1 Total Fertility Rate (TFR)

The total fertility rate (TFR) refers to the number of children that would be borne to a woman if she was to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with age-specific fertility rates of the specified year.

Figure 4.1a, b depict TFRs for SEA countries as of 2014. “Low-fertility countries” are defined as those with TFRs below the population replacement rate of 2.1, while “high-fertility countries” are those with TFRs above 2.1.

Fig. 4.1
figure 1

a TFR of low-fertility countries in Souheast Asia, 2014, b TFR of high-fertility countries in Southeast Asia, 2014. Source World Bank database on Health Nutrition and Population Statistics accessed on 25 October 2016. Data for Singapore (2000) sourced from UN Population Division (UNPD) World Fertility Data 2015 accessed on 2 November 2016

Most SEA countries have been experiencing steady declines in TFRs, reflecting a global trend in falling TFR (Lippman & Wilcox, 2015). In 1960, many SEA countries had TFRs around 5–7 but they have all dropped to below 3.0 by 2014, except Timor-Leste. The TFRs for Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam have fallen below the population replacement rate of 2.1 since the early 2000s, while Singapore’s TFR fell below replacement level since 1975 and Thailand’s TFR reached replacement around 1990. Singapore and Thailand’s TFR remains the lowest in the region at 1.25 and 1.51 in 2014. The fertility decline in these countries can be attributed to several factors: (1) rising costs of childbearing, be it financial expenses and/or opportunity costs borne by women with interrupted career development; (2) growing societal pressure for women to ensure their children “succeed” in life via “intensive parenting”; and (3) “work–life balance” issues for mothers juggling work and household demands and responsibilities (Jones, 2013, p. 13). In Thailand, the decline in fertility arose from the success of the Thai government’s policies in the 1970s encouraging voluntary family planning, with Buddhist values and monks employed to promote women’s reproductive autonomy via supporting the use of contraception (Rigg, 2012).

By contrast, Singapore’s TFR experienced a brief incline from 1.61 in 1985 to 1.87 in 1990 but fell again to 1.71 in 1995 and has steadily declined ever since. The country has been ranked by the UN as 4th out of the top 10 lowest fertility countries or areas in the world for 2010–2015, with the first 3 being Taiwan, Macao, and Hong Kong (United Nations, 2015, p. 7). Frequently reported struggles of balancing work and family due to limited workplace flexibility, alongside financial constraints, and the desire to pursue other forms of fulfilment in life have made Singaporean women more reluctant to have children (Call et al., 2008; Yeung & Hu, 2018). While Singapore’s latest TFR has experienced a slow increase from 1.15 in 2010 to 1.25 in 2014, its overall TFR since the mid-1970s has remained very low and is unlikely to increase dramatically within the next decade barring immigration given the size of citizen childbearing-age women will start to shrink and the increasing singleness and permanent childlessness rates in the country.

Despite experiencing overall falls in TFRs, the majority of SEA countries still have relatively high-fertility rates, particularly Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Timor-Leste. The TFRs for these three countries experienced decades of increase before beginning to decline. These drops in fertility resulted from family planning policies in these countries, alongside other factors such as trauma experienced during the Khmer Rouge years in Cambodia, and the small population size and large land resources in Lao PDR (Jones, 2013, p. 30). The Philippines did not experience such drastic changes to its TFR, having undergone a gradual decline since the 1960s with its TFR remained comparatively high at 2.98 in 2014 due to the influence of Catholicism that restricts the use of contraceptives. The TFR in Myanmar reached 2.1 in 2014.

From 1980 to 2014, Timor-Leste experienced the steepest fluctuations in TFR in the region. Its TFR rose sharply from 5.3 in 1990 to 7.11 in 2000 representing a post-war baby boom. Subsequently, TFR fell to 5.10 in 2014. The high-fertility rates in Timor-Leste are related to the country’s low socioeconomic development as shown earlier in its low GDP per capita, high poverty rate, low education, and low FLFP level. In 2010, fertility rates remained highest among Timorese women living in poverty, in rural areas, and/or with lower levels of education but have been declining over time among those with higher socioeconomic status due to increased use of, and access to, modern contraception (Bank, 2011). Another reason for Timor-Leste’s high-fertility rate has to do with its culture. The 2003 Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) showed that the majority of Timorese women desired high numbers of children—half the women who had reached the end of their reproductive years in 2003 having given birth to 5.9 children, of whom 4.9 were still alive, wanted more children. This can be seen in the significantly higher number of ideal children shown in Fig. 4.9 in a later section.

