Abstract
The high bar that Aristotle sets for judicious deliberation creates difficulties for his political theory. If a judicious deliberator must be virtuous in order to be able understand the chief end for humans and to deliberate well (see above, Chap. 4), political deliberation faces severe challenges in most cities that do not have the requisite number of virtuous citizens. Worse still, no deliberation is possible without a common goal and most cities are divided between the rich and the poor with very different ideas of the goal of political activity. As with his other studies, other difficulties emerge from Aristotle’s survey of the reputable opinions (henceforth, RO), but these difficulties are not merely theoretical because some of the ROs surveyed represent firmly held opinions of political participants for which the judicious legislator needs to account. For example, in Politics 3, Aristotle considers the competing claims of the few or the many to rule. These represent the opinions held by the rich and the poor (Pol. 3.9, 1280a22–5) who are the key parts of most cities that the judicious legislator needs to accommodate to have any hope of attaining civil peace.
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Notes
- 1.
Robinson (1962, p. ix) expresses the common view that the Politics is not a united treatise: “The fact is, probably, that the Politics is a collection of long essays and brief jottings pretending to be a treatise.”
Lord (2013, p. xxv) and Simpson (1998, p. xvii) see the Politics as unified but do not explain its unity in terms of its central pros hen analogy.
- 2.
Jaeger (1948, p. 273) argues that books 2, 3, 7 & 8 of the Politics represent an earlier “utopian” approach and that books 4–6 are a later insertion of “purely empirical” material.
- 3.
For good reasons for skepticism regarding the developmental approach in Jaeger and in general, see Barnes (1995, pp. 16–22).
- 4.
Note that the sentences are not identical, which tells against a purely mechanical explanation such as Richard Kraut’s. Kraut (2002, pp. 188–9) argues that the last sentence of Book 3 enters from a shorter edition omitting books 4–6, so there is no need to change the order of the books. His hypothesis does not explain the verbal differences between the sentences.
- 5.
Simpson (1998, p. 194) tries to overcome the problem by reading it as a complete sentence, filling in an implicit reference to the preceding sentence, “Anyone, then, who is going to do this [namely, speak about the best regime] must conduct the examination that is proper to the subject.” Besides resulting in rather anodyne advice, the reconstruction does not work grammatically because Simpson has introduced two verbs (“do” & “conduct”) to complete the two auxiliaries (“going to” & “must”) in the sentence, where the Greek has only one verb poiēsasthai. Poiēsasthai is governed by mellonta leaving anagkē without a verb to govern.
- 6.
As Kraut (2002, pp. 185–6) notes, the Politics builds from the less to the more perfect.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
Ober (2005, p. 234) calls Aristotle’s ideal state an “aristocratic democracy.” Keyt (1991, p. 257, n. 43) claims, “‘the one constitution that is best’ is a genus whose species are absolute kingship and true aristocracy,” 257 n. 43. Keyt’s view is endorsed by Fred Miller, Jr. (1995, p. 193). Wilson (2011, p. 268) says the best regime is an aristocracy with features of a polity.
- 10.
- 11.
Contrary to Saxonhouse (1996, p. 130) who argues that Aristotle leaves behind the competing claims to rule to focus on the preservation of regimes. The two questions can hardly be separated. As Aristotle says, “It is difficult for a constitution to remain if it is founded on something other than justice” (Pol. 7.14, 1332b27–9).
The issue of just rule remains central throughout. Aristotle’s discussion of the preservation of regimes in Politics 5 prioritizes conflicting claims to just rule as being the universal cause of revolution (Pol. 5.2, 1302a23–4). He seeks to balance the conflicting claims in his discussion of the middle regime (Pol. 4.11, 1296a7–9) and returns to the question of just rule in Politics 7.14 (1332b27–38).
- 12.
The analysis here focuses on the outline of the questions in Politics 4.2. By contrast Frede (2005, p. 168) draws the main questions from Politics 4.1. She lists the best states as “the best state that one could wish or pray for;” the best ‘under given conditions;’ and the best “under special circumstances.” She omits the best state generally, which Aristotle mentions both in 4.1 (1288b33–5) and 4.2 (1289b14–17) and includes the best ex hupotheseōs, which is included in 4.1 (1288b28) but not in 4.2 and only briefly at the end of 4.11 (1296b9–10).
The list of questions in 4.2 better tracks with what follows in Politics 4 & 5, whereas the list in 4.1 is part of a more general discussion of the various senses of “the best” in the comparison between the legislator and the trainer.
- 13.
Contrary to Roochnik (2008, p. 714) who argues that in Politics 7, Aristotle defends contemplation as the best life. Illustrative of Roochnik’s approach, he argues that Politics 7.2 shows that the political life is not best, and therefore the theoretical life is (p. 723). This is a false dichotomy because it ignores the possibility of a complete life that includes both political activity and contemplation.
