Abstract
There is a moral significance to transferring human likeness to a sex robot. Once the robot has been crafted with a human likeness, the representational contents of human-robot sex must be understood as the same as sex with a human. As a result, sex with a child-like sex robot, for example, is a representation of sex with an underage child. Sex with a robot modelled on a particular person is a representation of sex with that person objectified. Human likeness plays a pivotal role in these representations. From a Confucian perspective, I argue that making sex robots in our own human image is an ethically fraught undertaking because it shows disrespect for the humanity it signifies. Confucius once roundly condemned the introduction of tomb figurines that showed a high degree of verisimilitude of humans on the grounds that the use of such figurines in burial is disrespectful of humanity. Respect for humanity and the principle of reciprocation in human relationships are characteristic features of Confucianism; human relationships have been a central concern in Confucianism since its inception. I argue that human relationships may be severely strained by human-robot sex as it may foster sexual objectification and reinforce any tendency among the users to develop asymmetrical relationships. Humanoid sex robots are closely reminiscent of humans and this characteristic is morally significant; we cannot treat them like mere things and it is not desirable simply to “do to robots what we wish” because of the negative impact on human relationships and that such moral self-cultivation might have. These moral implications of transferring human likeness to sex robots should not go unquestioned. Stakeholders in the design, production, and use of sex robots should pause to consider the moral significance and implications of human likeness.
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Notes
- 1.
Non-human forms may be preferable for robot fetishists who are sexually attracted to non-human-shaped robots. However, it is beyond the scope of this discussion to determine whether sex with a robot without human form is free of moral problems.
- 2.
The survey respondents were asked to answer the question “Should a robot with the form of a human child be allowed?” on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 defined as “completely inappropriate” and 7 as “completely appropriate”. The mean score for this question was 1.89 across all respondents. It was 2.04 for male respondents and 1.7 for female respondents. By contrast, the mean score for the question “Should a robot with the form of an adult human be allowed” was 5.92 (6.47 for male subjects and 5.19 for female subjects) (Scheutz and Arnold 2016, p. 356).
- 3.
I believe that the use of childlike sex robots in the treatment of paedophilia is wrong because of its expressive value, i.e., that it represents the use of children for sexual gratification, regardless of whether such so-called therapeutic uses can keep paedophiles from preying on children. See my arguments in Sect. 7.3.
- 4.
Whether the rape of robots will cause the rape of women remains controversial (see, e.g., Sparrow 2017) . In any case, I contest the “catharsis” theory of sexual fantasy which suggests that acting out rape fantasy with sex robot can help to lower the incidence of real rape.
- 5.
Frank and Nyholm (2017) provide an interesting discussion on sex robot and consent.
- 6.
Other views on humanoid robots include that they are the “subhuman other”, the “sentient other”, the “divine other” and the “co-evolutionary path to immortality”.
- 7.
- 8.
The Classic of Filial Piety (Xiao Jing) IX: “The disciple Zeng said, ‘I venture to ask whether in the virtue of the sages there was not something greater than filial piety.’ The Master replied, ‘Of all (creatures with their different) natures produced by Heaven and Earth, man is the noblest. In filial piety there is nothing greater than the reverential awe of one’s father’” (translation by James Legge).
- 9.
The other moral sprouts are the feelings of shame and dislike (i.e., righteousness) deference and compliance (i.e., propriety) right and wrong (i.e., wisdom). According to Mencius, humans have these four virtues in the same way as they have four limbs.
- 10.
To explain filial piety to a student, Confucius says, “When your parents are alive, comply with the rites in serving them; when they die, comply with the rites in burying them; comply with the rules in sacrificing to them” (Analects 2.5, translated by Lau 1979).
- 11.
Benevolence can be achieved by subduing one’s self and returning to propriety. As Confucius explains, “Do not look unless it is in accordance with the rites; do not listen unless it is in accordance with the rites; do not speak unless it is in accordance with the rites; do not move unless it is in accordance with the rites” (Analects 12.1; translation by Lau).
