Abstract
This article aims to show how knowledge about facts is decisive in the judicial review. In order to do this, it uses the category of legislative facts as a more forward looking approach when compared to the traditional doctrine on evidence which privileges the areas of civil and common law by focusing on what happened in the past. It also works with the judicial review’s premise that there must be a correspondence between the facts underlying the constitutional norm, the statutes and the precedents—derivative norms. There are two consequences to this: the proof of the facts serves as a justification for the restriction of freedom and as a limit to the legislator’s will. Thus, it can be concluded that the standards of proof in constitutional law can guarantee legitimacy on judicial review.
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Notes
- 1.
“[…] no court can undertake to decide upon the validity of legislation by a mere comparison of its provisions with those of the applicable constitution, but it must first be informed as to the truth of some question of fact which the statute postulates or with reference to which it is to be applied; and the validity of the legislation depends on the conclusions reached by the court with reference to this question of fact.” Biklé (1924), p. 6.
- 2.
The summary of the case reads as follows: “Process of unconstitutionalization. Change on the facts that underlies the rule. Carcinogenic nature of chrysotile asbestos and the unfeasibility of its use in an effective way. Existence of alternative raw materials.”. ADI 3937/SP available on http://portal.stf.jus.br/processos/downloadPeca.asp?id=15339396406&ext=.pdf.
- 3.
Here it is worth drawing on the assertion by Wróblewski (2008), p. 260, in the sense that “the legal rule is a rule that determines the consequences that must follow certain facts!” (free translation from: “la norma jurídica es una regla que determina las consecuencias que deben seguir a ciertos hechos.”).
- 4.
In this paper we consider the existence of rules that derive from a Constitution, as explained by Robert Alexy. In cases of collision of principles, as occurs in the majority of the times in which fundamental rights are applied, balancing will show that in certain circumstances one principle will precede the other, generating a rule that functions as a base for deciding the specific case and for future cases. “Si el principio P1, bajo las circunstancias C, precede al principio P2: (P1 P P2) C, y si de P1 bajo las circunstancias C resulta la consecuencia R, entonces vale uma regla que contiene a C como supuesto de hecho y a R como consecuencia jurídica: C -> R.”. Alexy (1993), p. 94.
- 5.
According to Robert Alexy’s theory (1993), a constitution engenders derivative rules through a process of weighting principles that establish fundamental rights in the constitutional text. Drawing on arguments of fact in favor of the necessity and adequacy of a certain measure, and arguments of principles, of legal nature, that guarantee the proportionality stricto sensu, a norm can be extracted to justify a certain decision holding both for a current issue and for future cases.
- 6.
As per Kelsen (1967), sanctions, the feature of coercion of legal rules, are the distinctive element on these rules.
- 7.
Robert Alexy (2014), in Formal Principles, develops the principle of proportionality of second order, relating the distribution of legitimacy between legislative and judiciary branches to determine the validity of existing laws.
- 8.
Beltrán (2005), footnote 24 and 35, defines elements of judgment as “any descriptive factual wording from which inferences for the corroboration or refutation of the main hypothesis of the fact may be direct or indirectly obtained”.
- 9.
The logic of creation and interpretation of the rule follows the leveled structure of the legal system presented by Hans Kelsen in chpt V (The Dynamic Aspect of Law) in Pure Theory of Law.
- 10.
Precedent is here understood as a binding rule, and not as mere persuasion. Cf. Schauer (2009), chapter 3.
- 11.
The reasons that justify a particular case must be universalizable, that is, if in any specific case it is possible to assume, with good reasons, that X must take care of Y because X is the mother, then we can assume the same whenever the custody of a child is in question, although some exceptions may be considered, as long as they are also seen as universal. MacCormick (2005), pp. 88–89.
- 12.
This formalistic perspective favors the authoritative aspect for the benefit of the principle of legal certainty. Schauer (2009), chpt 3.
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Camargo, M.L. (2021). Constitutional Evidence. In: Klappstein, V., Dybowski, M. (eds) Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 138. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83841-6_13
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