2 Mean Age at Childbearing (MAC)

The mean age at childbearing (MAC) refers to the mean age of mothers at the birth of their children if women were subject throughout their lives to the age-specific fertility rates observed in a given year. Note that the calculation of MAC only includes women who have children. Figure 4.2a, b illustrate the MAC in Southeast Asia from 1960 to 2010. The mean age of mothers at the birth of their children is shown both for all births and also for first births only.

Fig. 4.2
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a SEA countries with increasing, or little change in, MAC (as of 2010–2015), b SEA countries with decreasing MAC (as of 2010–2015). Source Accessed on 23 November 2016. Notes Each label in the y-axis represents a 5-year period, e.g. “1960” refers to the period between 1960 and 1965. The data refer to five-year periods running from 1 July to 30 June of the initial and final years

Four countries have had the MCA at 30 or later since 2000—Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, and Timor-Leste. Echoing the shift towards postponement of first birth in most OECD countries, and following the success of anti-natalist policies to control population growth from the mid-1960s (Call et al., 2008), the MAC in Singapore has been continuously increasing from 28.2 in 1975–1980, to 31.2 in 2010–2015. While Malaysia’s MAC remained at a plateau (around 29) from the 1960s to the 1980s, by 1995–2000, the MAC had risen above 30 and has continued to hover around that increased range of 0.5. Myanmar’s MAC has been around 30 since the 1980s, from 30.0 in 1980–1985 to 30.5 in 2010–2015. Malaysia and Myanmar’s increasing MAC among women reflects similar trends of rapidly rising SMAM, at 25.7 and 26.1 years, respectively, as of 2010 (see Fig. 2.12a).

Although a shift towards delayed childbearing has been observed in many OECD countries, Fig. 4.2b reveals that women in almost half of Southeast Asia are increasingly giving birth at a younger age. Since the 1970s, the MAC in Thailand and Vietnam has decreased exponentially—from 30.2 and 31.8, respectively, in 1970–1975, to 27.1 for both countries in 2010–2015—the lowest in the region. For Cambodia and Lao PDR, the decline in MAC began later between the late 1980s and early 1990s, before falling rapidly across the 1990s to 2010s. Currently, their MAC stands at 27.6 for Cambodia and 27.7 for Lao PDR. These falling rates for MAC correspond with increasing levels of adolescent fertility in said countries, to be described later in Sect. 4.4. Timor-Leste’s MAC increased from the early 1990s to the 2000s but the number has recently started decreasing since 2000.

The exception to these trends of increasing or decreasing MAC is Indonesia. Its numbers have remained relatively unchanged across the past 40 years, from 28.3 in 1970–1975 to 28.2 in 2010–2015.

3 Age-Specific Fertility Rates (ASFR)

Age-specific fertility rates (ASFR) refer to the number of births to women in a particular age group, divided by the number of women in that age group. Figure 4.3a, b show the latest age-specific fertility rates between 2010 and 2015, categorized based on countries’ latest TFR.

Fig. 4.3
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a ASFRs in high-fertility countries (as of 2010–2015), by age group, b ASFRs in low-fertility countries (as of 2010–2015), by age group. Source UNPD World Population Prospects, the 2015 Revision accessed on 23 November 2016

While a global shift in delayed childbearing has been reported around the world, most women in SEA continue to give birth in their peak fertility periods between their early to late 20 s. The exception to this trend is Malaysia, Myanmar, and Singapore, where more women appear to be giving birth between their late 20 s and early 30 s. In Malaysia and Myanmar, current fertility rates among 25–29 and 30–34-year olds are the highest among all age groups. Current fertility rates among Malaysian women aged 25–29 are more than double the rates of 20–24-year olds. In Singapore, the current fertility rate of 30–34-year olds is the highest among all age groups and the current fertility rate among 25–29-year-old women is triple that for 20–24-year olds.