Confucius draws attention to the effects of rituals on the character in Analects 8.8 (“It is by the rules of propriety that the character is established”) and Analects 20.3 (“Without an acquaintance with the rules of propriety, it is impossible for the character to be established”) (my translation).
- 12.
In the Book of Rites (Liji) 2B.155, Confucius also mentions that the vessels made for the dead should look real enough in appearance and yet should not be able to be put to real use. Burying the dead with the vessels of the living is inappropriate as this could lead to the interment of the living with the dead. Confucius points out that the principles underlying the mourning rites require a clear distinction to be made between vessels for the dead and vessels for the living.
- 13.
“The disciple Zeng said, ‘I venture to ask whether in the virtue of the sages there was not something greater than filial piety.’ The Master replied, ‘Of all (creatures with their different) natures produced by Heaven and Earth, man is the noblest’” (The Classic of Filial Piety (Xiao Jing) IX, translation by Legge) .
- 14.
If robotic child sexual abuse is immoral should it be criminalized? Danaher (2017) offers some tentative arguments for criminalization.
- 15.
According to the neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming (1472–1529), “having no depraved thoughts” encapsulates the essence of the Six Classics of Confucianism: the Book of Odes (Shijing), the Book of Documents (Shujing), the Book of Rites (Lijing), I Ching, the Classic of Music (Yuejing) and, Spring and Autumn Annals. For Wang Yangming, “having no depraved thoughts” is the first and foremost step towards moral self-cultivation in everyday life (Wang Yangming, Chuan Xi Lu or Instructions for Practical Living 2015, p. 249).
- 16.
The Analects 15.24: “Tzu-kung asked, ‘Is there a single word which can be a guide to conduce throughout one’s life?’ The Master said, ‘It is perhaps the word shu (reciprocity or consideration of others). Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire’” (translation by Lau).
- 17.
The subjects also expected sex robots to “respond to touch” (64%) and “move by itself” (79%). But these attributes raise no additional moral issues (Scheutz and Arnold 2016).
- 18.
Assuming “a naive correspondence account of representation”, Sparrow insists that “even in the case where a robot fetishist is sexually attracted to a woman-shaped robot qua woman-shaped robot, sex with the robot will represent and refer to sex with a woman” (Sparrow 2017, pp. 471–472).
- 19.
Sparrow believes that there is a limit on what one can claim about the representational contents of one’s own actions and the consensus of the larger community would trump the individual’s claim.
- 20.
Nussbaum identifies the following seven modes of thinglike treatment of persons:
-
(1)
Instrumentality: The objectifier treats the object as a tool of his or her purposes.
-
(2)
Denial of autonomy: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in autonomy and self-determination.
-
(3)
Inertness: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and perhaps also in activity.
-
(4)
Fungibility: The objectifier treats the other as interchangeable (a) with other objects of the same type, and/or (b) with objects of other types.
-
(5)
Violability: The objectifier teats the object as lacking in boundary-integrity, as something that it is permissible to break up, smash, break into (1995).
-
(6)
Ownership: The objectifier treats the object as something that is owned by another, can be bought or sold, etc.
-
(7)
Denial of subjectivity: The objectifier treats the object as something whose experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account (Nussbaum 1995, p. 257).
-
(1)
- 21.
Papadaki (2012) takes issue with Nussbaum and argues that instrumentality should not be thought of as more problematic.
- 22.
The Analects 12.2: “Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire” (translation by Lau).
- 23.
The Book of Rites (Liji): The State of Equilibrium and Harmony (Zhong Yong) 13: “When one cultivates to the utmost the principles of his nature, and exercises them on the principle of reciprocity, he is not far from the path. What you do not like when done to yourself, do not do to others.”
- 24.
See also The Analects 4:15.
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Yung, L.Y.Y. (2021). The Moral Significance of Human Likeness in Sex Robots: A Confucian Perspective. In: Fan, R., Cherry, M.J. (eds) Sex Robots. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82280-4_7
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