Keywords

Land Tenure Security and Armed Conflict: Before, During, After

Land tenure insecurity has a deeply intertwined and fraught relationship with armed conflict. Because the exercise of both land rights and civil conflict are spatial endeavors and are fundamentally about the relationships between people(s) with regard to land and territory, the interaction between the two is complex, nuanced, highly variable, and not easily separated. This is particularly the case when extreme and sufficiently widespread tenure insecurity in society is a fundamental reason for conflict to begin with. There are a variety of pathways from acute tenure insecurity to conflict, and from conflict to forms of intensified tenure insecurity. However, there are also opportunities for tenure security improvements subsequent to armed conflict to make real contributions to sustainability and durable peace. This chapter reviews some of these pathways and uses the case of Afghanistan for illustration.

While there are a variety of factors that can be part of a tenure insecurity contribution to periods of armed conflict (resource scarcity; poor land access; governance, rule of law, and political problems; identity; geography; history; ethnicity; and grievance), many countries are able to establish laws and institutions broadly seen as legitimate and fair in order to manage these. However, countries affected or threatened by such factors that also lack the political and institutional capacity to resolve the resulting land rights problems can find that their existing civil institutions cannot endure the stresses of large-scale unresolved land problems in society. This is especially the case where rural land rights are a fundamental unresolved problem in society. In such scenarios, tenure insecurity for significant segments of a national population can lead to an accumulation of confrontational ways to dealing with land rights problems which emerge from an increasingly divided society. The result is a build-up of competition, inequity, confrontation, grievance, resentment, and animosity, with no legitimate, fair way to manage all of these through a country’s legal and institutional systems. In these cases, alternative informal institutions and approaches (such as resistance, insurgent, warlord, or mafia forms of land tenure, or extremist approaches involving land rights) can emerge from the absence of effective, legal institutions. These alternatives are able to operate within the fluidity, confrontation, and grievances of land crisis-ridden settings. Such crisis-based alternative informal institutions, which often belong to specific segments within a population, usually do not function in a fair and equitable manner in the context of broader society, and so ideally need to be replaced or reworked. But because such crisis situations are very different from land tenure situations in stable, adequately functioning, peaceful settings, solutions to such situations are also different. What may work well in stable, peaceful settings have proven extremely difficult to implement and operate in societies affected by pervasive, severe, unresolved land rights problems. In such difficult contexts, different interventions are needed in order to be able to (1) work within a conflict-prone setting; (2) meet short-term land rights security needs; (3) use land rights as a tool in recovery or improvement; and (4) transition to more stable and conventional land rights arrangements. This chapter considers the role of large-scale insecure land rights situations with regard to how these are both problems for conflict-affected countries but with significant lessons learned for sustainability. Subsequent to a review of tenure insecurity as a contributor to armed conflict, and the forms of tenure insecurity that then emerge from conflicts, the chapter looks at certain opportunities for post-war land tenure security in recovery and sustainability and concludes with a look at Afghanistan as an example of tenure insecurity as a contributor to armed conflict and as a lesson for the management of tenure issues subsequent to conflict.

