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Can Antitrust Trust Blockchain?

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Part of the Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship book series (EALELS,volume 12)

Abstract

Although blockchain is decentralized by designed, today this technology is in practice in the hands of few corporations—antitrust can be crucial in restoring blockchain’s decentralization. Having provided a toolkit to navigate into the blockchain ecosystem of Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT), Section 3 investigates the relation between competition and blockchain. Is blockchain the real game-changer for today’s centralized digital markets? Section 3 explores the exploitation of DLT as a tool to enforce antitrust principles more efficiently in today’s tech-digital economy. In particular, it will be analyzed if blockchain and DLT, in general, can be considered as revolutionary progress also in the context of antitrust. Section 4 bears the question as to whether blockchain raises antitrust concerns and how to deal with them. Technologies are not the driver of anticompetitive conduct, but forms of government surveillance, such as antitrust, are fundamental for keeping people’s trust in new advanced technologies.

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Correspondence to Giovanna Massarotto .

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Massarotto, G. (2022). Can Antitrust Trust Blockchain?. In: Portuese, A. (eds) Algorithmic Antitrust. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85859-9_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85859-9_6

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