Figure 4.4 shows the ASFRs by five-year age groups for 1970–1975, 1990–1995, and 2010–2015. The changes are more on the levels of fertility rather than the shape of the age-specific curves. In almost all SEA countries, current fertility rates among 20–24, 25–29, and 30–34-year-old women are much lower than they were in 1970. Much of the decline in births among women in their 20s occurred between 1970 and 1990. In Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Malaysia, the fertility rates for women fell at a drastic pace from the 1990s onwards. Conversely, age-specific fertility patterns in Timor-Leste have remained relatively stable from the 1970s to 2010s. In Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam, the change in age-specific fertility rates is relatively small between the 1990s and 2010s.

Fig. 4.4
figure 4figure 4

Age-specific fertility rates in 1970–1975, 1990–1995, and 2010–2015. Source UNPD World Population Prospects, the 2015 Revision accessed on 23 November 2016

4 Adolescent Fertility Rates

Adolescent fertility rates refer to births per 1000 women aged 15–19 years old in the population. Figure 4.5 illustrates the general trend in adolescent fertility rates across Southeast Asia.

Fig. 4.5
figure 5

Adolescent fertility rates (births per 1000 women aged 15–19) in Southeast Asia, 1960–2015. Source World Bank database on Gender Statistics accessed on 26 October 2016

We observe dramatic declines in adolescent fertility rates in Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Singapore since the late 1960s. This decline was manifested two decades later in Lao PDR, even if its adolescent fertility rate remains the highest at 64.5 in 2014. Cambodia saw a similar decline since the 1980s. Indonesia experienced an impressive decline from 143 in 1960 to 48 in 2014. In Timor-Leste, the adolescent fertility rate rose from 51.8 in 1980 to 70.8 in 2000 reflecting the post-war baby boom and lack of contraceptives in the country. Even though the rate started to decline after 2000, it remains relatively high at 47.7 in 2014.

The sharpest decline in Singapore occurred between 1960 and 1980. The country has the lowest adolescent fertility rates in the region, which stood at 3.8 in 2014. It is also ranked 6th out of the top 10 countries or areas with the lowest adolescent birth rates (United Nations, 2015, p. 11).

Despite a decrease in overall adolescent fertility rates across Southeast Asia, several countries are experiencing a surprising increase in current adolescent fertility rates. In Vietnam, the adolescent fertility rate has more than doubled from 1975 (18.9) to 2014 (38.1). According to Nguyen et al. (2016), the rise in teenage pregnancy in Vietnam can be attributed to more teenagers having sex outside of marriage and at earlier ages, alongside rising occurrences of drug addiction, delinquency, and high-risk sexual behaviour that could potentially lead to HIV/AIDS (p. 5). These teenagers tend to live in rural, economically disadvantaged areas, and tend to have lower levels of education, no access to the Internet and/or sex education at school, depressive symptoms, and live in families with a history of domestic violence (p. 11). Cultural norms may also play a significant role, such as the normative expectations of traditional ethnic minorities living in the mountains who may see little issue with marriage and pregnancy at a younger age, and increasing acceptance of premarital sex due to teenagers’ consumption of Western movies, news, music, and social media propagating Western sexual norms, for those who have access to it (p. 12).

While the number in the Philippines fell from 54.8 in 1975 to 49.8 in 1995, teenage pregnancy has steadily risen to 60.8 in 2014, marking an increase of more than 22% in the last 20 years or so. Its adolescent fertility rate is also currently the second highest in the region, after Lao PDR, which is experiencing a decline in its numbers. Although early childbearing in both the Philippines and Vietnam is more prominent among those with elementary level schooling, those in rural areas, and those with poorer socioeconomic status, Natividad (2014) highlighted that recent upsurges in early childbearing in the Philippines are especially pronounced among those in urban areas (62.5% increase from 1993 to 2008) and those with a college education (290% increase from 1993 to 2008). She suggested that the rising proportion of urban, better educated teenage mothers from the middle to highest socioeconomic groups may have stemmed from widespread premarital sexual activity at an early age—a finding supported by the country’s high prevalence of consensual unions, which range from 7.6% for 15–19-year olds to 23% for 20–24-year olds (see Fig. 3.4a).

The numbers for Cambodia and Thailand reached their lowest point in 2005, before slowly increasing by about 5.5–7.5% in 2014. Despite being one of the SEA countries with the lowest adolescent fertility rates, Malaysia’s adolescent fertility rate has recently increased to 13.4 in 2014.

5 Childlessness

Figure 4.6 illustrates available data on childlessness as reported among women aged 40–44 years old.

