Climate action cannot be limited to government policies. If our economies ever become climate neutral, it will be because households and firms have innovated, invested and consumed in different ways than they currently do. This is the perspective of ‘subsidiarity’: the idea that responsibility is best laid at the lowest hierarchical level. Subsidiarity is a conviction that people thrive in an environment where there is a clear and simple relationship between their own actions and the results of those actions.
The principle is mentioned as such in the Treaty on European Union (1992) and extended in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) to be used in the assessment of legislative proposals. In this form, subsidiarity is a bulwark against instrumentalism and an overbearing bureaucracy.
A good distribution of responsibilities leads to economic efficiency. Efficiency means that we reduce greenhouse gases at the lowest cost possible. It is a necessary condition for a sustainable economic model for which moral convictions are, by themselves, not enough. As Bowles and Carlin (2020) write: “Successful policy paradigms combine a set of ethical values with a model of how the economy works, a property of which is that the pursuit of those ethical values contributes to the performance of the economy as represented in the model.”
There is also an existential reason for devolving responsibilities: a sustained effort to better the world needs ample room for joy, curiosity and cooperation. Joy is the expression of doing something that is worthwhile and that draws on our abilities to overcome hurdles, to work together with other people. In this cooperation, we learn from each other, experience human relationships, mutual help, reciprocity and love. It is a necessary ingredient of meaningful life and it comes to us when there is room for initiative and freedom. Without it, climate change action risks becoming a joyless and bureaucratic affair.
In this section, I describe the lessons from the following chapters as follows: Firms and households alike would benefit from easier-to-access facts about carbon prices and the value of their contribution. For companies to take on their own responsibility, taxation could evolve to be more friendly to a circular form of production. Financial markets should price the risks of unsustainable business practices correctly. And countries could muster the national pride and sense of direction by formulating difficult technical challenges as ‘Apollo projects’.
An Arbiter of Facts as a Form of Climate Policy
Households and firms have a hard time gauging the realities of climate change and their role in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. Large firms in Europe have the emissions trading scheme (ETS), the rest of us have nothing. That is, we might receive well-intended communication about subsidy schemes, energy savings plans and the possibilities of investing in clean energy. But what we – the public – lack is a clear quantification of the size of the contribution that is needed.
As Von Storch writes in his contribution, most of the middle class is keen on acting against the potentially catastrophic effects of climate change. However, it lacks trustworthy estimates of the size of the challenge, and the role it can play in it. To stimulate political responsibility and accountability, the public needs cost-benefit analyses of climate policies, both in terms of money and of emissions.
Possibilities for a Green Corporate Tax
The legal structure of the corporation is a unique invention, as a place where people work together for a common goal. It brings together labour, capital and entrepreneurship in a way that is beneficial to all the partners. In his contribution, Jan Gooijer describes the reasons for corporate taxation, next to personal income taxes and value-added taxes. From the theory of taxation, a clear rationale emerges for basing some of the tax rules on the extent of circularity of the company.
Currently, corporate taxes do not discriminate on whether the firm pollutes, uses many or little resources, or performs any function in transitioning towards a more sustainable economy. Instead, they could better differentiate between business practices that are sustainable and those that are not. Criteria have been developed that are a good starting point for a ‘greener’ corporate tax. For large corporations, the relevant data is already in place by 2022. For smaller and medium-sized enterprises, practical solutions still have to be developed.
The Market Can Be Wrong: A Role for the Central Bank
The information problem about climate change cannot be solved by centralized planning. As Hayek (1945) points out in his famous essay The use of knowledge in society, there is simply not enough power of mind and coordination to understand and influence the actions and interactions of millions of people. It is the price mechanism that performs this role, almost magically, by letting the individual actions of consumers and producers be displayed in the prices of goods and services. This mechanism should and does work for the challenge of reducing greenhouse gases.
However, devolving responsibility to the market for assessing the seriousness of climate change or the shadow price of climate action has pitfalls. As Dirk Schoenmaker points out in his contribution, markets have been spectacularly wrong before. One only has to think of the statement of former Fed-governor, Alan Greenspan, to Congress, after the derivative market collapsed in 2008: “I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organisations, specifically banks and others, were such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms”(Clark & Treanor, 2008). And this meant that a theory was wrong that he had held dear for a long, namely that of efficient markets.
Markets could be wrong again, especially in how they value traditional, polluting businesses. Climate neutrality by 2050 requires that not all proven reserves of carbohydrates are mined. Investors, however, are still pricing in the value of proven reserves, see Livsey (2020).
Given the imperfections in how investors assess climate risks, and the potential tipping points in the climate, Schoenmaker argues for a larger role of the ECB. The ECB could incorporate a sustainable outlook in their operations, such as in a Green-QE program. This could be one way of influencing the markets and preventing an “I was wrong” statement by the then-ECB president in 2030.
For a good distribution of responsibilities, a clear mandate from the EU on this topic would be essential. Its current mandate is not sufficient to fully take on the responsibilities for a “Green QE” operation. Political action is required.
Apollo Projects as Stimulators of Innovation
The climate change challenge is in the gigaton-range. This scale of emission reductions is not in a range that is comprehensible by ordinary households or small and medium enterprises. This scale needs to be in proportion to the scale from which solutions can be expected. Energy savings plans and relying on current technology will just not do enough. What is needed are incentives, prizes or an appeal to national pride to develop breakthrough technologies.
The public is keen on acting against the potentially catastrophic effects of climate change. However, the effects of individual action, or even those of groups of people, can be very disappointing in terms of emissions reductions. This inconvenient fact is the starting point for the contribution of Hans von Storch. His contribution connects the goodwill of people and the thrill of exploration to what is needed for a long-term solution to halt or reverse anthropogenic climate change.
In this volume, Hans von Storch lists the breakthroughs that are not just nice-to-have, but essential and required for developed economies being net-carbon-neutral in 2050: cheap and high-capacity storage of electricity, sources of green energy, carbon capture and sequestration, emission-free ship propulsion. And so on. Von Storch calls these projects ‘Apollo projects’ that should appeal to national pride and to working towards something, not because it is easy, but because it is hard.
It is an appealing and joyful prospect to set high goals. It connects the goodwill of people and the thrill of exploration to what is needed for a long-term solution to halt or reverse anthropogenic climate change. It reminds us of the Ansari X Prize for incentivizing the creation of a reliable, reusable, privately financed, crewed spaceship. Innovation is helped by unleashing forms of competition, a variety of motivators and well-designed goals (Wagner, 2011). A similar momentous effort was the race to map the whole human genome in 2000, or the race to create a vaccine for the worldwide Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. In the latter case, a previously unheard of time of just 9 months, technology, entrepreneurship and politics came together to solve a global issue. This approach should inspire governments everywhere to set ambitious goals for technological breakthroughs that are needed. It is also rooted in the normal inclinations of people to seek novelty, cooperation and marvel at new discoveries.