- 14.
- 15.
So also, Francisco Lisi (2014, p. 263).
- 16.
- 17.
Resolving the debate between the “inclusive” versus “dominant” interpretations of the human good would require a careful analysis of Nicomachean Ethics 10.7–8 and is beyond the scope of the present study. For our purposes, we are not assuming that the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics present identical views of happiness, so even if the Nicomachean Ethics teaches the dominant version of happiness, that does not mean that the Politics does. For the contrasting interpretations of happiness, see Hardie (1965, p. 279); see also Frede (2019, 484–8) who points out several incongruities between the discussion of happiness in Nicomachean Ethics 10.7–8 and the rest of the Nicomachean Ethics . This is a further indication that one cannot simply import a dominant interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics 10.7 into the reading of Politics 7, as Lord and Roochnik do.
For a recent review of the literature on happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics , see Roche (2014).
- 18.
As Kraut (2002, p. 225) indicates, inferences can also be drawn from his discussions from earlier books of the Politics.
- 19.
See also, Schütrumpf (2005, 110, n. 5) for a discussion of Aristotle’s refined definition of aristocracy.
- 20.
- 21.
Pellegrin (1996, p. 349) argues that the CP is “prepolitical” because it does not determine a constitutional form. Pellegrin ignores the fact that all the elderly participate in a deliberative assembly, see above.
- 22.
Aristotle never precisely defines what he means by the middle class.
According to Woods (2014, p. 411) it is the hoplites.
However, the best indication occurs in 6.5, 1320a32–b1, quoted and discussed below, in which he recommends moving citizens out of poverty by making them economically independent.
This is consistent with several studies. Markle (1985, p. 268, n. 7) notes, “The basic meaning of a-poros [i.e. poor] is ‘without sufficient property to serve the polis’.” Cf. Nagle (2006).
See also, Ober (1991, p. 119) who identifies the middle with those with sufficient means “to avoid the necessity of manual labor.”
- 23.
Frank (2005, p. 164) argues that the middle polity is no more achievable than the CP because in most cities there are few in the middle class. This certainly reflects Aristotle’s view of the state of most cities (Pol. 4.11, 1296a23–4), but ignores the steps that Aristotle says a legislator should take to grow the middle class, see below.
- 24.
- 25.
Miller (1995, p. 255).
- 26.
Miller (1995, p. 268) argues that the arguments for the virtue of the middle class are “unsubstantiated.” It is better to look at his arguments as not meant to establish the virtue of the middle class in a general sense, but to argue that their experience in ruling and being ruled prepares them to be good citizens.
- 27.
In Eudemian Ethics 7.4, Aristotle does discuss the friendship between non-equals, but denies that the pair are friends (1239a4–5). They are not both friends because the relationship is one-sided and the inferior loves the superior, but not vice versa (6–8). In any case, political friendship is a friendship of equals (Eth. Eud. 7.10, 1242b21–2).
- 28.
According to Bickford (1996, p. 410), “Deliberation is a practice that can enable citizens who do not perceive themselves to have substantive common interests, and are not bound by friendship, to interact politically.” This is contrary to Aristotle’s theory of deliberation, which requires a shared end (see above, Chap. 4). Deliberation is not an alternative to political friendship as Bickford claims. Political friendship serves as the basis for political deliberation in the middle polity because the mutual recognition of ends in political friendship supplies the common ends needed for political deliberation. Alternatively, the poor and rich can be numerically balanced in the deliberative body (Pol. 4.14, 1298b25–6), but as will be seen below, such a balance is inherently unstable.
Yack (1993, p. 238) suggests that Aristotle expects the middle class “to be much more open to recognizing the relevance of both egalitarian and inegalitarian principles of justice.” However, Aristotle never says as much. Instead, he emphasizes that they do not have so little as to desire the property of others (1295b29–30). This is an economic consideration, not relying on the ability of the middle class to consider principles of justice or to place themselves in the minds of others.
- 29.
Yack (1993, p. 114) understands political friendship is a friendship of utility. So also, Mayhew (1997, pp. 79–82); Leontsini (2013, p. 26); Jenkins (1999, pp. 468–9); Miller (1995, pp.135–6).
By contrast, Schollmeier (1994, pp. 83–4) takes it to be virtue-based friendship. So also, Kronman (1979, p. 129).
Alternatively, Yack (1999) classifies political friendship as a combination of a friendship of utility and a friendship of virtue.
- 30.
- 31.
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Hubler, J.N. (2021). Aristotle’s Model Polities. In: Overcoming Uncertainty in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82091-6_5
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