Abstract
If we think that the point of a criminal trial is to arrive at the truth regarding the guilt of the accused, then exclusionary rules are curious. Exclusionary rules prevent the triers of fact from having access to all of the relevant information, and thus, one may worry, exclusionary rules make errors in criminal trials more likely. Thus, it is often thought, if we are to justify exclusionary rules, we must do so on moral grounds rather thanĀ for epistemic reasons. In this essay, I argue that we can justify exclusionary rules on epistemic grounds, and in fact, sound epistemic practices often require us to exclude relevant information from consideration both inside and outside the courtroom.
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Notes
- 1.
For an excellent summary of the case see Grann (2009).
- 2.
Beyler (2009), p. 51.
- 3.
- 4.
Clark (1961).
- 5.
- 6.
Bentham (1843) Vol 6, chapter 9.
- 7.
See for example, Powell (1981)
- 8.
For an interesting discussion of the differences here see Leiter (1997).
- 9.
Laudan (2006), pp. 17ā18.
- 10.
Laudan (2006), p. 18. My emphasis.
- 11.
Laudan (2006), p. 121.
- 12.
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
- 13.
Laudan (2006), p. 175.
- 14.
Laudan (2006), p. 122.
- 15.
Leo and Ofshe (1998), pp. 449ā450.
- 16.
Warden and Drizin (2009), pp. 415ā427.
- 17.
Leo and Ofshe (1998), p. 450.
- 18.
The Innocence Project (2019).
- 19.
Indeed, the number may be much higher. Social scientists argue that 2ā8% of the 2.2 million people in prison have accepted plea bargains despite the fact that they are innocent. Rakoffās numbers are based on a more modest estimate of 1%. See Rakoff (2014).
- 20.
Kassin (2012), p. 434.
- 21.
Costanzo et al. (2010), p. 238.
- 22.
Harris (2012), pp. 44ā45.
- 23.
Frazier v. Cupp, 393 U.S. 732 (1969).
- 24.
Harris (2012), p. 45.
- 25.
Starr (2013).
- 26.
Laudan (2006), p. 229.
- 27.
Laudan (2006), p. 120.
- 28.
This is not entirely correct. Judges are asked to make judgments about both the relevance and the reliability of expert witnesses. This is how it should be. We should work to ensure that judges consider excluding more forensic āscienceā because of its unreliability. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
- 29.
- 30.
Harris (2012), p. 27.
- 31.
- 32.
- 33.
Ahlstrom-Vij argues just such a thing, what he calls ameliorative epistemology, (2013), pp. 137ā179.
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Harris, J.R. (2021). An Epistemic Defense of Exclusionary Rules in the Criminal Justice System. In: Klappstein, V., Dybowski, M. (eds) Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 138. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83841-6_12
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