Skip to main content

Questions of Sincerity in Cooperative Polls

  • 348 Accesses

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNISA,volume 12983)

Abstract

Online tools like Doodle polls are frequently used for meeting coordination and other decentralized cooperative decision-making. Since Doodle polls are a form of approval voting, theoretical results from voting theory often underpin work in this area. Sincerity, where a voter never says yes to a less-preferred option without saying yes to all more preferable choices, is a common assumption in approval voting. However, that does not take into account cooperative behavior sometimes exhibited by users when others’ responses are known. We conduct a user study investigating the extent to which college-student participants in Doodle-style polls were sincere, reporting on responses from one institution.

Keywords

  • Approval voting
  • Doodle polls
  • Sincerity

A Sam Taylor Fellowship Fund grant compensated study participants. Southwestern University’s High-Impact Experience Fund supported student research assistants.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-88207-5_2
  • Chapter length: 7 pages
  • Instant PDF download
  • Readable on all devices
  • Own it forever
  • Exclusive offer for individuals only
  • Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout
eBook
USD   59.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • ISBN: 978-3-030-88207-5
  • Instant PDF download
  • Readable on all devices
  • Own it forever
  • Exclusive offer for individuals only
  • Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout
Softcover Book
USD   79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
Fig. 1.

References

  1. Alrawi, D., Anthony, B.M., Chung, C.: How well do doodle polls do? In: Social Informatics of the 8th International Conference, pp. 3–23 (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Anthony, B.M., Chung, C.: How bad is selfish doodle voting? In: Proceedings of the 17th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, pp. 1856–1858 (2018)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Anthony, B.M., Chung, C.: Equilibria in doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules. Theor. Comput. Sci. 822, 61–71 (2020)

    MathSciNet  CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  4. Brams, S.J., Fishburn, P.C.: Approval Voting. Birkhauser, Boston (1983)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Brams, S.J., Sanver, M.R.: Critical strategies under approval voting: who gets ruled in and ruled out. Elect. Stud. 25(2), 287–305 (2006)

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  6. Endriss, U.: Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting. Theor. Decis. 74(3), 335–355 (2013)

    MathSciNet  CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  7. Obraztsova, S., Polukarov, M., Rabinovich, Z., Elkind, E.: Doodle poll games. In: 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, pp. 876–884 (2017)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Reinecke, K., Nguyen, M.K., Bernstein, A., Näf, M., Gajos, K.Z.: Doodle around the world: online scheduling behavior reflects cultural differences in time perception and group decision-making. In: 2013 Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, pp. 45–54 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Zou, J., Meir, R., Parkes, D.: Strategic voting behavior in doodle polls. In: 18th Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, pp. 464–472 (2015)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Barbara M. Anthony .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

M. Anthony, B., Galvez, M., Ojonta, C. (2021). Questions of Sincerity in Cooperative Polls. In: Luo, Y. (eds) Cooperative Design, Visualization, and Engineering. CDVE 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12983. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88207-5_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88207-5_2

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-88206-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-88207-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)