From Tenure Insecurity to Armed Conflict

The importance of land rights issues as a contributor to civil conflict is reflected in the significant role that agrarian reform has played in many insurgent and revolutionary agendas. While there are several pathways from land rights problems to widespread tenure insecurity to armed conflict, they usually coalesce around pre-conflict perceptions of the ‘unjustness’ in the way the state deals with land rights for specific segments of a population. Left unattended, this then constitutes an important aggregate force in the deterioration of tenure security and the reduction of state legitimacy prior to the onset of conflict. Such perceptions can range from simple disappointment in, or distrust of the state and its ability, willingness, or bias in handling land issues, to the perception of the state as the enemy. The latter can be especially powerful if there are land-related grievances against the state brought on by specific issues that fuel tenure insecurity: land alienation and discrimination, legalized forms of eviction, land confiscations and speculation, crowding, corruption in court proceedings and court access, state intervention in agricultural production, dislocating agricultural and/or population programs, and heavy-handed approaches to enforcement of state decisions and prescriptions regarding land issues. Such dysfunctional statutory land tenure systems can be rife with micro-level generic disputes that do not get resolved and are often highly discriminatory. At times they can become, as in the Balkans, formal policy in support of ethnic cleansing (Toal & Dahlman, 2011). In Liberia prior to the war, the statutory tenure system generated an accumulation of rural underclass land-related grievances that resulted in a crisis of agrarian institutions, while at the same time poor governance precluded the peaceful derivation of legitimate alternatives (Sawyer, 2005). The result was the production of deep animosities regarding land that were a primary cause of the war (Richards, 2005). In El Salvador, grievances toward the landed elite and the state were at the core of the country’s problems since the colonial era, and a primary cause of the conflict in the 1980s (de Bremond, 2007). This was also the case in Zimbabwe’s liberation war due to land expropriations by the Rhodesian state (Mutasa, 2015), and in Mozambique’s RENAMO war and Ethiopia’s Derg war as a result of government villagization programs (Norfolk & Liversage, 2003; Wubne, 1991). Variants of such conditions also prevail for problems in southern Mexico, and in the way the land issue has been handled over the course of the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis (Unruh, 2002; Cohen, 1993). Such perceived injustices resulting in widespread tenure insecurity can become especially problematic if they merge with other issues involving the state not necessarily related to land, serving to further decrease the state’s legitimacy. This was a fundamental part of the situation in Somalia, where disputes over access to grazing and water resources quickly merged with a history of perceived wrongs done by the state to certain clans and sub-clans on issues not directly about land (Besteman & Cassanelli, 1996). Animosities toward the state that become tied to historical events also have played a fundamental role in perceptions about who has legitimate access to what lands in the Balkans (Toal & Dahlman, 2011). In some scenarios, the accumulation of land-related grievances, combined with the lack of legitimate and workable alternatives, can lead to a search for order. Such was the case with the eventual emergence of Shari’a courts in Somalia, and, arguably, the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were able to field their own mechanisms of enforcement for a variety of institutions, including those managing land rights (Unruh, 2002).

For many who find themselves in worsening tenure security scenarios, identity can be, or can quickly become, intricately bound up in land occupation, access, or perceived rights to specific lands in very powerful ways. The existence of ethnic, religious, geographic, or other identities to which primary attachments persist can be based on connections to land, home area, or territory, with worsening tenure security in such a context then contributing significantly to animosity, and the development of narratives of grievance (Abdul-Jalil & Unruh, 2013). With armed conflict developing in such a context, some groups will seize the opportunity to advance the goals of substate self-determination, especially with regard to land and territorial rights. And as the identities of those involved in narratives of grievance develop to take on significant enmity with opposing groups (including the state), approaches to land issues will reflect this and can become a prominent feature in the conflict and subsequent peace process. In such a scenario approaches to land employed by one group in a conflict can be purposefully rejected by another. The difference between Palestinian and Israeli approaches to land and land tenure is in a number of ways grounded in identity. Identity for Palestinians especially has developed to a significant degree to mean opposition to Israel, Israelis, and Israel’s approach to land administration (Unruh, 2002). Sri Lanka provides an example where land rights problems attached to identity were a primary cause of what became a 30-year war (Fonseka & Raheem, 2011; CPA, 2016). In Sri Lanka, long-standing grievances, discontent, and perceptions of government discrimination in land rights hardened along ethnic lines prior to the conflict (Yusuf, 2017; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2005). Even years after the war ended in 2009, ‘[l]and is a key issue for reconciliation in Sri Lanka’ (CPA, 2016).

From Conflict to Tenure Insecurity

The ongoing disintegration of land rights institutions during armed conflict, and yet the importance of land, homeland, and territory to the cause and conduct of conflict present particular dilemmas once hostilities cease. Like the complex histories involving land and territory that lead to conflict scenarios, the post-war re-establishment of ownership, use, and access rights will likewise be complicated and problematic. Left unattended, land and property issues can provide significant potential for renewed confrontation (Vines, 1996; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1995; Crocker & Hampson, 1996). An end to armed conflict, especially prolonged civil conflict, creates a situation whereby a significant proportion of the affected population will begin to claim, re-claim, or access lands and land-based resources. The result is that land rights issues can be thrust to centerstage over large geographic areas in a short period of time for considerable numbers of people.