Fig. 4.6
figure 6

Childlessness among women aged 40–44, years 2000, 2010. Source UNSD Demographic Statistics accessed on 2 November 2016. Notes (a) 2000 data for Lao PDR refer to 1995, for Cambodia to 1998, for Vietnam to 1999, and for Timor-Leste to 2004. 2010 data for Cambodia refer to 2008, and for Vietnam to 2009. Data for all other years refer to the actual year indicated in the chart; (b) Data for Thailand (2000) and Vietnam (2010) is based on provisional figures from census data; (c) No available data for Brunei, Lao PDR (2010), Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines (2010), and Timor-Leste (2010)

Singapore stands out as the only country with exponential growth in childlessness among women aged 40–44—from 6.9% in 2000 to 23.2% in 2010, signifying a 337% increase within a decade. This coheres with findings from the UNPD which revealed that Singapore has the highest level of childlessness among women aged 40–44 in low-fertility countries across the world (United Nations, 2014, p. 13). Although the numbers do not distinguish involuntary from voluntary childlessness, a 2008 study highlighting that Singaporean women aged 40–45 report the lowest mean ideal number of children (2.3) among their age and gender cohorts may point towards the prevalence of the latter (Call et al., 2008, p. 101).

Thailand has the second-highest childlessness rate at 11.4% in 2010. Interestingly, the percentage of childless women within the same age group has decreased from 14.8% in 2000 to 11.4% by 2010. Thus, despite the country’s falling TFR, women continue to give birth to children, a finding which is also supported by their decreasing mean age of childbearing. In all other countries, the prevalence is lower than 10%. The percentage of childless women within the 40–44 years old-age group in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam has remained relatively unchanged from 2000 to 2010.

Figure 4.7 depicts “definitive childlessness” as reported among women aged 45–49, where they have reached the end of their reproductive period. Definitive childlessness mirrors the trends of childlessness for women aged 40–44 as discussed in the preceding section. Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam’s definitive childlessness have remained relatively unchanged from 2000 to 2010, while in Thailand, the percentages have fallen from 13.63% in 2000 to 10.17% in 2010. Again, Singapore’s rate of childless women aged 45–49 has increased rapidly within the same period to 20%.

Fig. 4.7
figure 7

Definitive childlessness among women in Southeast Asia aged 45–49 (2000, 2010). Source UNSD Demographic Statistics accessed on 2 November 2016. Notes (a) 2000 data for Lao PDR refer to 1995, for Cambodia to 1998, for Vietnam to 1999, and for Timor-Leste to 2004. 2010 data for Cambodia refer to 2008, and for Vietnam to 2009. Data for all other years refer to the actual year indicated in the chart; (b) Data for Thailand (2000) and Vietnam (2010) is based on provisional figures from census data; (c) No available data for Brunei, Lao PDR (2010), Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines (2010), and Timor-Leste (2010)

Figure 4.8a shows a different view of the childlessness rate—the proportion of childlessness among women across birth cohorts as recorded in 2000. Data were only available for Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste. Childlessness rates in Thailand increased across the different birth cohorts from 5% among the 1926 birth cohort to 15% among the 1956 birth cohort. In Singapore, there was an initial decline in childlessness among those born in 1921 but rose slightly for cohorts born in the early 1930s and continue to increase to 6.9% for the 1956 cohort. Timor-Leste was an exception to this trend, with childlessness being the highest within Southeast Asia at 36.1% among cohorts born in the 1920s, and sharply decreasing among cohorts born in later periods to 12% among the cohort born in 1956. This may be due to a prevalent “post-genocidal” psychology wherein many believe that they have to replace lost family members with more children (Saikia, Dasvarma, & Wells-Brown, 2009).

