipping}\). As the underlying garbled circuits are secure, \(P_t\)’s view composed of labels in real-world is indistinguishable from the ideal-world view, which comprises of simulated labels.

Privacy of \(\mathsf {CSWA}\). In the offline, the view of \(P_t\) in the real-world is computationally indistinguishable from the ideal-world view because of the semantic security of \(\mathsf {AHE}\). Moreover, in the online, the real-world view of \(P_t\) is also masked random values. \(\mathsf {Sim}\) can simulate it with random values of the same size.

Therefore, we guarantee that the adversary \(\mathcal {A}^s\) (when corrupts \(P_0\)) learns nothing beyond what can be inferred from the aggregated results (\(\sum _{i=1}^K \langle \nu _i \widetilde{\mathbf {w}_i}\rangle ^\mathsf {A}_t\), \(\sum _{i=1}^K \langle \nu _i\rangle ^\mathsf {A}_t\)) with an overwhelming probability. Completing the proof.

C MA of ResNet-18 on CIFAR10 with Altering \(\delta \)

Fig. 8.
figure 8

MA of ResNet-18 on CIFAR10 with \(\delta =10\%\)\(90\%\) for all Byzantine-robust aggregation methods, where 8(a) is for GA and 8(b) is for LF.

D Online Overhead of Free-HD and Private \(\tau \)-Clipping

Table 4. Comm. and Run-time of \(\mathsf {Free-HD}\) and Private \(\tau \)-\(\mathsf {Clipping}\).

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Dong, Y., Chen, X., Li, K., Wang, D., Zeng, S. (2021). \(\mathsf {FLOD}\): Oblivious Defender for Private Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning with Dishonest-Majority. In: Bertino, E., Shulman, H., Waidner, M. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2021. ESORICS 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12972. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88418-5_24

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