Significant change in tenure rights and security can occur during armed conflict and it is the outcome of these changes which are most operative at the close of a war. While such change can build upon prewar tenure problems, they nonetheless act to thrust the post-war land rights situation in new directions. Civil conflict necessarily results in a reduction in the power and penetration of state law, with the overall effect spatially variable. Early in a war, the state’s land and property administration institutions in affected areas of the country can be damaged, destroyed, or rendered crippled or inoperable, and rules unenforceable—particularly if they were weak and/or linked to prewar grievances to begin with. This comes about due to general human insecurity; areas occupied by opposition groups or populations sympathetic to them; diversion of resources; departure of personnel who worked in service provision; and the destruction of the physical components of the lands system such as buildings, survey and demarcation equipment, boundary markers, local registries, and other records. In East Timor, the land and property buildings were among the first destroyed by militia activity along with most property rights records (Marquardt et al., 2002). As civil conflict grew in Somalia in the early 1990s, a reduced state capacity contributed to certain areas of the country being claimed by nomadic pastoralists under clan transient-access rights arrangements, by small-scale agriculturalists, by large-scale land interests accessing lands through the instruments of the crumbling state, and by heavily armed interests seeking access and control over lands by force (Besteman & Cassanelli, 1996). As well, forms of land tenure may be created which are directly connected to the opposition or insurgency which is made legitimate by direct military occupation and military strength (e.g., Vines, 1996).

Apart from the destruction of state capacity in land rights administration, armed conflict alters the system of rights and obligations in human relationships about land, with the result being that accepted and established rights arrangements can be at the forefront of change during conflict. The social and spatial repercussions of violence, dislocation, property destruction, battlefield victory and loss, and food insecurity, together with the breakdown of land-related norms, significantly alter ongoing relationships between people(s), land uses, production systems, and population patterns. In essence, armed conflict and its repercussions reconfigure the network of social relations upon which land tenure systems depend. For example, physical separation of people from established home areas and ways of land use and tenure due to wartime dislocation can be the first and most dramatic step toward the development of a changed approach to land rights. Physical separation from one’s land changes, terminates, or puts on hold prevailing rights and obligations among people regarding land, especially where actual occupation or social position forms the basis or a significant aspect of claim. The result can be landholders abandoning the features of tenure systems because disputes and the lack of legitimate ways to resolve them have made such features unworkable. Or they believe there is little point in adhering to land rights rules that others are not following. And because those dislocated by war often develop or deepen political awareness while away from home areas, land problems in a post-war phase can easily be placed within the animosities of the larger political dynamic, further complicating the recovery of tenure systems (Alexander, 1992).

Claims to land and hence tenure security for societies emerging from armed conflict usually experience a significant ‘proving’ or evidence problem—particularly for returning dislocated populations. The issue of proving rights to post-war land claims in a way that is legitimate to claimants, authority structures (state and customary), and potential counter-claims becomes quite important subsequent to conflict, with direct repercussions on tenure security. While it can be assumed that evidence for claims must have effective dispute resolution institutions in place in order to be effective and provide for some form of tenure security, this is actually not the case in many instances where land administrative capacity is lacking. Where effective, legitimate institutions are lacking, the use of certain forms of landscape-based evidence (‘facts on the ground’) can emerge and be particularly strong in post-war scenarios in order to attempt to maintain or enhance tenure security. Especially valuable are ‘facts on the ground’ that connect with both customary and statutory definitions of claim, such as concepts of ‘occupation’ (Unruh, 2006). Clearing land is widespread as a means of creating visible evidence of occupation and thus claim in situations where institutions for adjudication are lacking, weak, or one-sided. This practice is of great concern for sustainability. Deforestation as a form of creating ‘facts on the ground’ evidence is widespread because it is so effective. Thus, the more lacking or compromised local to national institutions are for adequately dealing with evidence (claim, dispute resolution), the greater the tenure security need will be to make a strong visible argument for claim, in order to pre-empt the likelihood of a counter-claim and therefore the need for an institution to resolve a dispute (Unruh, 2006).

Opportunities for Post-war Land Tenure Security and Sustainability

Despite the problems with tenure insecurity prior to, during, and after a war, there do exist opportunities for addressing tenure security and its contribution to sustainability subsequent to armed conflict. In general, these can be grouped into opportunities that pertain to statutory land rights systems, customary rights systems, and how these interact.

