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Embracing Scientific Realism pp 1–22Cite as

In Defense of the No-Miracles Argument

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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 445))

Abstract

Both semantic realism and epistemic realism inhere in Putnam’s no-miracles argument (NMA). Laudan’s objection to realism is compatible with both semantic and epistemic realism. To reject the NMA for the reason that the success of science does not cry out for explanation is to violate the basic rule for evaluating an argument. Some antirealists reject inference to the best explanation, but they use it themselves to establish their own philosophical hypotheses. It is incoherent for antirealists to appeal to evolutionary theory and a psychological hypothesis as a way to discredit realism. Realism is not an ad hoc hypothesis because it explains not only the phenomenon that it was designed to explain but also another phenomenon. It is circular to explain success in terms of empirical adequacy. Surrealism inadequately attributes the success of a scientific theory to the behavior of observables. Predictive similarity is an unsatisfactory explanans for explaining success.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A theory has manipulative power when it helps us intervene in natural processes.

  2. 2.

    I drop “approximately” hereafter for the sake of brevity.

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  1. School of Liberal Arts, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Ulsan, Korea (Republic of)

    Seungbae Park

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Park, S. (2022). In Defense of the No-Miracles Argument. In: Embracing Scientific Realism. Synthese Library, vol 445. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87813-9_1

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