Skip to main content

Racialized Sexual Discrimination: A Moral Right or Morally Wrong?

  • 241 Accesses

Abstract

Many people claim that we have the right to act on our sexual preferences, including racialized sexual preferences, because doing so isn’t harmful, and even if it were harmful, this wouldn’t matter because either our “right” to act on our sexual preferences outweighs the harm and/or we cannot even control our sexual preferences. Against this view, Cheryl Abbate argues that (1) when white people act on anti-Black sexual preferences, white people harm Black people insofar as they reduce their objective welfare level, and (2) we can in fact, to some degree, control our racialized sexual preferences. This leads Abbate to conclude that white people don’t have even a prima facie right to act on anti-Black sexual preferences.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Buying options

Chapter
GBP   19.95
Price includes VAT (United Kingdom)
  • DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-87786-6_25
  • Chapter length: 16 pages
  • Instant PDF download
  • Readable on all devices
  • Own it forever
  • Exclusive offer for individuals only
  • Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout
eBook
GBP   119.50
Price includes VAT (United Kingdom)
  • ISBN: 978-3-030-87786-6
  • Instant PDF download
  • Readable on all devices
  • Own it forever
  • Exclusive offer for individuals only
  • Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout
Hardcover Book
GBP   149.99
Price includes VAT (United Kingdom)

Notes

  1. 1.

    For a defense of this position, see Kershnar (2018). Halwani (2017), too, suggests that people with racialized sexual desires are like people with other sexual preferences.

  2. 2.

    The term sexual racism appears in Callander et al. 2015 and Coleman 2011. See Stember 1978, pg. (xi) for his definition of sexual racism.

  3. 3.

    See Anderson et al. 2014.

  4. 4.

    For the use of this terminology, see Hutson et al. 2018.

  5. 5.

    See Mills 1994 for his discussion of white endogamy.

  6. 6.

    For more on the topic of the immorality of racial fetishization, see Zheng (2016).

  7. 7.

    See Wynne 2020.

  8. 8.

    See Brown 2018.

  9. 9.

    See Paul et al. 2010; Wade and Harper 2020.

  10. 10.

    See Brennan et al. 2013.

  11. 11.

    See Wade and Harper 2020 for a discussion about the negative effects of racialized sexual discrimination. Relatedly, white people are more likely to casually date or have sex with racial minorities than they are to marry them, which reinforces the harmful message that racial minorities are a “type” or an “experience” (West 2020).

  12. 12.

    And it’s worth noting that P1 itself is problematic. While racialized intimate preferences are preferences, they may not be personal, as they often are a product of social and cultural influence.

  13. 13.

    See Kershnar 2018, pg. 244 for his discussion about our alleged inability to control our sexual preferences.

  14. 14.

    See Coleman 2011 pg. 13 for his discussion of sexual goods

  15. 15.

    See Laumann and Yoom 1999 for a discussion about the “intraracial network effect.”

  16. 16.

    This point is made in Hutson et al. 2018.

  17. 17.

    See Huemer 2003.

  18. 18.

    If I am lied to by my partner, I cannot make fully autonomous romantic decisions, insofar as I am lacking information that is necessary for me to make informed decisions about my romantic activities.

  19. 19.

    See Regan 1983 for this example.

  20. 20.

    And perhaps we have a right, or even a moral obligation, to interfere with her drug use.

  21. 21.

    See Abbate 2020 for my prior discussion of the ethics of racialized discrimination in the dating context.

  22. 22.

    See Davis 2007 for his discussion of “lookism.”

  23. 23.

    It may be permissible to harm others (i.e., it may be permissible to reduce the objective welfare level of others) when competing rights are at stake. So, sometimes harming others doesn’t amount to wronging them. But because there is no such thing as a “right” to disrespect the personhood of others (such as by treating them as a mere means), disrespecting the personhood of others is always a harm that is wrong.

  24. 24.

    See Liu 2015.

  25. 25.

    See Hellman 2008.

  26. 26.

    Law, too, recognizes this distinction: it identifies race as a protected class but not things like hair color.

  27. 27.

    This point is made in Mills 1994.

  28. 28.

    See Gallup 2013.

  29. 29.

    See YouGov 2018 and Skinner and Hudac 2017.

  30. 30.

    This point can be found in Mills 1994.

  31. 31.

    This point can be found in Mills 1994.

  32. 32.

    See Hutson et al. 2018.

  33. 33.

    See Marway 2018 and Mills 1994 for further discussion of Eurocentric beauty ideals.

  34. 34.

    See Moreland and Beach 1992.

  35. 35.

    See Buss 1985, Little et al. 2006, and McPherson et al. 2001.

  36. 36.

    And if our segregation practices, in part, influence our racialized preferences, then we can partially control our sexualized preferences and thus can be held at least partially accountable for both having and acting on these desires.

  37. 37.

    See Dixon 2008 and Okantah 2016.

  38. 38.

    See Hergovich and Ortega 2018.

  39. 39.

    Intimate platforms arguably have a corresponding legal duty based on Public Accommodation Law. For instance, if intimate platforms continually permit users to exclude Black people, there’s a sense in which these platforms are saying “I’m open to the public and provide this social good, but not to Black people.” This argument, however, does not apply to intimate platforms that are open only to racial minorities, since the persons who are excluded by these platforms (white people) aren’t members of a protected class.

  40. 40.

