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Artificial Agents and Their Moral Nature

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Ethics, Governance, and Policies in Artificial Intelligence

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 144))

Abstract

Artificial agents, particularly but not only those in the infosphere Floridi (Information—a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010a), extend the class of entities that can be involved in moral situations, for they can be correctly interpreted as entities that can perform actions with good or evil impact (moral agents). In this chapter, I clarify the concepts of agent and of artificial agent and then distinguish between issues concerning their moral behaviour vs. issues concerning their responsibility. The conclusion is that there is substantial and important scope, particularly in information ethics, for the concept of moral artificial agents not necessarily exhibiting free will, mental states or responsibility. This complements the more traditional approach, which considers whether artificial agents may have mental states, feelings, emotions and so forth. By focussing directly on “mind-less morality”, one is able to by-pass such question as well as other difficulties arising in Artificial Intelligence, in order to tackle some vital issues in contexts where artificial agents are increasingly part of the everyday environment (Floridi L, Metaphilos 39(4/5): 651–655, 2008a).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For an excellent introduction see Jamieson (2008)

  2. 2.

    See for example Bedau (1996) for a discussion of alternatives to necessary-and-sufficient definitions in the case of life.

  3. 3.

    It is interesting to speculate on the mechanism by which that list is maintained. Perhaps by a human agent; perhaps by an AA composed of several people (a committee); or perhaps by a software agent.

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Acknowledgement

This contribution is based on Floridi and Sanders (2004), Floridi (2008a, 2010a). I am grateful to Jeff Sanders for his permission to use our work.

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  1. Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

    Luciano Floridi

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  1. Luciano Floridi
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Correspondence to Luciano Floridi .

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  1. Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

    Luciano Floridi

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Floridi, L. (2021). Artificial Agents and Their Moral Nature. In: Floridi, L. (eds) Ethics, Governance, and Policies in Artificial Intelligence. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 144. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81907-1_12

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