Tenure Security Opportunities in Statutory Tenure Systems

Within the statutory system of a country emerging from armed conflict, in many cases land-related laws must undergo some form of reform in order to address post-war land rights concerns that cause ongoing acute tenure insecurity. There are two reasons for this. First, as noted, problematic land laws often contribute to the onset of a crisis, and so need to be reformed. Second, even well-functioning and fair land laws are usually not able to handle the particular problems that a country in crisis presents, such that existing laws often need to be amended or put on hold, and new laws enacted. There are three primary reform responses to land problems connected to the statutory system: (1) broad national land policy reform, (2) legal actions aimed at specific problems, and (3) institutional reform. Land policy reform seeks a broad, national-level improvement in tenure security and includes a broad-based process of consultation with affected communities and sectors (villagers, ex-combatants, refugees, commercial interests, government, etc.). The process is usually supported by a consortium of donors together with a government who does not have the capacity to undertake such an endeavor itself. Land policy reform after conflicts is an involved process, needing a good deal of capacity building, coordination, political will, donor involvement, money, and often a good deal of time.

Legal actions aimed at specific tenure insecurity problems is a much quicker approach than land policy reform, and more easily achievable, albeit with less scope, and thus fewer people (nationally) are likely to experience enhanced tenure security. Specific legal actions which are able to attend to distinct land problems in a post-war context can be quite useful until a broader land policy reform can be considered. Examples of such legal actions include:

  1. 1.

    Legal decrees that focus on specific society-wide land issues and are quickly derived, disseminated, enforced, and then terminated when the objective is obtained. Decrees can be used to temporarily manage land speculation; evictions; confiscations; duress, coerced and bad faith sales and purchases; and to invalidate specific forms of claims that are proving destabilizing. Decrees and their effects are largely seen as temporary, to be replaced by more robust forms of law later.

  2. 2.

    Legal rulings that resolve specific but potentially volatile problems for certain post-war communities. Liberia’s experience with the problem of adverse possession (uncontested occupation for a period of time resulting in legal ownership) dealt with the question of whether or not the wartime and post-war periods should count as part of the period of ‘uncontested occupation’ needed for ownership claims via adverse possession. This affected large numbers of squatters in long-term occupation situations, but also returning commercial interests who had title to the same lands. In such a situation, if there is not a clear legal ruling on the issue, then powerful interests can seek to violently evict squatters who are claiming, or may be about to claim, ownership under adverse possession (Unruh, 2009).

  3. 3.

    Rendering legal decisions that affect or resolve an entire category of land and property claims and/or dispute problems. Both Liberia and Mozambique have had positive experiences with this strategy. The Sirleaf administration in Liberia cancelled all of the forestry concessions as a legal decision due to pervasive fraudulent acquisition and the profound tenure insecurity it caused (GOL, 2006). And Mozambique dealt with whole categories of problematic land claims issued before and after its war, involving (1) whether or not Portuguese colonists or their descendants would be able to return to claim lands, (2) the need for concession holders to reapply under new rules that included more adequate interaction with local communities, and (3) the cancellation of certain categories of concessions due to fraudulent acquisition (Norfolk & Liversage, 2003).

Institutional reform attends to the issue of violence being a too-ready alternative with which to pursue land (and other) issues because postwar state institutions are crippled, corrupt, not legitimate, or nonexistent. In such a situation, working to purposefully include customary institutions which are able to garner legitimacy from a local population into the recovering statutory legal system can be a positive step. At the same time, providing forms of state legitimacy to certain customary institutions can be a shortcut to setting up workable institutions (OAU-IBAR, 1999). Ethiopia has had particular success with this approach in its restive regions (Sugule & Walker, 1998).

Tenure Security Opportunities in Customary Tenure Systems

The practical reality in many situations of low government capacity in land administration after a crisis such as armed conflict will be that customary and other forms of informal tenure are often the prevailing system(s) for the majority of the population, and where a great many attachments to tenure security are made. In such a context, opportunities for improvements in tenure security include what should be avoided. State actors and the international community present in post-conflict countries would do well to not insist on or attempt to re-impose debilitated or corrupt statutory law arrangements onto situations where customary law is re-emerging, as tenure insecurity for those within customary tenure systems would see a marked decline. At the same time, attempting (except in highly abusive circumstances) to downgrade customary law so as to promote statutory law in practice as a form of recovery would likely be counterproductive to tenure security. Prewar statutory land laws that are quickly reimposed after crises and in degraded institutional situations often have little ability to be enforced, are very open to corruption and abuse, and in many cases will have contributed in some fashion to the cause of the crisis.

