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Enduring Gaps between Public Preferences and Institutional Designs

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Public Preferences and Institutional Designs

Abstract

Golan-Nadir offers a summary of existing theoretical frameworks usually employed in order to analyze enduring gaps between public preferences and institutional designs in democratic settings. This chapter, Enduring Gaps between public preferences and Institutional Designs, highlights the contribution of the study, namely suggesting a third way to study such gaps as portrayed in the Model of Sustaining Institutional Designs. The model sees disparities as the product of active tactics operated by state institutions in order to repress the translation of public preference into political action using pro-active practice of one or more tactics: Utilizing ‘Pressure Relief Valves’; Building Political Legitimacy; and Coercion through Sanction. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the importance of case selection for the study—comparing Israel and Turkey.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Legally, Israel is defined as a ‘Jewish and democratic state’. The ‘Jewish’ nature was first defined within the Declaration of Independence of 1948. The ‘Democratic’ character of the state was officially inserted in the amendment to the Basic Law: The Knesset, that was introduced in 1985.

  2. 2.

    Matters of personal conduct (marriage and divorce, conversions); mandatory bible education in the public system, and restriction on religious national holidays (selling bread “Chametz food” on Passover; drive or present food and beverages during Yom Kippur fast).

  3. 3.

    The time period for process tracing in both case studies begins with the critical juncture of state formation; in Israel (1948–2015) and in Turkey (1923–2015). Nevertheless, since this research studies democratic states, the examination of the interplay between public preferences and the institutional designs in Turkey begins in 1950. Only in that time Turkey has completed its transition to democracy. In that year, the secular Republican People’s Party, the only ruling party up until that year, lost the election to the Democrat Party (Arat, 2010; Güneş-Ayata, 2002). Importantly, in 1950 the technique of governmental elections was altered, yet institutions which were formed in 1923 remained intact. Therefore, though the examination of the Israeli timeline is consecutive, in Turkey there is a skip between the state institution’s formation (1923–1950) and the examination of institutions under a democratic regime (1950–2015).

  4. 4.

    When the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came to power, they aligned with the public protest and campaigned against any ban that would limit Islamic freedoms, and the hijab was at the top of that list. Turkey lifted the ban on the wearing of hijab on university campuses in 2010. In October 2013, another law allowed female civil servants to wear hijabs, while their male counterparts could sport beards. Yet, the ban remained in place for judges, prosecutors, police and military personnel. By 2016, the AKP government lifted the ban on hijab in the police and military forces as well.

  5. 5.

    In some instances, state institutions may be established in order to practice coercion. As Avner Greif (2008) describes, there are key roles played by two sets of institutions. First are “contract-enforcement institutions”, the complex set of institutions required for securing exchanges. “Contract-enforcement institutions” can be organic, private-order institutions that arise spontaneously from the pursuit of individual interests or designated private or public-order institutions that are intentionally created to secure contracts. Second are “coercion-constraining institutions”, rules that constrain those with coercive power from abusing the property rights of others.

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  1. Center for Policy Research, The University at Albany, SUNY, Albany, New York, USA

    Niva Golan-Nadir

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Golan-Nadir, N. (2022). Enduring Gaps between Public Preferences and Institutional Designs. In: Public Preferences and Institutional Designs. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84554-4_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84554-4_1

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