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AERM: An Attribute-Aware Economic Robust Spectrum Auction Mechanism

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Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications (WASA 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 12939))

Abstract

The lack of radio spectrum resources and low resource utilization have always been existing problems. Current researchers usually use spectrum auctions to improve the utilization of radio spectrum. The existing auction mechanisms rarely consider the attributes of the radio frequency spectrums, which is likely to cause problems that it cannot meet user needs. Based on the double auction mechanism, we propose an auction mechanism perceiving spectrum attributes to solve this problem. This mechanism can improve the satisfaction of secondary users, provide a certain incentive for high-quality service providers, and at the same time reuse spectrums. The economic robustness of the auction mechanism is of great importance. The auction mechanism proposed in this paper satisfies the three economic properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, and ex-post budget balance, so it is economically robust.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://www.fcc.gov/auctions-summary.

  2. 2.

    https://github.com/PiggerZZM/SpectrumAuction.

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Acknowledgments

This research was sponsored by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 6217020594, 61571049).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Artificial Intelligence, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China

    Zhuoming Zhu, Shengling Wang & Rongfang Bie

  2. Department of Computer Science, The George Washington University, Washington D.C., 20052, USA

    Xiuzhen Cheng

Authors
  1. Zhuoming Zhu
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  2. Shengling Wang
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  3. Rongfang Bie
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  4. Xiuzhen Cheng
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rongfang Bie .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, China

    Zhe Liu

  2. Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

    Fan Wu

  3. Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, MO, USA

    Sajal K. Das

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Zhu, Z., Wang, S., Bie, R., Cheng, X. (2021). AERM: An Attribute-Aware Economic Robust Spectrum Auction Mechanism. In: Liu, Z., Wu, F., Das, S.K. (eds) Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications. WASA 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12939. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86137-7_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86137-7_16

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-86136-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-86137-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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