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Conceptualizing Enduring Gaps between Public Preferences and Institutional Designs

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Public Preferences and Institutional Designs

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Abstract

Golan-Nadir draws on the literature review for the study which is carried out in two sections. The first section provides an account of existing schools of thought, aiming to explain gaps between public preferences and institutional designs in a democratic setting. Focusing on the two schools, the chapter aims to establish that the existing literature falls short in accounting for the realities in the realm of marriage regulation in Israel and Turkey. The second section of the chapter offers a third innovative way to explain the endurance of disparities between popular preferences and official policies. Accordingly, it suggests that such disparities are the product of active institutional tactics operated by state institutions in order to repress public desire to translate its preferences into political action.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This demand led to the establishment of non-kosher supermarkets and delicatessens (the ‘Tiv-Taam’ chain of supermarkets) designed for and run by Russian-speaking immigrants.

  2. 2.

    U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom Annual Report, 2012.

  3. 3.

    When the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came to power, they aligned with the public protest and campaigned against any ban that would limit Islamic freedoms, and the hijab was at the top of that list. Turkey lifted the ban on the wearing of hijab on university campuses in 2010. In October 2013, another law allowed female civil servants to wear hijabs, while their male counterparts could sport beards. Yet, the ban remained in place for judges, prosecutors, police and military personnel. By 2016, the AKP government lifted the ban on hijab in the police and military forces as well.

  4. 4.

    With the publication of Theda Skocpol’s 1979 States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

  5. 5.

    The law requires at least some observant Ultra-Orthodox Haredi men to serve in the national army. According to the bill, the Conscription Law applied from 1 July 2017, when every Haredi man was required to report for the IDF recruitment process. Further, in a very debatable clause, those who failed to report for duty would be liable for criminal prosecution as draft-dodgers. MK Lapid threatened to bolt from the coalition unless the new draft law included criminal penalties.

  6. 6.

    The 2013 Gezi Park protests dealt with alcohol restrictions, among other issues.

  7. 7.

    In some instances, state institutions may be established in order to practice coercion. As Avner Greif (2008) describes, there are key roles played by two sets of institutions. First are “contract-enforcement institutions”, the complex set of institutions required for securing exchanges. “Contract-enforcement institutions” can be organic, private-order institutions that arise spontaneously from the pursuit of individual interests or designated private or public-order institutions that are intentionally created to secure contracts. Second are “coercion-constraining institutions”, rules that constrain those with coercive power from abusing the property rights of others.

  8. 8.

    Max Weber defined legal order as the order achieved, at least in part, by the probability that a “coercive apparatus” would be mobilized to impose a penalty, physical or psychological, in reaction to a norm violation simply because the norm is violated, and not to achieve any other material benefit. The “coercive apparatus” is understood by Weber as “one or more persons whose special task it is to hold themselves ready to apply specially provided means of coercion (legal coercion ) for the purposes of norm enforcement” (Weber, 1978, p. 313).

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    Niva Golan-Nadir

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Golan-Nadir, N. (2022). Conceptualizing Enduring Gaps between Public Preferences and Institutional Designs. In: Public Preferences and Institutional Designs. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84554-4_2

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