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Rethinking Expert Opinion Evidence as an Argument from Epistemic Authority

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Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory

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Abstract

In the modern age dominated by technical thinking and overabundance of information, judges, as never before, have become dependent on expert witness opinions without having necessary assessment tools at their disposal. Legal dogmatics, especially that of civil law procedure and penal law procedure, needs data feedback from argumentation theory to be used to augment and change the existing legal order concerning court expert institution, and to provide basis for developing techniques that could help lay people in the court environment in evaluation of experts and their opinions in a way inaccessible for legal dogmatics alone. On the other hand, it should be stressed that every theory of legal argumentation always has to take into consideration a given legal culture with its traditions, values, rules and legal science. The tools that are used to accomplish this are based on Douglas Walton’s logical argumentation, Bayesian probability and Bayesian belief networks. The author’s own way of combining Bayesian network with Walton’s critical questions method is viewed as a new tool that employs a questionnaire to gather data to be subsequently used in Bayes theorem calculations. The degree to which the argumentation theory tools prove to be useful depends on the amount of data gathered during the argumentation evaluation and the number of opportunities when dialectical critical testing can be performed.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Walton and Zhang (2013, 2016).

  2. 2.

    To compare with relation between legal discourse and culture See Zeidler (2011) pp. 156–157 and Zeidler (2020), pp. 135–148.

  3. 3.

    Walton and Zhang (2013).

  4. 4.

    Bocheński (1993); There is authority from fame (celebrity authority) or from reverence (like in Theodor’s Mommsen definition—less than an order more than a suggestion [Mommsen 1867]) among others.

  5. 5.

    Bocheński (1993).

  6. 6.

    Ibidem, p. 243.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Walton (1997), pp. 82–83: “being in a position to know”.

  8. 8.

    Ibidem, p. 102.

  9. 9.

    Walton (2013).

  10. 10.

    Most commonly used critical questions by Douglas Walton, e.g. Walton (1997, 2013, 2016).

  11. 11.

    Walton (2016).

  12. 12.

    Hahn and Hornikx (2016), p. 1837.

  13. 13.

    Goodwin (2011); Ciurria and Altamimi (2014).

  14. 14.

    See Walton (1997) p. 258.

  15. 15.

    Hahn and Hornikx (2016), p. 1837; Bustamante and Dahlman (2015).

  16. 16.

    Harris et al. (2016), p. 1502.

  17. 17.

    Godden and Zenker (2016).

  18. 18.

    Dalhman et al. (2015).

  19. 19.

    See below.

  20. 20.

    This is a radical simplification of the Bayesian network topic in context of expert opinion, for topic expansion and proper definition of Bayesian networks cf.: Hahn and Oaksford (2006); Hahn et al. (2013); Hahn and Hornikx (2016); Harris et al. (2016); Jaynes (1986).

  21. 21.

    At least in the Polish law. See Dzierżanowska and Studzińska (2019).

  22. 22.

    Ibidem, Zenker (2012); Olson (2002); Bench-Capon (2002); Fenton et al. (2013); Fenton and Neil (2000).

  23. 23.

    Harris et al. (2016), p. 1504.

  24. 24.

    Cf. Walton and Zhang (2013), pp. 1–2.

  25. 25.

    Walton and Zhang (2016), pp. 64–68.

  26. 26.

    Walton (2013); Walton and Zhang (2016), pp. 66–68; Walton Zhang (2013).

  27. 27.

    See Dzierżanowska and Studzińska (2019).

  28. 28.

    In Polish legal system See Dzierżanowska and Studzińska (2019).

  29. 29.

    Understood in this instance as a fallacious use of an argument form expert authority based on abuse of authority to deflect critical questioning.

  30. 30.

    Cf. Walton (1997), pp. 259–261.

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Pretkiel, B. (2021). Rethinking Expert Opinion Evidence as an Argument from Epistemic Authority. In: Klappstein, V., Dybowski, M. (eds) Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 138. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83841-6_9

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