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Limiting Exposure by Hiding the Identity

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Abstract

This chapter examines PETs that limit exposure by hiding the user’s identity information. As examples of this category, the following PETs are described: mix networks; anonymous remailers; and onion routing networks. For each of these examples, the original scheme is given, enhancements made over the years are presented, and strengths and limitations of the technology are discussed.

Keywords

  • Mix network
  • Anonymous remailer
  • Cipherpunk remailer
  • Mixmaster
  • Mixminion
  • Onion routing network
  • Tor

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Adams, C. (2021). Limiting Exposure by Hiding the Identity. In: Introduction to Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81043-6_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81043-6_3

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