Abstract
Based on insights from the interviews conducted with the two study groups, former POWs and long-term meditators, this chapter presents a static structure of human consciousness. Fundamentally, my goal is to present a model of consciousness that seriously considers the subjective experience. This chapter suggests that consciousness can be broken down into two parts: Whereas the lower part can be defined as the emotional-schematic-implicit-temporal part, the upper part is feeling-explicit-autobiographical-accessible-verbal. The gap between them can be defined in terms of the pre-reflective self-consciousness level vs. the reflective self-consciousness level. This chapter explores both levels of consciousness and the interaction between them focusing mainly on the way our body is thrown into the world and shapes our existence.
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Notes
- 1.
Merleau-Ponty (1968, p. 147) emphasized that “what we are calling flesh, this interiorly worked-over mass, has no name in any philosophy.”
- 2.
At least in western-monotheistic cultures.
- 3.
Even if chimpanzees pass the mirror test, this in itself does not prove that they have introspective capabilities.
- 4.
- 5.
This phenomenon should be examined on a certain spectrum, and of course the emotional experience can differ depending on the level of autism.
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Ataria, Y. (2022). Embodied Consciousness. In: Consciousness in Flesh. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86834-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86834-5_3
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