While the use of certain ‘facts on the ground’ noted earlier (e.g., clearing to claim) that detract from sustainability can surge after armed conflicts in attempts to gain greater tenure security, other customary facts on the ground are much more sustainable and can be useful for enhancing tenure security. Purposefully planted economic or ‘marker’ trees are a good example of this due to the very clear connections made between rightful occupants and the land upon which trees are planted. Such trees are notable for their pervasive role as legitimate evidence for claim within customary systems, and their strong connection with formal legal concepts of long-term occupation or presence. Using purposefully planted trees for land claim, demarcation, and enhancing tenure security is widespread, particularly in low-capacity institutional environments such as after a war. Recognizing such customary forms of evidence for claims in reforming statutory laws and institutions has proven useful in a number of cases (e.g., Vogt et al., 2006; Unruh, 2002, 2008). In such situations, it is not tree planting after a war that is seen as valuable, but rather the recognition of the owner and tenure security value of older trees planted well before the war and their utility in re-attaching people to landscapes.

Societies emerging from armed conflict are usually fractured into units of lineage; extended family; ethnicity; tribe; religious; geographic; or experienced-based groups such as refugees, ex-combatants, female head of household, and squatters. In this context, with state capacity low, the emergence of multiple ways of using group legitimacy and authority to secure access to rural lands is common (Unruh, 2003; Galanter, 1981). In such a scenario, previous experiences with what is called ‘forum shopping’ can be useful. Forum shopping occurs when individuals and communities choose and negotiate with each other regarding which fora to go to in order to resolve land rights problems—disputes, claims, restitution, squatting, eviction, and so on (Galanter, 1981; Lund, 1996). Where such ‘legal pluralism’ is present, there can be a variety of authorities, rules, and institutions to choose from, including forms of customary law, informal wartime norms, remnants of formal law, hybrids of these, as well as the perceived legal capacities and institutions associated with humanitarian organizations, donors, and NGOs. While messy, forum shopping can offer room for maneuver or negotiability, potentially reducing tenure insecurity and violence in a degraded state administrative situation in the near term (Galanter, 1981; Lund, 1996). Allowing and managing such forum shopping in recovery scenarios can buy time while other forms of land rights recovery take shape, and can provide important ingredients for what works.

Lessons Learned for Afghanistan

The case of Afghanistan demonstrates how intertwined land rights and tenure security are with armed conflict and recovery, with important lessons for donors and governments engaged in sustainable peacebuilding. Afghanistan illustrates the current approach to peacebuilding and reconstruction by the international community after conflicts, which is to focus on the large-scale building blocks of recovery separately. However, such building blocks are largely isolated from each other in their planning, analysis, implementation, and measures for success with regard to contributing to overall peace and recovery. In Afghanistan’s case, two of these building blocks—recovery of land rights and (re)construction of road infrastructure—are regarded separately as crucial to post-war recovery. However, how they interact has resulted in large-scale land grabbing, tenure insecurity, and obstacles to achieving durable peace (Unruh & Shalaby, 2012).

The reconstruction of road infrastructure, and in many cases its construction for the first time in war-torn countries, is thought to contribute, on its own, to peacebuilding and post-war recovery in very substantial ways. Road (re)construction is intended to facilitate trade and economic linkages, promote access to a wide variety of services, boost agricultural yields, bring rural areas into commercial interaction with the marketplace, provide security to rural communities, and contribute to the development of other sectors (JICA, 2006; JSCE, 2002; USAID, 2006, 2009). The realization of these benefits is understood to be crucial to economic and livelihood recovery and development, and hence the presumed winning of hearts and minds in unstable and volatile socio-political settings (JICA, 2004; Mockaitis, 2003; USAID, 2009). At the same time, the reconstitution of land and property rights systems in post-conflict scenarios is fundamental for the return of dislocated populations; restitution; improvements in tenure security; agricultural recovery and food security; broad economic recovery; and the ability to address volatile ethnic, tribal, and religious claims to lands (Bruch et al., 2009). The reconstitution of functioning land rights systems is also thought to contribute to the resolution of an array of problems recognized as important causes and catalysts for armed conflict—ethnic cleansing, evictions, retribution, inequality in land and property laws and legal systems that are non-inclusive or exploitive, and land-related grievances and animosities (Bruch et al., 2009; DW, 2005; Wiley, 2003).