    I also cannot thoroughly explore the question of whether these online dating platforms should be regulated by the courts and legislators. I suspect that there is a compelling argument in favor of such a proposal.

  41. 41.

    See Sigelman et al. 1996.

References

  • Abbate, C. 2020. It’s Not Just a Personal Preference: Racialized Discrimination in the Tinder Context. In College Ethics, ed. B. Fischer, 142–154. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, A., S. Goel, G. Huber, N. Malhotra, and D. Watts. 2014. Political Ideology and Racial Preferences in Online Dating. Sociological Science 1: 28–40.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Brennan, D., K. Asakura, C. George, P. Newman, S. Giwa, T. Hart, and G. Betancourt. 2013. ‘Never Reflected Anywhere’: Body Image Among Ethnoracialized Gay and Bisexual Men. Body Image 10: 389–398.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Buss, D. 1985. Human Mate Selection. American Scientist 73: 47–51.

    Google Scholar 

  • Callander, D., C. Newman, and M. Holt. 2015. Is Sexual Racism Really Racism? Distinguishing Attitudes toward Sexual Racism and Generic Racism among Gay and Bisexual Men. Arch Sex Behav 44 (7): 1991–2000.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Coleman, N. 2011. What? What? In the (Black) Butt. APA newsletter on Philosophy and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender issues 11: 12–15.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis, A. 2007. ‘Lookism’, Common Schools, Respect and Democracy. Philosophy of Education 41 (4): 811–827.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Dixon, T. 2008. Crime News and Racialized Beliefs: Understanding the Relationship between Local News Viewing and Perceptions of African Americans and Crime. Journal of Communication 58: 106–125.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Gallup. 2013. In U.S., 87% Approve of Black-White Marriage, vs. 4% in 1958. Retrieved from:https://news.gallup.com/poll/163697/approve-marriage-blacks-whites.aspx (Accessed September 18, 2020).

  • Halwani, R. 2017. Racial Sexual Desires. In The Philosophy of Sex, ed. R. Halwani, A. Soble, and S. Hoffman, 7th ed. Washington, DC: Rowman and Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hellman, D. 2008. When is Discrimination Wrong? Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hergovich, P. and J. Ortega. 2018. The Strength of Absent Ties: Social Integration via Online Dating. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3044766 (Accessed September 18, 2020).

  • Huemer, M. 2003. Is There a Right to Own a Gun? Social Theory and Practice 29 (2): 297–324.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Hutson, J., J. Taft, S. Barocas, and K. Levy. 2018. Debiasing Desire: Addressing Bias and Discrimination on Intimate Platforms. Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact. 2 (73): 1–18.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Kershnar, S. 2018. In Defense of Asian Romantic Preference. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (2): 243–256.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Laumann, E., and Y. Yoom. 1999. Racial/Ethnic Group Differences in the Prevalence of Sexually Transmitted Diseases in the United States: A Network Explanation. Sexually Transmitted Diseases 26 (5): 250–261.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Little, A., D. Burt, and D. Perrett. 2006. Assortative Mating for Perceived Facial Personality Traits. Personality and Individual Differences 40: 973–984.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Liu, X. 2015. No Fats, Femmes, or Asians. Moral Philosophy and Politics 2 (2): 1.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • McPherson, M., L. Smith-Lovin, and J. Cook. 2001. Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks. Annual Review of Sociology 27 (1): 415–444.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Mills, C. 1994. Do Black Men Have a Moral Duty to Marry Black Women? Journal of Social Philosophy 25: 131–153.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Moreland, R., and S. Beach. 1992. Exposure Effects in the Classroom: The Development of Affinity among Students. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 28 (3): 255–276.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Okantah, M. 2016. In Search of the Real Brother Man: An African Centered Approach to Black Cultural Identity. Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies 9: 411–423.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paul, J., G. Ayala, and K. Choi. 2010. Internet Sex Ads for MSM and Partner Selection Criteria: The Potency of Race/Ethnicity Online. Journal of Sex Research 47: 528–538.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Regan, T. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Skinner, A., and C. Hudac. 2017. ‘Yuck, You Disgust Me!’ Affective Bias against Interracial Couples. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 68: 68–77.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Stember, C. 1978. Sexual Racism: The Emotional Barrier to an Integrated Society. New York: Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wade, R., and G. Harper. 2020. Racialized Sexual Discrimination (RSD) in the Age of Online Sexual Networking: Are Young Black Gay/Bisexual Men (YBGBM) at Elevated Risk for Adverse Psychological Health? Am J Community Psychol 65 (3-4): 504–523.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • West, K. 2020. Interethnic Bias in Willingness to Engage in Casual Sex Versus Committed Relationships. The Journal of Sex Research 57 (4): 409–420.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Wynne, G. 2020. Racial Fetishization Is A Big Problem Online. Here's What Dating Apps & Users Can Do. Bustle. Retrieved from: https://www.bustle.com/wellness/racial-fetishization-big-problem-online-what-dating-apps-users-can-do (Accessed October 1, 2020).

  • YouGov. 2018. The Economist/YouGov Poll. Retrieved from:https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/y3tke5cxwy/econTabReport.pdf (Accessed September 18, 2020).

  • Zheng, R. 2016. Why Yellow Fever isn’t Flattering: A Case against Racial Fetishes. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (3): 400–419.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Cheryl Abbate .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Abbate, C. (2022). Racialized Sexual Discrimination: A Moral Right or Morally Wrong?. In: Boonin, D. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Sexual Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87786-6_25

Download citation