Conclusion

Abstract

The drought was caused by three years of exceptionally low rainfall, with a combined return period estimated at 590 years translating to a probability of occurrence of less than 0.2%. The severity of the water shortage was intensified by the failure to adhere to the system operating rules, resulting in dam levels ending up significantly lower than should have been the case. Deterioration in relationships both within the Cape Town municipality as well as amongst the different spheres of government involved in water supply had a tangible negative impact on the drought response. Water was politicised to the extent that factual information was mostly ignored and drought interventions weaponised. For a period, Cape Town unwisely accepted responsibility for water supply beyond its legal mandate, thereby seemingly absolving national government, and then produced a remedial plan that was never workable. This resulted in an ill-afforded distraction. The message to the public was that the City had it in hand, while creating a flurry of activity tying up the municipality’s limited resources instead of adhering to practical time-tested drought management interventions. Eventually political conflict culminated in changed leadership of the drought management effort, allowing for a rational focus to be restored. In the end, the close-to-average rainfall experienced in 2018 saved the day by boosting dam storage levels to above three-quarters of capacity and provided the region with some respite to implement preparatory strategies prior to the next, inevitable drought.

Water sustains all

–Thales of Miletus