Implemented in the same areas at the same time, these two priority components of peacebuilding do not however interact in planning, programming, implementation, or evaluation (JICA, 2006; JSCE, 2002; USAID, 2009). They do, however, interact quite robustly on the ground among recipient populations in an unplanned way, to produce very difficult outcomes, with some of these working significantly against sustainable recovery. A primary outcome of the interaction between road (re)construction and land tenure in the prevailing context in Afghanistan is a large surge in land grabbing—resulting in widespread and dramatic declines in tenure security. This occurs as the increases in land values brought on by road (re)construction occurs, within a context of a debilitated capacity of both customary and statutory tenure systems, increased ease of access to lands (via roads), flourishing corruption, and the absence of many landowners due to dislocation. Land grabbing in Afghanistan is so acute that it is thought to constitute a significant conflict-related flashpoint, able to push the country into renewed civil unrest (Batson, 2008; IWPR, 2008). Land grabbing by powerful interests, including government officials, militia commanders, former military commanders, and members of parliament is pervasive (Irvine, 2007). Of particular importance is the 3000 km ring road connecting Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and back to Kabul (Fig. 8.1). When completed it is estimated that 60 percent of Afghans (approximately 17 million people) will live within 50 km of this road (USAID, 2009). However, of the nine provinces where the percentages of government-seized agricultural land are the highest (Reydon, 2007), all reside along the ring road. Six of these provinces have had between 80 and 90 percent of their agricultural area subjected to land grabbing and three have had over 100 percent of the land grabbed (Baghlan province, 110 percent; Kandahar, 111 percent; and Logar, 190 percent) (Reydon, 2007), indicating that land is being grabbed, and then grabbed again.

Fig. 8.1
figure 1

Afghanistan’s donor-funded ring road, as part of the country-wide road reconstruction effort. Source: Unruh and Shalaby (2012)

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The resulting severe tenure insecurity brought on by land grabbing, along with the government’s institutional deficit, then strongly dissuades people from engaging in any services connected with the state land tenure system that should be used to enhance tenure security—laws, titles, inheritance procedures, the official land market, the recording of transactions, surveying, demarcation, and so on. Instead, these are all seen as ways that the officialdom comes to know about the location, size, and potential value of lands, and importantly, which land can be most easily seized. This then encourages a search by local inhabitants for alternatives to state institutions for forms of security of their lands which are able to resist or act against land grabbing brought on by road reconstruction and corruption. The Taliban are only too eager to provide such an alternative, especially as this often involves violent actions against state actors. The Taliban also provide disgruntled and disenfranchised villagers with weapons so they are able to react to land grabbing themselves (Sato, 2010). In fact, the Taliban have used widespread discontent with the land-grabbing problem specifically as a recruiting tool as resentment over the problem and desire for retribution and restitution of seized land and property grew after the war (Bowman, 2010).

What the Afghanistan case demonstrates for tenure security in recovery scenarios is that the sequencing of interventions is of utmost importance. In this case, the reconstruction of the land rights system—legal, technical, political—should have come before the implementation of road reconstruction efforts. Much greater attention could have been placed on capacity building for institutions, services, and rule of law, prior to road reconstruction efforts. An additional important lesson from the Afghanistan case is that, while it can be generally acknowledged that war-affected settings are very different from stable settings, exactly how this translates technically into implementation of the large building blocks in peacebuilding by the international community and governments needs to be thoroughly analyzed prior to implementation.

Conclusion

Tenure (in)security in countries threatened by, enduring, or recovering from civil conflict has great influence on the prospects for sustainability. War-torn, fragile, failed, and in-transition states have particular difficulty aligning tenure security with sustainability so that the two are mutually reinforcing. Instead, tenure insecurity aligns with a deterioration in livelihoods and land resource management, to draw communities into sometimes prolonged periods of fragmentation, narratives of grievance, and violent confrontation. Although daunting, there are approaches for the reorientation of tenure insecurity in such fraught settings toward greater security. And while this chapter mentions a just few of these, there are now a significant number of country experiences that are coming together to comprise best practices.