Fig. 4.8
figure 8

a Childless women per birth cohort, recorded in 2000. Source UNSD Demographic Statistics accessed on 2 November 2016. Notes (a) Years indicated in the x-axis refer to those born within five years from the indicated year, e.g. 1926 refers to the cohort of women born between 1926 and 1930; (b) Data for Cambodia refer to 1998, for Timor-Leste to 2004; (c) Data for Thailand are based on provisional figures from census data; (d) Those under 1946 birth cohort in Cambodia refer to women listed as aged 50+ in the UNSD Demographic Statistics report; (e) Those under 1921 birth cohorts in Singapore and Timor-Leste refer to women listed as aged 75+ in the UNSD Demographic Statistics report. b Childless women per cohort in 2010. Source UNSD Demographic Statistics accessed on 2 November 2016. Notes (a) Years indicated in the x-axis refer to those born within five years from the indicated year, e.g. 1926 refers to the cohort of women born between 1926 and 1930; (b) Those under the 1936 birth cohort in Thailand refer to women listed as aged 70+ in the UNSD Demographic Statistics report

Fig. 4.9
figure 9

Ideal and actual fertility rates, 2000, 2014. Source World Bank Gender Statistics accessed on 26 October 2016 except for Singapore; data for Singapore from National Population and Talent Division (NPTD), Marriage and Population Survey 2012 accessed on 5 December 2016. Notes (a) 2000 data for Vietnam refer to 2002, for Indonesia and Philippines to 2003, for Singapore to 2004, and for Cambodia to 2005. 2014 data for Timor-Leste refer to 2010, for Indonesia and Singapore to 2012, and for the Philippines to 2013. Data for all other years refer to the actual year indicated in the chart; (b) Data not available for Brunei, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Timor-Leste (2000) and Vietnam (2014)

In comparison, Fig. 4.8b shows how the proportion of childlessness among women differs across countries and age cohorts, as recorded in 2010. The chart focuses on Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand as data were only available for these countries. For Singapore and Thailand, there is an increase among younger cohorts. The increase is particularly sharp for Singapore women born after 1941, from 9% to 23.2% among women born in 1966. Note that by 2010, the year of the report, the youngest cohort (born in 1966) in Fig. 4.8b would have been 44 years old, nearing the end of the conventional childbearing age. With almost one in four women at this age remained childless, this is among the highest childless rates observed in the world. The reverse trend is observed in Indonesia where the childlessness rate has declined across birth cohorts to 6.9% among women born in 1966.

6 Ideal and Actual Fertility Rates

The ideal fertility rate is based on the wanted fertility rate, which is an estimate of what the total fertility rate would be if all unwanted births were avoided. The actual fertility rate is based on the total fertility rate recorded in the same year when the ideal numbers of children were recorded.

Figure 4.9 compares the mean average personal ideal number of children with the actual fertility rate for Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam.

Based on the chart, we can see how observed total fertility rates are between 2 and 3 and they tend to be higher than ideal fertility rates (except for Singapore), a pattern that drastically contrasts with what has been observed in OECD countries. The difference between ideal and actual fertility rates tend to be around 0.2 to 0.5 child except for the Philippines where the differences were 1.1 and 0.8 children in 2000 and 2014 respectively which may reflect the restriction on contraceptives (See also David & Atun, 2014).

Overall, the ideal number of children in Timor-Leste is much higher than the numbers for other SEA countries—5.1 in 2000. This may be due to cultural beliefs among men in Timor-Leste where big families are desired. There is also the existence of a widespread norm that women need to “compensate” their bride price by bearing many children (Saikia et al., 2009). Additionally, the tradition of “assigning” children to the uma lisan or “Traditional/Cultural House” makes it culturally desirable for families to have more children to ensure the families’ ability to carry on their culture through future generations (Saikia et al., 2009). Accordingly, despite undergoing its first demographic transition with declining fertility rates, it is predicted that Timor-Leste will not experience drastic fertility decline due to the prevalent cultural preference for more children (Hosgelen & Saikia, 2016, p. 249).

Singapore is an outlier among SEA countries in that its actual observed total fertility rates were lower than the ideal fertility rates. A survey in 2012 shows that 80% of singles and 84% of married respondents were reported to desire two or more children, and both male and female respondents expressed an average ideal of 2.2 children (National Population & Talent Division, 2013), notably higher than the actual fertility rates in 2000 (1.4) and 2010 (1.15). Despite Singapore’s low-fertility levels, ideal family sizes have more or less remained similar from 2004 to 2012 (NPTD, 2013). With 80% of single female respondents desiring to be working mothers, and 77% of married female respondents desiring employment after having a child (NPTD, 2013), it is evident that issues related to “work–life balance”, such as job opportunity and family–work conflict, high cost and social pressure noted earlier remain significant constraints for Singaporeans to achieve their childbearing aspiration.